Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Harold Stewart, a sergeant in Camden County's Fire Police Department, while operating a Camden County vehicle, was involved in a motor vehicle accident with plaintiff Joseph Vanderslice. Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants Camden County, the Camden County Fire Police Department, and Stewart, alleging personal injuries sustained as a result of the accident. The case was referred to mandatory, non-binding arbitration, as required by our court rules. An arbitration panel determined that defendants were 100% liable for plaintiff s injuries, and awarded $145,970 for noneconomic damages and lost wages. The next day, defendants submitted the required demand forms to the Camden County Arbitration Administrator. Attached to defendants demand was a payment voucher that gave the recipient the right to draw upon Camden County s account with the State Treasury. The Arbitration Administrator signed the voucher and sent it to the State Treasurer for payment. The Treasurer issued a check thirty days after the arbitration award was filed. Thirty-two days after the award, the Arbitration Administrator received the check. However, because the Arbitration Administrator concluded that the check was not received within thirty days of the arbitration award as required by Rule4:21A-6(b)(1), the clerk did not file the demand or deposit the check. Although Rule1:5-6(c)(1)(A) required the clerk to notify defendants of their error, neither the clerk nor the Arbitration Administrator informed defendants of their nonconforming payment. Rather, defendants were alerted that the demand had not been filed when plaintiff moved to confirm the arbitration award and enter judgment. Defendants opposed the motion and asked the trial court to permit a late filing. Concluding that defendants had substantially complied with the court rules, the court permitted the late filing and rejected plaintiff s motion to confirm the award and enter judgment. The case proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court should not have permitted defendants late filing, and that the arbitration award should have been confirmed and judgment entered for plaintiff. In an unpublished decision, the Appellate Division determined that defendants demand was filed too late, reversed the trial court, and remanded the matter for entry of an order confirming the arbitration award and entering judgment in plaintiff's favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded defendants demand was not filed out of time. The Appellate Division's judgment was reversed and the jury's verdict was reinstated. Because the Court found that defendants notice was timely, it did not reach the issue of the standard for expanding the thirty-day time limit under Rule4:21A-6(b)(1). View "Vanderslice v. Stewart" on Justia Law

In 1979, plaintiff Morristown Associates purchased commercial property located in Morristown. The property contained a strip-mall-style shopping center known as Morristown Plaza. Among the tenants was Plaza Cleaners, a dry cleaning business owned at the time by Robert Herring. Herring and his wife had entered into a lease with the property's previous owner, Morris Center Associates, in 1976. Due to construction, Herring was unable to occupy and operate Plaza Cleaners until 1978. At some point before moving in, Herring installed a steam boiler in a room at the rear of the leased space and an underground storage tank (UST) for fuel to operate the boiler. In 1985, Herring sold Plaza Cleaners to defendants Edward and Amy Hsi. The Hsis owned the business until 1998 when it was sold to current owner and third-party defendant, Byung Lee. In August 2003, a monitoring of a well installed near Plaza Cleaner's UST revealed fuel oil contamination. A subsequent investigation revealed that although the UST was intact, the fill and vent pipes were severely deteriorated, with large holes along a significant portion of their lengths. Plaintiff's experts concluded that those holes had developed as early as 1988 and, since that time, oil had been leaking from the pipes each time the tank was filled. Each of the named oil company defendants in this case allegedly supplied fuel oil to Plaza Cleaners at various times between 1988 and 2003. The issue in this appeal was whether the general six-year statute of limitations contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 applied to private claims for contribution made pursuant to the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a). Based on the plain language of the Spill Act, reinforced by its legislative history, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 s six-year statute of limitations was not applicable to Spill Act contribution claims. The Court therefore rejected the contrary determination of the Appellate Division and reversed and remanded this case to the Appellate Division for its consideration of other issues raised on appeal that were unaddressed. View "Morristown Associates v. Grant Oil Co." on Justia Law

