Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1998, Dave Adams (fictitious name) filed a complaint against his uncle Wayne Anderson (fictitious name) alleging Anderson had sexually assaulted him at various times when Adams was a minor. Adams sought compensatory and punitive damages, interest, and costs of suit. Anderson answered, denying Adams's allegations and raising the statute of limitations as a defense. He also counterclaimed for frivolous litigation, defamation (both libel and slander), infliction of emotional distress, and violations of his "statutory and constitutional rights." In 2000, a "Lopez" hearing was held to determine whether to grant Anderson's motion for summary judgment. The Court dismissed Adams' complaint because it was filed nine years after the "normal" statute of limitations would have run without sufficient justification. Anderson obtained a jury award of damages and interest, and found that Adams' statements constituted false and defamatory statements. No appeal ensued. Subsequently, Adams declared bankruptcy to avoid paying the damages award against him. The bankruptcy court determined the judgment was non-dischargeable. Anderson obtained a contempt order against Adams for failing to comply with post-judgment discovery requests. While fighting the contempt charge, Adams created a website on which he recounted his claims of sexual abuse by Anderson, including direct quotes from the trial transcript and allegations of perjury and intimidation of a witness. Anderson's attorney asked Adams's attorney to shut down the site because it contained "per se defamatory statements" along with the same allegations made in the earlier lawsuit. He also threatened to file a defamation suit if Adams did not close the website. Adams received notification of the letter on February 16 and closed the website on February 21. In March 2007, Anderson filed a new complaint alleging that Adams's website contained defamatory statements. Adams failed to answer and Anderson moved for the entry of default, which was granted. Thereafter, he moved for the entry of default judgment. With that motion pending, in May 2008, Adams entered a special appearance challenging service of process, seeking to vacate the entry of default, and requesting the court to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The judge granted the motion to vacate the default, but denied the motion to dismiss. In December 2008, Anderson moved for summary judgment. In January 2009, the judge denied the motion, despite finding that Adams's statements were defamatory per se because they accused Anderson of having committed a criminal offense and of engaging in serious sexual misconduct. The judge concluded that he could not permit the jury to evaluate the claim without any evidence of cognizable damages. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the vitality of the doctrine of presumed damages: if defamatory, constituted libel rather than slander, and whether it is an open question of whether "the doctrine of presumed damages should apply to claims made by a private-figure plaintiff when no public interest is implicated." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that where a plaintiff does not proffer evidence of actual damage to reputation, the doctrine of presumed damages permits him to survive a motion for summary judgment to obtain nominal damages, thus vindicating his good name. View "W.J.A. v. D.A." on Justia Law

The issues in this appeal were whether, pursuant to "Contey v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.," 136 N.J. 582 (1994) or N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1, an electric utility company is entitled to immunity for any negligence in its placement of a pole along a public roadway; and whether a county is entitled to immunity for any negligence on its part pursuant to the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3. Early one winter morning, plaintiff John Seals was driving his pickup truck and descended a curved, snow-covered road in Washington Township that is owned and maintained by Morris County. Due to the road conditions and despite applying the brakes, plaintiff could not negotiate the curve and the vehicle struck an electric utility pole located several feet from the roadway. He alleged that the County negligently maintained a dangerous roadway condition and that the electric utility company negligently placed the pole. The trial court denied defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court distinguished "Contey," in which the Supreme Court held that a telephone company that placed its pole in compliance with a municipal ordinance owed no duty to a motorist. The trial court reasoned that because the County did not set standards for placing electric poles, and was not statutorily required to do so, the utility is subject to a negligence standard; and although "Contey" did not impose a duty on the County to conduct a safety study, it was not shielded by the TCA because it took "no action" to regulate placement of electric poles. The Appellate Division reversed the denial of summary judgment for JCP&L and vacated the denial of summary judgment for the County. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that neither "Contey" nor N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1 conferred immunity on the utility for its negligence, if any, in placing the electric pole. If a governmental entity directs a utility where to place a pole (as in "Contey") the utility is immune from liability. When there is no governmental dictate, ordinary negligence standards apply. A utility will be liable if it places or maintains an electric pole where there is an unreasonable and unnecessary danger to travelers upon the highway. Whether the County is entitled to TCA immunity was remanded for further proceedings. View "Seals v. Morris County" on Justia Law

