Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, Beverly Maeker and William Ross, although unmarried to each other, lived together and shared a marital-like relationship from 1999 to 2011. In the course of that relationship, Maeker alleged she gave up a career and devoted herself to Ross, who promised to support her in the future. In short, Maeker claimed that the two entered into a palimony agreement. In 2011, their relationship dissolved, and Maeker filed an action to enforce Ross's promise to provide financial support. Ross argued that the alleged agreement was not reduced to writing and could not be enforced under the 2010 Amendment to the Statute of Frauds. The trial court rejected Ross's argument, concluding that the Legislature intended the 2010 Amendment to be prospectively applied. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed Maeker's complaint, holding that the Legislature intended that any palimony agreement as of 2010 had to be in writing and that oral agreements predating the Amendment were no longer enforceable. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Division, finding that the Legislature did not intend the 2010 Amendment to apply retroactively to oral agreements that predated the Amendment. "In amending the Statute of Frauds, the Legislature was aware that historically the Statute has been construed -- absent a legislative expression to the contrary -- not to reach back to rescind preexisting, lawfully enforceable oral agreements. The Legislature has given no indication that it intended to depart from the traditional prospective application of a change to the Statute." Accordingly, the Appellate Division was reversed and Maeker’s complaint reinstated. View "Maeker v. Ross" on Justia Law

In 2009, George Riley, then seventy-six years old, completed serving a twenty-year sentence for aggravated sexual assault. On his release from prison, Riley was under no form of parole supervision, although he was required to comply with the registration and notification provisions of Megan’s Law. Six months later, the New Jersey Parole Board advised Riley that he was subject to the Sex Offender Monitoring Act (SOMA), which was passed in 2007, more than twenty years after Riley committed his last offense. Riley was told that he would have to wear an ankle bracelet twenty-four hours a day for the rest of his life, that his movements would be tracked continuously by global positioning system (GPS) satellites, and that he would be assigned a monitoring parole officer to whom he would have to report and give access to his home. This monitoring program placed restrictions on Riley’s freedom to travel, and his failure to comply with the program would subject him to prosecution for a third-degree crime. On appeal to the Parole Board, Riley claimed that the retroactive application of SOMA to him, based on his 1986 conviction, violated the bar against ex post facto laws. The Chairman of the Parole Board rejected Riley’s challenge, explaining that he was carrying out the mandate of the statute. The Appellate Division reversed in a split decision, finding that the retroactive application of SOMA to Riley based on his 1986 conviction constituted punishment under both the Federal and State Ex Post Facto Clauses. The Supreme Court affirmed: "The constraints and disabilities imposed on Riley by SOMA, and SOMA’s similarity to parole supervision for life, clearly place this law in the category of a penal rather than civil law. Accordingly, when applied to Riley, SOMA violates both the federal and state constitutional guarantees against ex post facto laws." View "Riley v. New Jersey State Parole Board" on Justia Law

In 2007, then eighteen-year-old defendant Kirby Lenihan was driving her vehicle on a road whose speed limit was posted at forty-five miles per hour. K.G., who was then sixteen years old, was in the passenger seat. It was raining heavily and visibility was poor. At approximately 12:39 a.m., defendant veered to the right, drove through the shoulder, collided head-on with the guardrail, and hit a yellow roadway sign about five feet off the side of the road. Defendant and K.G. suffered serious head injuries as a result of the crash. K.G. also sustained serious bodily injuries. Neither defendant nor K.G. were wearing seat belts. Both airbags deployed. Defendant admitted that she was "driving too fast" given the road and weather conditions and her inexperience as a driver. Two aerosol cans of household cleaners, the contents of which contained difluoroethane, were discovered in defendant's car during the police investigation of the accident. Defendant and K.G. were transported to Morristown Memorial Hospital. As a result of the evidence of suspected inhalation ("huffing"), blood was drawn from defendant at the hospital about forty-five minutes after the accident, and difluoroethane was found in her blood. The following morning, K.G. died at 5:26 a.m., as a result of her injuries. Defendant asserted that due to the injuries suffered in the accident, she had no specific recollection of the accident or the events leading up to it. A Grand Jury returned an indictment charging defendant in count one with a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18a, a second-degree offense, based on the Seat Belt Law and recklessly causing the death of K.G. The indictment also charged defendant with second-degree vehicular homicide (count two); and first-degree vehicular homicide within 1000 feet of school property (count three). The latter charge was subsequently dismissed on defendant's motion. