Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether an initiative petition filed under the Optional Municipal Charter Law (known as the Faulkner Act), requiring the City of Camden to create and maintain its own police force, and enjoining the municipality from replacing its police force with a countywide police force, unlawfully restricted the municipality's legislative authority or was preempted by state fiscal statutes. Defendants, a group of City voters acting as a Committee of Petitioners (Committee), attempted to block the regionalization of the City's police services. The Committee invoked the Optional Municipal Charter Law. The Committee submitted an initiative petition for the adoption of a proposed ordinance that would have required the City of Camden to create and maintain its own police force, and would have enjoined the City from disbanding its municipal police force and replacing it with a regionalized or countywide police force. The Committee obtained, on its petition, the number of voter signatures required by the Faulkner Act. It sought to have its initiated ordinance certified by the municipal clerk, considered by the City Council, and, if not enacted by the Council, placed on the ballot for voter approval in the 2012 General Election. Plaintiffs Mayor Dana L. Redd, Camden's Mayor, and Camden's Council President Francisco Moran filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the Committee's Faulkner Act initiative. The trial court found that the proposed ordinance constituted an invalid divestment of the City's legislative authority. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for a determination whether the state fiscal statutes preempt the proposed ordinance. Although the Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division that the proposed ordinance does not constitute an improper divestment of the municipal governing body's legislative power, it disagreed with the panel's remand of the case for further inquiry into the question of preemption. The Supreme Court found no evidence of a legislative intent to preempt the initiative and referendum procedure set forth in the Faulkner Act in either the municipal finance or police statutes cited in this appeal. Instead, the Court found a legislative intent in some of the statutes to retain the Faulkner Act's procedures, including its initiative and referendum provisions. Thus, the Committee's Faulkner Act initiative was not preempted. Notwithstanding the Court's holdings that the proposed ordinance neither effected an unlawful divestment of legislative power nor was preempted by state statutes, the relief sought by the Committee in its 2012 petition was not granted in a manner consistent with the Faulkner Act. Because the reorganization that the ordinance was intended to forestall was completed more than two years ago, the ordinance as drafted was inconsistent with then-current circumstances. Accordingly, the ordinance might no longer be supported by all of the citizens who backed it with their signatures, and it could not meaningfully be evaluated by the voters. The presence of an out-of-date ordinance on the ballot would contravene the Faulkner Act's objective that voters be presented with a clear, understandable proposed ordinance that they may accept or reject as they see fit. Accordingly, The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Appellate Division's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of a judgment barring the Camden Municipal Clerk from certifying the Committee's petition. View "Redd v. Bowman" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal were the circumstances under which a law enforcement officer may legally enter a disabled vehicle to obtain the driver's registration and insurance information without first requesting the driver's permission or allowing the driver the opportunity to retrieve the documents himself. This became an issue when the officer found a handgun and marijuana inside an open backpack inside the disabled vehicle. Defendant was arrested and subsequently charged with multiple weapons offenses The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found in the car, finding that the trooper lawfully conducted a search for defendant's credentials and was therefore permitted to seize any evidence discovered in plain view. The Appellate Division disagreed, finding that the trooper never gave defendant the opportunity to present his credentials. Therefore, since the trooper was not lawfully in the viewing area of the contraband, the Appellate Division found that the plain view exception did not apply, and reversed the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division, finding that the trooper was required to provide defendant with the opportunity to present his credentials before entering the vehicle. "If such an opportunity is presented, and defendant is unable or unwilling to produce his registration or insurance information, only then may an officer conduct a search for those credentials." View "New Jersey v. Keaton" on Justia Law

The State’s public pension systems were defined-benefit plans, which guaranteed participants a calculable amount of benefits payable upon retirement based on the participant’s salary and time spent in the pension system. In 2011, with the enactment of L. 2011, c. 78 (Chapter 78), the Legislature added language explicitly declaring that each member of the State’s pension systems "shall have a contractual right to the annual required contribution amount" and the failure of the State to make the required contribution "shall be deemed to be an impairment of the contractual right." A separate statutory provision, enacted earlier, required the State to increase its annually required contribution (ARC) beginning with fiscal year 2012 (FY12) over the course of seven years at increments of 1/7 of the ARC per year, until the contribution covered the full ARC. The State made the required contributions in FY12 and FY13, and the Appropriations Act signed into law for FY14 included the required contributions of 3/7 of the ARC. In February 2014, the Governor released the FY15 proposed budget, which also included funding to satisfy the State’s required payment (i.e., 4/7 of the ARC). On May 20, 2014, the Governor issued Executive Order 156, which reduced the State payments into the pension systems for FY14, explaining that the reduction was due to a severe and unanticipated revenue shortfall. Instead of paying the required 3/7 of the ARC contribution, which totaled $1.582 billion, the State made a total contribution of $696 