Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant stated he could not perform field sobriety tests because of a handicap. After failed attempts, he was arrested. At headquarters officers read Miranda warnings and a standard statement that the law requires breath samples and that a separate summons will issue for refusal. The statement provides that any ambiguous or conditional response will be treated as a refusal; if a defendant remains silent or indicates that he has a right to remain silent, wishes to consult an attorney or other person, or if the response is ambiguous or conditional, the officer shall read an additional statement. The defendant consented and indicated that he understood instructions. He twice provided samples that were not of sufficient length or volume. An officer told defendant that if he did not give a long continuous breath, it would be considered a refusal. When defendant again failed, he was charged with violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. Law Division held that the officer was not required to read the additional statement; Appellate Division reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction. Defendant unequivocally consented to the test; his failures to provide the necessary volume and length of samples did not render his consent ambiguous or conditional. Defendant was not entitled to the additional statement.

Plaintiff Donald Sachau and Defendant Barbara Sachau were married in 1964, and divorced in 1979. At the time of their divorce, the partiesâ two children lived with Mrs. Sachau. Pursuant to the divorce judgment, Mr. Sachau was to pay his wife child support, and Mrs. Sachau would remain in the marital home until the youngest child reached age eighteen. At that time, the house would be appraised and listed for sale within 30 days of the childâs birthday. The proceeds from the sale would then be split according to the divorce judgment. In 1984, the youngest child turned eighteen, triggering the sale provision. For the next twenty-two years, neither party took action to enforce their rights under the judgment. Mrs. Sachau remained in the home, and in 1990, began making inconsistent payments to her husband. In 2005, Mr. Sachau was unable to support himself, and as a result, sought to enforce his rights under the 1979 divorce judgment. In 2006, he sued to compel the sale of the marital home. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge ruled that the marital home should be sold and that Mrs. Sachau should receive full credit for all the payments she made. Mrs. Sachau filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied and she was ordered to sign a listing agreement. Mrs. Sachau appealed, and the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Sachau appealed the trial courtâs evidentiary findings, but the appellate court adopted the trial courtâs findings. The Supreme Court found that the divorce judgment was silent on how the parties should value the marital home. The Court reversed the appellate court decision and remanded the case to the trial court for re-evaluation of its conclusions.

In 2001, Petitioner Police Officer Gregory Russo and his partner responded to a house fire. Officer Russo went into the burning structure, located an adult and two children trapped inside and saved them. The officer heard cries for help on the second floor, and went back inside to try to find more persons trapped by the fire. When inside, the intense heat and smoke overwhelmed him. Firefighters escorted the officer from the burning building, but not before the person who had cried out for help had died. Outside, the officer received first aid, and witnessed firefighters remove the victim from the burning building. Firefighters laid the victim’s body on the lawn in front of Officer Russo. The family blamed the officer for the victim’s death. The officer later reported he had trouble sleeping, stomach disorders, suicidal thoughts and depression. Eventually the officer would be diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Officer Russo applied for “accidental” disability retirement benefits in 2004. The Police & Fireman’s Retirement System Board of Trustees had an expert evaluate Officer Russo. He would be classified as “totally and permanently disabled” as a result of the fire in 2001. The Board, however, denied Officer Russo’s claim, and granted him an “ordinary” disability pension. The Officer appealed, and a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). While the ALJ’s decision was pending, the Supreme Court decided “Patterson v. Board of Trustees, State Police Retirement System,” which addressed the applicable standards to determining accidental disability pensions. The ALJ concluded that Officer Russo was eligible for an accidental disability pension. The Board adopted the ALJ’s findings, but rejected the decision. The appellate court upheld the Board’s conclusion that Officer Russo did not qualify for accidental disability benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the officer was improperly denied accidental disability benefits for his injury because both the Board and appellate court misapplied the standards set out in its decision in the “Patterson” case. The Court reversed the appeals court’s decision and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. View "Russo v. Bd. of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement Sys." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ming Yu He was in an automobile accident with Defendant Enilma Miller. A jury found Defendant was negligent, and awarded Plaintiff $1.7 million for pain, suffering, injury, and loss of consortium. Defendant moved for a new trial or remittitur. The trial court granted the remittitur and reduced the money award to approximately $1.5 million. The court concluded that Plaintiff did not appear to be affected by her injuries at trial, and because she decided against surgery on her spine, and she was still able to drive a motor vehicle, she was not as injured as the juryâs original award would suggest. The appellate court reversed the trial courtâs decision. The Supreme Court summarily reversed part and remanded part of the case to the trial court, ordering the trial court to perform a factual analysis of how the award in Plaintiffâs case compared to similar awards given in New Jersey. On remand, the trial court noted that it had never seen such high damages in similar cases, and that his observations of Plaintiff during trial supported the remittitur. The appellate court again reversed the trial courtâs decision, concluding that the record fell short of what remittitur required. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, and reversed, finding that the trial court provided a sufficient explanation for remititur and that the record supported its decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial courtâs remittitur.

Defendant R.T.âs nephew lived with him between 1997 and 2003. In 2004, the nephew told his mother that Defendant had sexually assaulted him multiple times. The mother reported the allegations. Defendant voluntarily presented himself to the prosecutorâs office, was advised of the allegations, received Miranda warnings, and waived his rights. During the audiotaping of his statement, Defendant denied the allegations. However, he âconfessedâ to having a drinking problem, and that if he had abused his nephew, it âprobablyâ would have been while he was intoxicated. Defendant was indicted on counts of aggravated sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant moved to suppress his statement, but the trial court denied his motion. Defendantâs confession and taped statement, and the nephewâs videotaped statement were admitted into evidence at trial. After the close of the case, the court called the parties together to discuss jury instructions. The judge asked about a âvoluntary intoxicationâ charge. Defense counsel objected, asserting that Defendant never used âvoluntary intoxicationâ as a defense, and didnât want that matter brought up for the jury to consider. The judge found that Defendant himself âopened the doorâ to the intoxication issue in his audiotaped confession. The court used the âvoluntary intoxicationâ instruction in its charge to the jury. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Defendant was sentenced to a 25-year custodial term. The appellate court was split in its decision, but reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The majority concluded that Defendantâs own statements in his audiotaped statement were too vague for a jury to conclude he intended his actions against his nephew. The court also noted that the jury instruction should be given over counselâs objection when the evidence deems it appropriate to do so. With the Supreme Court being equally divided as the appellate court, it affirmed the appellate courtâs decision to reverse the decision in the case and remand it for a new trial.