Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was an employee of the North Bergen Board of Education who filed an action asserting statutory and common law employment discrimination claims against the Board. In discovery, defendant's counsel produced several hundred documents that allegedly had been removed or copied from Board files. According to the Board, the documents included highly confidential student educational and medical records that were protected by federal and state privacy laws. The Board reported the alleged theft of its documents to the county prosecutor. The State presented the matter to a grand jury, which ultimately indicted defendant for official misconduct and theft by unlawful taking of public documents. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to support the indictment and withheld exculpatory evidence about her motive. She also contended that her removal of documents for use in her employment discrimination claim was sanctioned by the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in "Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.," (204 N.J. 239 (2010)). The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial and appellate court's decisions. View "New Jersey v. Saavedra" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Richard Grabowsky filed a complaint against the Township of Montclair, challenging the validity of an ordinance adopted by the Township to permit the construction of an assisted living facility on a site located next to the Unitarian Universalist Congregation Church of Montclair. Plaintiff asserted that a statement made by Township Mayor Jerry Fried, a member of the Township Council and Planning Board, demonstrated that Fried had a direct personal interest in the development and that he should have been disqualified from voting on the zoning issue. He also alleged that Fried and a second member of the Council, Nick Lewis, shared a disqualifying indirect personal interest in the development project because of their membership in the Unitarian Church. The Township, its Planning Board and the developers seeking the opportunity to build the assisted living facility denied the existence of any conflict. Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction barring the Township and Planning Board from considering or approving development applications for the assisted living facility. Although no party filed a motion for any form of dispositive relief, the trial court sua sponte granted summary disposition, and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. An appellate panel concluded that the trial court's summary judgment was procedurally improper, but concurred with the court's determination that the two Township officials had no conflict of interest, and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment, but did not concur with the panel's conclusion that, on the limited record developed in the trial court, plaintiff's claim was properly dismissed because the Unitarian Church was neither an applicant nor an objector in the redevelopment application at issue. The Court held that when a church or other organization owned property within 200 feet of a site that is the subject of a zoning application, public officials who currently serve in substantive leadership positions in the organization, or who will imminently assume such positions, are disqualified from voting on the application. View "Grabowsky v. Township of Montclair" on Justia Law

In 2007, Camden police officers arrived at the scene of a shooting where they found the body of Edwin Torres on the sidewalk. Torres had suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the head and neck. An eyewitness identified defendant, who was a juvenile, as the shooter. Three days later, defendant Edwin Urbina surrendered, and, subsequently, he voluntarily elected to have his case transferred from the Family Part to the Law Division. In order to avoid an indictment for first-degree murder, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement, agreeing to proceed as an adult and plead guilty to one count of aggravated manslaughter in exchange for the State's recommendation of a sentence not to exceed seventeen and a half years' incarceration, subject to an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier and five years of post-release parole supervision. Nearly three years after his sentencing, defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea because the factual basis elicited for the plea indicated that he was asserting a complete defense to the charge. In a split decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The majority held that, although defendant testified to facts that raised the possibility of self-defense, when considered in light of the surrounding circumstances, his testimony did not constitute a contemporaneous claim of innocence requiring vacation of the plea. The Supreme Court reversed, however, finding that after defendant stated during the plea colloquy that he pulled his handgun after the victim and his cousin pulled their guns, and said "I ain't mean to kill him, your Honor. I just wanted to have him back up[,]" the trial court should have explored whether defendant was claiming he acted in self-defense. The Court found that the plea judge did not ensure that defendant truly understood the law of self-defense, including the requirement of a reasonable and honest belief in the necessity of using force, or that he understood that the State had the burden to disprove self-defense once asserted. "Absent such an inquiry on the record, it is unclear whether defendant's plea was truly knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." View "New Jersey v. Urbina" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action because Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 and FY 2015 Appropriations Acts did not provide sufficient funding to meet the amounts called for with the Legislature's enactment of Chapter 78, L.2011, c.78 (amending N.J.S.A. 43:3C-9.5(c)). Plaintiffs argued that Chapter 78 created an enforceable contract that was entitled to constitutional protection against impairment. The Supreme Court granted the State's motion for direct certification to resolve important questions raised by this "apparent clash of constitutional provisions." After review, the Supreme Court held that the Legislature and Governor were without authority to enact an enforceable and legally binding long-term financial agreement through this statute. "Chapter 78's contractual language creates, at best, the equivalent of appropriations-backed debt that is accompanied by a strong legislative expression