Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant and two others were charged with various drug offenses. Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to third-degree conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute, and to cooperate with the State's prosecution of his co-defendants. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend a three-year prison term and to allow defendant the right to argue for probation or a custodial sentence to be served in county jail. Defendant pled guilty on August 16, 2011, but sentencing was delayed until his co-defendants cases were resolved. As a result, defendant was not sentenced until August 3, 2012. At sentencing, defense counsel asked the court to consider defendant's rehabilitative efforts since he was arrested and charged. The trial court declined to weigh such evidence in assessing mitigating factors, concluding that applicable law did not allow him to consider post-offense conduct. The Supreme Court concluded that the sentencing court, in light of recent case law, had to consider a defendant's relevant post-offense conduct in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. The case was remanded for resentencing "to ensure consideration of all of the facts relevant to the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors." View "New Jersey v. Jaffe" on Justia Law

Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and was convicted of second-degree luring, among other crimes, at the conclusion of a bench trial. The convictions were based on Internet conversations between defendant and a law enforcement officer impersonating a fourteen-year-old female named Amanda. Defendant testified and offered a diminished-capacity defense. Then twenty-nine years old, defendant stated that during his years as a professional firefighter and emergency medical technician (EMT), he experienced traumatic events that caused him to suffer a mental breakdown. He repeated that he did not intend to engage in sexual acts with Amanda. He denied using the Internet to search for child pornographic materials, and police did not find any such materials on his home computer or in his apartment. Defendant called three mental health experts to support his diminished-capacity defense. All three expressed the view that defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress and did not possess the requisite mental state to commit the crimes charged. The defense also called a number of character witnesses who testified to defendant s trustworthiness and good reputation in the community. The State's expert rejected the validity of the diminished-capacity defense, finding that defendant engaged in a series of purposeful goal-directed behaviors that led him to an intended sexual liaison with a minor. In finding defendant guilty, the trial court rejected the defense of diminished capacity. The Court found both aggravating factors proposed by the State: risk that defendant will commit another offense, and need for deterrence. Attempted luring is a second-degree crime with a range of imprisonment between five and ten years. The trial court imposed an aggregate custodial term of eight years with a four-year parole disqualifier. In addition, the court ordered defendant placed on parole supervision for life, that he register as a sex offender, that he forfeit his public employment as a firefighter, that he not possess a device with Internet capability unless required for employment, and that he submit to random searches of his computer or other Internet-capable device. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the sentencing proceeding in this case was flawed for several reasons, including the trial court's finding of a critical aggravating factor that was not based on credible evidence in the record. The trial court also failed to articulate clearly how the aggravating and mitigating factors were balanced to arrive at the sentence. View "New Jersey v. Case" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the free speech rights of residents in a high-rise cooperative apartment building. A resident who was a regular critic of the building's Board of Directors was interested in running for a Board seat. He asked the Board if he could distribute campaign materials in the building. The Board, citing a House Rule that barred soliciting and distributing any written materials, denied the request. On prior occasions, though, the Board had distributed written updates under apartment doors throughout the building, which criticized the Board's opponents. The resident filed a lawsuit and claimed that the House Rule was unconstitutional. "Different concerns arise when the speaker is an owner, not a visitor, who seeks to exercise the right to free speech in the common-interest community where he or she lives. [...] In those cases, courts should focus on the purpose of the expressional activity . . . in relation to the property's use, and conduct a more general balancing of expressional rights and private property rights." Here, the Board's policy violated the free speech clause of the State Constitution. "The important right of residents to speak about the governance of their community, which presents a minimal intrusion when a leaflet is placed under a neighbor s apartment door, outweighs the Board's concerns." View "Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Avenue Owners, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In "New Jersey v. Rodriguez," the Supreme Court held that a person who acts in self-defense and kills in the honest and reasonable belief that the protection of his own life requires the use of deadly force cannot be convicted of murder, aggravated manslaughter, or manslaughter. In the 2003 trial of defendant Naquan O'Neil, the court instructed the jury that self-defense is a valid justification for murder but not for aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter. Defense counsel did not object to the charge. The jury acquitted defendant of murder and convicted him of aggravated manslaughter. On appeal, defense counsel did not challenge the court's charge on self-defense. In his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), defendant claimed he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel, arguing appellate counsel did not raise on direct appeal the erroneous jury instruction that denied him a valid defense to the charges of aggravated manslaughter and manslaughter. The Law Division denied the PCR petition, and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding that appellate counsel's performance was not deficient because different caselaw controlled at the time of defendant s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed. The Appellate Division panel in defendant's direct appeal heard argument on March 21, 2007, but did not render its decision until August 10, 2007. Between those dates, another Appellate Division panel ruled, in a decision published on March 29, 2007, that self-defense was a valid defense to a charge of manslaughter. On this precise issue, the Supreme Court granted certification on July 6, 2007. "Whatever confusion was caused by 'Moore,' defendant's appellate counsel s failure to bring the 'Rodriguez' decisions to the attention of the Appellate Division panel that heard this case rendered counsel's performance ineffective under both our Federal and State Constitutions." Defendant's aggravated manslaughter conviction was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. O'Neil" on Justia Law

