Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On April 28, 2020, defendant Amandeep Tiwana, while driving in Jersey City, struck a police officer and collided with two police cruisers. Defendant and three injured officers were transported to Jersey City Medical Center. Defendant’s blood alcohol content was 0.268%, three times the legal limit. Detective Anthony Espaillat of the Regional Collision Investigation Unit of the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office arrived at the hospital and spoke first to the injured officers in the emergency room. Two uniformed police officers were stationed outside the curtain separating defendant’s bed from other patients. Detective Espaillat walked up to defendant’s bed, introduced himself as a detective with the Prosecutor’s Office, and explained that he was assigned to investigate the accident. Espaillat testified that, as soon as he had spoken, defendant immediately complained of chest pain and said “she only had two shots prior to the crash.” Espaillat directed defendant not to make any other statements. He clarified that he did not come to the hospital to ask her questions and that he wanted to interview her at a later date at the Prosecutor’s Office. The entire interaction lasted “less than five minutes.” The next day, defendant went to the Prosecutor’s Office and invoked her Miranda rights. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court consideration was whether the detective’s self-introduction to defendant at her bedside in the hospital initiated a custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent warranting the administration of Miranda warnings. Pretrial, the State moved to admit defendant’s statement at the hospital. The trial court denied the State’s motion and the Appellate Division affirmed. Both courts found that a custodial interrogation occurred at the hospital and the detective’s failure to give Miranda warnings rendered defendant’s statement inadmissible. The Supreme Court reversed: defendant was in custody at the hospital in light of the police presence around her bed area. But no interrogation or its functional equivalent occurred before her spontaneous and unsolicited admission. Miranda warnings were therefore not required, and defendant’s statement -- that she “only had two shots prior to the crash” -- was admissible at trial. View "New Jersey v. Tiwana" on Justia Law

Defendants “Divina” and “Javier” were parents to “Ignacio,” born in 2015; “Josefina,” born in 2016; “Antonia,” born in 2019; and “Ian,” born in 2020. The record reflected extensive evidence of domestic violence involving Divina and Javier. In July 2018, the trial court granted the Division of Child Protection and Permanency care, custody, and supervision of Ignacio and Josefina, citing concerns about continuing domestic violence, Divina’s inability to provide a safe environment for the children, and Divina’s mental health. Antonia and Ian were each removed from the home shortly after birth. Ignacio and Josefina were placed together in a resource home; Antonia and Ian were each placed in different resource homes. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether trial courts could still consider the relationships between children and resource families under the fourth prong of the best interests of the child test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4), despite a 2021 Amendment that precluded consideration of those relationships under the test’s second prong, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2). The Court concluded that the New Jersey Legislature did not intend to bar trial courts from considering evidence of the child’s relationship with the resource family when addressing the fourth prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). The Court determined the trial court properly considered the relationships between the children and their resource families, and its determination as to all four prongs of the test were grounded in substantial and credible evidence in the record. View "DCPP v. D.C.A. and J.J.C.B." on Justia Law

In New Jersey v. Olenowski ("Olenowski I"), 253 N.J. 133 (2023), the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted for criminal cases a non-exclusive, multi-factor test for the reliability of expert testimony patterned after the standard established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The issue presented in this case involves whether Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) testimony was reliable and admissible under that standard. The Court also considered the appropriate standard of review for Daubert-based expert reliability determinations in criminal appeals. Defendant Michael Olenowski was convicted of drug-impaired driving based in part on DRE evidence. His convictions were upheld on appeal, and the Supreme Court granted certification to determine whether DRE testimony was admissible under the “general acceptance” admissibility standard established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Finding that the record was not sufficient to make that determination, the Court asked a Special Master to conduct a hearing. The Special Master concluded that DRE evidence should be admissible under Frye. In Olenowski I, the Court adopted a “Daubert-type standard” for determining the reliability of expert evidence in criminal and quasi-criminal cases and remanded this matter to the Special Master to apply that standard. After remand, the Special Master concluded that the twelve-step DRE protocol satisfied the reliability standard of N.J.R.E. 702 when analyzed under the methodology-based Daubert standard. The Supreme Court concluded after review that Daubert-based expert reliability determinations in criminal appeals would be reviewed de novo, while other expert admissibility issues were reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Here, the Court found the extensive record substantiated that DRE testimony sufficiently satisfied the Daubert criteria to be admissible, enumerating four limitations and safeguards to be followed in such analysis. View "New Jersey v. Olenowski" on Justia Law