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment in its entirety on the grounds of "bias and preconceived attitude by a grand juror," and "prejudicially improper instructions to the grand jury by the State." Defendant also moved to dismiss count one on the grounds that the Seat Belt Law was not intended to "protect the public health and safety" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18. That motion was denied by the trial court. As a result of plea negotiations, count one was amended to charge a third-degree crime. The State agreed to recommend dismissal or merger of the vehicular homicide charge and to dismiss various summonses for: failure to wear a seat belt and to ensure that K.G. buckled her seat belt, N.J.S.A. 39:3-76.2f(b); driving under the influence, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(g); and reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96. Defendant retained the right to appeal the denial of her motion to dismiss count one. The judge imposed a three-year term of supervised probation conditioned upon serving 180 days in the Sussex County jail. Defendant moved for a stay of the custodial term pending appeal. The Appellate Division granted the application. The Appellate Division held that the Seat Belt Law was a "law intended to protect the public health and safety" as stated in N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18. Moreover, the panel held that the statutory language of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. Defendant appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. The issue presented for the Court's review was whether N.J.S.A. 39:3-76.2f could be deemed "a law intended to protect the public health and safety," or a predicate offense within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18b. Under the circumstances presented in this case, a Seat Belt Law violation is a predicate offense that can support a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-18b. View "New Jersey v. Lenihan" on Justia Law

Winslow Township Police Patrolman Carl Mueller testified that he stopped defendant after defendant’s car passed the officer’s police vehicle. Officer Mueller testified defendant was traveling at a “high rate of speed,” and failed to use his turn signal when returning to the normal travel lane. After he approached the vehicle, Officer Mueller detected an odor of alcoholic beverage. Defendant admitted that he had been drinking. Officer Mueller ordered defendant to perform field sobriety tests and defendant acquiesced. Defendant later resisted arrest. The officer requested backup, and eventually resorted to the use of pepper spray to subdue defendant. Defendant was charged with DUI, reckless driving and failing to signal. A Camden County Grand Jury also indicted defendant for third-degree aggravated assault on a police officer, third-degree resisting arrest, and two counts of fourth-degree subjecting a law enforcement officer to bodily fluid. Defendant pled guilty to assaulting the officer and was sentenced to two years non-custodial probation. The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed and the motor vehicle charges were remanded to municipal court for disposition. At trial, the conviction was entered solely on the basis of evidence elicited at a pre-trial hearing to suppress the fruits of the stop and subsequent arrest. The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s conviction, and entered a judgment of acquittal, holding that a trial court sitting as a fact-finder in a quasi-criminal matter may not rely on the evidence heard in a pre-trial suppression hearing as proof of guilt in the trial on the merits without defendant’s consent. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was the correct remedy when the municipal court convicts a defendant solely based on evidence adduced in a pre-trial suppression hearing, without defendant’s consent but without objection. Due to the fundamental differences between the purposes of a suppression hearing and a trial on the merits of the charges, the evidence from the pre-trial hearing cannot be used in a subsequent trial on the merits, without a stipulation from both parties. However, the correct remedy for this error is a remand for a new trial rather than a judgment of acquittal. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded the case to the municipal court for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Gibson" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a defendant released on bail on one indictment, later incarcerated on a different indictment, could claim jail credit for the first one. Defendant Daryel Rawls was indicted on drug-related charges in Union County, made bail, but was later arrested for unrelated offenses in Ocean County. Defendant spent 155 days in Ocean County custody before he pled guilty to his Union County charges and his bail was formally revoked. The trial court denied defendant's motion to receive jail credit for this period toward his Union County sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a direct application of "New Jersey v. Hernandez,"(208 N.J. 24 (2011)), mandated that defendant receive a 155-day jail credit toward his Union County sentence. Accordingly, the Court reverseed the Appellate Division and remanded the case to the trial court for application of the 155-day jail credit. View "New Jersey v. Rawls" on Justia Law

