Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Robert Occhifinto filed suit against defendant Robert S. Keppler Mason Contractors, LLC (Keppler) and others seeking damages for alleged defective construction of an addition to his warehouse. In the liability action, Keppler was defended by its insurance carrier, Mercer Mutual Insurance Company, under a reservation-of-rights agreement. Before trial in the liability action, Mercer filed an action for a declaratory judgment challenging its obligation to provide coverage and to defend Keppler in the liability action. Occhifinto, on Keppler s behalf, contested the claims raised by Mercer, and filed counterclaims asserting that Mercer had a duty to defend and indemnify Keppler under the policy, and that Mercer was obligated for the counsel fees incurred in defending the declaratory judgment action. In the declaratory judgment action, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the insurance coverage question. The trial court held that Mercer was required to indemnify Keppler for damages covered by the insurance policy. The court therefore denied Mercer's motion for summary judgment and granted partial summary judgment to Occhifinto, reserving the claim for counsel fees until conclusion of the liability action. The liability action proceeded, and Occhifinto lost. After trial, Occhifinto sought to recover counsel fees from Mercer pursuant to Rule 4:42-9(a)(6), which authorized an award of counsel fees in an action upon a liability or indemnity policy of insurance in favor of a successful claimant. The trial court denied Occhifinto's motion, holding that he was not a successful claimant in the liability action because he was not entitled to indemnity coverage in the liability action. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed that determination. The Supreme Court reversed, finding Occhifinto was a successful claimant and therefore was entitled to attorneys' fees. View "Occhifinto v. Olivo Construction Company" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether three teachers employed by the Board of Education of the Bridgewater-Raritan School District (Board) appropriately were denied tenure as a matter of law or equity under circumstances , implicating the interplay of N.J.S.A.18A:28-5, which establishes the general rule by which teachers obtain tenure, and N.J.S.A.18A:16-1.1, which creates an exception to that general rule. The Bridgewater-Raritan Education Association filed a petition of appeal on behalf of the teachers with the Commissioner. The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case, and the Board moved for summary judgment. The Association maintained that the teachers were entitled to tenure as a matter of law and under the equitable principles of apparent authority and equitable estoppel. An administrative law judge (ALJ) granted the Board s motion, finding that none of the teachers met the statutory requirement for tenure because they each had served as temporary replacements for other tenured teachers. The ALJ rejected the Association's equitable arguments and concluded that the Board was not required to notify teachers of their status as replacement teachers under N.J.S.A.18A:16-1.1. The Commissioner affirmed the ALJ s decision. The Association appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished decision. The Supreme Court, after review, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court found that N.J.S.A.18A:16-1.1 required a board of education to give an employee notice of his or her designation as a replacement. With respect to the claim of Tamara Manzur, a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether she was provided such notice as to her status during the 2007-08 school year. The Court agreed with the Appellate Division that equitable principles were inapplicable. View "Bridgewater-Raritan Education Association v. Board of Education of the Bridgewater-Raritan School District" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of December 16, 2010, defendant Timothy Adkins was involved in a single-car accident that resulted in injuries to his two passengers. Based on his performance on a series of field sobriety tests conducted at the scene of the accident, defendant was arrested on suspicion of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI). Defendant was transported to the Police Department and was advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant invoked his right to counsel. Although Alcotest equipment was present, no breathalyzer test was administered at headquarters. Police conveyed defendant to the hospital, and the police obtained defendant s BAC test results from a sample, drawn by hospital personnel at police direction, without the police first having secured a warrant or defendant s prior written consent. Defendant was issued summonses for DWI, careless driving, and possession of an open container in a motor vehicle. Subsequently, a grand jury also charged him with fourth-degree assault by auto for recklessly operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury. Following issuance of the United States Supreme Court's decision in "McNeely," which held that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant, defendant sought suppression of his BAC results. After a hearing, the court applied "McNeely" and excluded defendant's blood test results. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, declining to apply the exclusionary rule when officers relied on pre-McNeely New Jersey case law that had permitted warrantless blood draws based on the exigency inherent in the human body s natural dissipation of alcohol. Consistent with its decision in "New Jersey v. Wessells," (209 N.J. 395 (2012)), the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that McNeely's pronouncement on the Fourth Amendment's requirements applied retroactively to cases that were in the pipeline when McNeely was issued. Because McNeely applied, the Court reversed the Appellate Division judgment. However, the case was remanded to allow the State and defendant the opportunity to re-present their respective positions on exigency in a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the admissibility of the blood test results. View "New Jersey v. Adkins" on Justia Law

