Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether plaintiff International Schools Services, Inc. (ISS) was properly denied a tax exemption for 2002 and 2003 under the state tax code. ISS has owned and occupied the West Windsor Township property at issue in this case since 1989. ISS is a nonprofit corporation and maintains a tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Service Code. Although West Windsor Township granted ISS a property tax exemption from 1990 through 2001 for the portions of ISS's property that it actually occupied, the exemption was denied for 2002 and 2003 based on the Township's review of ISS's activities. ISS appealed to the Tax Court which found that ISS had not satisfied the first prong of a three-part test (the "Paper Mill Playhouse" test) requiring that the entity seeking tax exemption be "organized exclusively for the moral and mental improvement of men, women, and children." The Appellate Division reversed that decision, and remanded for the Tax Court to address the remaining prongs of the test. On remand, the Tax Court held that ISS had not satisfied the second prong of the test because the schools, not ISS, were performing the activities sufficient for tax exemption, and ISS was merely assisting them. Focusing on the rates charged for rent to some of its for-profit affiliates, the Tax Court found also that ISS had not satisfied the third prong of the test. The Appellate Division disagreed with the Tax Court with regard to the second prong of the test, but found that ISS failed the third prong due to the subsidies it provided to its affiliates. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that West Windsor Township properly denied a property tax exemption to ISS for the tax years 2002 and 2003 because the commingling of its effort and entanglement of its activities and operations with its profit-making affiliates was significant and substantial, with the benefit in the form of direct and indirect subsidies flowing only one way-from ISS to the for-profit entities. View "International Schools Services, Inc. v. West Windsor Township" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs William and Vivian Allen contracted defendant V and A Brothers, Inc. (V&A) to landscape their property and build a retaining wall to enable the installation of a pool. At the time, V&A was wholly owned by two brothers, Defendants Vincent DiMeglio, who subsequently passed away, and Angelo DiMeglio. The corporation also had one full-time employee, Defendant Thomas Taylor. After V&A completed the work, Plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint naming both corporate and individual defendants. The first count was directed solely to V&A and alleged that the corporation breached its contract with Plaintiffs by improperly constructing the retaining wall and using inferior backfill material. The second count was directed to the corporation and Vincent's estate, Angelo, and Taylor individually, alleging three "Home Improvement Practices" violations of the state Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Before trial, the trial court granted the individual defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint against them, holding that the CFA did not create a direct cause of action against the individuals. Plaintiffs' remaining claims were tried and the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on all counts, awarding damages totaling $490,000. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's order dismissing the claims against the individual defendants under the CFA. The panel remanded the matter to determine whether any of the individual defendants had personally participated in the regulatory violations that formed the basis for Plaintiffs' CFA complaint. The panel precluded relitigation of the overall quantum of damages found by the jury in the trial against the corporate defendant. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that employees and officers of a corporation might be individually liable under the CFA for acts they undertake through the corporate entity. Furthermore, individual defendants are not collaterally estopped from relitigating the quantum of damages attributable to the CFA violations. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant DuPont Chambers Works (DuPont) manufactures chemical products, and employed Plaintiff John Seddon for approximately thirty years. In 2002, Mr. Seddon worked as an operator technician in one of DuPont's facilities. Among Mr. Seddon's duties was to ensure the safe operation of equipment and the safe handling of chemicals in the building. Mr. Seddon expressed concern over certain dangerous conditions he saw at the plant. When DuPont did nothing to ameliorate the situation, Mr. Seddon filed an OSHA complaint. From 2003 to 2005, Mr. Seddon alleged that DuPont retaliated against him for making the OSHA complaint by cutting his overtime, reducing his work hours, changing his shifts, and giving him poor performance evaluations. He filed suit against DuPont under the state Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA). A jury returned a verdict in Mr. Seddon's favor and awarded him over $2 million for wages lost as a result of DuPont's actions. The award also included punitive damages and attorney fees. DuPont appealed, and the appellate court reversed and entered judgment in favor of DuPont. The appellate court concluded that Mr. Seddon could not prevail on a lost-wage claim under the CEPA unless he proved "actual or constructive discharge," and vacated the $2 million damages award. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Seddon challenged the appellate court's holding that he had to prove "lost-wages" under CEPA. Upon consideration of the briefs and the applicable legal authorities, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Court found that lost wages are recoverable in a CEPA case, even in the absence of a "constructive discharge." The Court reinstated the jury verdict and damages award in favor of Mr. Seddon. View "Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether Defendant George Calleia's convictions were appropriately reversed because the State used the deceased victim's "state-of-mind" hearsay statements as evidence to suggest Defendant's motive. The victim in this case was Susan Calleia, Defendant's wife. Her body was found wrapped in a yoga mat in the cargo area of the family's SUV parked at an arts center two miles from their home. Mrs. Calleia was strangled to death. Before trial, the court denied Defendant's motion to preclude statements that Mrs. Calleia made to friends that she was unhappy, wanted a divorce, and was seeking a lawyer. The court found them admissible as "state-of-mind" evidence to show the nature of her relationship with Defendant and whether it had significance in establishing his motive to kill her. The court instructed the jury that Mrs. Calleia's statements could only be considered as her state of mind and plans, and as evidence of the nature of her and Defendant's relationship, but not towards his motive to kill her. The jury found Defendant guilty of murder, and sentenced him to fifty years in prison. On appeal, Defendant challenged the admission of his wife's "state of mind" statements. Upon consideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling in admitting the statements. "If a victim's state-of-mind hearsay statements are relevant to show the victim's conduct, and if such conduct also can give rise to motive when it is known or probably known to the defendant, then the statements are admissible" to establish motive. The Court held that any error in this case that stemmed from the admission was harmless. View "New Jersey v. Calleia" on Justia Law

A mother and her adult son were found dead and bound together in the son's home. Each had been killed by a gunshot wound to the back of the head, and the son's throat had been slashed. An investigation lead police to three suspects: Keith Mercer, Defendant Dwayne Gillispie and Defendant Gregory Buttler. Before trial, the State moved to introduce evidence that Gillispie and Buttler had participated in a robbery and shooting that took place in a New York barbershop twenty days before the murders. The trial court conducted a joint hearing to determine whether "other-crimes" evidence was admissible under state law. The court found the evidence was probative to identify who committed the murders. Although the court acknowledged the evidence was prejudicial, it concluded that the probative value outweighed the prejudice and admitted it. Gillispie and Buttler were tried separately, and separate juries found Gillispie and Buttler guilty on all charges against them. In an unpublished decision, the appellate court reversed the convictions and remanded the cases for new trials. The appellate court found that the other-crimes evidence was too prejudicial, and that the probative value did not outweigh the prejudice. Upon consideration of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, and affirmed its decision. The Court held that the admission of this evidence was harmless error that ultimately would not have affected the outcome of the trials. The Court remanded the cases back to the appellate panel for disposition of other issues unanswered due to its "new trial" order. View "New Jersey v. Gillispie" on Justia Law

Defendant Andrea Hernandez was arrested in 2006 in connection with a series of armed robberies. While in custody awaiting trial on robbery charges, in 2007, she was charged in another county for burglary and theft charges. She pled guilty and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for burglary which was to run concurrently to any sentence she received on robbery charges. With the burglary conviction, Ms. Hernandez was awarded 213 days of credit for the time she spent in jail awaiting trial. Ultimately, Ms. Hernandez pled to concurrent sentences of twenty years for the robbery charges. At the robbery sentencing hearing, Ms. Hernandez objected to the amount of credit she received for the burglary charges. She believed she should have received more credit. In 2006, Defendant Derrick Rose allegedly sold cocaine and heroin to an undercover officer. He was not arrested at the time. In 2007, Mr. Rose was arrested for theft, and charged with theft and the earlier drug charges. Mr. Rose pled guilty, and received two five-year sentences on the drug charges, and a four-year sentence for theft, all to run concurrently. Mr. Rose was awarded 357 days of credit for time spent in jail awaiting trial. On appeal, Mr. Rose argued that the allocation of his jail credit should have gone towards his longer sentences so as to improve his chances of being accepted into a drug treatment program. In both the Hernandez and Rose cases, the appellate courts affirmed the calculation of credit awarded. The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases, and reversed the trial courts' calculation of credit in both cases. The Court found that the lower courts misapplied the rule for calculating credit based on a defendant's time spent awaiting sentencing. The Court remanded both cases for reconsideration of jail credit. View "New Jersey v. Rose" on Justia Law

