Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with murder, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, carjacking, kidnapping, felony murder, terroristic threats, tampering with physical evidence, hindering apprehension, and aggravated assault. At trial, Q.M. recanted his statement and claimed that he never witnessed the murder, did not help dispose of the gun, and that a police officer had coerced him into lying. D.C. testified unequivocally that he saw defendant order the victim into the dumpster and then shoot him. As a result of Q.M. s recantation, and the differing accounts D.C. offered in his pretrial statements, the court allowed videotapes of both pretrial statements to be played for the jury in the courtroom. The State suggested, without defense objection, that a DVD player be made available for jurors to view the videotaped statements during deliberations. The trial court granted the request and during summation, the prosecutor urged the jury to watch the videotaped statements of both witnesses. Two days into deliberations, defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that a juror was tainted and stated that he may have been mistaken when he declined to object to the State's proposal to give jurors access to those statements during deliberations. The court did not remove the DVDs from the jury room, suggesting that doing so after two days of deliberations could be prejudicial to both parties. The jury returned a partial verdict, convicting defendant of everything except murder, carjacking, felony murder and aggravated assault. At defendant s retrial on the remaining counts, the witnesses testified again. D.C. testified that he witnessed the murder and identified defendant as the shooter, but added new details. Q.M. testified that he never witnessed the murder, did not help dispose of the gun, and that police had coerced him into identifying defendant. The court denied the State's request to allow D.C.'s pretrial statements to be allowed into evidence, but allowed the recording of Q.M.'s pretrial statement to be played for the jury. The State later informed the court that it had arranged for the jury to have access to a DVD player in the jury room. Defendant did not object to that procedure. The State again urged the jury to watch the DVD and to note the inconsistencies between Q.M.'s pretrial statement and his testimony on the stand. The jury convicted defendant of murder, carjacking, and felony murder, but acquitted him of aggravated assault. The court imposed an aggregate term of life plus thirty-five years, with a total period of parole ineligibility of more than eighty-five years. An appellate panel reversed, holding that both trial courts committed plain error when they permitted the juries unrestricted access to videotaped statements during deliberations. Given the content of the statements, and the strength of the other evidence presented by the State, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial courts' decisions permitting the juries access to the pretrial statements did not constitute plain error. View "New Jersey v. Weston" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested at a locked, fenced-in parking lot used for storage by an adjoining warehouse operated by Domino Manufacturing. Domino Manufacturing used the lot to store equipment for printing presses, including metal shafts and printing rollers which were kept outside because they were too heavy to be moved inside the warehouse. Defendant was attempting to exit the main gate in a pick-up truck in which the police found bolt cutters, the padlock from the gate, and eleven metal printing rollers. Defendant was charged with third-degree burglary, and disorderly persons possession of a burglary tool. Defendant was tried only on the burglary charge; the charge under the disorderly persons statute was dismissed. At the close of the State's evidence at trial, defendant moved for acquittal on the ground that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the premises that defendant entered was a "structure" as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:18-1, contending that defendant entered a parking lot, which is not a "structure" within the statute. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the fenced-in area was a prohibited space not open to the public, as well as a place adapted for the conduct of Domino Manufacturing's business, and therefore it constituted a "structure." Defendant was convicted of third-degree burglary, and sentenced to five years in prison. He appealed, challenging the trial court's conclusion that the fenced-in parking lot was a "structure." Finding no error in the trial court's analysis, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Olivero" on Justia Law

Two indictments were pending against defendant Aakash Dalal. The first charged defendant with a series of offenses directed against four synagogues and a Jewish community center. The second charged defendant with conspiracy to murder the assistant prosecutor, conspiracy to possess a firearm, and terroristic threats after a jailhouse informant's tip lead law enforcement to obtain a search warrant of his cell and found handwritten documents, including a chart of ENEMIES that listed the criminal presiding judge as a high profile enemy and the assistant prosecutor on defendant s case as a tactical enemy. Defendant moved to dismiss both indictments and sought to recuse the presiding judge. After the State observed that the evidence provided a significant reason for the court to recuse itself, the presiding judge transferred the proceedings to a third judge (the trial court). The trial court subsequently denied defendant's motions to recuse the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office and for a change of venue based on pretrial