Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted defendant Kelvin Williams of first-degree robbery based on evidence that he entered a bank, told a teller he possessed a bomb, and demanded money. Defendant made no gesture as he made his threat, and a bomb was not displayed. Defendant was dressed in a hooded sweatshirt and pants, and his hands were not visible. It was undisputed that defendant was not armed with a bomb. The issue in this appeal was whether defendant’s demand of money from the bank employee while telling her he was armed with a bomb, in the absence of any gesture suggesting the truth of his remark, constituted sufficient evidence of an immediate threat to use a deadly weapon. The Appellate Division concluded that the failure of defendant to make some gesture suggesting he was armed with a bomb did not allow a finding that defendant threatened the immediate use of a deadly weapon. The appellate panel therefore overturned the jury verdict. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Division: "Well-documented events since 2001 have made the public painfully aware that bombs can be secreted in cunning ways [. . .] and can be exploded by various means, including by timers and remote devices. A defendant who makes a credible threat that he is armed with a bomb may be taken at his word for purposes of first-degree robbery. So long as the victim had an actual and reasonable belief that a defendant was armed with a bomb based on the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s words, conduct, and dress, a gesture is not a prerequisite for a finding that defendant threatened the immediate use of a deadly weapon." The Court reversed the Appellate Division, reinstated defendant’s conviction of first-degree robbery, and remanded the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the remaining issue not addressed in defendant’s appeal. View "New Jersey v. Williams" on Justia Law

At trial on attempted murder and related charges, a State's witness against defendant Vonte Skinner was permitted to read to the jury, at great length, violent and profane rap lyrics that had been written by defendant before the events at issue. There was no assertion at trial that the violence-laden verses were in any way revealing of some specific factual connection that strongly tied defendant to the underlying incident. Nevertheless, the State maintained that the lyrics helped to demonstrate defendant’s "motive and intent" in connection with the offense because the rap lyrics addressed a street culture of violence and retribution that fit with the State’s view of defendant’s role in the attempted murder. The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s conviction based on the admission of the rap lyrics into evidence in defendant’s trial. In reaching its conclusion, the panel used an N.J.R.E. 404(b) analysis and determined that the prejudicial impact of defendant’s rap lyrics vastly outweighed any potential probative value. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that admission of the lyrics constituted highly prejudicial evidence against him that bore little or no probative value as to any motive or intent behind the attempted murder offense with which he was charged. "The admission of defendant’s inflammatory rap verses, a genre that certain members of society view as art and others view as distasteful and descriptive of a mean-spirited culture, risked poisoning the jury against defendant. Fictional forms of inflammatory self-expression, such as poems, musical compositions, and other like writings about bad acts, wrongful acts, or crimes, are not properly evidential unless the writing reveals a strong nexus between the specific details of the artistic composition and the circumstances of the underlying offense for which a person is charged, and the probative value of that evidence outweighs its apparent prejudicial impact. In the weighing process, trial courts should consider the existence of other evidence that can be used to make the same point. When admissible, such evidence should be carefully redacted to ensure that irrelevant and inflammatory content is not needlessly presented to the jury." View "New Jersey v. Skinner" on Justia Law

Malik & Son, LLC owned property in the Borough of Merchantville. The Property contained a fifty-four unit apartment building and had been designated by the Borough as an area in need of redevelopment. Malik assumed a mortgage loan issued by LB-RPR REO Holdings, LLC’s (LB) predecessor, and defaulted on the loan. LB’s predecessor in interest filed a complaint to foreclose the mortgage, and Malik did not file an answer. In early 2011, the court entered a final judgment of foreclosure. LB’s predecessor in interest transferred all its rights and interest in the Property to LB the next day. Once it acquired the loan, LB had a receiver appointed for the Property and made substantial repairs to the building. In an effort to protect its interest in the Property, LB sought, and the court entered, an order that directed that Malik could not sell the Property without the express approval of the sale price by LB. Throughout 2010 and 2011, the Borough pursued a plan to redevelop the Property. The Borough designated Citadel Wellwood, LLC (Citadel) as the redeveloper of the Property, and adopted the redevelopment and rehabilitation plan for the Property. Months before Citadel was designated as the redeveloper of the Property, Citadel entered a contract to purchase it for $1,250,000. Richard DePetro, the principal of Citadel, cancelled the contract after seeking a $200,000 reduction in the purchase price due to the deteriorated condition of the building. Malik rejected the offer, citing the amount due on the LB mortgage. Prior to cancelling the contract, Citadel contacted LB and