Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Anna Mae Cashin owned a parcel of land in Hoboken. Two separate structures were located on that property: a six-unit apartment building, and a two-story single-family home built in a converted garage. Plaintiff has rented out five units of the apartment building and used the sixth for storage. Plaintiff lived in the single-family home with her late husband for four years until 1971, when they began renting it out. In 1973, defendant Marisela Bello moved into that unit. Defendant occupied the space with her son. Defendant's rent was $345 per month, five dollars more than the rent she initially paid in 1973. Plaintiff tried to regain possession of the house several times. She first asked defendant to leave in the 1980s so that plaintiff's daughter could live there. In June 2009, plaintiff again asked defendant to leave so that plaintiff's son could live there to be closer to his parents during his father's illness. At that time, plaintiff sent defendant a notice to quit, giving her sixty days to vacate the house. In response, defendant's attorney sent a letter indicating that defendant refused to leave. Plaintiff took no further action to evict defendant at that time. On January 4, 2012, plaintiff, through her attorney, sent defendant another notice to quit. Plaintiff demanded possession of the house under N.J.S.A.2A:18-61.1(l)(3), asserting that the unit was a single-family home and that she, the owner, wished to reside there. Defendant refused to leave, and plaintiff filed a complaint for possession of the house on April 2, 2012. In this appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether the Anti-Eviction Act, which permits the owner of a building of three residential units or less to oust a tenant if the owner intends to personally occupy a unit, could be applied to remove a tenant (defendant) from the two-story single-family house built in a converted garage. To that end, the Court had to determine whether "building" denotes a single, unattached physical structure or whether it includes all structures owned by an individual located on the same parcel of land. The Supreme Court found that the Legislature's use of the word "building," in its singular form, was both deliberate and dispositive. "Building" designates a discreet physical structure, not a number of such structures connected only by the ownership of the land on which they sit. By the plain language of N.J.S.A.2A:18-61.1(l)(3), the converted garage constituted its own building for purposes of the Act, and plaintiff could evict defendants. View "Cashin v. Bello" on Justia Law

Defendants Donald Lindsey and Martin Pierce engaged in a shoot-out in a residential neighborhood of Camden. They were not injured, but a four-year-old boy, B.T., was killed in the cross-fire. Following a joint trial, the jury convicted Lindsey of passion/provocation manslaughter of B.T., as a lesser-included offense of murder, (count one); and convicted Pierce of aggravated manslaughter as charged, (count two). Defendants were convicted of attempted murder of each other (counts three as to Lindsey, and four as to Pierce). Defendants were also convicted of various weapons offenses. Lindsey and Pierce were each convicted of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (count five as to Lindsey and count six as to Pierce); and unlawful possession of a handgun, (count seven as to Lindsey and count eight as to Pierce). Lindsey was convicted of unlawful possession of an assault firearm (count nine). Lindsey received an aggregate term of thirty-three years, and Pierce forty-two years the disparity primarily due to the different verdicts related to B.T.'s homicide. Among their asserted claims on appeal, one or both defendants argued the court erred in various evidentiary rulings; the court gave incorrect jury instructions, generally raised as plain error; the verdicts regarding B.T. homicide were inconsistent; and the sentences were excessive. Having reviewed defendants' arguments in light of the record and applicable principles of law, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, but remanded for resentencing. View "New Jersey v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether defendant's repeated requests to speak with a family member during interrogation was sufficient to invoke the right to remain silent and, if so, whether defendant's subsequent statements and physical evidence recovered as a result of those statements should be suppressed. The jury found defendant guilty of second-degree passion/provocation manslaughter of his father; first-degree murder of his mother; third-degree hindering prosecution; third-degree theft; third-degree fraudulent use of a credit card; fourth-degree tampering with evidence; fourth-degree false swearing; and second-degree disturbing, moving or concealing human remains. Defendant received an aggregate sentence of sixty-four years in prison, with an 85% period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act. The Appellate Division concluded that defendant initially invoked his right to remain silent by requesting to speak to his uncle, the police improperly recorded that conversation and, as such, the trial court properly suppressed the recorded conversation with defendant's uncle. The Appellate Division concluded, as did the trial court, that defendant's statement to police was obtained voluntarily after the police re-administered defendant's Miranda rights. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Maltese" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her husband resided in a home at the Villas at Cranbury Brook, a common-interest community, in the Township of Plainsboro. The homeowners at the Villas take title only to their dwelling units; all other areas, including the sidewalks and walkways, are common area property owned by the homeowners association and the recreation association. Homeowners are charged monthly assessments for the maintenance of the common areas, which pay for services such as snow and ice removal from the sidewalks. Although the Villas is not a gated community, the general public does not have an easement to use the sidewalks. In December 2008, a snowstorm with freezing rain led to the accumulation of approximately one-and-a-half inches of ice on the sidewalks and streets of the Villas. At the request of the homeowners association, a landscape contractor salted the roadways, but the association did not request that the common sidewalks and walkways also be cleared. Two days later, additional freezing rain accumulated. The landscape contractor did not apply any salt to the roadways or sidewalks that day. That afternoon, plaintiff and her husband walked through the Villas to a food market; on their way back to their home, plaintiff slipped and fell on ice on a common-area sidewalk within the community, injuring her wrist and shoulder on ice on a common-area sidewalk within the community, injuring her wrist and shoulder. Plaintiff sued the developer of the community, the management company, the homeowners association, and the landscape contractor to recover for the personal injuries that she sustained. The trial court granted summary judgment to the homeowners association and the management company, and dismissed plaintiff's complaint. The trial court concluded that the private sidewalks in the community were the functional equivalent of the public sidewalk for which the Court conferred immunity. The Appellate Division affirmed that determination in an unpublished decision. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether sidewalk immunity applied in "Luchejko v. City of Hoboken," (207 N.J. 191 (2011)), in the context of injuries that occurred on a public sidewalk adjoining a residential condominium community, was applicable to claims for personal injuries sustained on a private sidewalk owned and controlled by a homeowners association of a common-interest community. After review, the Supreme Court reversed: immunity did not apply based on the facts of this case. "Here, the by-laws of the homeowners association spell out the association's duty to manage and maintain the community s common areas, including sidewalks. This association also has a statutory obligation to manage the common elements of which the sidewalks are a part. . . .the limited immunity given to a qualified common interest community under N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-13 is a legislative acknowledgement that common-law tort liability extends to the private areas of such a community." View "Qian v. Toll Brothers Inc." on Justia Law

At the conclusion of the first day of jury deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court asking if a particular juror could be excused from the case. The court responded to the question appropriately, generally explaining that a juror could not be excused for reasons related to differences with other jurors, but could for personal reasons, such as illness. The court gave the jurors the opportunity to raise the issue the next day at sidebar. No one did. The following day, Juror Number 2 did not appear for service. Over the objection of defense counsel, the trial court impanelled an alternate juror. The court declined defense counsel's request that the jurors be questioned about whether Juror Number 2 was the subject of the previous day's note. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the juror substitution. That motion was denied. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court erred in making the substitution before exploring whether the juror's failure to return to court was for reasons personal to the juror or due to the juror's interaction with the jury. The Supreme Court did not agree with the Appellate Division that the trial court's decision to place an alternate juror on the panel, without inquiring of the jury about the reasons for Juror Number 2's absence, was a fatal error requiring that the jury's verdict be overturned. "The court was well within its discretion to make the juror substitution under Rule1:8-2(d)(1) - even without an inquiry of the jury. . . .A juror's unexplained absence from the courthouse on deliberation day cannot, alone, sabotage a trial." View "New Jersey v. Musa" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether evidence seized after defendant's arrest, made in the absence of a valid warrant or probable cause, was subject to exclusion without application of an exception based on the subjective good faith of the executing officers, who relied upon an arrest warrant that had been judicially vacated but had not been removed from the computer database showing active warrants. In 2009, a Municipal Court Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of defendant for non-payment of fines owed to the City of Asbury Park. Defendant learned of that warrant while incarcerated in Bayside State Prison on an unrelated charge. He sent a letter to the municipal court requesting that his fines in connection with two matters (a criminal conviction and a motor vehicle violation) be vacated due to hardship. In 2010, another Municipal Court Judge granted defendant's request. The Asbury Park Municipal Court Administrator explained that once the vacation of a fine is entered into the relevant database, the outstanding warrant in that database is also vacated. The municipal court employees, not the police department, are responsible for entering that information. With respect to defendant, the administrator stated that a deputy municipal court administrator properly vacated the traffic fines in the "ATS" system but failed to go into the "ACS" system and vacate the criminal fines there. Therefore, the ACS computer system did not reflect that the criminal fines were vacated, and, correspondingly, the arrest warrant associated with those fines was not vacated. Defendant was later indicted for third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), and second degree possession of a CDS with intent to distribute. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from the police vehicle, contending that the officer's questioning and warrant check were unconstitutional. Following a hearing at which only the arresting officer testified, the court denied defendant's motion. On the eve of trial, defendant asked the court to reopen his suppression motion, relying on a letter from the municipal court which indicated that his fines had been vacated. The court reopened defendant's motion, and, following a hearing at which the municipal court administrator testified, granted the motion to suppress. The court found that defendant was arrested unlawfully, the drugs seized from the vehicle were inadmissible fruits of an unlawful arrest, and that the lack of culpability of the police department was irrelevant. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. "The arresting officer's good faith belief that a valid warrant for defendant's arrest was outstanding cannot render an arrest made in the absence of a valid warrant or probable cause constitutionally compliant." View "New Jersey v. Shannon" on Justia Law

In this appeal, on a morning in early May 2009, a mother left her sleeping nineteen-month-old child unattended for approximately ten minutes in a locked motor vehicle with the motor running in a shopping mall parking lot. The Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) substantiated neglect, and the mother filed for an administrative review of that determination. The Division filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking care and supervision of the unattended child and her siblings. That complaint was resolved by a consent order, and the mother renewed her administrative appeal of the substantiation determination. Years later, the Division determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed and summarily disposed of the matter. The Appellate Division affirmed the final agency decision substantiating neglect. The appellate panel concluded that a hearing in the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) was unnecessary because the mother s actions plainly constituted gross neglect. The mother argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that in a case in which no actual harm befell the child, the Division must evaluate whether her conduct caused an imminent risk of harm to her child at the time of fact-finding, rather than at the time of the event. To do otherwise, she contended, was contrary to the plain meaning and legislative intent of the statute. Furthermore, the mother argues that requiring her name to be listed on the Central Registry for a single lapse in judgment was unreasonable. In addition, the mother argued that the Division erred and the Appellate Division compounded the error by applying a categorical approach to evaluate her actions. The Supreme Court rejected the mother's interpretation of the definition of abuse and neglect found in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b), that the statute requires a finding that the parent's conduct presented an imminent risk of harm to the child at the time of fact-finding rather than at the time of the event that triggered the Division's intervention. Such an interpretation is not supported by the text of the statute, the legislative history, the Court's long-standing interpretation and application of the statute, or common sense. The Court also held that the Division should have referred the mother's appeal to the OAL for a hearing. "Leaving a child unattended in a car or a house is negligent conduct. However, this Court has emphasized that whether a parent's conduct is negligent or grossly negligent requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. Such an evaluation can only occur through a hearing. The Division not only denied the mother a timely determination of her appeal but also denied her an individualized review of the unique circumstances attendant to the incident involving her child. We therefore reverse and remand this matter for a hearing before the OAL." View "Dept. of Children Families v. E.D.-O." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court consolidated two appeals in this opinion. J.S. was a thirty-four-year-old former New Jersey resident, who, in 2000, while a sophomore at Kean University, was arrested after twice selling marijuana to an undercover police officer during a five-day period. He pled guilty to a fourth-degree distribution charge arising from a June 16 sale, and a third-degree distribution charge arising from a June 21 sale. J.S. was sentenced to a three-year term of noncustodial probation. Five years after completing his sentence, he filed the expungement petition that was the subject of this appeal. The trial court granted J.S. s petition, reasoning that his two offenses were a single spree that constituted a solitary crime. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed. G.P.B. was a fifty-two-year-old New Jersey resident and business owner, who, in 1999, committed several offenses in support of a scheme to offer illegal gifts to local officials in a particular municipality, in order to obtain a public contract for his business and a specific vote on a municipal resolution. G.P.B. pled guilty to four offenses: one count of third-degree conspiracy to offer gifts to a public servant and three counts of third-degree offering gifts to a public servant. He was sentenced to a county correctional facility for thirty days and ordered to perform 100 hours of community service and pay a $10,000 fine. G.P.B. petitioned for expungement approximately ten years after his convictions. The trial court granted G.P.B. s petition, reasoning that his crimes were all part of a continuing conspiracy to influence a governing body and achieve a single aim, and that the conspiracy linked the charges together as one crime. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reversed, noting that G.P.B. had pled guilty to four offenses committed on two separate days, the panel concluded that he was not entitled to expungement. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division in both appeals: "[t]he plain language of N.J.S.A.2C:52-2(a) precludes expungement of convictions when the petitioner has been convicted of multiple crimes, even when those crimes occurred within a short span of time. [. . .] We conclude that, as it is currently drafted, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) does not authorize expungement of the criminal records of individuals who are in the position of petitioners. If the Legislature determines that expungement should be available to such individuals, it can amend the statute to clarify its intent in that regard." View "In the Matter of the Expungement Petition of J.S." on Justia Law

Shortly after plaintiff John Ross signed a contract to sell his home, he learned of contamination on his property as a result of a leak that previously existed in an underground oil storage tank located on a neighboring property. The prospective purchaser then cancelled the contract, and plaintiffs commenced suit against the current and former owners of the neighboring property, and their respective insurers. After the insurers remediated the contamination on the property, the lawsuit proceeded on the claims for damages against all defendants on theories of negligence, strict liability, private nuisance and trespass, as well as violations of the Spill Compensation and Control Act. In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed, and whether plaintiffs could maintain claims as third-party beneficiaries against the insurers which provided coverage to the former owner of the neighboring property where the underground storage tank was located. The Court found no basis for the claims of private nuisance or trespass against the homeowner defendants because there was no proof of negligence, recklessness, intentional conduct, or the conduct of an abnormally dangerous activity, by these parties. Additionally, the Court declined to expand these causes of action to impose strict liability upon defendants. Plaintiffs could not proceed with a direct claim against the defendant insurers for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in the insurance contracts because they did not hold an assignment of rights from the named insured, and there was no evidence that the named insured or her insurers agreed to recognize plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries of the insurance contracts. View "Ross v. Lowitz" on Justia Law

In 2009, Erica Ortiz and a few friends went to a dance club in Newark. Defendant and her boyfriend, Oscar Rodriguez, went to the club that night as well. At about 1:35 a.m., while in the bathroom, defendant got into a fight with Ortiz and her friend, Jessica Machado. A security guard broke up the fight and escorted defendant and Rodriguez out of the club. Ortiz left the club at closing time, around 3:00 a.m., with two friends, Christina Gratacos and Nihar Patel. As the three walked to Patel's car, defendant and Rodriguez drove up to Ortiz and her friends. Rodriguez jumped out of the car and punched Ortiz in the face. Patel, who stepped in to help Ortiz, fought with Rodriguez. Meanwhile, defendant left the car and fought with Ortiz again. Bystanders eventually intervened and broke up the fight. Defendant and Rodriguez then got back in their car, and Rodriguez drove off. Minutes later, they returned. Rodriguez got out of the driver's side of the car and began to fight with Patel again; others also joined in the fight. Ortiz was not involved in this part of the brawl. From the sidewalk, she saw a jacket on the ground that she thought belonged to Patel. She went to pick up the jacket, which was in front of defendant's car. At that moment, defendant moved from the passenger's to the driver's seat, put the car into gear, turned the wheel, and drove into Ortiz. Ortiz became lodged under the car and was dragged about fifty feet. When defendant turned a corner, the back tire ran over Ortiz, who was dislodged from the car. Defendant drove off. A grand jury returned an indictment that charged defendant with several crimes, including first-degree attempted murder, fourth-degree aggravated assault by automobile, and third-degree endangering an injured victim. On appeal, for the first time, defendant argued that the trial judge omitted an element of the offense for endangering: that a defendant's flight increased the risk of further harm to the victim. The Appellate Division disagreed, concluding that the jury charge complied with the law and fully recited the three statutory elements of the offense. The panel found no fourth element under the statute. The panel also found sufficient evidence to support the endangering conviction. Agreeing with the Appellate Division's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Munafo" on Justia Law