Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jean Millman worked as a sales representative for Plaintiff Target Industries, an industrial bag company. Plaintiff Thomas F. Fox was Target's director of development and purchased all of its assets after Target filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 1999. Plaintiffs asserted that Millman signed a confidentiality agreement when hired. Target terminated Millman on September 7, 2000. Several days later, Defendant Polymer Packaging Inc., an industrial bag company owned by Defendants Larry and William Lanham, hired Millman knowing that she had previously worked for Target. The Lanhams asserted that Millman assured them that she was not subject to the terms of either a confidentiality agreement or a non-compete clause. The Lanhams did not verify independently the truth of that assertion. The Lanhams conceded that Millman provided Polymer with a list of customers, but contended that she described it as a customer base that she had developed over the years, thereby implying that she had generated the list on her own. The list did not identify Target or bear any indication that it was not Millman's own, and the Lanhams did not further inquire into the genesis of the list. Millman sold products for Polymer to former Target customers and, before leaving Polymer in October 2004, was responsible for generating substantial sales for the company. The core dispute over the list gave rise to a series of rulings by the trial court prior to and following a jury verdict based on special interrogatories, all of which were affirmed by the Appellate Division. Plaintiffs' petition for certification to the Supreme Court asserted that it was error for the trial court to permit Defendants to raise the defense of laches. In particular, they argued that permitting a laches defense, in circumstances in which the statute of limitations had not expired, would erase clearly defined deadlines and therefore create ambiguity, lead to confusion and engender inconsistent results in application. Further, Plaintiffs asserted that the trial and appellate courts erred in rejecting the continuing violation doctrine, in misapplying settled precedents from the Supreme Court recognizing that customer lists are protected as trade secrets, and in failing to require Defendants to inquire independently about the proprietary nature of the customer list prior to utilizing it. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the equitable doctrine of laches could not be used to bar an action at law that was commenced within the time constraints of an applicable statute of limitations. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Fox v. Millman" on Justia Law

In 2004, an argument escalated into an altercation which left Julio Colon dead. Defendant Reynaldo Galicia and Hector Cordero drove from Vineland to Newark to confront Colon about a sport utility vehicle (SUV) that he had borrowed but failed to return. Cordero implored Colon to renew a romantic relationship the two shared, and both Cordero and Defendant begged Colon to return to Vineland with them. The three men battled over the keys to the SUV, and Colon exchanged punches and kicks with Cordero and Defendant. With Cordero in the passenger seat, Defendant twice drove his car toward Colon, prompting Colon to climb on the hood of the car and bang his fists on the window. As Colon clung to the car, Defendant accelerated and drove several blocks, running a stop sign. Defendant abruptly stopped the car, and Colon fell from the hood to the pavement. He sustained severe head injuries and died a week later. Tried separately from Cordero, Defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated manslaughter, second-degree aggravated assault, disorderly persons theft and weapons charges. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Appellate Division. At issue was New Jersey's "passion/provocation" statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the facts of this case, as developed in the trial record, did not support passion/provocation finding under the statute. The Court further held that the verdict sheet used at trial incorrectly guided the jury in its consideration of the passion/provocation issue, and reversed that portion of the Appellate Division's decision that deemed the sheet not to constitute error ("[n]otwithstanding the trial court's correct instruction to the jury that it could not find Defendant guilty of murder unless it concluded that passion/provocation did not apply, the verdict sheet improperly directed the jury not to consider the issue of passion/provocation unless it had already reached a guilty verdict on the murder charge." The Court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision that rejected Defendant's belated invocation of self-defense as a defense to the charges against him. View "New Jersey v. Galicia" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal was whether Defendant Buddy Randolph should have been permitted, at the remand for his resentencing, to present evidence of his rehabilitative efforts between his initial sentencing and resentencing. This case involved five multiple-count indictments against Defendant arising from separate handgun-related incidents. In exchange for the State's dismissal of the remaining counts, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of second-degree aggravated assault, one count of third-degree aggravated assault, five counts of third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and other weapons offenses. At the time of sentencing in 2002, Defendant was twenty years old, had not completed high school, and had a serious, untreated substance abuse problem. He had been arrested twelve times over a two-year period and had an extensive juvenile history. The court found that there were no mitigating factors; that aggravating factors three and nine applied (risk Defendant will reoffend and need to deter Defendant and others, and that those factors supported imposing a term greater than the presumptive on each count. The court imposed three consecutive maximum term sentences but did not include its reasons on the record. Defendant appealed and the matter was remanded for resentencing. The trial court re-imposed the same sentences. Defendant appealed, arguing that his sentence should be remanded again for a reweighing of aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether three consecutive maximum terms were justified. Upon review by the Supreme Court, the Court concluded that when a trial court reconsiders a sentence, it should view Defendant as he stands before the court on that day unless the remand order specifies a different and more limited resentencing proceeding such as correction of a plainly technical error or a directive to view the sentencing issue from the vantage point of the original sentencing. The Court did not infer such a limitation in the circumstances of this case; thus, Defendant was entitled to present evidence of his post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts at resentencing. View "New Jersey v. Randolph" on Justia Law

