Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Jamie and Rebecca Gannon, maintained that plaintiff Jamie Gannon developed a form of brain cancer because of a series of polio vaccines he was given as a child. Plaintiffs pursued various forms of relief in both federal and state courts. In the federal court action, they sought relief from the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, contending that the federal government was negligent in permitting the polio vaccine to be sold to the public. Plaintiffs' federal action was dismissed following a partial bench trial, based on the government's motion for judgment on partial findings, and that judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Proceeding on a parallel track, plaintiffs sought relief in New Jersey state courts. In the state court action, they raised product liability claims against defendants American Home Products, Inc., American Cyanamid Company, Lederle Laboratories, and Wyeth-Lederle Vaccines, which they asserted were the entities that had manufactured or distributed the polio vaccine given to plaintiff Jamie Gannon. In the state court litigation, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants based on two grounds: (1) the trial court concluded that plaintiffs lacked sufficient evidence to prove the identity of the manufacturer of the polio vaccine that plaintiff Jamie Gannon was given; (2) the trial court concluded that plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from bringing the cause of action based on the prior judgment entered in federal court. The Appellate Division reversed both aspects of the trial court's judgment and remanded the matter for further discovery and for trial. The panel first concluded that the trial court had utilized an incorrect standard in evaluating the sufficiency of the product identification evidence because it failed to afford plaintiffs the benefit of the inferences to which they were entitled as the non-moving parties in the context of a summary judgment motion. The panel then concluded that there were equitable considerations that militated against granting collateral estoppel effect to the judgment of the federal court, including the status of discovery in the state court matter and the pendency of similar state court litigation involving other plaintiffs. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the Appellate Division’s collateral estoppel analysis was in error, the Court reversed. View "Gannon v. American Products, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, the Pension and Health Care Benefits Act (Chapter 78) was enacted into law, a law that applied to all public employees, including Supreme Court justices and Superior Court judges then in service. Article VI, Section 6, Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution provides that justices and judges "shall receive for their services such salaries as may be provided by law, which shall not be diminished during the term of their appointment" (the No-Diminution Clause). The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Chapter 78 violated the New Jersey Constitution by diminishing the salaries of justices and judges during the terms of their appointments. Upon review, the Court concluded that it did. "Whatever good motives the Legislature might have, the Framers' message is simple and clear. Diminishing judicial salaries during a jurist's term of appointment is forbidden by the Constitution." View "DePascale v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

In this appeal the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a pet owner should be permitted to recover for emotional distress caused by observing the traumatic death of her pet. Upon review, the Court concluded was no basis in law or public policy to expand the traditionally and intentionally narrow grounds established in "Portee v. Jaffee," (84 N.J. 88 (1980)), which permits compensation for the traumatic loss of carefully defined classes of individuals, to include emotional distress claims arising from observing a pet's death. "Although humans may share an emotional and enduring bond with pets, permitting that bond to support a recovery for emotional distress would require the Court to vastly expand the classes of human relationships that would qualify for Portee damages or to elevate relationships with animals above those shared with other human beings." View "McDougall v. Lamm" on Justia Law

In this appeal the Supreme Court considered the extent to which the Board of Governors of Rutgers, the State University (University) complied with the requirements of the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA), and if its compliance was deficient, the extent to which plaintiff was entitled to a judicial remedy. Plaintiff Francis McGovern is an alumnus of the University who attended regularly the meetings of the University's Board of Governors. Concerned at what he perceived to be a persistent disregard on the part of the Board for OPMA's mandates, he filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs. The trial court ultimately granted defendants' motion to dismiss this complaint. Plaintiff appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the case for entry of an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint. View "McGovern, Jr. v. Rutgers, State University of New Jersey" on Justia Law

Defendant F.M. (Fernanda) appealed the termination of her parental rights to her now five-year-old daughter, Quinn, and four-year-old son, Troy, Jr. Both children were born of a relationship between Fernanda and T.J. (Troy). The family court found that Troy had committed an act of domestic violence against Fernanda, had an intractable drug-addiction problem, and suffered from mental illness that induced delusional thoughts that he was God. On this basis, the court considered Troy a danger to the physical well-being of the children. The termination of Fernanda's parental rights was premised on the court's findings that she was incapable and unwilling to protect her children from the dangers presented by Troy. The court barred Troy from having unsupervised contact with Quinn, the only child born of their relationship at the time. In violation of court orders and earlier consent agreements with the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), Fernanda allowed Troy to have access to Quinn in her home. Fernanda's inability to shield Quinn from her father led to the child's removal from the home and later to the removal of Troy, Jr. after his birth. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Fernanda never raised any objection to "care or custody" before the family court, she was barred from doing so on appeal based on laches. Furthermore, the Court upheld the family court's determination to terminate Fernanda's parental rights, deferring to the lower court's findings as adequately supported by the record. View "New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. F.M." on Justia Law

