Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In three personal injury actions, the defendants required the plaintiffs to submit to a defense medical examination (DME). Plaintiffs, who had alleged cognitive limitations, psychological impairments, or language barriers, sought to record the examinations or to be accompanied by a third-party observer (TPO) at the examination. After various trial court rulings, the Appellate Division consolidated the cases for purposes of its opinion, and remanded all three for reconsideration in light of its six-part holding. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s core holding that trial courts determine on a case-by-case basis what conditions, if any, to place on a DME -- including who may attend and whether it may be recorded -- with no absolute prohibitions or entitlements. The Court further affirmed that video recording, in addition to audio recording, should be included in the range of options; that the parties shall enter into a protective order when a defense expert is concerned about the disclosure of proprietary information; that when third-party observation is permitted, the trial court shall impose reasonable conditions to prevent any disruption of or interference with the exam; and that, if a foreign or sign language interpreter is needed, a neutral interpreter shall be selected by the parties or, failing agreement, by the court. The Court departed from the Appellate Division only in declining to place the burden on the plaintiff to show special reasons why third-party observation or recording should be permitted in each case. Instead, once the defendant issues notice to the plaintiff of a Rule 4:19 exam, the plaintiff should inform the defendant if they seek to bring a neutral observer or unobtrusively record the examination. If the defendant objects, the two sides should meet and confer to attempt to reach agreement. If agreement is impossible, the defendant may move for a protective order under Rule 4:10-3 seeking to prevent the exam from being recorded, or to prevent a neutral third-party observer from attending. View "DiFiore v. Pezic; Deleon v. The Achilles Foot & Ankle Group; Remache-Robalino v. Boulos" on Justia Law

The Board of Education of the Borough of Somerville challenged the award of relief to former teacher Catherine Parsells in a tenure dispute. The Board employed Parsells as a full-time preschool teacher from September 2010 to June 2016. Parsells earned tenure in 2013. In May 2016, she wrote to the superintendent, expressing an interest in a temporary part-time preschool teaching position that included health benefits “for as long as [such a position] is available, or until my family decides that full-time work would be in our best interests again,” so that she could “pursu[e] [her] career goals while also being able to spend time with [her] son during his precious first few years.” Even though Parsells never formally applied for a part-time teaching job, and without addressing her assertion that she understood that her switch would be temporary, the superintendent notified Parsells that the Board approved her transfer from the full-time preschool teacher to the part-time position. Parsells began the 2016-17 school year as a part-time tenured teacher with health benefits. After requesting and receiving approval for maternity leave followed by a childcare leave of absence from February through June 2017, Parsells re-expressed interest in remaining a temporary part-time teacher for the 2017-18 school year. In an email to the school’s principal, the new superintendent noted that Parsells “was under the impression that she had the option of coming back full-time if she wanted to” and had “stated that if she had known all of this before changing to part-time, she would not have made the change.” Parsells returned to her part-time tenured teaching job in September 2018, but without health benefits. Parsells then applied for a full-time teaching position, and the Board rejected her applications, hiring non-tenured teachers from outside the district for some of those positions. Parsells filed a petition against the Board alleging it violated her tenure rights by hiring non-tenured teachers for the full-time positions to which she applied and that she had not voluntarily relinquished her tenure rights by moving temporarily to a part-time position. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined Parsells did not knowingly waive her tenured right to a full-time teaching position, and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision upholding the Commissioner’s award of “full back pay, benefits, and emoluments, less mitigation.” View "Parsells v. Borough of Somerville Board of Education" on Justia Law