publicity. The Appellate Division granted defendant s motion for leave to appeal and reversed. Although the panel was "confident" the trial judge could actually preside fairly and impartially, it concluded that the appearance of fairness in the future proceedings will be impaired so long as a Bergen judge presided over the matter. The panel remanded the matter to the assignment judge to either transfer the matter to another vicinage or arrange to have a judge from another vicinage preside over the case. The assignment judge transferred the matter to an adjacent county. The Court granted the State's motion for leave to appeal. As part of its consideration, the Supreme Court noted two relevant developments since the motion was first addressed: neither the presiding judge nor the judge who ruled on defendant's bail served in the adjacent Bergen Vicinage. Effective May 1, 2015, the presiding judge was assigned to the Passaic Vicinage, Civil Division for reasons unrelated to this matter. The other judge retired in August 2014. "Not all threats or efforts to intimidate a judge will require recusal." But the Supreme Court felt that given the serious nature of the threat, the absence of any proof of manipulation, the potential introduction of the evidence in one of the trials, and the relationships among judges within the Bergen Vicinage, a reasonable, fully informed observer could have doubts about a Bergen County judge's impartiality. The matter was remanded to the Bergen County assignment judge for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Dalal" on Justia Law

Defendants William Roseman and Lori Lewin were married from 1992 until 2000, during which time Roseman was the Mayor of Carlstadt. As his wife, Lewin was entitled to, and received, benefits under Carlstadt's health plan. After their divorce, each was responsible for their own health insurance pursuant to the divorce decree; Roseman and the son of the marriage would remain on Carlstadt's plan and Lewin was to be provided health insurance coverage through her employer. Roseman notified a Carlstadt payroll clerk, who also served as the Assistant to the Insurance Officer, of the divorce. At the direction of the clerk, Roseman changed his W-4 tax form to reflect that he was no longer married, but the clerk failed to remove Lewin's name from Carlstadt's plan. As a result, following the divorce, Lewin remained on Carlstadt's plan, in addition to her own employer-provided health insurance plan. In July 2009, Roseman and Lewin were indicted on one count each of third-degree conspiracy, third-degree theft by deception, and second-degree official misconduct. Even though other individuals also were eligible to improperly receive benefits under Carlstadt's plan, Roseman and Lewin were the only individuals prosecuted. Roseman and Lewin rejected a plea offer and applied for admission into Pretrial Intervention (PTI). Initially, Roseman was rejected, but after he informed the prosecutor that he would agree to resign and be subject to a lifetime disqualification from office in exchange for PTI, approval of the agreement was sought and obtained by the prosecutor from the Attorney General's office. The prosecutor also expressed his willingness to dismiss the indictment against Lewin if Roseman was admitted into PTI under those conditions. Subsequently, defendants reconsidered and rejected the conditioned PTI offer, and Roseman filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The trial court dismissed the official misconduct charges, but refused to dismiss the remaining charges. The State filed an interlocutory appeal. The Appellate Division reversed the trial judge and reinstated the official misconduct counts of the indictment.. Defendants' efforts to resolve the matter failed because Roseman refused to resign and agree never to pursue public office in the future as conditions to any agreement. As a result, the prosecutor rejected in writing both defendants PTI applications, citing the presumption against PTI for second-degree offenses under the Guidelines for PTI provided in Rule 3:28 and eleven of the seventeen factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). The trial judge, over the objection of the prosecutor, ordered that Roseman and Lewin be admitted into PTI without conditions, finding that the prosecutor s decision to deny PTI was a patent and gross abuse of discretion. The State appealed. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed, finding that Roseman failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prosecutor patently and grossly abused his discretion. As to Lewin, the panel remanded the matter for an individualized assessment. After review, the Supreme Court concluded defendants demonstrated extraordinary circumstances to overcome the presumption against Pretrial Intervention (PTI) for second-degree offenses and there was no factual justification for the application of the factors set forth by the prosecutor under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). "Denial of defendants' applications to Pretrial Intervention (PTI) by the prosecutor was plainly a patent and gross abuse of discretion." View "New Jersey v. Roseman" on Justia Law