For five months when C.V. was a pre-kindergarten student in the Waterford Township School District, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Alfred Dean, the seventy-six-year-old bus aide who was supposed to be ensuring her safety. C.V.’s parents only discovered the abuse when C.V. came home without her underwear one day. C.V. and her parents sued the Waterford Township Board of Education and Waterford Township School District (collectively, Waterford) alleging, among other things, discrimination in a “place of public accommodation” “on account of . . . sex” in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Waterford and dismissed plaintiffs’ LAD claims. The court found plaintiffs could not, as a matter of law, prove to a jury that Dean’s conduct occurred because of C.V.’s sex, or that it would not have occurred but for C.V.’s sex. According to the trial court, “the but for element can’t be satisfied . . . where you have a compulsive sexual predator, a pedophile,” especially one who testified at his deposition “that he is a compulsive sexual abuser of children, boys and girls.” The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the LAD did not apply “to a sexual predator’s assault of a student on a school bus where there is no evidence his actions were based solely on the victim’s status as a member of a protected group.” The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment because it conflicted with Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587 (1993) and L.W. v. Toms River Regional Schools Board of Education, 189 N.J. 381 (2007). The Court reiterated that under Lehman, sexual touching of areas of the body linked to sexuality happens, by definition, because of sex. The Court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint and to obtain certain records, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "C.V. v. Waterford Township Board of Education" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether a criminal defendant must be provided in-person interpreting services, rather than video remote interpreting (VRI) services, at his jury trial. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court announced amendments to the New Jersey Judiciary’s Language Access Plan (LAP) and expanded the circumstances in which remote interpreting services may be used. Prior to the update, VRI was allowed only for “emergent matters” or “short non-emergent matters of 30 minutes or less.” The 2022 LAP now allows VRI for both “emergent and routine proceedings,” subject to judicial discretion. In 2019, defendant Oscar R. Juracan-Juracan, a native speaker of Kaqchikel -- a language spoken by approximately 450,000 people worldwide -- was charged with several offenses related to an alleged sexual assault. During pre-trial proceedings, he requested a Kaqchikel interpreter and one was provided. The interpreter, however, resided on the West Coast, so he appeared remotely. Additionally, the Kaqchikel interpreter did not speak English, only Kaqchikel and Spanish, so a second interpreter was required to translate to and from Spanish and English. After the court advised counsel that the Kaqchikel interpreter would continue to participate virtually during the jury trial, defendant moved for in-person interpretation services. During the motion hearing, the Kaqchikel interpreter expressed concerns about his ability to provide interpretation services remotely during the trial. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, advising the Kaqchikel interpreter that the court would give him “as much time as you need, understanding the complexities, not only of interpretations, interpreting through two individuals, and also virtually.” The trial court reasoned that proceeding with VRI during the trial was “what’s financially feasible, what’s fair, what’s just.” The Appellate Division denied defendant’s motion for leave to appeal in light of the VRI policy change. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. "In a criminal jury trial, there is a presumption that foreign language interpretation services will be provided in person, which is consistent with the New Jersey Judiciary’s longstanding practice." The Court set forth guidelines and factors to assist trial courts in deciding whether VRI should be used during criminal jury trials, and it remanded this matter for the trial court to reconsider whether VRI was appropriate in this case after assessing those factors. View "New Jersey v. Juracan-Juracan" on Justia Law

The Church of St. Theresa (St. Theresa’s) owned and operated the St. Theresa School. St. Theresa’s terminated art teacher and toddler room caregiver Victoria Crisitello for violating the terms of her employment agreement. That agreement required employees to abide by the teachings of the Catholic Church and forbade employees from engaging in premarital sex; Crisitello, who was unmarried, had become pregnant. In response to her firing, Crisitello filed a complaint against St. Theresa’s alleging employment discrimination in violation of the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), based on pregnancy and marital status. St. Theresa’s countered that its decision to terminate Crisitello was protected by both the First Amendment and the LAD. The New Jersey Supreme Court held: (1) the “religious tenets” exception of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) was an affirmative defense available to a religious entity when confronted with a claim of employment discrimination; and (2) the uncontroverted fact was that St. Theresa’s followed the religious tenets of the Catholic Church in terminating Crisitello. The Court thus concluded St. Theresa’s was entitled to summary judgment and that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint with prejudice. View "Crisitello v. St. Theresa School" on Justia Law