offered to purchase the Property for $1,250,000 if LB agreed to a short sale to permit satisfaction of other liens. In the course of those discussions, DePetro mentioned to LB’s representative that the Borough would probably condemn the Property. In June 2011, in response to an inquiry from an LB representative, the Borough denied any intention to condemn the Property. However, once the Borough adopted the redevelopment plan on September 26, 2011, the Borough engaged an appraiser to ascertain the fair market value of the Property. The appraiser opined that as of August 24, 2011, its fair market value was $0. He calculated that value because the cost to renovate the Property far exceeded its market value following renovation and rehabilitation. The appraiser also assigned a fair market value of $270,000 without renovations. In a letter dated November 11, 2011, the Borough offered Malik $270,000 for the Property. Malik declined the Borough's offer. That same date, LB’s attorney contacted the Borough, expressing its surprise that the Borough intended to condemn the Property and noted that the Borough’s offer was far less than the price offered by Citadel in June 2011. LB’s attorney informed the Borough that it had obtained a final judgment of foreclosure and that the Property was scheduled to be sold at Sheriff’s Sale. Noting that it would soon own the Property, LB expressed its desire to meet with the Borough to discuss reasonable compensation for the Property. In this appeal, the issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether N.J.S.A. 20:3-6 required a condemning authority to engage in bona fide negotiations with a mortgage holder that has obtained a final judgment of foreclosure for the property sought to be condemned. In this case, the condemning authority initiated eminent domain proceedings after the property owner rejected its offer to acquire the property, just days before the holder of the foreclosure judgment expected the property to be sold at a Sheriff’s Sale. The judgment holder contended it was the real party in interest, and that the condemning authority had an obligation to negotiate with it rather than the property owner prior to initiating condemnation proceedings. The trial court concluded that the condemning authority had properly submitted the offer to the owner of record, and the subsequent rejection of the offer satisfied the statutory requirement of bona fide negotiations prior to the exercise of eminent domain authority. The trial court also determined that the condemning authority had no obligation to advise the foreclosure judgment holder of its intention to condemn or to engage in bona fide negotiations with it. In a reported decision, the Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "Borough of Merchantville v. Malik & Son, LLC" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant, Bryden Williams, of murder, third-degree possession of a handgun without a carrying permit, and second-degree possession of a handgun with the purpose to use it unlawfully against another. In 2006, Joel Whitley, Omar Boyd, and Boyd's girlfriend attended a party at Dynesha Gibson's apartment. Whitley became intoxicated and involved in an altercation with another party guest, and was asked to leave. A short time later, Whitley realized he had left his cell phone at the party, and he and Boyd went back to retrieve it. Gibson refused to return the phone and Whitley started kicking the apartment's front door. Gibson told Whitley and Boyd that they should leave before defendant arrived. As Whitley and Boyd were leaving, defendant arrived. He exited his car and, armed with a handgun, aimed it at Boyd and asked, "What's the problem?" After Gibson yelled from the window that Whitley had "disrespected" either her or her sister, defendant put the gun to Whitley's head and forced him into an adjacent alley. Defendant then pointed the gun at Whitley's chest and fired once, killing him. At trial, defendant asserted that he acted in self-defense. He claimed that when he arrived at Gibson's apartment, he saw Whitley banging on the apartment's door and told him to get off the porch. As Whitley stepped off of the porch, defendant claimed that Whitley pulled out a gun and pointed it toward him. Defendant claimed that he struggled with Whitley and that as they wrestled, a single shot was fired with the gun still in Whitley's hand. Defendant stated that he never touched the gun's handle and was trying to disarm Whitley when the gun fired. Dr. Zhongxue Hua, the Chief Medical Examiner of Union County and an expert in forensic pathology, testified as to the cause and manner of Whitley's death. Dr. Hua did not perform or assist in the autopsy. The doctor that had performed the autopsy was not called as a witness, and defendant did not object to Dr. Hua's testimony or qualifications. On cross-examination, defense counsel pursued a line of questioning consistent with a theory of self-defense. Based on gunpowder residue discovered on Whitley's clothing, defense counsel elicited from Dr. Hua that the gun was fired several inches away from Whitley. Defense counsel also had Dr. Hua explain that the bullet took a downward path through Whitley's body. In response to defense questioning, Dr. Hua stated that if Whitley had been holding the gun's handle when it discharged, gunpowder residue would have been found on his hand, but that the autopsy report did not indicate whether Whitley's hand was tested for gunpowder residue. Ultimately, the jury rejected self-defense as a justification for the shooting and found defendant guilty of all charges. Defendant appealed, claiming that his right to confrontation had been violated. