Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant John Wessells was arrested and charged with various offenses, including first degree conspiracy to commit murder, purposeful or knowing murder by use of a handgun, and first degree attempted murder. He moved to suppress statements he made during two separate interrogations. At a hearing, the focus was on Defendant's waiver of his "Miranda" rights: during his direct testimony, Defendant asserted that when the detectives started asking about the murders, he denied knowing anything about them and asked to speak with a lawyer. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that he had been informed about the purpose of the interrogation and had waived his rights prior to making the statements. However, without explicitly finding that the questioning had stopped based on Defendant's asserted invocation of his right to counsel, the court concluded that the reinitiation of questioning violated Defendant's constitutional rights. The Appellate Division reversed the order suppressing part of Defendant's statements, reasoning that once Defendant was released from custody, he was afforded an adequate opportunity to consult with counsel. Once investigators reinitiated questioning, Defendant was again advised of his rights, and that his waiver was knowing and voluntary. After the New Jersey Supreme Court accepted certiorari, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Maryland v. Shatzer," (130 S. Ct. 1213). Because Defendant had not been tried for the crimes with which he had been charged, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded Defendant was entitled to the benefit of the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Maryland v. Shatzer,"and the statements he made during his second interrogation should have been suppressed. View "New Jersey v. Wessells" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roland Davis had been a resident of the Devereux New Jersey Center (operated by Defendant Devereux Foundation) since shortly before his twelfth birthday. Plaintiff was diagnosed with autism, mental retardation, pervasive developmental disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and had a history of combative and aggressive behavior. Plaintiff's mother (as his guardian) filed a complaint alleging breach of a "non-delegable duty" to protect Plaintiff from harm, negligent care and supervision, and vicarious liability after a counselor assaulted Plaintiff. The trial court granted Devereux's motion for summary judgment, finding that to the extent claims were for negligence, they were barred by the Charitable Immunity Act (CIA). The court further concluded that New Jersey law does not compel imposing a "non-delegable duty" upon Devereux. The Appellate Division affirmed in part, also finding no "non-delegable duty," and reversed in part, holding that a reasonable jury could find that the counselor acted in part within the scope of her employment. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether to impose upon an institution that cares for developmentally disabled residents a "non-delegable duty" to protect them from harm caused by employees' intentional acts; and (2) whether the employee in this case could be found to have acted within the scope of her employment when she criminally assaulted the resident, thereby subjecting the non-profit facility to liability pursuant to "respondeat superior." The Court reaffirmed the duty of due care imposed upon caregivers with in loco parentis responsibilities to persons with developmental disabilities. However, applying the analysis set forth and developed by prior opinions, the parties' relationship, the nature of the risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and public policy, the Court concluded the circumstances of this case did not justify imposing on caregivers a "non-delegable duty" to protect residents from harm caused by employees' intentional acts. Furthermore, the Court held that no rational factfinder could find that the Devereux counselor's criminal assault on Plaintiff was conducted within the scope of her employment. View "Davis v. Devereux Foundation" on Justia Law

At the time of the attack, Anthony Andrews, who was temporarily living with his sister in an apartment across the hall, called 9-1-1. The call was routed to a State Police Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP). When the operator answered, Andrews reported that he "heard somebody screaming next door, inside this building" at "227 Wegman." The call was transferred to Jersey City’s PSAP, where the operator there asked for a location. Andrews responded, "185 Wegman." He stated: "I hear some screamin'" and "I don’t know what’s going on next door." The Jersey City operator prepared a narrative of the call which included the wrong address. The operator never asked Andrews what he meant by "next door" and so she mistakenly wrote "the house next door" rather than an apartment. Officers were dispatched to "Check 185 Wegman Parkway." Officers found the building at 185 Wegman unoccupied and left. Approximately twenty-two hours later, Andrews called 9-1-1 again. The operator who answered interrupted Andrews and asked if he had "a life threatening emergency that’s going on right now," and he replied, "No . . . it happened last night." A wrongful death and survival action was filed by both Plaintiff Paris Wilson through a guardian ad litem, his aunt Sonya Manzano, and by Plaintiff D Artagnan Manzano, individually and as Administrator of the Estates of his children DeQuan and Dartagnania. Plaintiffs claim that the two 9-1-1 operators were derelict in their duties and that their negligence, gross negligence, or wanton and willful disregard for the safety of others caused pain and suffering to all three children and led to the deaths of DeQuan and Dartagnania. The trial court dismissed the claims against defendants, finding that they were protected by statutes including the 9-1-1 immunity act, N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10, and that there was insufficient evidence of wanton and willful conduct needed to vault the immunity statute. The Appellate Division reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10 provides immunity to 9-1-1 operators and their public-entity employers for negligence in delivering 9-1-1 services, including the mishandling of emergency calls. Because the statute does not protect conduct that constitutes wanton and willful disregard for safety, the Court remanded the case to resolve that issue. View "Wilson v. City of Jersey City" on Justia Law