Defendant was an employee of the North Bergen Board of Education who filed an action asserting statutory and common law employment discrimination claims against the Board. In discovery, defendant's counsel produced several hundred documents that allegedly had been removed or copied from Board files. According to the Board, the documents included highly confidential student educational and medical records that were protected by federal and state privacy laws. The Board reported the alleged theft of its documents to the county prosecutor. The State presented the matter to a grand jury, which ultimately indicted defendant for official misconduct and theft by unlawful taking of public documents. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to support the indictment and withheld exculpatory evidence about her motive. She also contended that her removal of documents for use in her employment discrimination claim was sanctioned by the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in "Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.," (204 N.J. 239 (2010)). The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial and appellate court's decisions. View "New Jersey v. Saavedra" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Richard Grabowsky filed a complaint against the Township of Montclair, challenging the validity of an ordinance adopted by the Township to permit the construction of an assisted living facility on a site located next to the Unitarian Universalist Congregation Church of Montclair. Plaintiff asserted that a statement made by Township Mayor Jerry Fried, a member of the Township Council and Planning Board, demonstrated that Fried had a direct personal interest in the development and that he should have been disqualified from voting on the zoning issue. He also alleged that Fried and a second member of the Council, Nick Lewis, shared a disqualifying indirect personal interest in the development project because of their membership in the Unitarian Church. The Township, its Planning Board and the developers seeking the opportunity to build the assisted living facility denied the existence of any conflict. Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction barring the Township and Planning Board from considering or approving development applications for the assisted living facility. Although no party filed a motion for any form of dispositive relief, the trial court sua sponte granted summary disposition, and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. An appellate panel concluded that the trial court's summary judgment was procedurally improper, but concurred with the court's determination that the two Township officials had no conflict of interest, and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment, but did not concur with the panel's conclusion that, on the limited record developed in the trial court, plaintiff's claim was properly dismissed because the Unitarian Church was neither an applicant nor an objector in the redevelopment application at issue. The Court held that when a church or other organization owned property within 200 feet of a site that is the subject of a zoning application, public officials who currently serve in substantive leadership positions in the organization, or who will imminently assume such positions, are disqualified from voting on the application. View "Grabowsky v. Township of Montclair" on Justia Law

In 2007, Camden police officers arrived at the scene of a shooting where they found the body of Edwin Torres on the sidewalk. Torres had suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the head and neck. An eyewitness identified defendant, who was a juvenile, as the shooter. Three days later, defendant Edwin Urbina surrendered, and, subsequently, he voluntarily elected to have his case transferred from the Family Part to the Law Division. In order to avoid an indictment for first-degree murder, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement, agreeing to proceed as an adult and plead guilty to one count of aggravated manslaughter in exchange for the State's recommendation of a sentence not to exceed seventeen and a half years' incarceration, subject to an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier and five years of post-release parole supervision. Nearly three years after his sentencing, defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea because the factual basis elicited for the plea indicated that he was asserting a complete defense to the charge. In a split decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The majority held that, although defendant testified to facts that raised the possibility of self-defense, when considered in light of the surrounding circumstances, his testimony did not constitute a contemporaneous claim of innocence requiring vacation of the plea. The Supreme Court reversed, however, finding that after defendant stated during the plea colloquy that he pulled his handgun after the victim and his cousin pulled their guns, and said "I ain't mean to kill him, your Honor. I just wanted to have him back up[,]" the trial court should have explored whether defendant was claiming he acted in self-defense. The Court found that the plea judge did not ensure that defendant truly understood the law of self-defense, including the requirement of a reasonable and honest belief in the necessity of using force, or that he understood that the State had the burden to disprove self-defense once asserted. "Absent such an inquiry on the record, it is unclear whether defendant's plea was truly knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." View "New Jersey v. Urbina" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action because Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 and FY 2015 Appropriations Acts did not provide sufficient funding to meet the amounts called for with the Legislature's enactment of Chapter 78, L.2011, c.78 (amending N.J.S.A. 43:3C-9.5(c)). Plaintiffs argued that Chapter 78 created an enforceable contract that was entitled to constitutional protection against impairment. The Supreme Court granted the State's motion for direct certification to resolve important questions raised by this "apparent clash of constitutional provisions." After review, the Supreme Court held that the Legislature and Governor were without authority to enact an enforceable and legally binding long-term financial agreement through this