Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rodney Harper was shot to death in a Camden apartment early in the morning on January 1, 2003. James Womble was present when two men forcefully entered the apartment, seeking to collect money from Harper. Womble knew one of the men, co-defendant, George Clark, but the other man was a stranger. According to the State's evidence, Clark shot Harper while the stranger held a gun on Womble in a small, dark hallway. Thirteen days later, police showed Womble a photo array from which he identified Defendant Larry Henderson as the stranger. At trial, additional evidence relevant to Womble's identification was adduced. Neither Clark nor Defendant testified at trial. The primary evidence against Defendant was Womble's identification and a detective’s testimony about Defendant’s post-arrest statement. The jury acquitted Defendant of murder and aggravated manslaughter charges, and convicted him of reckless manslaughter, aggravated assault, and weapons charges. He was sentenced to an aggregate eleven-year term subject to a parole ineligibility period of almost six years. The Appellate Division reversed, presuming that the identification procedure in this case was impermissibly suggestive under the first prong of the "Manson/Madison" test. The court remanded for a new 'Wade' hearing to determine whether the identification was nonetheless reliable under the test's second prong. The panel contained its finding to what it considered to be a material breach of the Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the current legal standard for assessing eyewitness identification evidence must be revised because it does not offer an adequate measure for reliability; does not sufficiently deter inappropriate police conduct; and overstates the jury's ability to evaluate identification evidence. The Court held that Defendant was entitled to a new pretrial hearing, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Henderson" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was called to determine whether the heirs of an uninsured motorist killed in an automobile accident had a rightful claim under the Wrongful Death Act or whether N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) extinguished that claim, as it did the survival action. In 2005, Lawrence Aronberg was driving southbound on the New Jersey Turnpike when a tractor trailer careened into the rear of his car, killing him. The truck was operated by Wendell Tolbert and owned by Fleetwood Taggart (Fleetwood Trucking). On the day of the fatal accident, Aronberg, then thirty-four years old, was an uninsured motorist. Just three weeks earlier, Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company (Allstate) had cancelled Aronberg’s automobile insurance policy because of his failure to keep his premiums current. Plaintiff Sheila Aronberg, as General Administratrix of her son’s Estate, filed a survivorship and wrongful death action against defendants Tolbert and Fleetwood Trucking. The “Survivor’s Act” permits an appointed representative to file any personal cause of action that decedent could have brought had he lived. In contrast, the “Wrongful Death Act” provides to decedent’s heirs a right of recovery for pecuniary damages for their direct losses as a result of their relative’s death due to the tortious conduct of another. The trial court held that because the decedent did not carry insurance at the time of the accident, his estate could not recoup on its survival claim per N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a), but could recoup on the wrongful death action. The court found that the Wrongful Death Act granted heirs an independent right of recovery, regardless of the decedent’s failure to procure insurance. The Appellate Division granted defendants’ motion for leave to appeal and in a split decision affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held when an uninsured motorist’s cause of action is barred by the uninsured motorist statute, an heir has no right of recovery under the Wrongful Death Act. View "Aronberg v. Tolbert" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Blanca Gonzalez, and Monserate Diaz purchased a home as tenants in common. Diaz borrowed the downpayment from Cityscape Mortgage Corporation (Cityscape) and executed a note. Plaintiff did not sign the note. Plaintiff and Diaz secured that loan by mortgaging their home to Cityscape. Over time, Plaintiff fell behind on the payments and U.S. Bank obtained a foreclosure judgment. The trial court ordered that the home be sold to satisfy the judgment. Before the sheriff’s sale, Plaintiff entered into a written agreement with Defendant Wilshire Credit Corporation (Wilshire), U.S. Bank’s servicing agent. Plaintiff was represented by a Legal Services attorney who helped negotiate the agreement. Plaintiff missed four payments to Wilshire. A scheduled sheriff’s sale was cancelled when the parties entered into a second agreement. Plaintiff was contacted and dealt with directly; neither Wilshire nor U.S. Bank notified the Legal Services attorney. Although Plaintiff had not missed a single payment required by the second agreement, instead of dismissing the foreclosure action as promised, Wilshire sent a letter to Plaintiff noting that the second agreement was about to expire and that a new agreement needed to be negotiated to avoid foreclosure. Plaintiff contacted the Legal Services attorney. When the attorney questioned Wilshire, it could not explain how it had come to the arrears amount set in the second agreement, or why Plaintiff was not deemed current on the loan. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Wilshire and U.S. Bank engaged in deceptive and unconscionable practices in violation of the CFA. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Wilshire and U.S. Bank, finding that the CFA did not apply to post-judgment settlement agreements entered into to stave off a foreclosure sale. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated plaintiff’s CFA claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the post-foreclosure-judgment agreements in this case constituted stand-alone extensions of credit. In fashioning and collecting on such a loan, a lender or its servicing agent cannot use unconscionable practices in violation of the CFA. View "Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp." on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendants decided to purchase, renovate, and resell a home located in Medford Lakes. According to their plan, Defendants Christopher Masso and John Torrence would finance the purchase; Defendant James Githens would perform the renovations; and Defendant real estate agent Jennifer Lynch would serve as the listing agent. Plaintiff Debra Lombardi viewed the home and made an offer. The sales contract, which was signed by Masso and Torrence, indicated that the house was being sold to Lombardi “as is” and that any guarantees, unless set in writing, would be void. However, handwritten into the contract was a notation to “see construction addendum attached.” That addendum reflected at least seventy repairs and renovations. At the closing, the house was nowhere near completion. Masso agreed to place money in escrow to ensure completion of the renovations. The escrow was to be held until which time the renovations would be completed. Against her realtor’s advice, Lombardi went ahead with the closing. Thereafter, the house remained unfinished and Plaintiff filed suit. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendants, finding that Lombardi accepted the property “as is,” Defendants did not breach the contract, Defendants could not be held liable under the Consumer Fraud Act, and they made no misrepresentations. Later the trial judge would write a letter to the parties, including the dismissed defendants, informing them that he was going to reconsider his order granting summary judgment and was scheduling a new hearing on the issue. The judge ultimately vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Appellate Division granted defendants’ motion for leave to appeal, remanded to the trial court for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ultimately reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the Appellate Division correctly determined that the trial court’s original summary judgment order dismissing several of the defendants was issued in error, the trial judge was well within his discretion in revisiting and vacating the summary judgment order. View "Lombardi v. Masso" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether suggestive behavior by a private party, without any state action, should have been evaluated at a pretrial hearing to determine whether an eyewitness’ identification could have been admitted at trial. Defendant Cecelia Chen was indicted on charges of aggravated assault, armed robbery, and weapons offenses for her role in an attack on her ex-boyfriend’s wife. Nearly twenty-two months after the attack, police presented a photo array to the victim and an eyewitness for the first time. A detective testified that one of the reasons the police waited to show the photo array was out of concern that the website pictures might have prejudiced the victim. The victim and eyewitness separately selected Defendant’s picture. Defense counsel moved for a Wade hearing, arguing that the victim’s identification was based on seeing photos that her husband showed her rather than her memory of the attack. The trial court denied the motion finding the procedure followed by the police was not impermissibly suggestive. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that even without any police action, when a defendant presents evidence that an identification was made under highly suggestive circumstances that could lead to a mistaken identification, trial judges should conduct a preliminary hearing, upon request, to determine the admissibility of the identification evidence. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Chen" on Justia Law

The issue before the Court was whether the New Jersey League of Municipalities was a "public agency" that possessed "government record[s]" within the meaning of the Open Public Records Act (OPRA). Fair Share filed a verified complaint alleging that the League was in violation of OPRA and the common law right of access by refusing to make available certain requested documents. The League responded that it "is not a 'public agency' as defined by [OPRA], and as such the League’s records were not 'government records' or 'public records.'" The trial court dismissed Fair Share’s complaint, holding that the League is not a "public agency" because it is not an "instrumentality within or created by a political subdivision of the State or combination of subdivisions," such as a county health board or regional planning board. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the League of Municipalities is a "public agency" under the Open Public Records Act and must provide access to "government record[s]" that are not subject to an exemption. View "Fair Share Housing Center, Inc. v. New Jersey State League of Municipalities" on Justia Law

Under the New Jersey Affidavit of Merit statute, plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must provide an affidavit from an equivalently credentialed physician attesting that there is a reasonable probability that the defendant physician’s treatment fell outside acceptable professional standards. Plaintiff Robert Buck sued defendant Dr. James Henry, who had diagnosed Buck as suffering from depression and insomnia and prescribed an anti-depressant and a sleep aid. Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Henry failed to properly treat him. In March 2009, Plaintiff provided an affidavit of merit signed by Dr. Larry Kirstein, a licensed psychiatrist, who concluded that Dr. Henry’s treatment fell outside acceptable standards. In April 2009, due to a clerical error, the trial court mistakenly issued an order stating that “all issues involving the Affidavit of Merit statute have been addressed” and “there is no need” for a Ferreira conference. Dr. Henry moved for summary judgment, claiming that the affidavits were not from equivalent specialists. The court found that Dr. Henry was a family-medicine specialist based on his certification and, thus, Plaintiff was required to obtain an affidavit from a specialist in family medicine. The court therefore granted Dr. Henry’s motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate and trial courts and remanded a Ferreira conference. The Court found Plaintiff acted in good faith in filing affidavits of merit from two different medical specialists; and if the conference had been conducted as required and the trial court found deficiencies, Plaintiff would have had additional time to submit an affidavit that conformed to the merit statute. View "Buck v. Henry" on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiff J.D. and Defendant M.D.F. terminated a long-term relationship that resulted in the birth of two children. J.D. continued to live in the house the parties had purchased, along with the children, and she became involved in a new relationship with a boyfriend, R.T. In 2009, J.D. filed a domestic violence complaint. The complaint alleged that J.D. and R.T. observed M.D.F. outside of J.D.’s residence to harass her. When asked about the incident, M.D.F. requested that R.T. be sequestered and that he be given an opportunity to question him. After the court sequestered R.T., M.D.F. did not deny that he had gone to the residence and had taken pictures, but claimed that his purpose was not harassment, but to obtain evidence to support a motion to transfer custody. The court found that line of attack irrelevant and, without allowing M.D.F. to question R.T., granted a Final Restraining Order. As explained by the court, M.D.F. conceded that he had been taking pictures and, in light of the nature of the earlier incidents, his acts constituted harassment. The Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether M.D.F.'s due process rights were violated during the proceedings that resulted in the Final Restraining Order. The Court found that the trial court failed to sufficiently articulate its findings and conclusions, and the record contained insufficient evidence to sustain the Final Restraining Order. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a re-hearing to protect M.D.F.’s due process rights and to permit the trial court to evaluate the testimony and the evidence. View "J.D. v. M.D.F." on Justia Law

New Jersey uses a three-factor formula to calculate a multi-state corporation’s New Jersey Corporate Business Tax (CBT) by apportioning income between New Jersey and the rest of the world. For taxpayers with regular places of business outside of New Jersey, the portion of entire net worth and entire net income that is subject to New Jersey tax is determined by multiplying each by an allocation factor that is the sum of the property fraction, the payroll fraction, and two times the sales fraction, divided by four. The sales fraction is at issue in this case. Without the "Throw-Out Rule," the sales fraction is calculated by dividing the taxpayer’s receipts (sales of tangible personal property, services, and all other business receipts) in New Jersey by total receipts. The Throw-Out Rule increases a corporation’s New Jersey tax liability by “throwing out” sales receipts that are not taxed by other jurisdictions from the denominator of the sales fraction. This always increases the sales fraction, causing the apportionment formula and resulting CBT to increase. Whirlpool Properties, Inc. appealed its assessment from 2002, arguing that the Throw-Out Rule was unconstitutional. Upon review of the applicable legal authorities, the Supreme Court held that corporate taxpayers having a substantial nexus to New Jersey may constitutionally apply the Throw-Out Rule to untaxed receipts from states that lack jurisdiction to tax it due to an insufficient connection with the corporation but not to receipts that are untaxed because a state chooses not to impose an income tax. View "Whirlpool Properties, Inc. v. Div. of Taxation" on Justia Law

A Union County Grand Jury indicted the two defendants for first-degree murder, third-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, and second-degree possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose. After closing his bar, Luis Lecaros proceeded to drive home several of his employees in his pickup truck, including Sandra Narvarro and his son Paul. At some point, Luis’ truck slid on the rain-slicked road and slammed into the rear of a black Honda, shattering its back window and causing its rear bumper to fall off. The State’s theory was that Defendant Timyan Cabbell was driving the Honda and that Defendant John Calhoun was a passenger. Immediately after the collision, Cabbell and Calhoun, armed with handguns, opened fire on the pickup truck, and then fled in the Honda. The central issue at trial was the identification of the shooters. Two key State witnesses gave statements to police about the shooting, but in front of the jury, neither wished to testify. Because the witnesses insisted they did not wish to testify, the trial court conducted a Rule 104 hearing outside the presence of the jury. At this point, neither Defendant was given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses before the jury. The witnesses' out-of-court statements were deemed admissible under a hearsay exception. The primary issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether Defendants were provided an opportunity to cross examine the State's key witnesses consistent with the Confrontation Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that both defendants were denied their federal and state constitutional rights to confront one of the two key witnesses before the jury. For that reason, that witness' out-of-court statement to the police incriminating Defendants should not have been read to the jury and the admission of that statement was not harmless error. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Cabbell" on Justia Law