Defendant agreed to take an Alocotest (breathalyzer), in which a certified operator performed. At trial an Alcotest expert testified that the tests were done improperly and that the State had failed to enter the right simulator solution Certificate of Analysis and the most recent Calibrating Unit New Standard Solution Report into evidence. The court admitted the Drinking Driving Questionnaire (DDQ) and Drinking Driving Report (DDR) into evidence as business records. The court also admitted Alcotest Operator's Certification, in addition to several other documents relating to the unit's Calibration Certificates and test results. In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered the admissibility of the Alcotest evidence in the prosecution of driving while intoxicated (DWI) cases. The Court held that in this case, it was error to admit the Alcotest results without the foundational documents required by "New Jersey v. Chun," (194 N.J. 54, cert. denied (2008)). Further, although the Court found no violation of the Confrontation Clause with respect to the admission of two of the reports, the Court determined that those reports constituted inadmissible hearsay. Therefore, consideration of this improperly admitted evidence may have unduly influenced the municipal court's credibility findings. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Kuropchak" on Justia Law

Atlantic City police responded to reports of a domestic disturbance between defendant Kingkamau Nantambu and his girlfriend, Crystal Aikens. Aikens told police that defendant had threatened her with a gun. After police located a hidden handgun in defendant's apartment, defendant was charged with fourth-degree possession of a defaced firearm and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person. Subsequently, Aikens called the Atlantic County Prosecutor's Office alleging that defendant had engaged in witness tampering. She agreed to call defendant on her cell phone and allow detectives to record the conversation. During a discussion about the gun, defendant insisted that "[n]obody seen the gun that day". Aikens disagreed, claiming that she saw defendant put the gun in a case. Immediately after that statement, a beeping sound interrupted the conversation. According to one of the detectives, Aikens had moved the phone, causing the recording device to fall and the wires to disconnect. The detective picked up the recorder, removed and replaced its batteries, and replaced the wires. By the time recording resumed, approximately two minutes had passed and Aikens and defendant were concluding their conversation. Based on the conversation, charges of third-degree bribery of a witness, third-degree witness tampering and fourth-degree tampering with physical evidence were added to defendant s existing weapons charges. The recording was offered as evidence demonstrating defendant's intent to tamper with the State's witness and showing that defendant possessed the gun for which he was charged with unlawful possession. Defendant moved to suppress the recording, asserting that the two-minute gap rendered it inadmissible. The trial court granted defendant s motion, finding that the two-minute gap rendered the recording inadmissible as substantive evidence. The court determined that it was irrelevant whether the deletion was intentional; rather, it only mattered that the recording was interrupted following a very damaging statement regarding defendant s alleged possession of the gun. The Appellate Division granted the State's motion for leave to appeal, and reversed in an unpublished decision. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether an inadvertent omission that rendered a portion of a recording unreliable required suppression of the entire recording. "Nothing in our review of case law or evidentiary rules requires suppression of an entire recording when only part of that recording has been omitted or is found unreliable. Instead, the trial court should conduct an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to evaluate which portions of a recording are reliable, and which portions must be redacted. The trial court should admit the recording to the extent it is deemed reliable, redacting only the portion of the recording deemed unreliable due to an omission or defect." The Supreme Court therefore vacated the Appellate Division's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Nantambu" on Justia Law