Defendants were charged with a series of robberies that took place in Middlesex, Essex, and Bergen Counties. Defendant Alnesha Minitee was apprehended almost immediately after the Bergen County incident, while Defendant Darnell Bland was arrested several months later when one of the victims of the Bergen County crime identified his picture in a photo array. When Minitee was arrested, she was standing next to a red SUV that the police had followed from the robbery scene. The search of that vehicle produced evidence linking the parties to the series of robberies. Defendants Bland and Minitee both moved to suppress the results of that search but were unsuccessful. At the trial of Defendant Minitee, which led to her conviction, the State introduced evidence that was obtained during the search of the SUV. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether, in the circumstances of this case, evidence obtained from the warrantless vehicle search conducted after the vehicle was towed to police headquarters should have been suppressed. Upon review, the Court held that under the circumstances of this case, the trial court correctly denied the Defendants' motion to suppress because the warrantless search of the SUV that was involved in the robbery fit within the scope of the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement. View "New Jersey v. Minitee" on Justia Law

In 2003, twelve year old C.A. engaged in instant message conversations with seventeen adult men; communications with six of those men included sexually explicit language. In her instant messages, C.A. did not mention Defendant or report any history of sexual abuse. Instead, C.A. laced her communications with sexual vulgarities in an attempt to impersonate a sexually experienced adult. C.A.'s mother discovered the instant messages. At a meeting attended by C.A.'s school guidance counselor, her parents, and her homeroom teacher, C.A., for the first time, accused Defendant of sexual abuse. Defendant was subsequently indicted on one count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, six counts of second-degree sexual assault, and three counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. Some of these charges related to Defendant's former stepdaughter and the trials were ultimately severed. Defendant consistently maintained that his relationship with C.A. was entirely appropriate and denied any sexual abuse. Defendant moved to compel production of C.A.'s instant messages. The trial court found that the instant messages were protected and permitted their limited use at trial only for the limited purpose of explaining a physical injury to C.A. in the event that the State were to proffer an expert to prove such injury. The trial court also ruled that the fact that C.A. had sent and received explicit messages could be admitted to show that C.A.'s allegations "did not arise until the victim had been officially confronted by the authorities." A jury convicted Defendant on the single count of first-degree sexual assault and three counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant was sentenced to a twenty-year prison term with a ten-year period of parole ineligibility for the single count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, and a concurrent ten-year prison sentence for the remaining counts. In 2011, an Appellate Division panel affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification "limited to the issue of whether Defendant should have been permitted to introduce the sexually explicit content of the instant messages sent by the minor, female victim to other adult males." Upon review, the Court held that the content of the instant messages written by and to the victim in this case constituted "sexual conduct" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7(f), and that content was therefore protected by New Jersey's Rape Shield Law. Any probative value of the content of the victim's messages was substantially outweighed by its prejudice. View "New Jersey v. J.A.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mazdabrook Commons Homeowner's Association, Inc. manages a common-interest community in which individual owners agree to certain common rules and restrictions for the benefit of the entire group. The Rules and Regulations of the community bar signs except as provided in a "Declaration." Defendant Wasim Khan lived in a planned townhouse community managed by Mazdabrook Commons. In 2005, Defendant ran for Parsippany Town Council and posted two signs in support of his candidacy at his private residence: one inside the window of his townhouse and another inside the door. Mazdabrook notified Defendant that the signs violated the association's rules and ordered their removal. Mazdabrook's regulations banned all residential signs except "For Sale" signs. Upon review, the Supreme Court "balance[ed] the minimal interference with Mazdabrook's private property interest against [Defendant's] free speech right to post political signs on his own property" and found that the sign policy in question violated the free speech clause of the State Constitution. View "Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners' Ass'n v. Khan" on Justia Law

