Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This was the second time defendant James Robinson appeared before the Supreme Court concerning his conviction for two drug transactions in December 2003 and January 2004. In "New Jersey v. Robinson," (200 N.J. 1, 18 (2009)), the Court held that a twenty- to thirty-second delay between the police knocking and announcing their presence to execute a search warrant and the forcible entry into defendant's apartment was not unreasonable. Defendant then filed a motion to reduce his fifteen-year term of imprisonment subject to a five-year period of parole ineligibility. The trial court had imposed two mandatory extended terms on one count of second-degree distribution of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) within 500 feet of public property and one count of third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute. Treating the motion as an application to correct an illegal sentence, the trial court held that the mandatory repeat drug offender extended term should not have been imposed on the second-degree offense. The trial court then imposed a discretionary persistent offender extended term sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment subject to a five-year period of parole ineligibility on the second-degree offense and a mandatory repeat drug offender extended term of seven years' imprisonment subject to a three-year period of parole ineligibility on the third-degree offense. Defendant argued that this sentence also was illegal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2) barred the imposition of a discretionary extended term when the prosecutor has requested one and the trial court is obliged to impose a mandatory extended term on another offense in the same proceeding. "The statutes governing sentencing provide sufficient flexibility to fashion an appropriate sentence to address the repeat offender without resorting to multiple extended terms. To that end, when a defendant is eligible for imposition of both a discretionary extended term and a mandatory extended term, the State may elect which extended term it wishes to pursue." View "New Jersey v. Robinson" on Justia Law

A father, J.G., was incarcerated six months after the birth of his daughter. He was released five years and four months later, while a guardianship trial was in progress. The birth mother surrendered her rights in favor of her own mother. J.G. appealed the termination of his parental rights to the daughter. The trial court found that the Division of Youth and Family Services failed to prove its case for termination of the father’s rights by clear and convincing evidence. The majority of the Appellate Division panel reversed and entered judgment in favor of the Division. Judge Jonathan Harris dissented, agreeing with the trial court's conclusions drawn from factual findings. Upon careful consideration of the facts presented at trial, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division majority, reinstated the judgment of the trial court, and remanded the case to the Family Part for further proceedings. View "New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Svcs. v. J.G." on Justia Law

A family-care physician prescribed a powerful medication to treat a patient who suffered from chronic back pain. The patient was known to abuse alcohol and drugs. The complaint alleged that the physician breached the governing duty of care by failing to protect the patient from self-injury. The issue this appeal presented to the Supreme Court centered on the jury’s no-cause verdict and various portions of the trial court's charge on causation. The trial court charged the jury on "preexisting disease or condition" (a "Scafidi" charge). The trial court, however, never identified in its jury charge the preexisting condition or related the facts to the law as required by the Model Jury Charge. Furthermore, this case did not involve the ineluctable progression of a disease on its own. "The ultimate harm caused to the patient was from her own conduct - whether volitional or not - after the physician prescribed the [patch]." For that reason, the court also charged the jury on superseding/intervening causation and avoidable consequences. In a split decision, the Appellate Division overturned the verdict and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court erred in giving the Scafidi charge and failed to articulate for the jury the nature of the preexisting condition or explain the proofs and parties' arguments in relation to the law. The panel majority also determined that the court should not have given a superseding/intervening cause charge because the general charge on foreseeability was sufficient. Additionally, it pointed out that the court had mistakenly included the concept of "but for" causation in a case involving concurrent causes. The Supreme Court agreed with the panel majority that the trial court misapplied the Scafidi charge and that the trial court failed to explain the complex concepts of causation in relation to the proofs and legal theories advanced by the parties. The Court disagreed with the panel majority that the charge on superseding/intervening causation was unnecessary in light of the general charge on foreseeability, and concluded the "but for" causation reference apparently was mistake to which no objection was made by either party. The Court therefore affirmed and modified the Appellate Division's and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Komlodi v. Picciano" on Justia Law