statute. "Chapter 78's contractual language creates, at best, the equivalent of appropriations-backed debt that is accompanied by a strong legislative expression of intent to provide future funding. The legislative use of contractual terms in Chapter 78, when referring to the required schedule of recurring payments of the State's annual required contribution to the State public pension systems, does not create an enforceable long-term financial contract that can co-exist with the limitations of the Debt Limitation Clause and the related Appropriations Clause of the State Constitution. So long as Chapter 78 exists in its present statutory form, each year's appropriations act will reflect the present legislative and executive judgment as to the budgetary priority of this pressing need for which those branches will be answerable to the public and to the financial marketplace. It is not the place of this Court to dictate that judgment, for the Constitution has left such budgetary and political questions to the other two branches." View "Burgos v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from plaintiffs' complaint to cancel and discharge a creditor's judgment lien held by defendant Citi Mortgage, Inc. (Citi). Following the conclusion of Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings the Superior Court entered a default judgment in favor of Citi against plaintiffs, and by virtue of its docketing of that judgment, Citi obtained a lien on all of plaintiffs real property in New Jersey. Four years later, plaintiffs instituted a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court. Because plaintiffs listed the law firm that had represented Citi, rather than Citi itself in their Chapter 7 petition, the bankruptcy court did not provide notice of the proceeding to Citi. After the bankruptcy trustee abandoned two of plaintiffs' New Jersey properties, the bankruptcy court discharged plaintiffs' debt and closed their Chapter 7 case. Citi did not attempt to levy on plaintiffs property at any time prior to the bankruptcy filing and did not seek to enforce its lien in the wake of plaintiffs bankruptcy discharge. More than three years after the bankruptcy discharge, plaintiffs filed this action under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1, which permits a debtor whose debts have been discharged in bankruptcy, to apply to the state court that has entered a judgment against the debtor, or has docketed the judgment, for an order directing the judgment to be canceled and discharged. The trial court granted Citi's motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' claim. The court acknowledged that a judgment creditor, such as Citi, who has not levied on the debtor's property prior to the debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition, may enforce its valid lien following the bankruptcy discharge, but must do so within the year following the discharge. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division for substantially the same reasons. View "Gaskill v. Citi Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the third-party intervention or private search doctrine applied to a warrantless search of a home. Co-defendant Evangeline James and her young children lived in an apartment on the first floor of a two-family home in Asbury Park. Defendant Ricky Wright, James' boyfriend, stayed at the apartment about three to four nights per week. James called her landlord, Alfred Santillo, and reported a major water leak in the kitchen ceiling. Santillo told James to shut off the main water valve and said that he would stop by with a plumber the next morning. Santillo and the plumber, Nicholas Alexo, arrived at the apartment before noon on Monday. Because no one was home, Santillo called James, who did not answer her phone. After waiting about a half hour, Santillo let himself into the apartment, as he had done on prior occasions. Santillo and Alexo saw water and sewage leaking from the kitchen ceiling. Because the water pipes in the kitchen led to the back of the apartment, Alexo went to the rear bedroom to check for other leaks. Alexo saw a small bag of marijuana on top of a nightstand. Inside an open drawer of the nightstand, he also saw a small box that he believed contained powder or crack cocaine. Alexo called Santillo into the bedroom and showed him the items. They then called the police. Police ultimately James based on what they saw in the apartment. Defendant Wright arrived as they were leaving the apartment, and the police arrested him too. A grand jury indicted Wright and James on various drug offenses, second-degree possession of a firearm in the course of committing a drug offense, second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and fourth-degree possession of a prohibited weapon, namely, body armor piercing bullets. Wright moved to suppress the evidence. After review, the Supreme Court held that the third-party intervention or private search doctrine does not exempt law enforcement's initial search of defendant's home from the warrant requirement. Absent exigency or some other exception to the warrant requirement, the police must get a warrant to enter a private home and conduct a search, even if a private actor has already searched the area and notified law enforcement. "The proper course under the State and Federal Constitutions is the simplest and most direct one. If private parties tell the police about unlawful activities inside a person's home, the police can use that information to establish probable cause and seek a search warrant. In the time it takes to get the warrant, police officers can secure the apartment or home from the outside, for a reasonable period of time, if reasonably necessary to avoid any tampering with or destruction of evidence." View "New Jersey v. Wright" on Justia Law