Defendants Maryse and Emilio Guillaume failed to make their mortgage payment in April 2008, and made no payments since. In May 2008, the mortgage servicer "ASC" delivered a Notice of Intention to Foreclose informing them that the lender intended to file a foreclosure action and that they should seek the advice of an attorney. The notice of intention identified ASC, with a telephone number, as the entity to contact if they wished to dispute the calculation of the payment due or that a default had occurred. The name and address of the lender, Plaintiff U.S. Bank, did not appear anywhere on the notice. One month later, the Bank filed a foreclosure action. The complaint warned that judgment could be entered if Defendants failed to file an answer to the complaint within thirty-five days and that exercising their rights to dispute the debt did not excuse them from this requirement. For several months thereafter, the Guillaumes corresponded with ASC about the possibility of a loan modification to reduce their payment and to restore the loan to active status. However, the Guillaumes did not file an answer in the foreclosure action. The court entered a final judgment of foreclosure. The Guillaumes attempted to vacate the default judgment against them, arguing that the failure to provide the lender's name on the May 2008 notice of intent to foreclose was in violation of the Fair Foreclosure Act. The trial court denied the motion to vacate. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that because the trial court ordered the Bank to reissue a notice of intention and because the Guillaumes' other arguments did not warrant relief, the Court affirmed the denial of their motion to vacate the default judgment. View "US Bank National Association v. Guillaume" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Plaintiff Kaime Kendall's lawsuit against the developers and marketers of the prescription drug Accutane, Hoffman-LaRoche, was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff was first prescribed Accutane in January 1997, when she was twelve years old. By that time, the information provided to physicians began to warn of a possible link between Accutane and irritable bowel syndrome (IBD). The information provided to patients warned to stop taking the drug and consult a doctor if stomach pain, diarrhea and rectal bleeding occurred. In 1998 and 2000, the physician warnings were strengthened with regard to IBD. When Plaintiff was first prescribed Accutane, her doctor did not mention the risk of IBD because he was not aware of it. In 1999 at a period in which Plaintiff had stopped taking Accutane, she was hospitalized for abdominal pain later diagnosed as ulcerative colitis. Plaintiff filed suit against the company in 2005, alleging that Hoffman-LaRoche was liable because the warnings were inadequate. The Company moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that the statute of limitations had expired. The trial court noted that at the time Plaintiff began taking Accutane, warnings focused primarily on preventing pregnancy and suicide. The judged then concluded that by December 2003, Plainitff did not know her ulcerative colitis would be caused by Accutane, and that a reasonable person in her circumstances would not have known either. Hoffman-LaRoche appealed the jury verdict in Plaintiff's favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because a reasonable person in Plaintiff's situation would not have known by 2003 of the relationship between Accutane and ulcerative colitis, her lawsuit against the drugmaker was timely. View "Kendall v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether a defendant's prior convictions for disorderly persons offenses (inadmissible because they are not crimes) could be used to find that earlier criminal convictions were not too remote and would then be admissible to impeach the defendant's credibility if he testified. Defendant Derrick Harris was indicted for second-degree robbery and second-degree burglary. He was tried for these offenses approximately thirteen years after he was sentenced to concurrent four-year custodial terms for "disorderly persons" offenses in the intervening years. At a hearing, Defendant argued that the prior convictions were too remote to be admissible; the prosecution noted that Defendant had accumulated a significant number of convictions for disorderly persons offenses. The trial court was persuaded that while the disorderly persons convictions were not themselves admissible, they could serve to "bridge the gap" between Defendant's two earlier criminal convictions and his trial in this matter. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it viewed Defendant's intervening convictions for disorderly persons offenses as having removed the bar to admission of those convictions as too remote. Thus, Defendant's prior criminal convictions would be admissible if he testified at trial. View "New Jersey v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff American Dream at Marlboro, L.L.C., is the successor in interest to Beacon Road Associates, L.L.C., an entity that served as the residential developer of a series of lots. In 1994 and 1995, Plaintiff’s predecessor sought the approval of the Marlboro Township Planning Board for "Beacon Woods I." In 1995, the Planning Board granted preliminary major subdivision approval specifically conditioned on the inclusion of a restriction in the deed for a "flag lot" that would preclude its further subdivision. In 1999, Defendant Patricia Cleary entered into a contract with Plaintiff to purchase one of the properties in the originally-approved development. Defendant's lot backed onto the flag lot. The Planning Board approved Plaintiff's application for a new subdivision. The resolution made no reference to the deed restriction. Plaintiff closed on the purchase of the additional land and vacated the easement that had provided that parcel with separate access to a nearby road. In 2002, when Plaintiff entered into an agreement to sell the new subdivision to another developer, Plaintiff realized that it failed to reserve the easement that it needed to cross Defendant's property. When negotiations to secure Defendant's consent to