Peter Risko filed a wrongful death action against Defendant Thomson Muller Automotive Group. His wife Camille slipped and fell in the automobile showroom. Mr. Risko alleged that because of this fall, a chain reaction of injuries was set in motion that ultimately ended in her premature death. During his summation, Mr. Risko's attorney cited the Eighth Amendment, stating that "prisoners of war are not supposed to be tortured ... Camille went through torture and defendant has to pay for that." Counsel told the jury to report to the judge if any of them could not find for more than $1 million in damages because they would be "ignoring the law." The trial judge interrupted Plaintiff's counsel, held a sidebar, and stated that he was considering a mistrial because of the outlandish statements. The judge did not ask the attorneys to argue on whether to mistry the case, nor did defense counsel object to continuing the case. The jury returned a verdict against the dealership, and awarded $1.75 million in damages. The dealership then moved for a new trial, arguing that opposing counsel's summation tainted the verdict. The judge acknowledged that he should have given immediate cautionary instructions to the jury. He felt compelled to grant a new trial on all issues. The appellate court reversed the trial court's new trial order. The court noted that the trial court did not strike the offending remarks nor issue a curative instruction to the jury, and defense counsel did not request a mistrial or offer a corrective jury charge "which would be expected if they truly found the summation objectionable." The Supreme Court disagreed with the majority appellate opinion, and reversed its holding pertaining to the damages award. The Court held that a new trial on the damages issue was warranted based on the "cumulative effect of counsel's comments during summation." The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Risko v. Thompson Muller Automotive Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Zarik Rose was incarcerated in 1995 on charges relating to the to the attempted murder of Charles Mosely. While awaiting trial, Defendant allegedly told one of the State's witnesses against him that he wanted to have Mosely "whacked," and that Defendant solicited the witness to kill Mosely. The State moved to admit Defendant's comments at trial. The trial court found some of the evidence admissible as "res gestae." During the trial, the court provided instructions to guide the jury's use of that evidence. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that, among other things, all evidence relating to his incarceration on attempted murder charges was improperly admitted at trial. In this appeal, the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed Defendant's conviction, finding that the trial court appropriately instructed the jury on use of the admitted statements. However, by this case, the Court ended the practice of using "res gestae" as an explanation for the admission of evidence: "[e]vidence of uncharged misconduct that is not intrinsic evidence of the crime is inadmissible unless proffered for a proper purpose. ... The Court direct[ed] trial courts to make the Rules of Evidence the touchstone for the analysis of all bad acts categories of res gestae evidence, and disapproves further use of res gestae to support evidential rulings." View "New Jersey v. Rose" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Denise Perrelli appealed a trial court decision in favor of Defendants Bridget and Paul Pastorelle. Plaintiff believed the last time she sent her car insurance company a check for coverage was in 2005. She believed she had coverage on August 4, 2006, the day she got into an accident with Defendants. Geovanni Velverde, a friend, was driving at the time of the accident. He died of his injuries, and Plaintiff suffered serious injuries. Plaintiff sued Defendants alleging that her injuries were caused by Defendants' negligence. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that as an uninsured motorist, Plaintiff had no right to sue. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court found that under the state's "No Fault Act," a person injured while a passenger in her on uninsured vehicle was barred from suing for her injuries.

Plaintiff Frederick Voss was injured when his motorcycle collided with a vehicle operated by Defendant Kristoffe Tranquilino. Plaintiff alleged that prior to the accident, he was a dining at Tiffany's (a restaurant) and was negligently served alcoholic beverages that contributed to the accident and caused his injuries. Plaintiff was charged with DWI and subsequently pled guilty to the charge. Plaintiff sued Tiffany's. Tiffany's moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the state "Dram Shop Act" barred Plaintiff from bringing suit because he pled guilty to DWI. Tiffany's lost at trial, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, including the legislative history of the Dram Shop Act, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court, in quoting the appellate panel, found that "immunizing liquor licensees from liability in such circumstances would me inimical to the State's police of curbing drunk driving."