Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, an eight-year-old child disclosed during an interview with a detective in 2016 that her music teacher, defendant Donnie E. Harrell, had touched her inappropriately on multiple occasions during school hours. In 2019, a grand jury indicted Harrell on charges of sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child, with additional official misconduct charges added in a superseding indictment later that year. In 2021, the trial court approved the admission of the child's entire recorded statement under the "tender years" hearsay exception. However, while preparing for trial in 2022, the child could not recall most of the events she had originally reported.The trial court decided to limit her trial testimony to the one incident she recalled, ruling that her lack of memory rendered her unavailable for cross-examination on the incidents she could not recall, which would violate the defendant's right of confrontation. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, stating that the defendant's right of confrontation was not dependent on the child's ability to recall the details, but on the defendant's opportunity to probe her lack of recollection on cross-examination.The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division, holding that the admission of the child's entire video-recorded statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause as long as the child testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination, even if she doesn't recall all the details. The court also emphasized that it is essential for the State to act expeditiously in investigating and prosecuting matters that rely heavily on a young child's ability to recall events, to avoid memory decay over time. View "State v. Harrell" on Justia Law

The New Jersey Supreme Court evaluated a class-action lawsuit brought by shoppers at the retail clothing store Aéropostale against the store's owner and operator, SPARC Group LLC. The plaintiffs alleged that the store used "illusory discounts," offering items at a discounted rate from an original price that was never actually charged. They claimed this practice violated the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), the Truth in Consumer-Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA), and various common law contract rights.The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated an "ascertainable loss," which is a prerequisite for a private cause of action under the CFA. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, contending that the plaintiffs had suffered an ascertainable loss because they received no value for the offered discount.The Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Division, ruling that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated an ascertainable loss because they purchased non-defective, conforming goods with no measurable disparity between the product they thought they were buying and what they received. Even though the court found that the store's pricing practices were deceptive and violated the CFA, it held that the plaintiffs' CFA claim failed because they had not demonstrated either a benefit-of-the-bargain loss or an out-of-pocket loss.Since the plaintiffs did not meet the "ascertainable loss" requirement of the CFA, they were also not considered to be "aggrieved consumers" under the TCCWNA, and their common law claims failed. The court reversed the Appellate Division's decision and reinstated the trial court's order dismissing the lawsuit. View "Robey v. SPARC Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey delivered an opinion concerning an appeal by condominium owners who claimed they were discriminated against because of their need for an emotional support animal (ESA) that exceeded the weight limit set by the condominium association's pet policy. The owners argued that their ESA, a 63-pound dog, was necessary for one of the owners who had been diagnosed with several mental health conditions. The court considered whether the trial court correctly dismissed the disability discrimination claims under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD) and how requests of this type should be evaluated under the LAD.The court held that individuals seeking an accommodation must show they have a disability under the LAD and demonstrate that the requested accommodation may be necessary to afford them an "equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." The housing provider then has the burden to prove that the requested accommodation is unreasonable. Both sides should engage in good-faith, interactive dialogue in this process. If the parties cannot resolve the request, courts may be called on to balance the need for, and benefits of, the requested accommodation against cost and administrative burdens it presents. With this framework, the court found that the owners' claims should not have been dismissed and remanded the matter. View "Players Place II Condominium Association, Inc. v. K.P. and B.F." on Justia Law

In 2017, defendant Shlawrence Ross was indicted for attempted murder and other offenses following an alleged exchange of gunfire with police officers. During the incident, he was wounded and a bullet lodged in his abdomen. In 2022, on advice of his counsel, he underwent elective surgery to remove the bullet. The state applied for a search warrant to obtain the removed bullet from the hospital and sought all medical records regarding the defendant’s treatment. The trial court denied the applications, reasoning that the bullet was shielded from the State’s access as it resulted from defence counsel’s “conscious litigation choice”. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision, stating that the Fourth Amendment, concerning search and seizure, rather than the Sixth Amendment and reciprocal discovery rules, was the appropriate legal framework.The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment. It held that the proper analysis for determining whether the State can obtain this physical evidence rests within the principles of search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendment would preclude issuing a valid search warrant for the bullet in this case, and the trial court should have determined whether there exists probable cause on which to issue such a warrant. The case was remanded back to the trial court for a determination of probable cause. View "State v. Ross" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in its decision, examined whether the State can obtain from defense counsel an affidavit that is physical evidence of a crime, under New Jersey discovery rules. The case revolves around a murder where two witnesses identified the defendant, Isaiah J. Knight, as the shooter. Later, one of the witnesses was allegedly kidnapped and forced to write an affidavit recanting his original statement. The prosecution believed the defendant's alleged co-conspirators gave this affidavit to the defense counsel. The State filed a motion to compel discovery of this document, which was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Appellate Division.The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the sought-after affidavit is physical evidence of the crimes of witness tampering and kidnapping for which the defendant and others have been charged. Therefore, it is subject to reciprocal discovery under Rule 3:3-13(b)(2)(B) and (D). The Court reasoned that the affidavit, allegedly the outcome of a kidnapping and witness intimidation plot, is not the product of the defense investigation or attorney work product and hence does not fall within the exception to the discovery obligations. The Court found that compelling defense counsel to turn over an item in his possession that is physical evidence of a crime does not trigger the same Sixth Amendment concerns. The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that compelling the discovery of this affidavit violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. View "State v. Knight" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey examined whether N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16 limits an arbitrator’s authority to penalize conduct under the Tenure Employees Hearing Law (TEHL), N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 to -18.1. The defendant, the Board of Education for the Town of West New York Public Schools, brought tenure charges against the plaintiff, Amada Sanjuan, for conduct unbecoming. The charges were based on alleged false claims made by Sanjuan about an accident at the school. An arbitrator concluded that Sanjuan's conduct warranted a penalty, but not dismissal. The arbitrator demoted Sanjuan from her tenured administrative position to a tenured teaching role, without backpay. Sanjuan sought to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by demoting her. The Appellate Division agreed, interpreting N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16 to allow sustained tenure charges to result only in termination or loss of salary, but not demotion. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed, holding that N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16 provides the basis to refer a case to arbitration but does not limit an arbitrator’s authority to impose penalties. Therefore, the Supreme Court reinstated the arbitrator's award demoting Sanjuan. View "Sanjuan v. School District of West New York" on Justia Law