million for FY14. The next day, citing new information that placed the State’s projected revenue at less than previous projections, the State Treasurer announced that the proposed budget for FY15 was being revised to reduce the amount that would be contributed to pension systems. The revised FY15 budget thus advanced would include a total contribution of $681 million, reflecting $1.57 billion less than what was required. Plaintiffs brought this action because the prior Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 and current FY 2015 Appropriations Acts did not provide sufficient funding to meet the amounts called for under Chapter 78’s payment schedule. Plaintiffs argued that Chapter 78 created an enforceable contract that was entitled to constitutional protection against impairment. The trial court issued a detailed and comprehensive opinion that granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on their impairment-of-contract claims and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court accepted the argument that Chapter 78 created a contract and that the State’s failure to appropriate the full value of ARC in the FY15 Appropriations Act substantially impaired plaintiffs’ rights under the contract. In so finding, the court rejected arguments that Chapter 78 was unenforceable as violative of the Debt Limitation Clause, the Appropriations Clause, and the gubernatorial line-item veto power. The court did not order a specific appropriation, but rather determined to give the other branches an opportunity to act in accordance with the court’s decree. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Chapter 78 did not create a legally enforceable contract that was entitled to constitutional protection. The Debt Limitation Clause of the State Constitution interdicted the creation, in this manner, of a legally binding enforceable contract compelling multi-year financial payments in the sizable amounts called for by the statute. View "Burgos v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the tragic death of Myroslava Kotsovska, who was fatally injured when defendant Saul Liebman, for whom decedent worked as a caretaker, inadvertently struck her with his car. Petitioner Olena Kotsovska, as administratrix of the decedent's estate, filed a wrongful death action against Liebman. Liebman did not dispute that decedent's injuries were the result of his negligence. Instead, Liebman argued that, because decedent was his employee, petitioner could recover only under the Workers Compensation Act. At trial, the judge instructed the jury that it would need to decide by a preponderance of the evidence whether decedent was an employee or an independent contractor and explained the factors that it should consider in reaching that conclusion. The judge also informed the jury that it should give whatever weight it deemed appropriate to the facts. The jury returned a verdict in favor of petitioner, found that decedent was an independent contractor and awarded decedent's estate a total of $525,000 in damages. Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed. Relying on the New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions in "Kristiansen v. Morgan," (153 N.J.298 (1998)), and "Wunschel v. City of Jersey City," (96 N.J.651 (1984)), the panel concluded that the Division had primary jurisdiction over the dispute regarding decedent's employment status. The panel rejected defendant's challenges to the damages award, reversed the judgment on liability only, and remanded the matter to the Division for a determination of decedent's employment status. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Compensation Act divested the Superior Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the decedent's employment status once defendant raised an exclusive remedy provision of the Act as an affirmative defense. Further, the Court addressed whether the jury charge was deficient enough to require reversal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court had concurrent jurisdiction to resolve the dispute based on the dispute over the decedent's employment status. Further, the Court could not conclude that the jury instruction given confused or otherwise mislead the jury. Consequently, the Court reversed the Appellant Division and reinstated the jury's verdict. View "Estate of Kotsovska v. Liebman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rolando Fernandes and his boss, Mario Freitas (Mario), were installing a sewer pipe on a residential construction site. The wall of the trench in which Fernandes was working collapsed, burying him up to his chest. Mario promptly extricated plaintiff and later drove him home. Fernandes was seriously injured and has not worked since that day. Fernandes filed a complaint against the general contractor, DAR Development Corp. and DAR Construction, Inc. (collectively DAR or defendant), seeking compensatory damages. At trial, the court rejected defendant s request to charge comparative negligence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. In resisting defendant s request to charge Fernandes' negligence, plaintiff argued according to controlling New Jersey case law, a worker's negligence should not have been submitted to the jury in negligence claims by an injured worker against third parties, such as a general contractor. He also argued that the record provided no evidential support for a comparative negligence charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision by the trial court refusing to submit the issue of plaintiff's negligence to the jury. In doing so, the appellate panel invoked not only the leading authority on negligence claims by injured workers arising from workplace accidents against third parties, but also authority governing workplace accidents involving unsafe or defectively designed equipment. After review of the Appellate Division's decision, the Supreme Court concluded that in negligence claims by injured workers against third parties, such as a general contractor, there was no sound reason to depart from settled precedent that an employee's negligence may be submitted to the jury when evidence has been adduced that the injured employee unreasonably confronted a known risk and had no meaningful choice in the manner in which he completed that task. The Court also determined, like the Appellate Division, that in this case the evidence produced at trial provided no basis to submit the issue of Fernandes' negligence to the jury. View "Fernandes v. DAR Development Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joel