the easement failed, Plaintiff redesigned the roadway so as to obviate the need the easement. In 2006, Plaintiff returned to the Planning Board and requested that it act on its 2003 application for an amendment to the subdivision approval, but the Board rejected it, noting that prior approvals had expired. In April 2003, Plaintiff filed suit for a declaration that its 2003 application had been approved by default. Defendant as intervenor, filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the flag lot was prohibited from being subdivided because of the earlier-imposed deed restriction, along with an order directing Plaintiff to record the deed restriction. The trial court concluded that the Planning Board could not approve the amended application because it lacked jurisdiction to eliminate the deed restriction. The court therefore entered an order declaring that all of the prior approvals for the subdivision were void, and it permitted Plaintiff to amend its complaint to eliminate the deed restriction based on changed circumstances. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification, and after review concluded the trial court misapplied the governing standards for considering the application to eliminate the restriction based on changed circumstances. View "AmericanDream at Marlboro, L.L.C. v. Marlboro Township Planning Board" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant KPMG already was in the process of auditing Papel Giftware's 1998 and 1999 financial statements when merger discussions began with Plaintiff Cast Art. In a November 1999 letter to Papel’s audit committee, KPMG explained that the audit was planned "to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. Absolute assurance is not attainable . . . ." The letter cautioned that there is a risk that "fraud" and "illegal acts may exist and not be detected by an audit performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards," and that "an audit is not designed to detect matters that are immaterial to the financial statements." In September 2000, KPMG delivered completed audits to Papel. KPMG's accompanying opinion letter, addressed to Papel's audit committee, stated that the audits were conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. The letter concluded by observing that as of December 31, 1999, Papel was not in compliance with certain agreements with its lenders, which raised "substantial doubt" about Papel's "ability to continue as a going concern." Three months later, Cast Art and Papel consummated their merger. Soon, Cast Art had difficulty collecting accounts receivable that it had believed Papel had outstanding prior to the merger. Cast Art investigated and learned that Papel's 1998 and 1999 financial statements were inaccurate and that Papel had accelerated revenue. Cast Art sought to recover from KPMG for the loss of its business. Cast Art alleged that KPMG was negligent; that if KPMG had performed a proper audit, it would have uncovered the fraudulent accounting activity that was taking place at Papel; and that Cast Art would not have proceeded with the merger if it had been alerted to the fraud. KPMG argued, among other things, that Cast Art had not retained KPMG and was not its client, and thus Cast Art's claim was barred by the Accountant Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-25. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because Cast Art failed to establish that KPMG either "knew at the time of the engagement by the client," or later agreed Cast Art could rely on its work for Papel in proceeding with the merger, Cast Art failed to satisfy the prerequisites of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-25(b)(2).View "Cast Art Industries, LLC v. KPMG LLP" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case arose from the November 8, 2011 election of Gabriela Mosquera to the fourth Legislative district of the General Assembly. Shelley Lovett, who received the next highest number of votes, challenged the election alleging that Mosquera was ineligible because she failed to meet the one-year durational residency requirement set forth in Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 2 of the New Jersey Constitution. Complicating the matter was the decision and accompanying order in "Robertson v. Bartels," (150 F. Supp.2d 691 (D.N.J. 2001)), wherein a federal trial court had concluded that the durational residency requirement of the State Constitution violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and had enjoined the New Jersey Attorney General and Secretary of State from enforcing the provision’s one-year durational residency requirement for eligibility for General Assembly office. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that The New Jersey Constitution's durational residency requirement for members of the General Assembly does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; this decision was not a new ruling and the Court therefore declined to limit its judgment to prospective application. Because Mosquera was the incumbent at the time of the vacancy, the Democratic Party, with which Mosquera was affiliated at the time of the election, could select an interim successor for the vacant seat. Further, in construing the vacancy-filling provisions the Court recognized that Mosquera would meet eligibility requirements for appointment as interim successor, if she were selected by her party. View "In re: Contest of November 8, 2011 General Election" on Justia Law

This appeal was a companion to "New Jersey v. Hudson," (___ N.J. ___ (2012), decided on the same day), because it also involved the application of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b) to an extended-term sentence. Here, the sentence was imposed on Defendant Sally McDonald for an offense committed prior to an offense for which she already was serving another extended-term sentence. As in "Hudson," the second extended term was imposed in a separate sentencing proceeding from that in which the first extended-term sentence was imposed. Consistent with the interpretation given N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5 in "Hudson," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for resentencing because it was error for the sentencing court to have imposed a second extended-term sentence on Defendant in these circumstances. View "New Jersey v. McDonald" on Justia Law