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division rejected defendant's claim. The Supreme Court affirmed: defendant's failure to object to the admission of the testimony on confrontation grounds and his decision to cross-examine the medical examiner constituted a waiver of his right of confrontation. View "New Jersey v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant Julie Michaels was charged with second-degree vehicular homicide, third-degree assault by auto, and four other related charges, as well as motor vehicle citations, including driving while intoxicated, reckless driving, possession of a controlled dangerous substance in a motor vehicle, and possession of an open container of alcohol. Laboratory results of gas chromatography/mass spectrometry tests performed on defendant's blood sample, which was drawn at a hospital the evening of her motor vehicle accident, revealed the presence of cocaine, alprazolam, and benzoethylene (a cocaine metabolite). At trial, the State introduced testimony from Edward Barbieri, Ph.D., an assistant supervisor and toxicology technical leader from the private laboratory that had performed the testing on defendant's blood sample and issued a report certifying the test results. Dr. Barbieri was responsible for supervising the technicians and analysts who were involved in the gas chromatography/mass spectrometry testing. Over defendant's objection, the report was admitted into evidence without the testimony of the fourteen individuals who had performed various tasks associated with the testing procedures. A jury convicted defendant on all counts, and the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction. Defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that her Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were violated because the laboratory report was admitted, although defendant had not had the opportunity to confront each laboratory employee who participated in the testing that generated the results contained in the report. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the admission of the laboratory report did not violate defendant's confrontation rights. The laboratory supervisor (who testified and was available for cross-examination) was knowledgeable about the testing process that he was responsible for supervising. "We recognize that the forensic report in issue is 'testimonial' and that it is the type of document subject to the Confrontation Clause. [. . .] However, in this matter we join the many courts that have concluded that a defendant's confrontation rights are not violated if a forensic report is admitted at trial and only the supervisor/reviewer testifies and is available for cross-examination, when the supervisor is knowledgeable about the testing process, reviews scientific testing data produced, concludes that the data indicates the presence of drugs, and prepares, certifies, and signs a report setting forth the results of the testing." View "New Jersey v. Michaels" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with allegedly driving off with an Audi A4 that had been left outside a restaurant in Wallington with the keys in the ignition. After the owner saw that his vehicle was missing, he called 9-1-1 and reported the vehicle stolen. Approximately one hour later, a Fair Lawn police officer saw an Audi being driven in a very aggressive manner. The officer turned on the patrol car's lights and siren, and began to chase. But the Audi accelerated to 130 to 140 miles per hour and the chase was abandoned. Subsequently, a Clifton detective took up the pursuit. While seeking to avoid the pursuit, the driver of the Audi hit a curb, turned into a shopping center, struck a car, and stopped. The occupants of the vehicle ran out of the car. The detective chased and captured the driver, defendant. Defendant was charged with third-degree theft of an automobile, and second-degree eluding by fleeing from a police officer. At the end of the trial, the judge inadvertently failed to provide the jury with the no-adverse-inference charge that was requested by defendant and his counsel. Defense counsel did not object to the failure to provide the requested charge. A jury found defendant not guilty of third-degree theft, but guilty of second-degree eluding. The Appellate Division held that the trial court erred when, after defendant requested the no-adverse-inference charge, the court failed to instruct the jury that it could not draw an adverse inference from defendant's failure to testify. The panel concluded that the trial court's failure to provide the instruction after a defendant requested the instruction was of such constitutional magnitude as to warrant automatic reversal and remand for a new trial. The New Jersey Supreme Court has mandated a trial court's use of the no-adverse-inference instruction when requested at trial. The issue this case presented was whether failure to provide the charge was a per se error requiring automatic reversal, or whether the failure to provide the charge required a harmless-error analysis. After analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that when there is a failure to provide the no-adverse-inference charge, the error constitutes trial error and does not mandate automatic reversal. In this case, the Court found the error was harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "New Jersey v. Camacho" on Justia Law