S. Lippman, M.D., was employed by defendant Ethicon, Inc., a subsidiary of defendant Johnson & Johnson, Inc., from July 2000 until his termination in May 2006. For the majority of his employment, plaintiff served as worldwide vice president of medical affairs and chief medical officer of Ethicon. He was responsible for safety, medical reviews, and medical writing. Plaintiff served on multiple internal review boards, including a quality board that was created to assess the health risks posed by Ethicon's products and provide medical input regarding any necessary corrective measures with respect to their products in the field. On numerous occasions, plaintiff objected to the proposed or continued sale and distribution of certain Ethicon medical products on the basis that they were medically unsafe and that their sale violated various federal and state laws and regulations. Although he received push back from executives and other members of the boards whose interest and expertise aligned with Ethicon's business priorities, Ethicon ultimately followed many of his recommendations. In April 2006, plaintiff advocated the recall of a particular product that he believed was dangerous, and it was eventually recalled in late April or early May 2006. On May 15, 2006, Ethicon terminated plaintiff's employment. In this appeal, the Court considers whether an employee, whose job duties entail knowing or securing compliance with a relevant standard of care and knowing when an employer s actions or proposed actions deviate from that standard of care, may invoke the whistleblower protections afforded under N.J.S.A.34:19-3 of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA or Act), N.J.S.A.34:19-1 to -14. After review, the Supreme Court held that CEPA's protections extended to the performance of regular job duties by watchdog employees. "Unless and until the Legislature expresses its intent to differentiate among the classes of employees who are entitled to CEPA protection, there can be no additional burden imposed on watchdog employees seeking CEPA protection." View "Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc." on Justia Law

Police arrived at defendant Evan Reece's home to investigate a dropped 9-1-1 call that originated there. Defendant denied making any such call, and insisted that he was alone in the home, although responding officer Sergeant Delagarza had observed three vehicles in the driveway. Defendant retrieved and displayed his cordless home phone to Delagarza, which did not show any call to 9-1-1 in its memory. Delagarza looked into the house through the front door that defendant had left open, and saw nothing unusual or suspicious. Nevertheless, Delagarza called for a backup, and with defendant present, confirmed with the police dispatcher that the originating number of the call was defendant's home phone number. During these communications, Delagarza noticed a small abrasion on the knuckle of defendant s hand, which Delagarza stated was similar to the result of punching something. Delagarza asked defendant if he was married, and defendant stated that he was, further stating that his marital status was none of Delagarza's business. Delagarza noticed that defendant's demeanor began to change at this point, and he became frustrated with Delagarza's presence and his questioning. Delagarza asked if he could enter the house and look around, but defendant refused consent. Delagarza then called for assistance and told defendant that he and the other officers needed to check the house. Defendant responded by slamming the door closed and attempting to lock it, while the officers pushed the door open. Delagarza announced that defendant was under arrest, and the officers entered defendant s residence. Defendant attempted to block their entry, and a struggle ensued. After being subdued, defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of simple assault, one count of resisting arrest, and one count of obstructing the administration of law. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge held that, under the emergency-aid doctrine, the officers were entitled to enter defendant's home without a warrant. Based on this finding, the court held that defendant's attempt to deny them access constituted obstruction. The court also made specific credibility findings. Defendant was found guilty of one count of simple assault, resisting arrest, and obstruction. Defendant was acquitted of the other count of simple assault. On appeal to the Law Division, defendant was found guilty of resisting arrest and obstruction, and not guilty of simple assault. In a split decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction for resisting arrest, and reversed the conviction for obstruction, a majority of the panel finding that the emergency-aid doctrine did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the emergency-aid doctrine justified the officers warrantless entry into defendant's home. Furthermore, because the credibility and factual findings of the municipal court and Law Division were supported by substantial evidence, the Court affirmed defendant's conviction for resisting arrest and reinstated defendant's obstruction conviction. View "New Jersey v. Reece" on Justia Law

The unions in each of three municipalities brought scope-of-negotiations challenges to the municipal actions. The Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC), in separate decisions, held that the municipalities violated the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act (EERA), and required each municipality to negotiate the changes in terms and conditions of employment. PERC applied the three-part test set forth in "Local 195, IFPTE v. New Jersey," (88 N.J.393 (1982)), for resolving questions about the scope of public sector employment negotiations. In "Local 195," the Court established that a subject is negotiable when: (1) the item intimately and directly affects the work and welfare of public employees; (2) the subject has not been fully or partially preempted by statute or regulation; and (3) a negotiated agreement would not significantly interfere with the determination of governmental policy.The three municipalities appealed their PERC administrative determinations. The Appellate Division observed that the Commission had approved all three layoff plans during the time when the Commission's emergency regulation permitting temporary layoffs, was in effect. PERC determined that the layoffs in each municipality directly affected employee work and welfare, that the subject of negotiation was not preempted by statute or regulation, and that the municipalities did not have the managerial prerogative to unilaterally implement the layoffs because negotiations would not significantly interfere with governmental policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that at the time that they occurred, the layoff actions at issue were non-negotiable under the third prong of the Local 195 test. View "IMO Borough of Keyport v. Local 68" on Justia Law