of intent to provide future funding. The legislative use of contractual terms in Chapter 78, when referring to the required schedule of recurring payments of the State's annual required contribution to the State public pension systems, does not create an enforceable long-term financial contract that can co-exist with the limitations of the Debt Limitation Clause and the related Appropriations Clause of the State Constitution. So long as Chapter 78 exists in its present statutory form, each year's appropriations act will reflect the present legislative and executive judgment as to the budgetary priority of this pressing need for which those branches will be answerable to the public and to the financial marketplace. It is not the place of this Court to dictate that judgment, for the Constitution has left such budgetary and political questions to the other two branches." View "Burgos v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from plaintiffs' complaint to cancel and discharge a creditor's judgment lien held by defendant Citi Mortgage, Inc. (Citi). Following the conclusion of Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings the Superior Court entered a default judgment in favor of Citi against plaintiffs, and by virtue of its docketing of that judgment, Citi obtained a lien on all of plaintiffs real property in New Jersey. Four years later, plaintiffs instituted a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court. Because plaintiffs listed the law firm that had represented Citi, rather than Citi itself in their Chapter 7 petition, the bankruptcy court did not provide notice of the proceeding to Citi. After the bankruptcy trustee abandoned two of plaintiffs' New Jersey properties, the bankruptcy court discharged plaintiffs' debt and closed their Chapter 7 case. Citi did not attempt to levy on plaintiffs property at any time prior to the bankruptcy filing and did not seek to enforce its lien in the wake of plaintiffs bankruptcy discharge. More than three years after the bankruptcy discharge, plaintiffs filed this action under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1, which permits a debtor whose debts have been discharged in bankruptcy, to apply to the state court that has entered a judgment against the debtor, or has docketed the judgment, for an order directing the judgment to be canceled and discharged. The trial court granted Citi's motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' claim. The court acknowledged that a judgment creditor, such as Citi, who has not levied on the debtor's property prior to the debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition, may enforce its valid lien following the bankruptcy discharge, but must do so within the year following the discharge. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division for substantially the same reasons. View "Gaskill v. Citi Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the third-party intervention or private search doctrine applied to a warrantless search of a home. Co-defendant Evangeline James and her young children lived in an apartment on the first floor of a two-family home in Asbury Park. Defendant Ricky Wright, James' boyfriend, stayed at the apartment about three to four nights per week. James called her landlord, Alfred Santillo, and reported a major water leak in the kitchen ceiling. Santillo told James to shut off the main water valve and said that he would stop by with a plumber the next morning. Santillo and the plumber, Nicholas Alexo, arrived at the apartment before noon on Monday. Because no one was home, Santillo called James, who did not answer her phone. After waiting about a half hour, Santillo let himself into the apartment, as he had done on prior occasions. Santillo and Alexo saw water and sewage leaking from the kitchen ceiling. Because the water pipes in the kitchen led to the back of the apartment, Alexo went to the rear bedroom to check for other leaks. Alexo saw a small bag of marijuana on top of a nightstand. Inside an open drawer of the nightstand, he also saw a small box that he believed contained powder or crack cocaine. Alexo called Santillo into the bedroom and showed him the items. They then called the police. Police ultimately James based on what they saw in the apartment. Defendant Wright arrived as they were leaving the apartment, and the police arrested him too. A grand jury indicted Wright and James on various drug offenses, second-degree possession of a firearm in the course of committing a drug offense, second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and fourth-degree possession of a prohibited weapon, namely, body armor piercing bullets. Wright moved to suppress the evidence. After review, the Supreme Court held that the third-party intervention or private search doctrine does not exempt law enforcement's initial search of defendant's home from the warrant requirement. Absent exigency or some other exception to the warrant requirement, the police must get a warrant to enter a private home and conduct a search, even if a private actor has already searched the area and notified law enforcement. "The proper course under the State and Federal Constitutions is the simplest and most direct one. If private parties tell the police about unlawful activities inside a person's home, the police can use that information to establish probable cause and seek a search warrant. In the time it takes to get the warrant, police officers can secure the apartment or home from the outside, for a reasonable period of time, if reasonably necessary to avoid any tampering with or destruction of evidence." View "New Jersey v. Wright" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert Occhifinto filed suit against defendant Robert S. Keppler Mason Contractors, LLC (Keppler) and others seeking damages for alleged defective construction of an addition to his warehouse. In the liability action, Keppler was defended by its insurance carrier, Mercer Mutual Insurance Company, under a reservation-of-rights agreement. Before trial in the liability action, Mercer filed an action for a declaratory judgment challenging its obligation to provide coverage and to defend Keppler in the liability action. Occhifinto, on Keppler s behalf, contested the claims raised by Mercer, and filed counterclaims asserting that Mercer had a duty to defend and indemnify Keppler under the policy, and that Mercer was obligated for the counsel fees incurred in defending the declaratory judgment action. In the declaratory judgment action, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the insurance coverage question. The trial court held that Mercer was required to indemnify Keppler for damages covered by the insurance policy. The court therefore denied Mercer's motion for summary judgment and granted partial summary judgment to Occhifinto, reserving the claim for counsel fees until conclusion of the liability action. The liability action proceeded, and Occhifinto lost. After trial, Occhifinto sought to recover counsel fees from Mercer pursuant to Rule 4:42-9(a)(6), which authorized an award of counsel fees in an action upon a liability or indemnity policy of insurance in favor of a successful claimant. The trial court denied Occhifinto's motion, holding that he was not a successful claimant in the liability action because he was not entitled to indemnity coverage in the liability action. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed that determination. The Supreme Court reversed, finding Occhifinto was a successful claimant and therefore was entitled to attorneys' fees. View "Occhifinto v. Olivo Construction Company" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether three teachers employed by the Board of Education of the Bridgewater-Raritan School District (Board) appropriately were denied tenure as a matter of law or equity under circumstances , implicating the interplay of N.J.S.A.18A:28-5, which establishes the general rule by which teachers obtain tenure, and N.J.S.A.18A:16-1.1, which creates an exception to that general rule. The Bridgewater-Raritan Education Association filed a petition of appeal on behalf of the teachers with the Commissioner. The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case, and the Board moved for summary judgment. The Association maintained that the teachers were entitled to tenure as a matter of law and under the equitable principles of apparent authority and equitable estoppel. An administrative law judge (ALJ) granted the Board s motion, finding that none of the teachers met the statutory requirement for tenure because they each had served as temporary replacements for other tenured teachers. The ALJ rejected the Association's equitable arguments and concluded that the Board was not required to notify teachers of their status as replacement teachers under N.J.S.A.18A:16-1.1. The Commissioner affirmed the ALJ s decision. The Association appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished decision. The Supreme Court, after review, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court found that N.J.S.A.18A:16-1.1 required a board of education to give an employee notice of his or her designation as a replacement. With respect to the claim of Tamara Manzur, a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether she was provided such notice as to her status during the 2007-08 school year. The Court agreed with the Appellate Division that equitable principles were inapplicable. View "Bridgewater-Raritan Education Association v. Board of Education of the Bridgewater-Raritan School District" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of December 16, 2010, defendant Timothy Adkins was involved in a single-car accident that resulted in injuries to his two passengers. Based on his performance on a series of field sobriety tests conducted at the scene of the accident, defendant was arrested on suspicion of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI). Defendant was transported to the Police Department and was advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant invoked his right to counsel. Although Alcotest equipment was present, no breathalyzer test was administered at headquarters. Police conveyed defendant to the hospital, and the police obtained defendant s BAC test results from a sample, drawn by hospital personnel at police direction, without the police first having secured a warrant or defendant s prior written consent. Defendant was issued summonses for DWI, careless driving, and possession of an open container in a motor vehicle. Subsequently, a grand jury also charged him with fourth-degree assault by auto for recklessly operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury. Following issuance of the United States Supreme Court's decision in "McNeely," which held that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant, defendant sought suppression of his BAC results. After a hearing, the court applied "McNeely" and excluded defendant's blood test results. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, declining to apply the exclusionary rule when officers relied on pre-McNeely New Jersey case law that had permitted warrantless blood draws based on the exigency inherent in the human body s natural dissipation of alcohol. Consistent with its decision in "New Jersey v. Wessells," (209 N.J. 395 (2012)), the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that McNeely's pronouncement on the Fourth Amendment's requirements applied retroactively to cases that were in the pipeline when McNeely was issued. Because McNeely applied, the Court reversed the Appellate Division judgment. However, the case was remanded to allow the State and defendant the opportunity to re-present their respective positions on exigency in a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the admissibility of the blood test results. View "New Jersey v. Adkins" on Justia Law

Defendant agreed to take an Alocotest (breathalyzer), in which a certified operator performed. At trial an Alcotest expert testified that the tests were done improperly and that the State had failed to enter the right simulator solution Certificate of Analysis and the most recent Calibrating Unit New Standard Solution Report into evidence. The court admitted the Drinking Driving Questionnaire (DDQ) and Drinking Driving Report (DDR) into evidence as business records. The court also admitted Alcotest Operator's Certification, in addition to several other documents relating to the unit's Calibration Certificates and test results. In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered the admissibility of the Alcotest evidence in the prosecution of driving while intoxicated (DWI) cases. The Court held that in this case, it was error to admit the Alcotest results without the foundational documents required by "New Jersey v. Chun," (194 N.J. 54, cert. denied (2008)). Further, although the Court found no violation of the Confrontation Clause with respect to the admission of two of the reports, the Court determined that those reports constituted inadmissible hearsay. Therefore, consideration of this improperly admitted evidence may have unduly influenced the municipal court's credibility findings. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Kuropchak" on Justia Law