The defendants in this case were private fire sprinkler inspection companies that were hired to assess the operating condition of a hotel's sprinkler system. Following a fatal fire at the hotel, the parents of the victims, individually and on behalf of the estates of the decedents, alleged that defendants had negligently failed to inform the hotel owner about a flaw in the design of the hotel’s sprinkler system. The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding that defendants' inspectors had possessed no duty to report any sprinkler system design flaws to the hotel owner because applicable State regulations did not necessitate any such reporting. The Appellate Division reversed, agreeing with plaintiffs' contention that defendants' compliance with regulatory requirements was not dispositive of the issue of negligence. The appellate panel explained that defendants owed plaintiffs a duty of reasonable care and that a jury should decide whether defendants had been obliged to exceed the dictates of the regulations in their exercise of reasonable care. After considering the complex nature of the Uniform Fire Code and other factors relevant to sprinkler inspections, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that a jury should not be allowed to speculate as to the proper standard of care in this case. Instead, the Court held that plaintiffs were required to establish the applicable standard of care through expert testimony. Although plaintiffs presented an expert during pretrial proceedings, the standard of care he set forth represented only his personal view and was not founded upon any objective support. As a result of plaintiffs' failure to support their asserted standard of care with admissible expert testimony, they were unable to establish the required elements of their negligence cause of action. View "Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd." on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on an agreement for the sale of a residential property and a subsequent lease and repurchase agreement, specifically whether the transactions collectively gave rise to an equitable mortgage, violated consumer protection statutes, or contravened its decision in "In re Opinion No. 26 of the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law," (139 N.J. 323 (1995)). In 2007, defendant Barbara Felton faced foreclosure proceedings with respect to her unfinished, uninhabitable home and the land on which it was situated. Felton and plaintiff Tahir Zaman, a licensed real estate agent, entered into a written contract for the sale of the property. A week later, at a closing in which neither party was represented by counsel, Felton and Zaman entered into two separate agreements: a lease agreement under which Felton became the lessee of the property, and an agreement that gave her the option to repurchase the property from Zaman at a substantially higher price than the price for which she sold it. For more than a year, Felton remained on the property, paying no rent. She did not exercise her right to repurchase. Zaman filed suit, claiming that he was the purchaser in an enforceable land sale agreement, and that he therefore was entitled to exclusive possession of the property and to damages. Felton asserted numerous counterclaims, alleging fraud, slander of title, violations of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), and violations of other federal and state consumer protection statutes. She claimed that the parties’ transactions collectively comprised an equitable mortgage and constituted a foreclosure scam, entitling her to relief under several theories. She further contended that the transactions were voidable by virtue of an alleged violation of "In re Opinion No. 26." A jury rendered a verdict in Zaman’s favor with respect to the question of whether Felton knowingly sold her property to him. The trial court subsequently conducted a bench trial and rejected Felton’s remaining claims, including her contention that the transactions gave rise to an equitable mortgage and her allegation premised upon In re Opinion No. 26. An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Appellate Division’s determination. The Court affirmed the jury’s determination that Felton knowingly sold her property to Zaman. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the trial court and Appellate Division's decisions that Felton had no claim under the CFA, that this case did not implicate "In re Opinion No. 26," and that Felton’s remaining claims were properly dismissed. The Court reversed, however, the portion of the Appellate Division’s opinion that affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Felton’s claim that the parties’ agreements constituted a single transaction that gave rise to an equitable mortgage, adopting an eight-factor standard for the determination of an equitable mortgage set forth by the United States Bankruptcy Court in "O’Brien v. Cleveland," (423 B.R. 477 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010)). The case was remanded to the trial court for application of that standard to this case, and, in the event that the trial court concludes that an equitable mortgage was created by the parties, for the adjudication of two of Felton’s statutory claims based on alleged violations of consumer lending laws, as well as several other claims not adjudicated by the trial court. View "Zaman v. Felton" on Justia Law