Defendant, who was convicted at trial of sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child, argued that the trial court and the Appellate Division, which affirmed his convictions and sentence, deprived him of a fair trial. Finding no merit to Defendant's arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "New Jersey v. J.D." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the nature and extent of fees that may be recovered from a litigant in a matrimonial dispute by an individual who has been appointed to serve as a parenting coordinator. More specifically, the Court addressed the circumstances under which and the basis upon which a litigant who raises a grievance against the parenting coordinator may be called upon to answer for fees incurred by the parenting coordinator in responding to a grievance; in resisting discovery demands relating to the grievance; in participating in discovery about the grievance; in pursuing enforcement of a fee award in the trial court; and in participating in the appellate process. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division to the extent that it affirmed the trial court's order awarding fees to the parenting coordinator for her work responding to the grievances and to the extent that it affirmed the trial court's rejection of the husband's argument that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his grievances; in all other respects the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed. View "Segal v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal concerned the validity of Chapter 37 of the Laws of 2009, "Kyleigh’s Law." Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that Chapter 37 is preempted by the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act; violates equal protection; and constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint and the Appellate Division affirmed. The panel found that the decal requirement was not preempted by the federal statute because disclosure of a person's age group is not "personal information" under the Act; that the decal requirement does not violate equal protection because it is a rational and suitable means of furthering a legitimate and appropriate government interest; and that the decal requirement does not give rise to an unreasonable search and seizure because a driver has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her age group and an officer's examination of the decal is not a "search." Upon review, the Supreme Court substantially affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that Chapter 37 is not preempted by federal law, does not violate equal protection, and does not give rise to an unconstitutional search and seizure. View "Trautmann v. Christie" on Justia Law

Police responded to an unverified 9-1-1 call reporting "a domestic dispute possibly involving a handgun" at a Carteret residence. Outside her apartment, Kamilah Richardson told the police that there was no problem in her home and that her eleven-year-old son was inside alone. Against her will, the police entered the apartment to assure the safety of the young boy. The police found him unharmed, without any visible injuries or signs of distress and no indication of a domestic disturbance inside the apartment. The police removed defendant Shareef Edmonds from an adjoining room, where he was watching television, and frisked him. Without evidence to corroborate the earlier domestic-violence report and without first securing a warrant, the police searched the area where defendant had been seated. A handgun was found under a pillow. Defendant, who was charged with the unlawful possession of the gun, claimed that the warrantless search yielding the weapon was unconstitutional. The trial court agreed, determining that the search of the home without a warrant was objectively unreasonable and could not be justified by either the emergency-aid or community-caretaking exception to the constitutional warrant requirement. The court suppressed the gun, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found credible evidence in the record to support the trial court's ruling. View "New Jersey v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether defendants were entitled to racial profiling discovery to challenge their convictions for attempted murder. The convictions relate to defendants' attack on a law enforcement officer after a motor vehicle stop. A New Jersey State Trooper stopped two Hispanic men for speeding on the New Jersey Turnpike in 1992. As the officer questioned the men immediately after the stop, they tried to overpower him. One defendant grabbed the officer around the neck and began to choke him, while the other tried to get control of the officer's firearm. During that struggle, the officer ultimately broke the second defendant's grip, retrieved his weapon, and fired twice, hitting defendants. The police later obtained a search warrant for defendants' car and found about fourteen ounces of cocaine in it. Both defendants were convicted for drug charges as well as attempted murder and related offenses. Years later, in a motion for post-conviction relief, defendants sought racial profiling discovery to prove that the stop was racially motivated. After a series of rulings at the trial and appellate levels, the Attorney General dismissed the drug convictions, leaving only defendants' convictions for attempted murder and related offenses. Defendants pressed for profiling discovery to challenge the remaining convictions. They contended that they needed the discovery to demonstrate that the drug evidence should have been suppressed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply in this case, there was no need for further discovery to determine whether the stop was in fact illegal. Furthermore, the Court concluded that defendants offered no viable theory to use possible evidence of racial profiling at trial. The Appellate Division order directing that discovery be produced was reversed. View "New Jersey v. Herrerra" on Justia Law