In November 2013, plaintiff Philip Pantano, a mechanic employed by Container Services of New Jersey (CSNJ), was injured at work while attempting to move a heavy piece of industrial equipment. Lawrence Giamella, who was also working on the site that day, tried to help plaintiff move the equipment with a forklift; plaintiff’s foot was crushed in the process. Plaintiff collected workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, CSNJ. He and his wife also brought a personal injury action against numerous defendants, including Marine Transport, Inc. (MT). MT and CSNJ were related companies owned by the same person. The core of the parties’ dispute concerned which entity or entities employed Giamella at the time of the accident: MT, CSNJ, or both. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CSNJ because of the statutory bar established by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8. MT also moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not Giamella’s employer and was therefore not vicariously liable for his negligence. Although Giamella was on MT’s payroll, MT raised the affirmative defense that he was a “borrowed servant” or “special employee” working for CSNJ at the time of the accident, applying the multi-factor test set forth in Galvao v. G.R. Robert Construction Co., 179 N.J. 462 (2004). The pretrial judge denied MT’s motion. At the close of plaintiff’s case, MT moved for judgment pursuant to Rule 4:40-1, founded on the same borrowed-employee theory it had raised earlier in its summary judgment motion. The trial judge did not rule on the motion, reserving judgment for after the jury verdict. The jury awarded plaintiff damages for pain and suffering, lost wages, and loss of consortium. Pursuant to an agreement reached by counsel, the jury was asked to presume that MT was vicariously liable and was not asked to resolve the borrowed-employee question. Instead, counsel assented to have the court resolve the borrowed-employee argument through the mechanism of MT’s yet-to-be-decided Rule 4:40-1 motion. The trial judge vacated the verdict and awarded judgment to MT, concluding that Giamella was a borrowed employee working for CSNJ when the accident occurred. The Appellate Division reversed, vacated the directed verdict, and reinstated the jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pantano v. New York Shipping Association" on Justia Law

A jury found defendants Kenneth Daniels, Levell Burnett, and Barry Berry guilty of being leaders of a drug trafficking network, known in New Jersey as the “kingpin” offense. As to the four material elements of the kingpin offense, the jury asked whether it was “possible” to be a supervisor (the third element), but not to occupy a high-level position (the fourth element). The New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether the judge’s response to that question was error capable of producing an unjust result. The Court also considered the Appellate Division’s determinations that the trial judge should have modified element four of the model kingpin charge by adding language from New Jersey v. Alexander, 136 N.J. 563 (1994), to further explain what constituted a “high-level” member of a conspiracy and that the judge needed to tailor the kingpin charge to the evidential proofs admitted against each defendant, as well as its determination that Berry’s motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted. The Supreme Court held that judges are encouraged, when practical, to respond “yes” or “no” to unambiguous and specific questions posed by juries during deliberations. Without concluding he should have answered “yes,” the Appellate Division determined that the trial judge failed to adequately address the “fundamental import of the jury’s question.” It found that the trial judge should have modified element four of the model kingpin charge by adding language from Alexander, and it determined that the judge needed to tailor the kingpin charge to the evidential proofs admitted against each defendant. The Appellate Division therefore reversed the kingpin convictions as to defendants Kenneth Daniels and Levell Burnett. As to defendant Barry Berry, however, the appellate court reversed an order denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal and vacated his conviction. The Supreme Court held the trial court was under no obligation either to mold the charge sua sponte by factually addressing the varying levels of authority that each defendant played in the conspiracy or to modify the model charge by adding further definitional language from Alexander. And the Court concluded the trial judge properly denied Berry’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. The Court therefore affirmed as modified the Appellate Division’s judgment to vacate the kingpin convictions as to Daniels and Burnett; and it reversed the appellate court’s reversal of the trial judge’s denial of Berry’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. The case was remanded for a new trial against all defendants on the State’s kingpin charge. View "New Jersey v. Berry; Daniels; Burnett" on Justia Law

