Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Rolando Fernandes and his boss, Mario Freitas (Mario), were installing a sewer pipe on a residential construction site. The wall of the trench in which Fernandes was working collapsed, burying him up to his chest. Mario promptly extricated plaintiff and later drove him home. Fernandes was seriously injured and has not worked since that day. Fernandes filed a complaint against the general contractor, DAR Development Corp. and DAR Construction, Inc. (collectively DAR or defendant), seeking compensatory damages. At trial, the court rejected defendant s request to charge comparative negligence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. In resisting defendant s request to charge Fernandes' negligence, plaintiff argued according to controlling New Jersey case law, a worker's negligence should not have been submitted to the jury in negligence claims by an injured worker against third parties, such as a general contractor. He also argued that the record provided no evidential support for a comparative negligence charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision by the trial court refusing to submit the issue of plaintiff's negligence to the jury. In doing so, the appellate panel invoked not only the leading authority on negligence claims by injured workers arising from workplace accidents against third parties, but also authority governing workplace accidents involving unsafe or defectively designed equipment. After review of the Appellate Division's decision, the Supreme Court concluded that in negligence claims by injured workers against third parties, such as a general contractor, there was no sound reason to depart from settled precedent that an employee's negligence may be submitted to the jury when evidence has been adduced that the injured employee unreasonably confronted a known risk and had no meaningful choice in the manner in which he completed that task. The Court also determined, like the Appellate Division, that in this case the evidence produced at trial provided no basis to submit the issue of Fernandes' negligence to the jury. View "Fernandes v. DAR Development Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joel S. Lippman, M.D., was employed by defendant Ethicon, Inc., a subsidiary of defendant Johnson & Johnson, Inc., from July 2000 until his termination in May 2006. For the majority of his employment, plaintiff served as worldwide vice president of medical affairs and chief medical officer of Ethicon. He was responsible for safety, medical reviews, and medical writing. Plaintiff served on multiple internal review boards, including a quality board that was created to assess the health risks posed by Ethicon's products and provide medical input regarding any necessary corrective measures with respect to their products in the field. On numerous occasions, plaintiff objected to the proposed or continued sale and distribution of certain Ethicon medical products on the basis that they were medically unsafe and that their sale violated various federal and state laws and regulations. Although he received push back from executives and other members of the boards whose interest and expertise aligned with Ethicon's business priorities, Ethicon ultimately followed many of his recommendations. In April 2006, plaintiff advocated the recall of a particular product that he believed was dangerous, and it was eventually recalled in late April or early May 2006. On May 15, 2006, Ethicon terminated plaintiff's employment. In this appeal, the Court considers whether an employee, whose job duties entail knowing or securing compliance with a relevant standard of care and knowing when an employer s actions or proposed actions deviate from that standard of care, may invoke the whistleblower protections afforded under N.J.S.A.34:19-3 of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA or Act), N.J.S.A.34:19-1 to -14. After review, the Supreme Court held that CEPA's protections extended to the performance of regular job duties by watchdog employees. "Unless and until the Legislature expresses its intent to differentiate among the classes of employees who are entitled to CEPA protection, there can be no additional burden imposed on watchdog employees seeking CEPA protection." View "Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc." on Justia Law

Police arrived at defendant Evan Reece's home to investigate a dropped 9-1-1 call that originated there. Defendant denied making any such call, and insisted that he was alone in the home, although responding officer Sergeant Delagarza had observed three vehicles in the driveway. Defendant retrieved and displayed his cordless home phone to Delagarza, which did not show any call to 9-1-1 in its memory. Delagarza looked into the house through the front door that defendant had left open, and saw nothing unusual or suspicious. Nevertheless, Delagarza called for a backup, and with defendant present, confirmed with the police dispatcher that the originating number of the call was defendant's home phone number. During these communications, Delagarza noticed a small abrasion on the knuckle of defendant s hand, which Delagarza stated was similar to the result of punching something. Delagarza asked defendant if