In the late 1990s, the Township of Ocean began a comprehensive planning process in anticipation of population growth and increased development. In April 2007, plaintiffs, who owned a significant amount of land in the Township, filed a complaint against the Township, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), and the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs (DCA) challenging the validity of three ordinances affecting their property. They alleged that they were arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, and illegal and that the rezoning constituted inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs lived in a single-family residence on the eastern portion of one of several lots they owned; the remainder of the property consisted of undeveloped woodlands. When plaintiffs acquired the property, it was subject to mixed zoning. As a result of the Planning Commission s endorsement of the Township s Petition, all but one of plaintiffs lots were converted to PA-5 Environmentally Sensitive Planning Areas. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the circumstances under which municipal zoning ordinances represent a legitimate exercise of a municipality s power to zone property consistent with its Master Plan and Land Use Law (MLUL) goals. Upon review, the Court concluded that the ordinances represented a legitimate exercise of the municipality's power to zone property consistent with its MLUL goals, and held that plaintiffs did not overcome the ordinances presumption of validity. The inclusion of plaintiffs property in the EC district rationally related to the municipality's comprehensive smart growth development plan, which concentrated development in a town center surrounded by a green-zone buffer. The Court declined to invalidate ordinances that fulfill MLUL goals and other legitimate land-use planning objectives through plaintiffs as-applied challenge. "Rather, we reassert the importance of exhausting administrative remedies and conclude that plaintiffs claim for redress for the downzoning of their property is better addressed through their inverse condemnation claim, which, as the trial court held, plaintiffs may pursue if they are denied a variance." View "Griepenburg v. Township of Ocean" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Sam Hargrove, Andre Hall, and Marco Eusebio delivered mattresses for defendant Sleepy s, LLC. Plaintiffs claimed that they were employees of Sleepy's, that Sleepy's miscategorized them as independent contractors, and that misclassification caused various financial and non-financial losses to them. Plaintiffs argued that the Independent Driver Agreement signed by each of them violated state wage laws because the contracts were a ruse to avoid payment of employee benefits, such as health insurance, deferred compensation benefits, and medical or family leave. The issue of whether plaintiffs were employees or independent contractors was submitted to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on cross motions for summary judgment. The federal court held that the undisputed facts demonstrated that plaintiffs were independent contractors. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals filed a petition with the New Jersey Supreme Court seeking to certify the question of New Jersey law: which test should a court apply to determine a plaintiff's employment status, the New Jersey Wage Payment Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1, et seq., or the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a, et seq.? The New Jersey Court responded that the test derived from the New Jersey Unemployment Compensation Act, N.J.S.A.43:21-19(i)(6), governed whether a plaintiff is an employee or an independent contractor for purposes of resolving a wage-payment or wage-and-hour claim. View "Hargrove v. Sleepy's, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants Fuquan Cromwell and James Grate were stopped by police officers on the campus of Drew University during the attempted robbery of someone they knew. Defendants were charged with various offenses, including second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon at an educational institution. With regard to the latter, the trial judge instructed the jury that the State must prove the defendant possessed the firearm in or upon the buildings or grounds of any school, college, university, or other educational institution. The judge did not ask the jury to decide whether defendants were aware that they were on the property of an educational institution. The jury found defendants guilty of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon at an educational institution, and acquitted them of the remaining charges. On appeal, defendants contended, among other things, that the jury charge for unlawful possession of a weapon at an educational institution improperly failed to instruct the jury that the knowingly mens rea requirement applied to the locational element of the crime. The Appellate Division rejected defendants arguments and affirmed their convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court found that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the mens rea requirement was an error. The Court reversed with respect to that charge, and the case was remanded for a new trial on that issue. The Court affirmed the appellate court in all other respects. View "New Jersey v. Grate" on Justia Law

At the time of the events that led to the charges in this case, defendant lived with his girlfriend and her daughter "Chloe," the victim. Chloe testified that defendant first sexually abused her when she was approximately eight years old. In the years immediately afterward, Chloe performed poorly in school and had run-ins with the law, resulting in spending time in juvenile detention centers. Eventually, Chloe told her mother about the abuse and identified defendant as the abuser. Defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree sexual assault, one count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, and one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court determined that defendant s six-year-old conviction for resisting arrest the result of a guilty plea would be admissible to impeach him. The trial court clarified that defense counsel would be limited in any cross-examination regarding Chloe's involvement with the juvenile justice system. Defense counsel also objected to the prosecutor asking the jurors whether they were surprised that Chloe was involved in the juvenile system. In response, the prosecutor noted that defense counsel had led off his closing argument by referring to Chloe as a troubled young lady. Following those arguments and prior to charging the jury on the law, the court instructed the jury regarding the prosecutor's remarks, stating that the jury's recollection of the evidence governed, not counsels' comments. The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of second-degree sexual assault and one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, and acquitted defendant of aggravated sexual assault. Defendant appealed, arguing that several prosecutorial and trial court errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. A majority of an Appellate Division panel affirmed in an unpublished opinion: though the majority identified several prosecutorial improprieties, no issue convinced the majority that defendant's conviction should have been reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment. View "New Jersey v. T.J.M." on Justia Law

Defendant K.S. was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated and refusing to submit to a breath test. As he was being transported to the Watchung Borough police station, defendant struck and attempted to spit blood onto the arresting officer. In addition to the above offenses, defendant was charged and ultimately indicted for third-degree aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, fourth-degree throwing bodily fluids at a law enforcement officer, third-degree resisting arrest, and fourth-degree criminal mischief. Following his indictment, defendant sought admission into the Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI). The PTI director recommended denial of defendant s PTI application because of the assaultive nature of the offense and because of defendant s pattern of past anti-social behavior. After denial of his PTI application, defendant filed a motion to compel admission claiming that the prosecutor failed to consider whether his bipolar disorder and mental illness contributed to his conduct. The trial court remanded the matter to the prosecutor for consideration of the medical report provided by defendant. The prosecutor responded by letter explaining that the report had been considered and confirming the denial of defendant s admission into PTI. The trial court subsequently denied defendant s motion, concluding that the denial of his PTI application was not an abuse of discretion. After his motion was denied, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to the charges in exchange for the State s recommendation to dismiss the driving while intoxicated charge. The State also agreed to recommend a non-custodial probationary sentence, community service, and restitution. Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement and later appealed, challenging the denial of his PTI application. Because the record included no admissions of conduct to support the truth of the allegations in defendant's dismissed adult charges and diverted and dismissed juvenile charges, those charges were not appropriate factors to be considered in deciding whether to admit defendant into PTI. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the case to the prosecutor for reconsideration of defendant s eligibility for PTI. View "New Jersey v. K.S." on Justia Law