Defendants Jamire Williams and Tyshon Kelly, two males, had borrowed the car from its female owner. When they passed Police Officer Jeffrey Kless, who had been parked on the side of the road, Kless ran an mobile data terminal (MDT) query on the car. The results revealed a photo of and standard identifying information about the car’s registered owner, and that the registered owner had a suspended license. Kless pulled the car pulled over without incident. It was not until he arrived at the passenger-side window that Kless concluded the driver was not the owner. Believing that he might have smelled marijuana while standing there, despite a stuffy nose, Kless arranged with a backup officer, who had not smelled anything except air fresheners, to have a canine sniff the car. Prior to the sniff, Kless asked defendants to exit the vehicle. Williams stated that the officers would need consent from the vehicle’s owner to perform the sniff, but an officer on the scene responded, “We don’t need consent.” The dog uncovered the presence of marijuana. An on-the-spot search thereafter revealed a gun under the driver’s seat. Kless patted down defendants and placed them under arrest. Throughout the car search and pat down, Williams repeatedly protested to the officers about the search, including their lack of consent from the car owner. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence found in the car. The trial court denied the motions. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded an MDT query revealing that a vehicle’s owner has a suspended New Jersey driver’s license provides constitutionally valid reasonable suspicion authorizing the officer to stop the vehicle -- unless the officer pursuing the vehicle has a sufficient objective basis to believe that the driver does not resemble the owner. Based on the specific facts presented here, the initial stop of the vehicle was valid because it was based on reasonable suspicion. However, the Court found the detention of defendants and the borrowed car was unconstitutionally prolonged after the officer recognized the driver was not the car’s owner. The officer’s admittedly uncertain ability to tell if he smelled marijuana was inadequate evidence of “plain smell” to justify a continuation of the stop and a search of the vehicle. Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Williams" on Justia Law

In October 2018, Rutgers University Police were dispatched to a campus residence hall to investigate reports that a student, defendant Izaia Bullock, had threatened to harm his girlfriend’s parents. When Officer Peter Archibald arrived to speak to another student, he encountered defendant in the hallway of a campus residence hall. After a brief discussion, Officer Archibald escorted defendant out of the building into the adjacent courtyard where they were met by two additional uniformed, armed Rutgers Police officers. Before advising defendant of his Miranda rights, Officer Archibald asked defendant why the officers were there, and defendant stated that he made a statement about wanting to hurt someone, specifically “[m]y girlfriend and her family.” After defendant made that admission, Officer Archibald advised defendant that he was “not in trouble” and then recited a cursory version of the Miranda warnings to defendant. After being transported to police headquarters, detectives administered Miranda warnings and defendant signed a waiver form. Two Rutgers Police detectives subsequently conducted a video-taped interrogation. Prior to the interrogation, one of the detectives stated that she was aware defendant already spoke to the officers and stated, “[b]ut we just have to do it again.” Defendant made additional incriminating statements, including details of his plan to kill his girlfriend’s parents. Prior to trial, the trial court suppressed all of defendant’s statements, finding that he was in custody in the courtyard and should have been properly advised of his rights, which did not occur. The trial court also suppressed the statements defendant made at the police station because of improper administration and waiver of Miranda rights. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing with the trial court that defendant’s statements in the courtyard must be suppressed. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division and affirmed suppression of defendant's statements. View "New Jersey v. Bullock" on Justia Law

Dispatched to a residence where an axe murder had taken place, Detective Marchak learned that the victim and his stepson, defendant Joao Torres, were the only two people believed to have been in the house the previous night. In the bedroom, the mattress was soaked in blood and there was a significant amount of blood on the wall and ceiling. Within a few hours, officers located defendant, placed him under arrest on an outstanding warrant, and, at 3:55 p.m., placed him in a squad car to be transported to the police station. At the station, detectives interviewed defendant until he invoked his right to counsel. Defendant made incriminating admissions during the interview that provided probable cause to arrest him for murder. Defendant was ultimately charged in a twenty-count indictment with murder, disturbing human remains, and several other offenses. Defendant moved to suppress the warrantless seizure of his clothing. After a hearing, the judge denied the motion. Defendant entered a guilty plea. He then appealed, arguing that “the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the warrantless strip search.” The Appellate Division held that the search was not a strip search but remanded “for more explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law” to justify the warrantless seizure. On remand, the trial court issued an amplified written opinion holding that the seizure of defendant’s clothing was valid as a search incident to arrest under the totality of the circumstances. The Appellate Division affirmed. Finding no reversible error in the lower courts’ judgments, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Torres" on Justia Law