he was married, and defendant stated that he was, further stating that his marital status was none of Delagarza's business. Delagarza noticed that defendant's demeanor began to change at this point, and he became frustrated with Delagarza's presence and his questioning. Delagarza asked if he could enter the house and look around, but defendant refused consent. Delagarza then called for assistance and told defendant that he and the other officers needed to check the house. Defendant responded by slamming the door closed and attempting to lock it, while the officers pushed the door open. Delagarza announced that defendant was under arrest, and the officers entered defendant s residence. Defendant attempted to block their entry, and a struggle ensued. After being subdued, defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of simple assault, one count of resisting arrest, and one count of obstructing the administration of law. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge held that, under the emergency-aid doctrine, the officers were entitled to enter defendant's home without a warrant. Based on this finding, the court held that defendant's attempt to deny them access constituted obstruction. The court also made specific credibility findings. Defendant was found guilty of one count of simple assault, resisting arrest, and obstruction. Defendant was acquitted of the other count of simple assault. On appeal to the Law Division, defendant was found guilty of resisting arrest and obstruction, and not guilty of simple assault. In a split decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction for resisting arrest, and reversed the conviction for obstruction, a majority of the panel finding that the emergency-aid doctrine did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the emergency-aid doctrine justified the officers warrantless entry into defendant's home. Furthermore, because the credibility and factual findings of the municipal court and Law Division were supported by substantial evidence, the Court affirmed defendant's conviction for resisting arrest and reinstated defendant's obstruction conviction. View "New Jersey v. Reece" on Justia Law

The unions in each of three municipalities brought scope-of-negotiations challenges to the municipal actions. The Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC), in separate decisions, held that the municipalities violated the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act (EERA), and required each municipality to negotiate the changes in terms and conditions of employment. PERC applied the three-part test set forth in "Local 195, IFPTE v. New Jersey," (88 N.J.393 (1982)), for resolving questions about the scope of public sector employment negotiations. In "Local 195," the Court established that a subject is negotiable when: (1) the item intimately and directly affects the work and welfare of public employees; (2) the subject has not been fully or partially preempted by statute or regulation; and (3) a negotiated agreement would not significantly interfere with the determination of governmental policy.The three municipalities appealed their PERC administrative determinations. The Appellate Division observed that the Commission had approved all three layoff plans during the time when the Commission's emergency regulation permitting temporary layoffs, was in effect. PERC determined that the layoffs in each municipality directly affected employee work and welfare, that the subject of negotiation was not preempted by statute or regulation, and that the municipalities did not have the managerial prerogative to unilaterally implement the layoffs because negotiations would not significantly interfere with governmental policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that at the time that they occurred, the layoff actions at issue were non-negotiable under the third prong of the Local 195 test. View "IMO Borough of Keyport v. Local 68" on Justia Law

At about 8:30 p.m. on December 15, 2010, Monmouth County Sheriff's Officers Alexander Torres and Thomas Ruocco arrived at a Matawan address to execute a child-support warrant on plaintiff Eric Morillo. While Torres went to knock on the front door, Ruocco went around the side of the home and discovered plaintiff sitting in an idling car parked in the driveway of the listed address. Although the car's engine was running, its headlights were off. As Ruocco approached the car, he observed plaintiff in the passenger seat smoking what appeared to Ruocco to be marijuana. Ruocco asked plaintiff if he had any other drugs on him; plaintiff told Ruocco that he was carrying a loaded weapon tucked in the right side of the waistband of his pants. Ruocco seized the weapon and called Torres on his hand-held radio to come and assist. Plaintiff and his companion were removed from the vehicle and patted down. Plaintiff was arrested on the child-support warrant. While still at the scene, Ruocco phoned his supervisor, Sergeant Steven Cooper, to alert him to the circumstances involved in executing the warrant and the seizure of the weapon. Although Ruocco did not ask plaintiff at the scene whether he had a permit to carry the gun, while en route to police headquarters, plaintiff informed the officers that the handgun was registered to him and that he had paperwork for it. Plaintiff told the officers that he was involved in gang activity and was carrying the handgun because he feared retaliation. Plaintiff posted bail on the child-support warrant. Plaintiff was later charged with unlawful possession of a handgun. After receiving confirmation from the New Jersey State Police that plaintiff's handgun had been purchased with the proper registration, the weapons charge was dropped. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Ruocco, Torres, and Cooper, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA). He alleged that they violated his constitutional rights by wrongfully charging him with unlawful possession of a weapon, which led to his incarceration until bail was posted. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability. Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity and seeking dismissal of the action. The trial court denied defendants motion for summary judgment, deeming it impermissible for plaintiff to be charged with unlawful possession of a weapon because the gun he carried was lawfully registered to him and he was at his present residence when he was found carrying the weapon. After several motions to stay the proceedings and motions for leave to appeal, the matter came before the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. Both plaintiff and defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court denied plaintiff s motion for leave to appeal, but granted defendants motion for leave to appeal the Appellate Division's judgment that affirmed the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. After review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the civil rights causes of action against the officers should have been dismissed based on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. View "Morillo v. Monmouth County Sheriff Officers" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant called 9-1-1 requesting assistance for his five-month old daughter, reporting that she was not breathing. When the police arrived, the infant was in an ambulance about to be taken to the hospital. Defendant told a detective that, upon observing his daughter lying in bed, he noticed that she was not breathing. Defendant acceded to the detective's request that he come to the police station to provide further information that may be helpful for his daughter s treatment. Defendant was at the police station for a total of three hours (including breaks), during which he was interviewed for some forty minutes. Defendant told the detective that, earlier in the day, his girlfriend told him that the baby was cranky, and he tried to calm her over several hours. At the conclusion of the interview, the detective drove defendant home. At no time prior to or while at the police station was defendant given Miranda warnings. Defendant's daughter was declared dead three days later. Approximately 7 months later, defendant was arrested, and after being read his Miranda rights, admitted that he tossed the baby toward the bed, causing her to hit the wall. Defendant was subsequently indicted for second-degree manslaughter and second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress his statement, concluding that defendant was in custody at the time of the interview and that his rights were violated when he was not administered Miranda warnings. The court relied on several key factors regarding the detective's interaction with defendant, including the detective's instruction that defendant sit in a certain chair to permit the video camera to obtain a full face view of defendant, the detective's physical proximity to defendant, and the probing nature of the questions that defendant was asked. The court also relied on testimony of witnesses at the evidentiary hearing demonstrating that the detective asked defendant to accompany him to the police station, defendant was placed in the back seat of the unmarked police car, defendant and the detective did not converse during the ride to the police station, and the house was secured to prevent entry by anyone. The trial court found that, under all of the circumstances, no reasonable person in defendant s position would have felt free to leave the room or the police station. The Appellate Division concluded that defendant had not been subjected to a custodial interrogation. The court held that the failure to provide Miranda warnings therefore did not require suppression of defendant's statement. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the interview conducted by the detective at the police station was a custodial interrogation and the failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to the interview required suppression of that recorded statement. View "New Jersey v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with murder, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, carjacking, kidnapping, felony murder, terroristic threats, tampering with physical evidence, hindering apprehension, and aggravated assault. At trial, Q.M. recanted his statement and claimed that he never witnessed the murder, did not help dispose of the gun, and that a police officer had coerced him into lying. D.C. testified unequivocally that he saw defendant order the victim into the dumpster and then shoot him. As a result of Q.M. s recantation, and the differing accounts D.C. offered in his pretrial statements, the court allowed videotapes of both pretrial statements to be played for the jury in the courtroom. The State suggested, without defense objection, that a DVD player be made available for jurors to view the videotaped statements during deliberations. The trial court granted the request and during summation, the prosecutor urged the jury to watch the videotaped statements of both witnesses. Two days into deliberations, defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that a juror was tainted and stated that he may have been mistaken when he declined to object to the State's proposal to give jurors access to those statements during deliberations. The court did not remove the DVDs from the jury room, suggesting that doing so after two days of deliberations could be prejudicial to both parties. The jury returned a partial verdict, convicting defendant of everything except murder, carjacking, felony murder and aggravated assault. At defendant s retrial on the remaining counts, the witnesses testified again. D.C. testified that he witnessed the murder and identified defendant as the shooter, but added new details. Q.M. testified that he never witnessed the murder, did not help dispose of the gun, and that police had coerced him into identifying defendant. The court denied the State's request to allow D.C.'s pretrial statements to be allowed into evidence, but allowed the recording of Q.M.'s pretrial statement to be played for the jury. The State later informed the court that it had arranged for the jury to have access to a DVD player in the jury room. Defendant did not object to that procedure. The State again urged the jury to watch the DVD and to note the inconsistencies between Q.M.'s pretrial statement and his testimony on the stand. The jury convicted defendant of murder, carjacking, and felony murder, but acquitted him of aggravated assault. The court imposed an aggregate term of life plus thirty-five years, with a total period of parole ineligibility of more than eighty-five years. An appellate panel reversed, holding that both trial courts committed plain error when they permitted the juries unrestricted access to videotaped statements during deliberations. Given the content of the statements, and the strength of the other evidence presented by the State, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial courts' decisions permitting the juries access to the pretrial statements did not constitute plain error. View "New Jersey v. Weston" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested at a locked, fenced-in parking lot used for storage by an adjoining warehouse operated by Domino Manufacturing. Domino Manufacturing used the lot to store equipment for printing presses, including metal shafts and printing rollers which were kept outside because they were too heavy to be moved inside the warehouse. Defendant was attempting to exit the main gate in a pick-up truck in which the police found bolt cutters, the padlock from the gate, and eleven metal printing rollers. Defendant was charged with third-degree burglary, and disorderly persons possession of a burglary tool. Defendant was tried only on the burglary charge; the charge under the disorderly persons statute was dismissed. At the close of the State's evidence at trial, defendant moved for acquittal on the ground that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the premises that defendant entered was a "structure" as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:18-1, contending that defendant entered a parking lot, which is not a "structure" within the statute. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the fenced-in area was a prohibited space not open to the public, as well as a place adapted for the conduct of Domino Manufacturing's business, and therefore it constituted a "structure." Defendant was convicted of third-degree burglary, and sentenced to five years in prison. He appealed, challenging the trial court's conclusion that the fenced-in parking lot was a "structure." Finding no error in the trial court's analysis, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Olivero" on Justia Law

Two indictments were pending against defendant Aakash Dalal. The first charged defendant with a series of offenses directed against four synagogues and a Jewish community center. The second charged defendant with conspiracy to murder the assistant prosecutor, conspiracy to possess a firearm, and terroristic threats after a jailhouse informant's tip lead law enforcement to obtain a search warrant of his cell and found handwritten documents, including a chart of ENEMIES that listed the criminal presiding judge as a high profile enemy and the assistant prosecutor on defendant s case as a tactical enemy. Defendant moved to dismiss both indictments and sought to recuse the presiding judge. After the State observed that the evidence provided a significant reason for the court to recuse itself, the presiding judge transferred the proceedings to a third judge (the trial court). The trial court subsequently denied defendant's motions to recuse