In New Jersey, custodial sentences for criminal and quasi-criminal violations are governed by different codes depending on the classification of the offense. Sentencing for crimes and disorderly persons offenses are governed by the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice. Offenses arising from violations of motor vehicle and traffic regulations are governed by the Motor Vehicle Code. In this category of cases, custodial terms and license suspensions are characterized as consequences of magnitude. In reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence, one of the principal goals, under either the Criminal Code or Motor Vehicle Code, is the elimination of disparity in order to ensure uniformity and predictability. Defendant was not under the influence at the time of the accident. Defendant struck the victim while the victim was crossing the street. Defendant did not realize the victim had become pinned between the vehicle's undercarriage and the pavement, and had been dragged under the vehicle. The victim died a few months after the accident. Defendant received citations for careless driving, and failure to yield to a pedestrian. The Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office reviewed the police investigation reports and declined to present criminal charges against defendant to the county grand jury. The prosecutor forwarded the traffic summonses to the Red Bank Municipal Court for adjudication. In the municipal court, pursuant to an agreement, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the careless-driving charge. The remaining charge was dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to a fifteen-day term in the Monmouth County Jail to be served on weekends; a ninety-day license suspension; and fines and costs. The municipal court judge stayed the custodial sentence and license suspension pending appeal. Subsequently, by agreement, the stay of the license suspension was vacated. Defendant appealed only the custodial sentence to the Law Division. On de novo review, the Law Division judge imposed the same sentence. Defendant then appealed to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division rejected the Law Division’s use of the Criminal Code factors to justify the custodial sentence. The panel then vacated defendant’s sentence and held that the "Moran"("State v. Moran," 202 N.J. 311 (2010)) factors were "equally apt in determining whether to impose a custodial sentence in this matter" as they were to impose a license suspension in "Moran." The State argued in its appeal that the Appellate Division incorrectly interpreted Moran, conflating the statutory language of the reckless driving statute with that of the careless driving statute. Recognizing the distinction between the facts of this case and that of the case law relied upon by the sentencing court, the Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to outline the factors to be used when imposing sentences for careless driving. The Court concluded lower courts should use the "Moran" factors, and affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "New Jersey v. Palma" on Justia Law

In this case, a jury determined that two New Jersey public entities, South Jersey Transportation Authority and the New Jersey State Police, were liable for injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of a multi-vehicle pile-up on the Atlantic City Expressway during a 2005 heavy snowstorm. Plaintiff alleged that the public entities were negligent in failing to adhere to standard operating procedures with respect to competing 9-1-1 calls for motorist assistance. The jury found no negligence on the part of plaintiff or the owners or drivers of the other vehicles involved in the several collisions. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the liability verdict against the public-entity defendants based on errors in the jury instructions with respect to the liability of the public entities for discretionary versus ministerial acts. The Appellate Division determined the trial court erred in failing to allow the jury to determine predicate facts that resolved whether ministerial or discretionary acts were involved. The Appellate Division remanded the matter for retrial only with respect to the liability of the public-entity defendants. The public-entity defendants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that, at the retrial, the second jury should decide anew the liability of all parties. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. View "Henebema v. South Jersey Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

This case arose from a business venture that was established by plaintiff Brendan Allen and defendant Asnel Diaz Sanchez. The venture was operated through plaintiff ADS Associates, Inc. (ADS), a corporation fully owned by Sanchez. Allen and Sanchez opened a business checking account in the name of ADS at a branch of Oritani Savings Bank where ADS had preexisting accounts. By agreement between ADS and Oritani, the new ADS account required the signatures of both Allen and Sanchez to appear on each check drawn on the account. Despite that limitation, Sanchez linked the new ADS account to other ADS accounts within his control and, through a series of internet transactions, transferred a substantial sum of money from the ADS account he had established with Allen to his other ADS accounts. After learning of these transfers, Allen sued Oritani and Sanchez. Although it dismissed Allen’s claims, the trial court permitted Allen to assert claims on ADS’s behalf against Oritani, notwithstanding Sanchez’s issuance of a resolution denying Allen the authority to maintain an action on ADS’s behalf. A jury returned a verdict in favor of ADS. The trial court, however, entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Oritani premised on an indemnification provision in the agreement governing ADS’s account with Oritani. An Appellate Division panel reversed the trial court’s determination. It found that the ADS resolution signed by Sanchez deprived Allen of authority to assert a claim on behalf of ADS. The panel held, however, that Allen could assert a common law negligence claim against Oritani despite the fact that he was not Oritani’s banking customer. It concluded that Allen had a “special relationship” with Oritani, and that Oritani had a duty to advise Allen of its internet banking policies when he and Sanchez opened the ADS account. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governed the wire transfers at the center of this case, and that Allen could not assert a claim under Article 4A against Oritani because he did not meet the statutory definition of a bank “customer.” Furthermore, the Court held that Allen could not assert a negligence claim based upon an alleged special relationship with Oritani. Accordingly, the Appellate Division was reversed and the trial court's judgment was reinstated. View "ADS Associates Group, Inc. v. Oritani Savings Bank" on Justia Law