Zagami, LLC owned the Landmark Americana Tap and Grill in the Borough of Glassboro. In 2006, Zagami applied to the Borough for a renewal of its liquor license. Luis Perez, a citizen residing in Glassboro, opposed the renewal. In a letter to the Glassboro Borough Council, Perez complained of several serious infractions allegedly committed by Zagami, including serving alcohol to minors and bribing public officials with free meals and drinks. As a result of those allegations, the Council scheduled a liquor license renewal hearing and invited Perez and Zagami to participate. At the hearing, Perez testified that, among other things, Landmark flouted fire-safety regulations, served alcohol to visibly intoxicated patrons, and encouraged bouncers to physically harm rowdy customers. Zagami disputed the allegations, calling them unsubstantiated. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Council voted to renew Zagami’s liquor license. A year later, Zagami filed a defamation complaint against Perez for statements that he made during the liquor license renewal hearing. Perez filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that his remarks were made in the course of a quasi-judicial proceeding and thus were entitled to absolute immunity. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the Appellate Division denied leave to appeal. The Supreme Court granted Perez’s motion for leave to appeal to this Court and summarily remanded the matter to the Appellate Division for consideration on the merits. On remand, the Appellate Division found that Perez’s statements during the liquor license proceeding were entitled to absolute immunity and dismissed the defamation complaint with prejudice. Perez filed a complaint against Zagami in 2010 for malicious use of process., alleging Zagami had instituted its defamation complaint as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) designed to punish Perez for speaking out against Zagami at the liquor license renewal hearing and to discourage his participation in future public proceedings. Zagami filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and Perez filed a cross-motion to amend his complaint to include as defendant the law firm retained by Zagami during the defamation suit. Finding that Zagami’s defamation suit was supported by probable cause, the trial court granted Zagami’s motion to dismiss the malicious use of process claim and denied Perez’s cross-motion to amend the complaint. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed both determinations of the trial court. The panel determined that Zagami’s defamation suit was not supported by probable cause and that Zagami should have been aware that Perez’s statements were privileged at the time it filed suit. Accordingly, the panel reversed the trial court’s grant of Zagami’s motion to dismiss the malicious use of process claim. The Supreme Court granted certification to review only whether the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA) permitted a private right of action against an individual who was not acting under color of law. The Court concluded that a private CRA cause of action only may be pursued against persons acting under “color of law”; the Attorney General, however, is authorized to file CRA actions against persons whether or not they acted under "color of law." View "Perez v. Zagami, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the New Jersey Supreme Court centered on the validity of a warrantless search of the bedroom of defendant Byseem Coles, "nine days shy of twenty years old" when the events pertinent to this appeal occurred. Defendant lived with other family members in his aunt’s home where he had his own bedroom. The bedroom door had a padlock on it to keep others, especially young children living in the household, from getting into his private belongings. While out one evening, defendant was detained by a police officer investigating a reported robbery in the area. After a showup in which the robbery victim failed to identify defendant as the perpetrator, and after a search of defendant’s person that produced no evidence linking defendant to the crime, defendant’s detention was continued because he had no identifying documents on him. At defendant’s urging, two officers walked a few houses over from where defendant was being held in a patrol car to ask one of defendant’s relatives to confirm that he lived at the address he had given the police. Instead of merely confirming defendant’s identity and that he lived in the home, the inquiries by the police turned into a concerted effort to obtain defendant’s aunt’s permission to search defendant’s bedroom. During the ensuing search, weapons unrelated to the robbery under investigation were found in his room. Upon review of defendant's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded defendant’s detention was unlawful. The police lacked probable cause to continue his detention after the showup and the search of defendant produced no evidence linking him to the crime. Although the police officers were entitled to a reasonable, but brief, opportunity to confirm defendant’s identity, that identification was accomplished at the threshold of defendant’s home. When the police efforts turned immediately thereafter to securing from defendant’s aunt consent to search defendant’s bedroom, their actions were premised on the belief that the man held in the patrol car was Byseem Coles. However, at that point, defendant’s detention ceased to be lawful. The interactions with defendant’s aunt cannot be disentangled from the unlawful detention of defendant in a patrol car parked a few houses down the street. Thus, the objective reasonableness of this asserted consent-based search founders on the unlawfulness of the police detention of defendant in the totality of these circumstances. View "New Jersey v. Coles" on Justia Law

An investigation of a reported shooting in a part of town led Pennsville police to the house in which police knew defendant Michael Lamb had resided at one time. Defendant's stepfather emphatically informed police that they were not welcome on his property or in his house. Defendant’s girlfriend appeared at the door and left the house. She supplied information to police that provided probable cause for defendant’s arrest and confirmed his presence in the house. Later, defendant’s stepfather agreed to leave the house, and soon thereafter, defendant left the house at the insistence of his mother. Defendant’s mother permitted police officers to enter the house and agreed to a search of the room where her son and his girlfriend were staying. Police located a loaded handgun and ammunition similar to the equipment used in the earlier shooting. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was defendant's challenge to the warrantless search of the house. The Court concluded after review that the consent to search provided by defendant’s mother was knowing, voluntary, and valid. The absence of defendant and his stepfather from the home permitted defendant’s mother to provide or withhold consent. View "New Jersey v. Lamb" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether a chief municipal court judge whose son became a member of the police department in the same municipality could hear cases involving that police department. The Supreme Court held that, "consistent with the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a municipal court judge whose child becomes a police officer in the same municipality may not hear any cases involving that police department. The judge also may not supervise other judges who hear those cases." View "In the Matter of Advisory Letter No. 7-11 of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Extrajudicial Activities" on Justia Law