In February 1995, the State executed a contract with Perini Corporation to design and build South Woods in Bridgeton (the Project), a twenty-six building medium- and minimum-security correctional facility. Perini subcontracted with L. Robert Kimball & Associates, Inc. as the architect and engineer. Defendant Natkin & Company was designated the principal contractor for heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC). The design that Kimball provided to Perini included an underground HTHW distribution system to serve the entire Project. It also included a central plant from which the hot water was distributed to the various buildings that comprised the Project. Perma-Pipe, Inc. manufactured the underground piping used in the HTHW system. Natkin furnished and installed the underground piping system and the boilers and heat exchangers housed in the central plant. Defendant Jacobs Facilities, Inc. (formerly known as CRSS Constructors, Inc.), was retained by the State to provide construction oversight services. In 2008, the State filed a complaint against Perini, Kimball, Natkin, Jacobs, and Perma-Pipe in which it alleged that the HTHW system failed in March 2000, and on several subsequent occasions, and that these failures were caused by various defects including design defects, defective site preparation for the pipes, defective pipes, and deficient system design. The State asserted breach of contract against Perini, negligence and professional malpractice against Kimball, negligence and breach of contract against Natkin, and breach of contract against Jacobs. Against Perma-Pipe, the State asserted a claim under the New Jersey Products Liability Act (PLA), as well as breach of implied warranties, negligence, and strict liability in tort. All defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Project was substantially complete well before April 28, 1998, and that, therefore, the statute of repose barred the State's complaint. The Appellate Division reversed the orders granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Perini, Kimball, Natkin, and Jacobs. The panel held that the statute of repose was triggered when defendants substantially completed their work on the entire project, no earlier than May 1, 1998, the date when the minimum-security unit and garage were certified as substantially complete. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the statute of repose does not begin to run on claims involving an improvement that serves an entire project (including those parts constructed in multiple, uninterrupted phases) until all buildings served by the improvement have been connected to it. In addition, the Court held that the statute of repose did not apply to claims relating solely to manufacturing defects in a product used in the HTHW system. View "New Jersey v. Perini Corporation" on Justia Law

Defendant K.P.S. was charged with numerous counts of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, child abuse, endangering the welfare of a child, and conspiracy to commit these crimes. Defendants Peter Lisa and Carmini Laloo were named as co-defendants in the indictment and charged with many of the same offenses as well as a number of additional ones. The charges against the three co-defendants arose from evidence discovered by the police during a series of searches of Lisa's residence (a home owned by Lisa's mother). Police were called to investigate a domestic violence dispute. During the search, the police seized guns, some of which they later learned were stolen, and observed in the garage a motorcycle trailer that fit the description of a trailer reported as stolen. Additionally, while conducting the search, the police saw Lisa in his bedroom quickly and suspiciously turning off his computer. The three co-defendants jointly filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the evidence seized during those searches was in violation of their rights under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. According to Lisa's mother, she did not give her consent to the police to conduct a further search of the garage, despite the presence of her signature on a consent-to-search form. The police executed two subsequent search warrants on Lisa's home, seizing the motorcycle trailer and other purportedly stolen items as well as Lisa's computer, a camcorder, videotapes, and digital photo flash cards. The evidence revealed that Lisa, Laloo, and defendant engaged in illicit sexual activities with defendant's minor son. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. In accordance with a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to a fifteen-year term of imprisonment subject to the No Early Release Act, to be followed by a five-year period of parole supervision and community supervision for life. The court also ordered that defendant comply with the registration requirements of Megan's Law. Lisa and Laloo also entered guilty pleas to first-degree aggravated sexual assault, pursuant to plea agreements with the State, and were sentenced to state prison terms. Defendant, Lisa, and Laloo appealed their sentences and the denial of their suppression motions. Lisa's appeal and defendant and Laloo's appeals were heard by two different panels of the Appellate Division. The issue in this appeal was whether the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded defendant's appellate panel from considering anew the issues that had been decided earlier by his co-defendant's panel. The Supreme Court held that the decision rendered by the appellate panel in Lisa's appeal was not the law of the case in defendant's later-heard appeal. Defendant had a due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to be heard on his appeal. View "New Jersey v. K.P.S." on Justia Law