The Essex County Prosecutor’s Office executed a search warrant issued in connection with a criminal investigation and seized items owned by plaintiffs Robert and Karen Lavezzi. The criminal investigation was eventually abandoned and the State did not institute either criminal charges or a civil-forfeiture action against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claimed that their property was lost and damaged while in the custody of the Prosecutor’s Office. They filed a complaint alleging that the Prosecutor’s Office and three of its employees were liable to them on theories of negligence, conversion, and unlawful taking. Defendants requested that the Attorney General’s Office defend and indemnify the action. The Attorney General denied defendants’ requests, finding that the Prosecutor’s Office’s processing and safeguarding of plaintiffs’ property were administrative acts. The County appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the retention of plaintiffs’ property "long after any related law enforcement activity" had concluded constituted an administrative function that did not implicate the Attorney General’s obligation to defend and indemnify State employees. After its review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the State was obligated to defend and indemnify the Prosecutor’s Office employees at this early stage of the litigation because, based on the limited record before the Court, this case arose from the performance of their law enforcement duties. View "Lavezzi v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

In late June 2004, approximately fifty young men and women gathered at the apartment of a recent high school graduate to celebrate her graduation. Later in the evening, a verbal argument erupted on the street in front of the apartment between two young men -- defendant Jahnell Weaver and Edward Williams. As the verbal altercation continued, someone drew a gun and fired five shots. Williams died from three gunshot wounds. His friend, Amyr Hill, was gravely wounded by two gunshots but survived. Weaver and his friend fled from the scene. Based on statements obtained from Hill and several eyewitnesses, police determined that the shots were fired by either Weaver or Khalil Bryant. Both were subsequently charged with the murder of Williams, the attempted murder of Hill, and various weapons charges. An issue at trial was the identity of the shooter. Hill initially identified Bryant as the shooter but later modified his identification, stating that he was not sure whether Weaver or Bryant fired the shots. An eyewitness provided similar testimony. Another eyewitness provided a description of the shooting that suggested Bryant was the shooter. Two other eyewitnesses stated unequivocally that Weaver shot both young men. Weaver contended that Bryant, shot the victims. In support of this defense, Weaver sought to introduce evidence of Bryant’s involvement in a later shooting in which he used the murder weapon. Weaver also moved for a separate trial. The trial court denied Weaver’s defensive use of the subsequent other-crimes evidence and denied the severance motion. The jury found defendant guilty of all counts and found Bryant guilty of third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon and two counts of third-degree endangering an injured victim. On appeal, defendant argued that his right to confrontation was violated because the trial court admitted Bryant’s statements identifying defendant as the shooter, even though Bryant did not testify. Defendant also contended that the trial court should have permitted him to introduce the other-crimes evidence, namely that Bryant used the murder weapon in connection with the another shooting incident. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "The confluence of defendant’s third-party defense strategy, the erroneous denial of his defensive use of co-defendant’s subsequent acts with the murder weapon, the denial of his motion to sever the trial, the admission of an inadequately redacted statement, and the erroneous admission of when co-defendant received the murder weapon require a new trial. The cumulative impact of these errors was not harmless." View "New Jersey v. Weaver" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Dekowski entered a bank carrying what looked like a briefcase, went to a teller’s counter, and with the use of a note demanded money and threatened that he had a bomb. The bank manager did as she was told and gave defendant cash. A jury convicted defendant of first-degree robbery. In New Jersey v. Williams, the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction of first-degree robbery for threatening a bank teller with a deadly weapon in the course of committing a theft despite having been unarmed on only having made the threat of use of a deadly weapon. The Court held that to find the defendant guilty of first-degree robbery in a simulated deadly weapon case, the victim must have an actual and reasonable belief that the defendant threatened the immediate use of such a weapon. The Appellate Division overturned the first-degree conviction in this case finding the evidence insufficient to prove that defendant simulated possession of a deadly weapon. In rendering that decision, the panel referred to the failure of the State’s witnesses to express in their testimony that “they believed defendant had a bomb in the briefcase, or that he led them to believe that it contained a bomb, or even that it was shaped in such a way that it was likely to hold a bomb.” The panel concluded that the evidence instead established second-degree robbery and remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court reversed: "A terrorized victim cannot be expected to demand proof from the robber that he is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a bomb. [. . .] It is enough if the victim has an actual and reasonable belief that the robber has a bomb based on the totality of the circumstances, including defendant’s verbal threat, dress, any hand-held objects, and overall conduct." View "New Jersey v. Dekowski" on Justia Law