In summer 2010, plaintiff Carol Conforti obtained a restraining order against her husband. On September 8, he was arrested for violating the restraining order by returning to the marital home to see his son. Conforti was taken to the OCJ, where he was evaluated by a staff member of Correctional Health Services (CHS). A CHS staff member wrote on the “Intake Receiving and Screening” form that Conforti reported: (1) drinking half a gallon of vodka each day; (2) major surgery that left him with rods and screws in his back; (3) feeling “hopeless or helpless”; and (4) the “[r]ecent significant loss” of his marriage. A physician prescribed him one extra mattress and medicine for back pain and alcohol dependence, and instructed that he not be assigned work or a top bunk. After 27 days, Conforti was released. Just over a week later, Conforti was arrested for again returning to the marital home to see his son. He arrived at OCJ on October 13, 2010. A document from Conforti’s file acknowledged his previous incarceration and history of binge drinking but stated he had “[n]o current mental health issues/concerns” and was cleared for OCJ’s general population. On October 16, he requested medical attention for back pain. On October 20, Conforti wrote a suicide note to his parents, closed the door to his cell, covered the cell door window with a sheet, and hung himself. During discover, plaintiff submitted an expert report who opined that defendants the County of Ocean and the Ocean County Jail acted negligently by failing to adequately train and supervise OCJ staff to prevent inmate suicide. The County defendants moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA). A jury found defendant negligent and apportioned liability 60% against the County and 40% against Correctional Health Services (CHS). Defendants moved for JNOV, reasserting their medical-facility-immunity argument. The New Jersey Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence count at the summary judgment stage, and no error in refusing to overturn the jury’s verdict after trial. View "Conforti v. County of Ocean, et al." on Justia Law

In November 2017, Defendant Stephen Zadroga was driving over the speed limit when he was involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle. Defendant’s passenger, and best friend, died in the crash. Pursuant to a warrant, the State seized and tested what they thought was Defendant’s blood. The blood alcohol content (BAC) came back as 0.376%, more than four times the legal limit. Relying on that evidence, the grand jury charged Defendant with aggravated manslaughter, death by auto, and three counts of driving while intoxicated. After the nurse who drew defendant’s blood testified for the State at trial, the State realized that the blood they believed to be Defendant’s had actually come from a person who had died seven months before the accident. After the State discovered the error, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice because the grand jury had relied on false testimony to indict him. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion as to the counts of driving while intoxicated but denied the motion as to counts one and two, aggravated manslaughter and death by auto. The court found that allowing Defendant to be retried on the counts unrelated to intoxication would not violate his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause both because he consented to the trial’s termination and because there was a manifest necessity to terminate the trial. The Appellate Division affirmed on manifest necessity grounds, adding that while the State could present counts one and two to a new grand jury, it could not present any evidence that defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the collision. Defendant appealed, arguing that a retrial, even on the counts unrelated to intoxication, was barred by both the New Jersey and federal constitutions. Finding no constitutional violation, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Zadroga" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Suzanne Cardali and defendant Michael Cardali entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA), which was incorporated in their judgment of divorce in December 2006. The PSA provided that defendant’s obligation to pay plaintiff alimony would end upon her “cohabitation,” as defined by New Jersey law. In December 2020, defendant moved to terminate alimony, stating he believed that plaintiff and an individual named Bruce McDermott had been in “a relationship tantamount to marriage” for more than 8 years, over the course of which they attended family functions and other social events as a couple, memorialized their relationship on social media, and vacationed together. Defendant submitted the report of a private investigator indicating that plaintiff and McDermott were together on all of the 44 days that they were under surveillance, and that they were together overnight on more than half of those days. The investigator’s report included photographs of plaintiff and McDermott carrying groceries, bags of personal belongings, and laundry in and out of one another’s residences. The investigator stated plaintiff had access to McDermott’s home when McDermott was not at home. The trial court denied defendant’s application, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a movant need not present evidence on all of the “Konzelman” cohabitation factors in order to make a prima facile showing. “If the movant’s certification addresses some of the relevant factors and is supported by competent evidence, and if that evidence would warrant a finding of cohabitation if unrebutted, the trial court should find that the movable has presented prima facie evidence of cohabitation.” View "Cardali v. Cardali" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason O’Donnell was a candidate for mayor of Bayonne, New Jersey in 2018. During the campaign, he allegedly accepted $10,000 in cash in a paper Baskin- Robbins bag from an individual. The State argued that in exchange for the money, defendant promised to appoint the individual as tax counsel for the city. The State charged defendant under the bribery statute. Defendant did not win the election. He contended the applicable statute did not apply to him because it did not cover candidates who accepted improper payments but were not elected. The trial court dismissed the indictment, finding that N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(d) did not apply to defendant. The Appellate Division reversed. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed: the bribery statute applied to any “person” who accepts an improper benefit -- incumbents, candidates who win, and candidates who lose. The statute also expressly states that it is no defense to a prosecution if a person “was not qualified to act.” View "New Jersey v. O’Donnell" on Justia Law