Defendant Cesar Lipa, pleaded guilty to first-degree aggravated sexual assault, based on allegations that he committed sexual acts against M.G. on three occasions when she was between the ages of thirteen and sixteen. During the plea colloquy, defendant gave answers to leading questions by his counsel. The questions established all of the elements of the offense to which he intended to plead guilty. The judge then asked another leading question: “And the only reason why you give up all those rights [waived as a result of the guilty plea] is because you’re in fact guilty. Is that true?” Defendant answered, “yes,” and the judge accepted defendant’s plea. After retaining new counsel, and before his sentencing hearing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant also moved to compel production of certain Division of Youth and Family Services records. Defendant certified that “[m]y prior attorney failed to obtain the necessary documentations to support my innocence.” In particular, defendant claimed that he told his first counsel “that alleged victim M.G. had on at least two other occasions made false allegations of sexual assault which were investigated by DYFS.” One incident allegedly involved defendant; another allegation involved a friend of M.G.’s father. According to the certification, “DYFS found that the allegations of both matters were without merit.” The judge first reviewed the DYFS records and noted that they provided “no basis of a false allegation.” The judge therefore denied defendant’s request to compel production as irrelevant. The judge then reviewed defendant’s certification in support of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Defendant asks this Court to reverse the Appellate Division’s affirmance of the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to first-degree aggravated sexual assault. Defendant argued, after the trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw, that the Law Division judge misapplied the standard for deciding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing, as set forth in "New Jersey v. Slater," (198 N.J. 145 (2009)), and Rule 3:21-1. "In the face of a general denial and specific, potentially plausible facts negating guilt," the Supreme Court found merit in this argument and reversed the Appellate Division. View "New Jersey v. Lipa" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the State challenged a family court order allowing seventeen-year-old A.B. and his attorney to conduct a thirty-minute inspection of a home where the juvenile was alleged to have committed sexual offenses against his six-year-old cousin, N.A. The juvenile moved for the inspection after the prosecutor’s investigators had photographed the home and cut a piece of rug from it for forensic testing. The juvenile’s attorney gave specific and particularized reasons for the need to visit and photograph the home in preparation for A.B.’s defense. The prosecutor opposed the juvenile’s motion on the ground that the defense inspection of the home (the crime scene) constituted “intimidation, harassment or abuse” in violation of the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights. On interlocutory review, the Appellate Division upheld the inspection order, finding that the family court had exercised its sound discretion. The order provided that the inspection be conducted at a reasonable time and in the presence of a prosecutor’s investigator and with N.A.’s parents present in the home, if they wished. The Supreme Court also affirmed: "[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding includes the right to conduct a reasonable investigation to prepare a defense. The right of the accused to a fair trial, and the right of a purported victim and her family to privacy must be balanced. The family court found that A.B. made a sufficient showing of need to inspect and photograph N.A.’s home. The court issued the inspection order only after carefully weighing the juvenile’s fair-trial rights and N.A.’s privacy interests and imposing reasonable time and manner restrictions. We conclude that the family court did not abuse its discretion. " View "New Jersey in the Interest of A.B." on Justia Law

Defendant Terry Jones was convicted of two counts of sexual assault and two counts of criminal sexual contact. He sought post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming in relevant part, that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) procure the appearance of an alibi witness who would have provided exculpatory and corroborative evidence that would have supported his defense; (2) obtain and introduce into evidence phone records that would have corroborated the defense’s theory of why the accuser fabricated the sexual assault charges against him; and (3) advise defendant that, if he were to testify, the jury could be informed only that he had a prior conviction for “a fourth-degree crime” and not a conviction for endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant did not take the stand in his own defense. The PCR court denied defendant’s petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing, and the Appellate Division affirmed. "This matter came down to a question of whom to believe -- defendant or his accuser -- notwithstanding the presentation of DNA evidence at trial. We cannot dismiss defendant’s assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel by calling them simple matters of strategy. [. . .] The disputed facts should have been judged in the light most favorable to defendant. [D]efendant presented a close but creditable prima facie case of ineffective assistance, entitling him to an evidentiary hearing." View "New Jersey v. Jones" on Justia Law