The taxpayer, Bocceli, LLC, is the taxpaying sublessee of a commercial property owned by Penns Grove Associates in the Township of Carney's Point. The Township's tax assessment list incorrectly listed Prime Accounting Department as the owner. In 2007, the Township wrote to Prime Accounting requesting updated income and expense information for purposes of assessing the value of the property. Prime Management's interest in the property transferred to a new lessee, WIH Hotels, Inc. That inquiry eventually reached WIH, which submitted a late response and paid taxes for 2007. WIH entered into a sublease with Bocceli, which became responsible for property tax payments. In 2008, the managing member of Bocceli visited the tax collector's office, made a tax payment, and requested that the tax assessment list be changed to designate "Bocceli, LLC" as the owner and that notices be sent to the property. According to the Township, the clerk advised the managing member that a deed needed to be presented to the assessor's office to change the list. No deed was presented, and Prime Accounting remained on the list. The tax assessor sent the annual request to Prime Accounting. When it was returned undelivered, the Township reviewed its records and discovered that WIH had responded to the prior year's request. It sent another request to WIH, which did not forward it to Bocceli. Later that year, the tax collector advised the tax assessor of the address that the managing member had provided, but it continued to list Prime Accounting as the owner. In early 2009, the assessor notified Bocceli of the annual tax assessment. Thus, at that time, the assessor was aware of Bocceli's responsibility to pay property taxes and used Bocceli's mailing address to serve the notice of assessment that prompted this tax appeal. The tax assessment list continued to designate Prime Accounting as the entity responsible to pay the taxes. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether a tax appeal complaint timely filed, but one which did not name the aggrieved taxpayer as the plaintiff, should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded that Bocceli's misdesignation of the plaintiff did not deprive the tax court of subject matter jurisdiction. "The defect in the complaint did not prejudice the Township and [could] be corrected by an amended complaint that relate[d] back to the filing of the original complaint." View "PrimeAccounting Department v. Township of Carney's Point" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Valeria Headen worked on a full-time ten-month basis as a food service worker for defendant Jersey City Board of Education (Board). She filed a complaint against the Board in 2009 alleging that because the District is governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Act (Act), she and potential class members were entitled to vacation leave under its provisions. Those provisions grant vacation leave to full-time "political subdivision employees" based on years of service, and they direct that a proportionate amount of leave be provided for part-time employees. Plaintiff's terms and conditions of employment were governed by a collectively negotiated agreement (CNA). Under the CNA, Headen and her fellow ten-month employee class members were classified as salaried employees. After discovery was completed, Headen filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and the Board filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Board's motion and denied Headen's motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that provisions of the Act (N.J.S.A. 11A:6-3) did not apply to full-time ten-month school district employees. It reasoned that the term "political subdivision" in the vacation leave provision did not include school districts, and it concluded that laws addressing vacation leave in Title 18, suggested that the Legislature did not intend for Title 11A, Chapter 6 to apply to school district employees. Upon review on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act's paid vacation leave provisions applied to career service, non-teaching staff employees of school districts that have opted to be part of the civil service system, including ten-month employees such as plaintiff Valeria Headen. "Because the Act and its implementing regulations establish a floor for the amount of leave to be provided to such employees and a collectively negotiated agreement provided Headen with more than the minimum paid vacation leave to which she was entitled under the Act, her claims were properly dismissed." View "Headen v. Jersey City Board of Education" on Justia Law

Bonita Pitt visited inmate defendant Ralph Sowell in a prison area monitored by security cameras. Sergeant Salvatore D'Amico of the Department of Corrections (DOC) observed Pitt and defendant lean forward. Defendant appeared to kiss Pitt on the cheek. She lifted her shirt slightly, reached into her left front pocket, took out an item, and placed it in defendant's hand. D'Amico then saw defendant lean back and place the item into a bag of potato chips. D'Amico immediately radioed an officer to seize defendant and the bag of chips. When the officer approached defendant, D'Amico, still monitoring the security cameras, saw defendant place the bag of chips under the seat next to him, and an officer recover the bag of chips. D'Amico emptied the contents of the bag of chips, which contained a balloon with thirty envelopes of heroin inside it. After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant admitted to a DOC investigator that he received drugs during the visit. Defendant was charged with drug offenses. At trial, D'Amico testified as to his observations, and the State played the videotape recording of the entire incident. A DOC investigator was accepted as the State's expert in "narcotics investigation." During testimony, the expert opined that "an exchange of narcotics took place." The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court centered on whether the State properly elicited expert testimony in response to a hypothetical question that in this case, "an exchange of narcotics took place." Upon review, the Court concluded that the expert's opinion was improper because it related to a straightforward factual allegation that was not beyond the understanding of an average juror and because the expert referred to facts not contained in the hypothetical. The Court affirmed defendant's conviction however, concluding that under the plain error standard, there was overwhelming evidence in the record of his quilt. View "New Jersey v. Sowell" on Justia Law