Ocean Walk, LLC, a company that operates a casino and other entertainment facilities in New Jersey, sought coverage under its commercial property insurance policies for losses sustained during the COVID-19 pandemic. The company claimed that the presence of the virus in its facilities and the government-mandated temporary suspension of its operations constituted a “direct physical loss” or “direct physical damage” to its property under the terms of the insurance policies issued by several defendants. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, disagreed with this interpretation and held that Ocean Walk’s allegations failed to meet the policy language's requirements. The court ruled that to demonstrate a “direct physical loss” or “direct physical damage,” Ocean Walk needed to show that its property was destroyed or altered in such a way that rendered it unusable or uninhabitable. The court noted that the company’s allegations did not suggest that the property suffered a physical change; rather, the company was simply not allowed to use its property due to the executive orders. Furthermore, the court ruled that even if Ocean Walk had pled facts supporting the finding of a covered “loss” or “damage,” the losses it claimed were excluded from coverage by the policies’ contamination exclusion. The court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Ocean Walk’s complaint. View "AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that the State's witness tampering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a), is not unconstitutionally overbroad, but it may have been unconstitutionally applied to the defendant, William Hill, in this case. Hill was initially convicted of first-degree carjacking and third-degree witness tampering. While detained awaiting trial, Hill sent a letter to the carjacking victim, A.Z., asserting his innocence and asking her to reconsider her identification of him as the perpetrator. A.Z. reported the letter to the police, resulting in a charge of witness tampering. The court concluded that Hill's letter did not explicitly ask A.Z. to testify falsely or withhold testimony, leading the Supreme Court of New Jersey to rule that it may have been unconstitutionally applied in Hill's case. The court vacated Hill's witness tampering conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge, but did not vacate his carjacking conviction. View "State v. Hill" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Curtis Gartrell fled from police near Newark Penn Station, leaving behind a suitcase containing handguns, ammunition, illegal narcotics, and cash. Gartrell was later apprehended and charged with possessory offenses and resisting arrest. He filed a motion to suppress evidence recovered from the warrantless search of the suitcase, arguing that he did not abandon the suitcase and therefore maintained standing to challenge the search. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that Gartrell's flight did not indicate an intention to abandon the suitcase. The State appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, holding that Gartrell had abandoned the suitcase.The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court applied the three-factor test from State v. Carvajal, which assesses (1) whether a person has control or dominion over the property, (2) whether the person knowingly and voluntarily relinquishes any possessory or ownership interest in the property, and (3) whether there are other apparent or known owners of the property. The court found that Gartrell's flight from police and deliberate abandonment of the suitcase in a public place indicated a clear intent to relinquish his possessory interest in the bag. Furthermore, there was no evidence of anyone else's interest in the suitcase, including the person Gartrell referred to as "Spoon," who remained unidentified. Therefore, the court concluded that Gartrell lacked standing to challenge the seizure and search of the suitcase. View "State v. Gartrell" on Justia Law

In the case State v. Calvin Fair, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had to decide whether a prosecution for terroristic threats under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), based on a mens rea of recklessness, is constitutional. The defendant, Calvin Fair, following a conflict with the police, had made threatening statements on Facebook, including knowledge of where the police officers lived and what cars they drove. He was charged under a statute which made it a crime to threaten to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.The court held that a mental state of recklessness is constitutionally sufficient for a “true threats” prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), as defined in this context as “morally culpable conduct, involving a ‘deliberate decision to endanger another.’” The state must also prove that a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim would have viewed the message as threatening violence. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded the case for a new trial.The court also held that the jury must unanimously agree on whether the defendant violated N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), or both. This was because the terroristic threats statute listed in the disjunctive two separately enumerated, alternative crimes of terroristic threats. View "State v. Fair" on Justia Law