In 1998, Dave Adams (fictitious name) filed a complaint against his uncle Wayne Anderson (fictitious name) alleging Anderson had sexually assaulted him at various times when Adams was a minor. Adams sought compensatory and punitive damages, interest, and costs of suit. Anderson answered, denying Adams's allegations and raising the statute of limitations as a defense. He also counterclaimed for frivolous litigation, defamation (both libel and slander), infliction of emotional distress, and violations of his "statutory and constitutional rights." In 2000, a "Lopez" hearing was held to determine whether to grant Anderson's motion for summary judgment. The Court dismissed Adams' complaint because it was filed nine years after the "normal" statute of limitations would have run without sufficient justification. Anderson obtained a jury award of damages and interest, and found that Adams' statements constituted false and defamatory statements. No appeal ensued. Subsequently, Adams declared bankruptcy to avoid paying the damages award against him. The bankruptcy court determined the judgment was non-dischargeable. Anderson obtained a contempt order against Adams for failing to comply with post-judgment discovery requests. While fighting the contempt charge, Adams created a website on which he recounted his claims of sexual abuse by Anderson, including direct quotes from the trial transcript and allegations of perjury and intimidation of a witness. Anderson's attorney asked Adams's attorney to shut down the site because it contained "per se defamatory statements" along with the same allegations made in the earlier lawsuit. He also threatened to file a defamation suit if Adams did not close the website. Adams received notification of the letter on February 16 and closed the website on February 21. In March 2007, Anderson filed a new complaint alleging that Adams's website contained defamatory statements. Adams failed to answer and Anderson moved for the entry of default, which was granted. Thereafter, he moved for the entry of default judgment. With that motion pending, in May 2008, Adams entered a special appearance challenging service of process, seeking to vacate the entry of default, and requesting the court to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The judge granted the motion to vacate the default, but denied the motion to dismiss. In December 2008, Anderson moved for summary judgment. In January 2009, the judge denied the motion, despite finding that Adams's statements were defamatory per se because they accused Anderson of having committed a criminal offense and of engaging in serious sexual misconduct. The judge concluded that he could not permit the jury to evaluate the claim without any evidence of cognizable damages. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the vitality of the doctrine of presumed damages: if defamatory, constituted libel rather than slander, and whether it is an open question of whether "the doctrine of presumed damages should apply to claims made by a private-figure plaintiff when no public interest is implicated." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that where a plaintiff does not proffer evidence of actual damage to reputation, the doctrine of presumed damages permits him to survive a motion for summary judgment to obtain nominal damages, thus vindicating his good name. View "W.J.A. v. D.A." on Justia Law

The issues in this appeal were whether, pursuant to "Contey v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.," 136 N.J. 582 (1994) or N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1, an electric utility company is entitled to immunity for any negligence in its placement of a pole along a public roadway; and whether a county is entitled to immunity for any negligence on its part pursuant to the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3. Early one winter morning, plaintiff John Seals was driving his pickup truck and descended a curved, snow-covered road in Washington Township that is owned and maintained by Morris County. Due to the road conditions and despite applying the brakes, plaintiff could not negotiate the curve and the vehicle struck an electric utility pole located several feet from the roadway. He alleged that the County negligently maintained a dangerous roadway condition and that the electric utility company negligently placed the pole. The trial court denied defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court distinguished "Contey," in which the Supreme Court held that a telephone company that placed its pole in compliance with a municipal ordinance owed no duty to a motorist. The trial court reasoned that because the County did not set standards for placing electric poles, and was not statutorily required to do so, the utility is subject to a negligence standard; and although "Contey" did not impose a duty on the County to conduct a safety study, it was not shielded by the TCA because it took "no action" to regulate placement of electric poles. The Appellate Division reversed the denial of summary judgment for JCP&L and vacated the denial of summary judgment for the County. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that neither "Contey" nor N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1 conferred immunity on the utility for its negligence, if any, in placing the electric pole. If a governmental entity directs a utility where to place a pole (as in "Contey") the utility is immune from liability. When there is no governmental dictate, ordinary negligence standards apply. A utility will be liable if it places or maintains an electric pole where there is an unreasonable and unnecessary danger to travelers upon the highway. Whether the County is entitled to TCA immunity was remanded for further proceedings. View "Seals v. Morris County" on Justia Law