This dispute arose in the context of a large construction project known as the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail Transit System. Plaintiff Twenty-First Century Rail Corporation served as the prime contractor for the Project. In January 2002, Twenty-First Century, acting through its contracting affiliate, Washington Group, entered into a contract with Frontier-Kemper/Shea/Bemo, Joint Venture (FKSB). Pursuant to that contract, FKSB was responsible for construction of “the civil, electrical, mechanical and emergency system portions of the tunnel, station, plaza, and elevators” for the (N30) Project. In 2004, FKSB retained Bruce Meller and his law firm, Peckar & Abramson, in connection with the work that FKSB was performing on the N30 Project. In particular, Richard Raab, who was an officer of FKSB and who served as its representative, first telephoned Meller in February 2004 and arranged to meet with him at the Peckar & Abramson offices. Raab signed a retainer agreement on behalf of FKSB, pursuant to which the lawyers were asked to provide FKSB with certain legal advice. The law firm provided its opinion on the issues about which it had been consulted in the form of a letter. A year later, Meller received a phone call from Paul Killian, Esquire. Killian told Meller that he was representing FKSB and wanted Meller’s impressions of Washington Group because FKSB was considering whether to enter into an agreement with it. Thereafter, the lawsuit at issue in this appeal was filed. Twenty-First Century, for which Washington Group was the contracting affiliate, and FKSB alleged that PB Americas was responsible for the N30 Project delays and the resulting costs due to defective project designs and slow responses to requests for corrections. Meller’s law firm, Peckar & Abramson, represented PB Americas. PKSB filed a motion to disqualify Peckar & Abramson based on the prior representation. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that many of the documents that would have been provided to the law firm for its use in preparing the opinion letter were publicly available, the representation there was insignificant and immaterial, and the matters were not substantially related. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that disqualification of the attorney for PB Americas was warranted in this case because details relating to the construction project, the relationship among the parties, and the attorney’s prior representation of an adverse party, FKSB, demonstrate that the subsequent representation was prohibited by RPC 1.9(a). View "Twenty-FirstCentury Rail Corp. v. New Jersey Transit Corp." on Justia Law

In June 2005, police discovered Defendant Juan Pablo Santos naked and in bed with a fourteen-year-old girl. He was arrested and, after receiving "Miranda" warnings, admitted that he lived with the girl and that they had an ongoing sexual relationship. Santos was indicted by a grand jury on one count of second-degree sexual assault and one count of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. The State proposed a plea agreement under which Santos would plead guilty to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child in exchange for the State’s agreement to drop the sexual assault charge and recommend that his term of imprisonment be limited to time served. After consulting with his attorney , Defendant decided to accept the deal. Less than three weeks after Defendant was sentenced according to the terms of the plea agreement he negotiated with the State, the United States Department of Homeland Security removed him to Mexico based on this criminal conviction. Defendant illegally reentered the United States. He was found and removed again to Mexico. In 2009, Defendant filed a post-conviction relief petition alleging that he had not read, and his attorney had not explained, the plea form before he signed it, and that his plea lacked an adequate factual basis. The PCR court determined that Defendant's allegations were sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and that Defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, which the court scheduled. Before the hearing, Defendant filed a motion seeking leave to testify telephonically from Mexico. The State opposed the motion, pointing out that telephonic testimony would deny the court the opportunity to evaluate Defendant's demeanor and assess his credibility. The court granted Defendant's motion and turned to examine the mechanics of how Defendant's testimony would be taken. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the grant of an evidentiary hearing in which Defendant was to be permitted to provide telephonic testimony must be reversed and the matter remanded for full reconsideration by the post-conviction relief (PCR) court as to whether Defendant could meet the standard for entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. View "New Jersey v. Santos" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Legislature passed a series of reform measures designed to lower property taxes. Among other issues, the reforms attempted to address the problem of excessive benefits for high-level school administrators. The following year, the Commissioner of Education issued various regulations to implement the new laws. The regulations limited certain benefits in new contracts for high-level administrators, and also capped payments for accumulated unused sick leave. In 2008, Plaintiffs-Respondents the New Jersey Association of School Administrators, Dr. Terry Van Zoeren, Dr. Simon Bosco, Joseph Abate, Jr., and John Golden filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the use of the regulations, as well as other provisions in N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-3.1(e) on federal constitutional and state law grounds. The court denied the application for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the lawsuit. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine known as "Burford" abstention, to allow the state courts the opportunity to determine important questions of state law. The Appellate Division held that the challenged regulations impermissibly reduced the compensation of tenured assistant superintendents, in violation of the tenure statute, and improperly deprived certain administrators of vested rights. The Appellate Division also concluded that the challenge to the sick leave cap was partially mooted by a newly enacted law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature had the authority to modify terms and conditions for future contracts for public employment in a manner that did not raise constitutional concerns. Furthermore, the Legislature properly exercised its power when it directed the Commissioner to issue regulations for new contracts for superintendents and assistant superintendents. The regulations that followed were consistent with their respective enabling statutes and advanced the Legislature's goals. They also protected benefits that employees had already accumulated. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "N.J. Association of Sch. Administrators v. Schundler" on Justia Law

Shortly before the trial was scheduled to begin, Defendant Marcus King's attorney informed the trial court that Defendant wished to represent himself at his trial. The trial court questioned Defendant with respect to his knowledge of particular areas. At one point during the colloquy, defendant stated: "I am willing to go to trial with what I have prepared for myself. I can’t explain it. I can’t sit and explain it to you in legal terms. But I know in my terms what I am ready to do." The trial court stated that it was not "satisfied" that defendant "fully under[stood] the nature and consequences of this decision." It pointed to the fact that Defendant was unable to state what he had written down while doing research in the law library a few days ago and could not adequately answer the court’s questions about the court rules or the evidence rules. The court found that defendant’s "inability to do that" precluded an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant’s application and directed that the trial proceed with defense counsel representing defendant. Defendant appealed the trial court's decision, contending that the court improperly denied him the right of self-representation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's examination was insufficient and, as a result, its ultimate determination was flawed. The Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Marcus King" on Justia Law

Defendant Frank A. Louis, Esq. represented Plaintiff Julia Gere in connection with Plaintiff's divorce from Peter Ricker. Pursuant to the property settlement agreement, Plaintiff had a six month window, which ended in October 2000, to decide how she wished to proceed with respect to the parties' ancillary real estate investments. Plaintiff's understanding was that she would retain a one-half interest in those assets unless she affirmatively advised Ricker within six months that she did not wish to do so. One of those assets was Navesink Partners, which owned both the real estate and business operations of a marina. Based on Louis's interpretation of Plaintiff’s wishes after a discussion with her friend, Louis sent a letter dated October 11, 2000, to Ricker's attorney stating, "this will confirm that except for the Marina, Mrs. Ricker wishes to maintain one-half interest in all other properties." Subsequently, a dispute arose in which Ricker maintained that Plaintiff had waived any interest in Navesink Partners, and Plaintiff contended that she did not waive her interest, that she wanted to continue her ownership interest in the marina's real estate, and that she was entitled to fair value for her interest in the marina's business operations. Plaintiff ultimately sued Louis for malpractice over the purported waiver of her interests in the marina property. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether "Puder v. Buechel" (183 N.J. 428 (2005)) barred Plaintiff's malpractice action against her former attorney and whether that claim was time-barred. The appellate division affirmed the trial court decision that Plaintiff indeed was time barred, and that she voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement regarding the marina property which she testified was "fair and reasonable." Upon review, the Supreme Court found Plaintiff's case was materially distinguishable from "Puder," and that her legal malpractice claim was not barred. View "Gere v. Louis" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court considered whether "Padilla v. Kentucky" (130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010)) could be applied retroactively on collateral review, and whether defendants' attorneys were ineffective under "State v. Nunez-Valdez" (200 N.J. 129 (2009)). In 2004, Defendant Frensel Gaitan was indicted for multiple possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and distribution charges. He pled guilty to the charge of third-degree distribution of a CDS within one thousand feet of a school in 2005, and was sentenced to five years’ probation. Gaitan did not file a direct appeal. In 2008, based on the drug conviction, a removable offense, Gaitan was removed. He thereafter filed a PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Although Gaitan had responded "yes" to Question 17 on the plea form, which asked "Do you understand that if you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty," he asserted that counsel failed to warn him that his plea carried with it potential immigration consequences. In 2007, Defendant Rohan Goulbourne was indicted on