In July 2019, N.D. and her adult daughter and son appeared at the headquarters of the Borough of Highlands Police Department. They spoke with the two officers on duty that day, Captain George Roxby and Detective Nicholas Riker. N.D. told the officers that she and defendant Anthony Miranda had been dating since 2015, and that defendant had assaulted her. N.D. showed the officers photographs of injuries. She presented to the officers screenshots of threatening text messages that she attributed to defendant. N.D. reported that defendant had brandished two guns in front of her and her children. She said that defendant kept the guns in a “black drawstring-type bag” in the residential trailer in which she, her children, and defendant lived. The officers contacted a judge, who entered a temporary restraining order against defendant and a search warrant for the residential trailer where defendant and N.D. lived. Roxby and Riker arrived at the residential trailer and knocked on the door. Defendant answered, and Roxby arrested him. Roxby entered the residential trailer to execute the search warrant but found no weapons. N.D. indicated there was storage to the trailer; N.D. identified the black bag in which guns and ammunition were found. Defendant was indicted, and he moved to suppress the weapons found in the black bag in the storage trailer. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, concluding that N.D. had consented to the search of the storage trailer and the seizure of the weapons found in the black bag in that trailer, and that the black bag containing the weapons was in plain view. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined N.D. had apparent authority to consent to the officer’s search of the storage trailer. However, the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the officer’s search of the black bag or his seizure of the weapons in that bag, and the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress constituted error. View "New Jersey v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Altice USA, Inc. (Altice) challenged N.J.A.C. 14:18-3.8, a regulation requiring cable companies to refund or not charge customers who cancel cable service before the end of a billing cycle for cable service after the date of cancellation. Altice argued that N.J.A.C. 14:18-38’s proration requirement effectively regulated its “rates for the provision of cable service” and was therefore expressly preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(1) of the federal Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act). Assuming it was correct, Altice contended that once its customers sign up for a monthly plan, they had to pay for a full final month of cable service even if they terminate service before the month ends. Alternatively, Altice asserted that even if the consumer protection regulation is not preempted, the BPU expressly waived compliance with that requirement. The New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (the BPU) and Division of Rate Counsel disagreed, contending this consumer protection regulation was a valid exercise of the State’s police power, which they argued the Cable Act explicitly authorized. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that Section 543(a)(1) of the Cable Act did not preempt the proration requirement in N.J.A.C. 14:18-3.8. The Court found the regulation did not regulate “rates for the provision of cable service,” but rather prevents cable companies from charging for cable service that customers have cancelled. The regulation does not set the “rate” that companies can charge. It simply protects cable users from paying for service they no longer want. The Appellate Division's judgment to the contrary was reversed and the The BPU's cease-and-desist order was reinstated. The matter was remanded for the appellate court to decide Altice's remaining argument that the BPU failed to follow proper procedures in this enforcement action. View "In the Matter of the Alleged Failure of Altice USA, Inc., to Comply with Certain Provisions of the New Jersey Cable Television Act and the New Jersey Administrative Code" on Justia Law

Defendant Andre Higgs and Latrena May had a child together. Defendant and May had been arguing when East Orange Police Officer Kemon Lee approached them after hearing a woman’s voice shout “police” several times while he patrolled the area. Officer Lee testified that shortly after exiting his patrol car, he asked May to come down from the porch, but defendant began shooting May. Officer Lee returned fire and shot defendant several times. Defendant testified to a different version of events. Defendant stated that May pulled out a gun during their argument, and defendant took the gun away from her. According to defendant, he tried to surrender as Officer Lee approached, but the officer fired his weapon at defendant which led to the involuntary discharge of the gun in defendant’s hand, causing May’s death. Defendant was convicted of murder, among other offenses, and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence, finding no error with the trial court’s rulings. The Court granted certification on the three issues raised in defendant’s petition: (1) whether the trial court erred in not allowing defendant access to Officer Lee’s internal affairs records and not allowing defense counsel to cross-examine Officer Lee regarding his prior on-duty shootings; (2) whether it was error pursuant to N.J.R.E. 701 to allow the lay opinion testimony of Detective Green regarding the image on the dashcam video; and (3) whether defendant’s remote convictions were improperly admitted for impeachment purposes. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed on all three issues and remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Higgs" on Justia Law