This dispute arose in the context of a large construction project known as the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail Transit System. Plaintiff Twenty-First Century Rail Corporation served as the prime contractor for the Project. In January 2002, Twenty-First Century, acting through its contracting affiliate, Washington Group, entered into a contract with Frontier-Kemper/Shea/Bemo, Joint Venture (FKSB). Pursuant to that contract, FKSB was responsible for construction of “the civil, electrical, mechanical and emergency system portions of the tunnel, station, plaza, and elevators” for the (N30) Project. In 2004, FKSB retained Bruce Meller and his law firm, Peckar & Abramson, in connection with the work that FKSB was performing on the N30 Project. In particular, Richard Raab, who was an officer of FKSB and who served as its representative, first telephoned Meller in February 2004 and arranged to meet with him at the Peckar & Abramson offices. Raab signed a retainer agreement on behalf of FKSB, pursuant to which the lawyers were asked to provide FKSB with certain legal advice. The law firm provided its opinion on the issues about which it had been consulted in the form of a letter. A year later, Meller received a phone call from Paul Killian, Esquire. Killian told Meller that he was representing FKSB and wanted Meller’s impressions of Washington Group because FKSB was considering whether to enter into an agreement with it. Thereafter, the lawsuit at issue in this appeal was filed. Twenty-First Century, for which Washington Group was the contracting affiliate, and FKSB alleged that PB Americas was responsible for the N30 Project delays and the resulting costs due to defective project designs and slow responses to requests for corrections. Meller’s law firm, Peckar & Abramson, represented PB Americas. PKSB filed a motion to disqualify Peckar & Abramson based on the prior representation. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that many of the documents that would have been provided to the law firm for its use in preparing the opinion letter were publicly available, the representation there was insignificant and immaterial, and the matters were not substantially related. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that disqualification of the attorney for PB Americas was warranted in this case because details relating to the construction project, the relationship among the parties, and the attorney’s prior representation of an adverse party, FKSB, demonstrate that the subsequent representation was prohibited by RPC 1.9(a). View "Twenty-FirstCentury Rail Corp. v. New Jersey Transit Corp." on Justia Law

In June 2005, police discovered Defendant Juan Pablo Santos naked and in bed with a fourteen-year-old girl. He was arrested and, after receiving "Miranda" warnings, admitted that he lived with the girl and that they had an ongoing sexual relationship. Santos was indicted by a grand jury on one count of second-degree sexual assault and one count of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. The State proposed a plea agreement under which Santos would plead guilty to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child in exchange for the State’s agreement to drop the sexual assault charge and recommend that his term of imprisonment be limited to time served. After consulting with his attorney , Defendant decided to accept the deal. Less than three weeks after Defendant was sentenced according to the terms of the plea agreement he negotiated with the State, the United States Department of Homeland Security removed him to Mexico based on this criminal conviction. Defendant illegally reentered the United States. He was found and removed again to Mexico. In 2009, Defendant filed a post-conviction relief petition alleging that he had not read, and his attorney had not explained, the plea form before he signed it, and that his plea lacked an adequate factual basis. The PCR court determined that Defendant's allegations were sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and that Defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, which the court scheduled. Before the hearing, Defendant filed a motion seeking leave to testify telephonically from Mexico. The State opposed the motion, pointing out that telephonic testimony would deny the court the opportunity to evaluate Defendant's demeanor and assess his credibility. The court granted Defendant's motion and turned to examine the mechanics of how Defendant's testimony would be taken. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the grant of an evidentiary hearing in which Defendant was to be permitted to provide telephonic testimony must be reversed and the matter remanded for full reconsideration by the post-conviction relief (PCR) court as to whether Defendant could meet the standard for entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. View "New Jersey v. Santos" on Justia Law