In 2009, plaintiff attended a free eye screening conducted by the New Jersey Commission for the Blind and Visually Impaired at the Jersey Shore Family Health Center. Plaintiff slipped and fell on the tile floor. As a result, plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries, including a torn ligament in her ankle, and herniated and bulging discs in her back. The Family Health Center was a nonprofit charitable clinic in the Meridian Health hospitals system. It was located in a separate building next to the Jersey Shore University Medical Center. The issue this case presented on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the Family Health Center was entitled to charitable immunity pursuant to N.J.S.A.2A:53A-7, or the limited liability afforded to nonprofit entities organized exclusively for hospital purposes pursuant to N.J.S.A.2A:53A-8. After review, the Court concluded that site of plaintiff's fall was part of a nonprofit health care corporation organized exclusively for hospital purposes. Defendants, therefore, were not entitled to absolute immunity, but rather are entitled to the limitation of damages afforded to nonprofit institutions organized exclusively for hospital purposes. View "Kuchera v. Jersey Shore Family Health" on Justia Law

Defendant "L.A." was employed by the Trenton Board of Education as an elementary school security guard. While at work, L.A. allegedly had unlawful sexual contact with two minor students, N.F. and K.O. The allegations were referred to the Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit (IAIU) of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) and defendant was subsequently indicted. In the N.F. indictment, L.A. was charged with third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact and second-degree endangering the welfare of a minor. In the K.O. indictment, L.A. was charged with two counts of second-degree sexual assault and one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a minor. L.A. pled guilty to one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a minor (N.F.) in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges regarding N.F. and complete dismissal of the K.O. indictment. K.O. s guardian ad litem subsequently filed a civil complaint alleging that L.A. sexually assaulted K.O. and that the Board negligently hired L.A. The Board answered the complaint, taking no position with regard to the allegations against L.A. However, L.A. was assigned counsel by the Horace Mann Insurance Agency, pursuant to a private insurance policy maintained by the New Jersey Education Association. Ultimately, K.O.'s civil action was settled without any admission of wrongdoing by L.A. or the Board. After the settlement, L.A., through counsel provided by Horace Mann, filed a verified petition against the Commissioner of Education seeking reimbursement for the attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against K.O.'s civil action. The matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law and L.A.'s counsel and the Board filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted L.A.'s motion, denied the Board's, and awarded L.A. attorney's fees and costs pursuant to N.J.S.A.18A:16-6, the statute that addressed the right to indemnification for officers and employees of boards of education in civil actions. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 entitled a school board employee to indemnification for attorney's fees and costs spent in defense of a civil action arising from the same allegations contained in a dismissed criminal indictment. The Court concluded that in such circumstances N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 requires indemnification unless there was proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee's conduct fell outside the course of performance of his or her employment duties. Here, rather than conducting an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ disposed of the matter by way of summary judgment. Because there are disputed issues of material fact regarding whether L.A. was acting within the scope of the responsibilities of his employment, the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed. The matter was remanded to the Commissioner of Education for a hearing to determine whether L.A.'s conduct fell outside the course of performance of his employment duties. View "L.A. v. Board of Education of the City of Trenton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned five lots in the City of Hackensack on which stood two dilapidated buildings abutted by two poorly maintained and decrepit parking lots. Hackensack designated eleven out of twenty lots in a two-block area as in need of redevelopment, including plaintiffs' five lots. In doing so, the Planning Board made specific findings that those lots met the statutory definitions of blight in N.J.S.A.40A:12A-5(a), (b), and (d). The Hackensack Mayor and Council passed a resolution that adopted the Planning Board s findings. Plaintiffs filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs challenging Hackensack's classification of their lots as blighted, arguing that a finding of blight did not meet the constitutional definition of blight enunciated in "Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro," (191 N.J. 344 (2007)). On that basis, plaintiffs sought to strike down the Mayor and Council's resolution classifying plaintiffs properties as part of an area in need of redevelopment. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that "Gallenthin" established a heightened constitutional standard for blight applicable to every subsection of the Redevelopment Law. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the Appellate Division over-read the scope of Gallenthin, which only addressed a specific constitutional defect in subsection (e) of N.J.S.A.40A:12A-5. Applying the required deferential standard of review to the municipal decision-making in this case, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that substantial evidence supported Hackensack's designation of plaintiffs properties as in need of redevelopment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Appellate Division. View "62-64 Main Street, L.L.C. v. Mayor & Council of the City of Hackensack" on Justia Law