multiple CDS possession and distribution charges. He agreed to plead guilty to one count of possession of a CDS with intent to distribute within one thousand feet of a school. The prosecutor, in return, recommended a sentence of three years' imprisonment with a fifteen-month period of parole ineligibility. At a March 2008 plea hearing, both defense counsel and the court informed Goulbourne that he "may very well" be deported as a result of the plea. The court also noted that Goulbourne answered all the questions on the plea form, which included Question 17, and that he signed the form after reviewing it with his attorney. Satisfied that Goulbourne knowingly and voluntarily was pleading guilty, the court accepted the plea. The court imposed the recommended sentence, and Goulbourne did not appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Padilla" represented a new constitutional rule of law that for Sixth Amendment purposes, was not entitled to retroactive application on collateral review. Although "Nunez-Valdez" governs the standard of attorney performance in these cases, the Court concluded Defendants were not entitled to relief under that decision because neither was affirmatively misadvised by their counsel, nor did they establish prejudice. View "New Jersey v. Gaitan" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court considered whether "Padilla v. Kentucky" (130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010)) could be applied retroactively on collateral review, and whether defendants' attorneys were ineffective under "State v. Nunez-Valdez" (200 N.J. 129 (2009)). In 2004, Defendant Frensel Gaitan was indicted for multiple possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and distribution charges. He pled guilty to the charge of third-degree distribution of a CDS within one thousand feet of a school in 2005, and was sentenced to five years’ probation. Gaitan did not file a direct appeal. In 2008, based on the drug conviction, a removable offense, Gaitan was removed. He thereafter filed a PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Although Gaitan had responded "yes" to Question 17 on the plea form, which asked "Do you understand that if you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty," he asserted that counsel failed to warn him that his plea carried with it potential immigration consequences. In 2007, Defendant Rohan Goulbourne was indicted on multiple CDS possession and distribution charges. He agreed to plead guilty to one count of possession of a CDS with intent to distribute within one thousand feet of a school. The prosecutor, in return, recommended a sentence of three years' imprisonment with a fifteen-month period of parole ineligibility. At a March 2008 plea hearing, both defense counsel and the court informed Goulbourne that he "may very well" be deported as a result of the plea. The court also noted that Goulbourne answered all the questions on the plea form, which included Question 17, and that he signed the form after reviewing it with his attorney. Satisfied that Goulbourne knowingly and voluntarily was pleading guilty, the court accepted the plea. The court imposed the recommended sentence, and Goulbourne did not appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Padilla" represented a new constitutional rule of law that for Sixth Amendment purposes, was not entitled to retroactive application on collateral review. Although "Nunez-Valdez" governs the standard of attorney performance in these cases, the Court concluded Defendants were not entitled to relief under that decision because neither was affirmatively misadvised by their counsel, nor did they establish prejudice. View "New Jersey v. Goulbourne" on Justia Law

In 2005, "The Record," a newspaper owned by Defendant North Jersey Media Group, published an article about an SEC complaint. The headline of the article read: "3 N.J. men accused in $9M stock scam." Neither the SEC complaint nor the article suggested that Plaintiffs Ronald Durando and Gustave Dotoli were arrested. The North Jersey Media Group also owns Defendant "The Nutley Sun," which received permission to reprint the Record article about Plaintiffs. In 2008, the Sun prepared the article for publication in its December 8 edition (a promotional issue circulated to 2500 non-subscribers in addition to the weekly's regular subscribers), but wrote a new headline for the article: "Local men charged in stock scheme." The day after publication, Plaintiffs' attorney sent an email to The Sun pointing out that his clients had not been "arrested," and demanded a retraction. The North Jersey Media Group gave approval for the filing of a retraction, and indeed one was published in boldface and large print on the front page of The Nutley Sun's December 22 edition. This edition was not circulated to the 2500 non-subscribers who received the December 8 edition with the erroneous teaser. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging libel against the Sun and North Jersey Media Group. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims and dismissed the complaint. The court determined that there was not "sufficient evidence from which a jury could clearly and convincingly conclude that any . . . of the defendants acted with actual malice." In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed, finding no 'clear and convincing' evidence of actual malice to warrant a jury trial on defamation or false light. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[a]lthough this case unquestionably involves sloppy journalism, the careless acts of a harried editor, the summary-judgment record before the Court cannot support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the editor knowingly or in reckless disregard of the truth published the false front-page teaser."View "Durando v. The Nutley Sun" on Justia Law