At a routine doctor appointment for a hand injury, Y.N. ("Yvonne") learned that she was four months pregnant. During that four-month period, Yvonne had been taking Percocet for injuries caused in a car accident and became dependent on that medication. Hospital personnel advised her that she could not stop taking Percocet abruptly without endangering her pregnancy and recommended that she enter a methadone maintenance treatment program. Yvonne entered such a program four months later, a month before she gave birth. Her baby, P.A.C. ("Paul"), suffered methadone withdrawal symptoms at birth and remained hospitalized for about seven weeks. The Division of Youth and Family Services filed an abuse and neglect complaint against Yvonne based on her long-term drug use before and during her pregnancy, the harm caused to Paul from methadone withdrawal, and her failure to address acts of domestic violence committed against her. After a hearing, the family court entered a finding of abuse and neglect. The Appellate Division affirmed on the basis that Yvonne caused her child to suffer withdrawal symptoms from the methadone she took as part of a prescribed, bona fide medical treatment plan. The panel held her strictly liable for the harm suffered by Paul and gave no consideration to whether Yvonne acted unreasonably or failed to provide a minimum level of care for her newborn. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Division's reasoning and reversed: absent exceptional circumstances, a finding of abuse or neglect cannot be sustained based solely on a newborn's enduring methadone withdrawal following a mother's timely participation in a bona fide treatment program prescribed by a licensed healthcare professional to whom she has made full disclosure. The Appellate Division did not consider all of the requisite statutory elements in its analysis. The case was remanded for a determination of whether the finding of abuse or neglect could be sustained on any other ground articulated by the family court. View "New Jersey Div. of Child Protection & Perm. v. Y.N." on Justia Law

At trial, when Abbas Husain was sworn in, he raised his right hand and spoke the oath, but did not place his left hand directly on the Bible. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Tomika Davis for $12,500. After the verdict was rendered and the jury was discharged, but before post-trial motions were argued and the judgment was entered, the trial judge had a conversation with the jurors, outside the presence of counsel, which was not recorded. During that discussion, one juror noted that she was surprised that Husain had not placed his hand on the Bible before he testified. The judge did not make a record of the juror's observation, but later informed counsel. Both parties subsequently filed post-trial motions. A certification by Husain, filed in support of his post-trial motion, included a brief reference to the juror's observation. At oral argument on the motion, the trial judge expressed surprise that information he had provided counsel in confidence ended up in a certification and as part of the trial record. Ultimately, the court denied Husain's motion, finding the amount allocated in the verdict fair in light of the evidence and giving no regard to the comment the juror made in reference to the fact that Husain did not touch the Bible. After the judgment was entered, Husain appealed, raising several arguments. Relevant to the limited issue presented in this appeal as of right, he argued that the trial judge erred by failing to declare a mistrial on the basis of the juror's comment about the fact that he did not touch the Bible. In an unpublished decision, a majority of the Appellate Division panel affirmed the verdict as to this issue, holding that no manifest injustice inhered in the juror's observation and comment. The dissenting judge maintained that the trial judge had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and that the juror's observation was sufficient to warrant a new trial. Husain appealed to the Supreme Court as of right. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: post-verdict discussions between the court and discharged jurors are prohibited unless those discussions are part of a hearing ordered on good cause shown. View "Davis v. Husain" on Justia Law

Defendant was first convicted of DWI in 1981. He was charged with DWI again in 1982 and, unrepresented by counsel, pled guilty to that charge. Defendant had a third DWI conviction in 1994. Because that conviction was more than ten years after defendant s second DWI offense, he was sentenced as a second DWI offender, rather than a third DWI offender. Defendant was convicted of his fourth DWI offense in 2011. Although there was a sixteen-year gap between defendant s third and fourth DWI offenses, the municipal court construed N.J.S.A.39:4-50(a)(3) to afford a defendant only a single step-down. The municipal court therefore sentenced defendant as a third or subsequent DWI offender. The Law Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant s conviction and sentence. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for review in which he challenged only his sentence and raised no issues regarding his conviction. The N.J.S.A.39:4-50(a)(3) step-down provision can benefit a DWI offender more than once, provided that the defendant's most recent and current DWI offenses are separated by more than ten years. In this case, defendant should have been sentenced as a second DWI offender with respect to any term of incarceration imposed, and as a third DWI offender with respect to the applicable administrative penalties. View "New Jersey v. Revie" on Justia Law