At about 8:30 p.m. on December 15, 2010, Monmouth County Sheriff's Officers Alexander Torres and Thomas Ruocco arrived at a Matawan address to execute a child-support warrant on plaintiff Eric Morillo. While Torres went to knock on the front door, Ruocco went around the side of the home and discovered plaintiff sitting in an idling car parked in the driveway of the listed address. Although the car's engine was running, its headlights were off. As Ruocco approached the car, he observed plaintiff in the passenger seat smoking what appeared to Ruocco to be marijuana. Ruocco asked plaintiff if he had any other drugs on him; plaintiff told Ruocco that he was carrying a loaded weapon tucked in the right side of the waistband of his pants. Ruocco seized the weapon and called Torres on his hand-held radio to come and assist. Plaintiff and his companion were removed from the vehicle and patted down. Plaintiff was arrested on the child-support warrant. While still at the scene, Ruocco phoned his supervisor, Sergeant Steven Cooper, to alert him to the circumstances involved in executing the warrant and the seizure of the weapon. Although Ruocco did not ask plaintiff at the scene whether he had a permit to carry the gun, while en route to police headquarters, plaintiff informed the officers that the handgun was registered to him and that he had paperwork for it. Plaintiff told the officers that he was involved in gang activity and was carrying the handgun because he feared retaliation. Plaintiff posted bail on the child-support warrant. Plaintiff was later charged with unlawful possession of a handgun. After receiving confirmation from the New Jersey State Police that plaintiff's handgun had been purchased with the proper registration, the weapons charge was dropped. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Ruocco, Torres, and Cooper, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA). He alleged that they violated his constitutional rights by wrongfully charging him with unlawful possession of a weapon, which led to his incarceration until bail was posted. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability. Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity and seeking dismissal of the action. The trial court denied defendants motion for summary judgment, deeming it impermissible for plaintiff to be charged with unlawful possession of a weapon because the gun he carried was lawfully registered to him and he was at his present residence when he was found carrying the weapon. After several motions to stay the proceedings and motions for leave to appeal, the matter came before the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. Both plaintiff and defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court denied plaintiff s motion for leave to appeal, but granted defendants motion for leave to appeal the Appellate Division's judgment that affirmed the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. After review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the civil rights causes of action against the officers should have been dismissed based on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. View "Morillo v. Monmouth County Sheriff Officers" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant called 9-1-1 requesting assistance for his five-month old daughter, reporting that she was not breathing. When the police arrived, the infant was in an ambulance about to be taken to the hospital. Defendant told a detective that, upon observing his daughter lying in bed, he noticed that she was not breathing. Defendant acceded to the detective's request that he come to the police station to provide further information that may be helpful for his daughter s treatment. Defendant was at the police station for a total of three hours (including breaks), during which he was interviewed for some forty minutes. Defendant told the detective that, earlier in the day, his girlfriend told him that the baby was cranky, and he tried to calm her over several hours. At the conclusion of the interview, the detective drove defendant home. At no time prior to or while at the police station was defendant given Miranda warnings. Defendant's daughter was declared dead three days later. Approximately 7 months later, defendant was arrested, and after being read his Miranda rights, admitted that he tossed the baby toward the bed, causing her to hit the wall. Defendant was subsequently indicted for second-degree manslaughter and second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress his statement, concluding that defendant was in custody at the time of the interview and that his rights were violated when he was not administered Miranda warnings. The court relied on several key factors regarding the detective's interaction with defendant, including the detective's instruction that defendant sit in a certain chair to permit the video camera to obtain a full face view of defendant, the detective's physical proximity to defendant, and the probing nature of the questions that defendant was asked. The court also relied on testimony of witnesses at the evidentiary hearing demonstrating that the detective asked defendant to accompany him to the police station, defendant was placed in the back seat of the unmarked police car, defendant and the detective did not converse during the ride to the police station, and the house was secured to prevent entry by anyone. The trial court found that, under all of the circumstances, no reasonable person in defendant s position would have felt free to leave the room or the police station. The Appellate Division concluded that defendant had not been subjected to a custodial interrogation. The court held that the failure to provide Miranda warnings therefore did not require suppression of defendant's statement. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the interview conducted by the detective at the police station was a custodial interrogation and the failure to administer Miranda warnings prior to the interview required suppression of that recorded statement. View "New Jersey v. Hubbard" on Justia Law