Defendant Reginald Roach was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual assault, burglary, and other offenses related to the home invasion and rape of a sixty-four-year-old woman. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether defendant's confrontation rights were violated when the DNA analyst who testified at trial, and who matched the DNA profile developed from defendant's buccal swab to DNA evidence left by the perpetrator at the scene of the offense, did not perform the testing procedures that provided the basis for the DNA profile developed from the perpetrator's evidence. At trial, the evidence from the analyst demonstrated that she had conducted her own review of the DNA testing results obtained from samples of the sperm and blood found on the victim after the sexual assault. The analyst explained that she engaged in that independent review to satisfy herself that she had a correct DNA profile to rely on in order to provide an expert comparison of DNA profiles. Upon review of the trial court record in this case, the Supreme Court held that defendant's confrontation rights were not violated by the analyst's testimony: defendant had the opportunity to confront the analyst who personally reviewed and verified the correctness of the two DNA profiles that resulted in a highly significant statistical match inculpating him as the perpetrator. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "State v. Reginald Roach" on Justia Law

In this case, a city clerk in a Faulkner Act municipality refused to accept for filing a petition for referendum on the ground that the petition did not have a sufficient number of qualifying signatures. Members of a Committee of Petitioners brought an action in lieu of prerogative writ to have the challenged ordinance put on the ballot. They also brought suit under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c). Ultimately, the trial court granted the Committee members the relief they sought, placing the ordinance before the voters and awarding them, as the prevailing party, attorney’s fees for the deprivation of a substantive right protected by the Civil Rights Act. The Appellate Division affirmed all but the trial court’s finding of a civil rights violation. The Appellate Division determined that the Committee members did not suffer a deprivation of a right because the court provided the ultimate remedy - the referendum. Accordingly, the award of attorney’s fees was vacated. Upon review, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed that the city clerk violated the right of referendum guaranteed by the Faulkner Act. Furthermore, the Court held that the violation of that right deprived the Committee members a substantive right protected by the Civil Rights Act. The vindication of that right under the Civil Rights Act entitled the Committee members to an award of attorney’s fees. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "Tumpson v. Farina" on Justia Law

In 2008, the State filed a petition for the involuntary civil commitment of D.Y., who was convicted of several state and federal charges arising from sexual assaults on minors. At his initial commitment hearing, D.Y. stated that he did not want to be represented by the attorney who had been appointed for him. D.Y. did not attend his final hearing, in which his counsel moved on his behalf for an order permitting D.Y. to represent himself. The judge conducting the hearing denied the motion, stating that individuals subject to Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) commitment must be represented by counsel pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(c). D.Y. appealed, asserting a right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s denial of D.Y.’s application, concluding that neither federal constitutional principle invoked by D.Y. afforded a right to self-representation in an SVPA civil commitment proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed: "We recognize that competent litigants in New Jersey have long been permitted to represent themselves in civil proceedings, with specific exceptions identified in statutes, court rules, and case law. Accordingly, we consider the Legislature’s intent when it enacted N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(c), and N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.31(a). [. . .] We find no evidence that the Legislature, when it enacted those provisions, intended to preclude an individual facing SVPA commitment from speaking on his or her own behalf, as long as standby counsel is present and available to assist throughout the hearing if needed." View "In the Matter of Civil Commitment of D.Y." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-petitioner Matthew Barrick challenged the award of a contract for the lease of office to the lowest bidder by the New Jersey Division of Property Management and Construction. Barrick argued that the winning bidder's (RMD) proposal failed to satisfy the distance-to-public-transportation requirement because its property was located .58 miles from the nearest bus stop. The Division determined that none of the bid properties, including Barrick’s, were located within one-quarter mile of public transit. After consultation with the DOL, the Division decided that the proposals would not be deemed non-conforming based on the distance requirement since it was not imposed by statute or regulation and each property was close enough to public transportation to meet the DOL's needs. Barrick sought reconsideration and to supplement the record. The Division upheld the award to RMD, explaining that, although Barrick's property satisfied the distance requirement, it had determined prior to awarding the lease that the requirement was not outcome-determinative. Barrick appealed without seeking a stay of the agency's decision. The Appellate Division panel reversed the award and remanded the matter to the Division either to award the lease to Barrick or rebid the project. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Director's determination that the distance requirement was not material to the RFP was unassailably reasonable and the decision awarding the lease contract to RMB was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. View "Barrick v. New Jersey" on Justia Law