the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office and for a change of venue based on pretrial publicity. The Appellate Division granted defendant s motion for leave to appeal and reversed. Although the panel was "confident" the trial judge could actually preside fairly and impartially, it concluded that the appearance of fairness in the future proceedings will be impaired so long as a Bergen judge presided over the matter. The panel remanded the matter to the assignment judge to either transfer the matter to another vicinage or arrange to have a judge from another vicinage preside over the case. The assignment judge transferred the matter to an adjacent county. The Court granted the State's motion for leave to appeal. As part of its consideration, the Supreme Court noted two relevant developments since the motion was first addressed: neither the presiding judge nor the judge who ruled on defendant's bail served in the adjacent Bergen Vicinage. Effective May 1, 2015, the presiding judge was assigned to the Passaic Vicinage, Civil Division for reasons unrelated to this matter. The other judge retired in August 2014. "Not all threats or efforts to intimidate a judge will require recusal." But the Supreme Court felt that given the serious nature of the threat, the absence of any proof of manipulation, the potential introduction of the evidence in one of the trials, and the relationships among judges within the Bergen Vicinage, a reasonable, fully informed observer could have doubts about a Bergen County judge's impartiality. The matter was remanded to the Bergen County assignment judge for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Dalal" on Justia Law

Defendants William Roseman and Lori Lewin were married from 1992 until 2000, during which time Roseman was the Mayor of Carlstadt. As his wife, Lewin was entitled to, and received, benefits under Carlstadt's health plan. After their divorce, each was responsible for their own health insurance pursuant to the divorce decree; Roseman and the son of the marriage would remain on Carlstadt's plan and Lewin was to be provided health insurance coverage through her employer. Roseman notified a Carlstadt payroll clerk, who also served as the Assistant to the Insurance Officer, of the divorce. At the direction of the clerk, Roseman changed his W-4 tax form to reflect that he was no longer married, but the clerk failed to remove Lewin's name from Carlstadt's plan. As a result, following the divorce, Lewin remained on Carlstadt's plan, in addition to her own employer-provided health insurance plan. In July 2009, Roseman and Lewin were indicted on one count each of third-degree conspiracy, third-degree theft by deception, and second-degree official misconduct. Even though other individuals also were eligible to improperly receive benefits under Carlstadt's plan, Roseman and Lewin were the only individuals prosecuted. Roseman and Lewin rejected a plea offer and applied for admission into Pretrial Intervention (PTI). Initially, Roseman was rejected, but after he informed the prosecutor that he would agree to resign and be subject to a lifetime disqualification from office in exchange for PTI, approval of the agreement was sought and obtained by the prosecutor from the Attorney General's office. The prosecutor also expressed his willingness to dismiss the indictment against Lewin if Roseman was admitted into PTI under those conditions. Subsequently, defendants reconsidered and rejected the conditioned PTI offer, and Roseman filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The trial court dismissed the official misconduct charges, but refused to dismiss the remaining charges. The State filed an interlocutory appeal. The Appellate Division reversed the trial judge and reinstated the official misconduct counts of the indictment.. Defendants' efforts to resolve the matter failed because Roseman refused to resign and agree never to pursue public office in the future as conditions to any agreement. As a result, the prosecutor rejected in writing both defendants PTI applications, citing the presumption against PTI for second-degree offenses under the Guidelines for PTI provided in Rule 3:28 and eleven of the seventeen factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). The trial judge, over the objection of the prosecutor, ordered that Roseman and Lewin be admitted into PTI without conditions, finding that the prosecutor s decision to deny PTI was a patent and gross abuse of discretion. The State appealed. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed, finding that Roseman failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prosecutor patently and grossly abused his discretion. As to Lewin, the panel remanded the matter for an individualized assessment. After review, the Supreme Court concluded defendants demonstrated extraordinary circumstances to overcome the presumption against Pretrial Intervention (PTI) for second-degree offenses and there was no factual justification for the application of the factors set forth by the prosecutor under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). "Denial of defendants' applications to Pretrial Intervention (PTI) by the prosecutor was plainly a patent and gross abuse of discretion." View "New Jersey v. Roseman" on Justia Law