Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs James Jarrell and his wife filed a complaint against Dr. Kaul and the Market Street Surgical Center (MSSC). On summary judgment, the court found that there was no cause of action against Dr. Kaul for deceit, misrepresentation, lack of informed consent, or battery based on his failure to maintain insurance. The trial court also dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against MSSC because they lacked an expert who would testify that MSSC deviated from accepted standards of medical care by failing to properly ascertain Dr. Kaul’s credentials and by permitting an uninsured physician to perform spinal procedures in its facility. Trial proceeded against Dr. Kaul limited to the issue of medical negligence, and the jury found that Dr. Kaul negligently performed the spinal fusion, which proximately caused James Jarrell’s injury. Dr. Kaul appealed and plaintiffs cross-appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the summary judgment orders, the jury verdict, and the damages award. The panel held that the trial court properly dismissed all claims against Dr. Kaul based on his lack of insurance because N.J.S.A.45:9-19.17 did not provide a private cause of action for injured parties. For the same reasons, the panel concluded that N.J.S.A.45:19-17(b), did not permit a direct action by a patient against a surgical center that permitted an uninsured or underinsured physician to use its facilities. The Supreme Court denied Dr. Kaul’s petition for certification, but granted plaintiffs cross-petition. Although it was undisputed that Dr. Kaul was uninsured for the procedure he performed on Jarrell, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Jarrell’s direct claim against the physician for his failure to maintain insurance. The statute imposing the medical malpractice liability insurance requirement did not expressly authorize a direct action against a noncompliant physician and neither the language nor the purpose of the statute supported such a claim. Although a reasonably prudent patient may consider a physician’s compliance with the statutorily imposed liability insurance requirement material information, lack of compliance or failure to disclose compliance does not necessarily provide the predicate for an informed consent claim. The Court reversed and remanded plaintiffs’ claim against MSSC, holding that a cause of action for negligent hiring could be asserted against a facility that granted privileges to physicians for its continuing duty to ensure that those physicians had and maintained the required medical malpractice liability insurance or have posted a suitable letter of credit that conformed with the statutory requirement. View "Jarrell v. Kaul" on Justia Law

In a series of decisions arising from personal injuries sustained by business invitees on the premises of businesses whose operations involve customer self-service, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized a principle known as “mode of operation.” This appeal arose from a slip-and-fall accident that occurred at a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Cherry Hill. On the evening of her accident, plaintiff Janice Prioleau and her adult son and daughter, Richard Prioleau and Adriana Prioleau, were on a trip from their home in Delaware to New Jersey. Plaintiff and her children recalled that the weather that evening was rainy; plaintiff stated that there was a torrential storm. Plaintiff and her children decided to stop at the Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant to have dinner. Plaintiff testified that, because of the heavy rain outside, she and her children tracked water into the restaurant. As she approached the restroom, plaintiff slipped and fell, landing on her buttocks and hands. According to plaintiff, the floor near the restroom felt greasy and wet. She stated that there were no mats or warning signs in the area where she fell. Plaintiff s children agreed with her that the floor near the restroom at the restaurant was slippery and greasy. Plaintiff’s testimony established that she had not yet ordered or purchased her dinner when her accident occurred. Instead, by her own account, plaintiff fell immediately after entering the restaurant. She asserted a negligence claim and specifically alleged that defendants failed to exercise reasonable care by failing to provide plaintiff, an invitee, with a safe place to traverse the premises. The jury found defendants negligent, without identifying the theory of negligence on which its verdict was based, and concluded that defendants’ negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s accident. Defendants appealed the trial court’s judgment. A divided Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. The majority reasoned that the unifying factor in case law recognizing the “mode-of-operation” doctrine was the negligence [that] resulted from the business’s method of operation, which was designed to allow patrons to directly handle merchandise or products without intervention from business employees, and entailed an expectation of customer carelessness. Finding no reversible error in the Appellate Division’s judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Prioleau v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant William Witt was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person. The police initiated a stop of defendant’s car because he did not dim his high beams when necessary, and a search of his vehicle uncovered the handgun. Defendant moved to suppress the gun on the ground that the police conducted an unreasonable search in violation of the New Jersey Constitution. Defendant’s sole argument was that the police did not have exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search of his car under “New Jersey v. Pena-Flores,” (198 N.J.6 (2009)). The Appellate Division granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal and affirmed the suppression of the gun because of the “utter absence” of any exigency to support the warrantless vehicle search that occurred, and because there was no justification for this motor vehicle stop. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed, holding that exigent-circumstances standard set forth in “Pena-Flores: was “unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.” View "New Jersey v. Witt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Bruce Kaye, the controlling principal of three entities that sold and managed timeshare interests in resort properties in Atlantic County, hired defendant Alan Rosefielde, an attorney admitted to practice law in New York but not in New Jersey, initially as outside counsel, and then as an employee. After defendant had worked closely with plaintiff for approximately four months, the parties entered an agreement providing that, as compensation for his services, defendant would earn an annual salary of $500,000. For approximately two years, defendant served as Chief Operating Officer for several of the timeshare entities, and effectively functioned as their general counsel. In that capacity, defendant committed serious misconduct by acting on his own behalf instead of for his employers benefit, and exposing his employers to potential liability. Based on this misconduct, and dissatisfaction with defendant’s performance, plaintiff terminated defendant’s employment. Kaye, in his individual capacity and as trustee of two trusts, Kaye’s son Jason Kaye, and the business entities that Kaye owned, sued Rosefielde and several other entities. Plaintiffs asserted claims based on Rosefielde’s breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, legal malpractice, unlicensed practice of law, and breach of the duty of loyalty. Following a lengthy bench trial, the trial court found that Rosefielde engaged in egregious conduct constituting a breach of his duty of loyalty, breach of his fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, and civil fraud. The trial court rescinded Rosefielde’s interest in several entities, awarded compensatory damages, punitive damages, and legal fees, and dismissed Rosefielde’s counterclaims. It declined, however, to order the equitable disgorgement of Rosefielde’s salary as a remedy for his breach of the duty of loyalty, on the ground that his breach did not result in damage or loss to the entities that employed him. The Appellate Division affirmed that determination, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification on the issue of equitable disgorgement. “In imposing the remedy of disgorgement, depending on the circumstances, a trial court should apportion the employee’s compensation, rather than ordering a wholesale disgorgement that may be disproportionate to the misconduct at issue. . . . If an agent is paid a salary apportioned to periods of time, or compensation apportioned to the completion of specified items of work, he is entitled to receive the stipulated compensation for periods or items properly completed before his renunciation or discharge. This is true even if, because of unfaithfulness or insubordination, the agent forfeits his compensation for subsequent periods or items.” The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed with respect to the remedy of equitable disgorgement, and the matter was remanded to the trial court to decide whether plaintiffs were entitled to disgorgement. If so, the trial court should apportion Rosefielde’s compensation, ordering disgorgement only for monthly pay periods in which he committed acts of disloyalty. View "Kaye v. Rosefielde" on Justia Law

Defendant Corey Morris appealed an order that denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Defendant was indicted on multiple counts of armed robbery, weapons offenses and eluding the police. At his first trial, defendant was convicted of eluding, but the jury deadlocked on all other charges. Prior to retrial, defendant and the State reached a plea agreement where defendant pled guilty to three armed robbery charges, and received three sentences of twenty years (to run concurrent to the twenty-year sentence for eluding), subject to the No Early Release Act. Defendant was permitted to represent himself on appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that “defendant’s arguments [were] without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.” View "New Jersey v. Morris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Anna Mae Cashin owned a parcel of land in Hoboken. Two separate structures were located on that property: a six-unit apartment building, and a two-story single-family home built in a converted garage. Plaintiff has rented out five units of the apartment building and used the sixth for storage. Plaintiff lived in the single-family home with her late husband for four years until 1971, when they began renting it out. In 1973, defendant Marisela Bello moved into that unit. Defendant occupied the space with her son. Defendant's rent was $345 per month, five dollars more than the rent she initially paid in 1973. Plaintiff tried to regain possession of the house several times. She first asked defendant to leave in the 1980s so that plaintiff's daughter could live there. In June 2009, plaintiff again asked defendant to leave so that plaintiff's son could live there to be closer to his parents during his father's illness. At that time, plaintiff sent defendant a notice to quit, giving her sixty days to vacate the house. In response, defendant's attorney sent a letter indicating that defendant refused to leave. Plaintiff took no further action to evict defendant at that time. On January 4, 2012, plaintiff, through her attorney, sent defendant another notice to quit. Plaintiff demanded possession of the house under N.J.S.A.2A:18-61.1(l)(3), asserting that the unit was a single-family home and that she, the owner, wished to reside there. Defendant refused to leave, and plaintiff filed a complaint for possession of the house on April 2, 2012. In this appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether the Anti-Eviction Act, which permits the owner of a building of three residential units or less to oust a tenant if the owner intends to personally occupy a unit, could be applied to remove a tenant (defendant) from the two-story single-family house built in a converted garage. To that end, the Court had to determine whether "building" denotes a single, unattached physical structure or whether it includes all structures owned by an individual located on the same parcel of land. The Supreme Court found that the Legislature's use of the word "building," in its singular form, was both deliberate and dispositive. "Building" designates a discreet physical structure, not a number of such structures connected only by the ownership of the land on which they sit. By the plain language of N.J.S.A.2A:18-61.1(l)(3), the converted garage constituted its own building for purposes of the Act, and plaintiff could evict defendants. View "Cashin v. Bello" on Justia Law

Defendants Donald Lindsey and Martin Pierce engaged in a shoot-out in a residential neighborhood of Camden. They were not injured, but a four-year-old boy, B.T., was killed in the cross-fire. Following a joint trial, the jury convicted Lindsey of passion/provocation manslaughter of B.T., as a lesser-included offense of murder, (count one); and convicted Pierce of aggravated manslaughter as charged, (count two). Defendants were convicted of attempted murder of each other (counts three as to Lindsey, and four as to Pierce). Defendants were also convicted of various weapons offenses. Lindsey and Pierce were each convicted of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (count five as to Lindsey and count six as to Pierce); and unlawful possession of a handgun, (count seven as to Lindsey and count eight as to Pierce). Lindsey was convicted of unlawful possession of an assault firearm (count nine). Lindsey received an aggregate term of thirty-three years, and Pierce forty-two years the disparity primarily due to the different verdicts related to B.T.'s homicide. Among their asserted claims on appeal, one or both defendants argued the court erred in various evidentiary rulings; the court gave incorrect jury instructions, generally raised as plain error; the verdicts regarding B.T. homicide were inconsistent; and the sentences were excessive. Having reviewed defendants' arguments in light of the record and applicable principles of law, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, but remanded for resentencing. View "New Jersey v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether defendant's repeated requests to speak with a family member during interrogation was sufficient to invoke the right to remain silent and, if so, whether defendant's subsequent statements and physical evidence recovered as a result of those statements should be suppressed. The jury found defendant guilty of second-degree passion/provocation manslaughter of his father; first-degree murder of his mother; third-degree hindering prosecution; third-degree theft; third-degree fraudulent use of a credit card; fourth-degree tampering with evidence; fourth-degree false swearing; and second-degree disturbing, moving or concealing human remains. Defendant received an aggregate sentence of sixty-four years in prison, with an 85% period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act. The Appellate Division concluded that defendant initially invoked his right to remain silent by requesting to speak to his uncle, the police improperly recorded that conversation and, as such, the trial court properly suppressed the recorded conversation with defendant's uncle. The Appellate Division concluded, as did the trial court, that defendant's statement to police was obtained voluntarily after the police re-administered defendant's Miranda rights. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Maltese" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her husband resided in a home at the Villas at Cranbury Brook, a common-interest community, in the Township of Plainsboro. The homeowners at the Villas take title only to their dwelling units; all other areas, including the sidewalks and walkways, are common area property owned by the homeowners association and the recreation association. Homeowners are charged monthly assessments for the maintenance of the common areas, which pay for services such as snow and ice removal from the sidewalks. Although the Villas is not a gated community, the general public does not have an easement to use the sidewalks. In December 2008, a snowstorm with freezing rain led to the accumulation of approximately one-and-a-half inches of ice on the sidewalks and streets of the Villas. At the request of the homeowners association, a landscape contractor salted the roadways, but the association did not request that the common sidewalks and walkways also be cleared. Two days later, additional freezing rain accumulated. The landscape contractor did not apply any salt to the roadways or sidewalks that day. That afternoon, plaintiff and her husband walked through the Villas to a food market; on their way back to their home, plaintiff slipped and fell on ice on a common-area sidewalk within the community, injuring her wrist and shoulder on ice on a common-area sidewalk within the community, injuring her wrist and shoulder. Plaintiff sued the developer of the community, the management company, the homeowners association, and the landscape contractor to recover for the personal injuries that she sustained. The trial court granted summary judgment to the homeowners association and the management company, and dismissed plaintiff's complaint. The trial court concluded that the private sidewalks in the community were the functional equivalent of the public sidewalk for which the Court conferred immunity. The Appellate Division affirmed that determination in an unpublished decision. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether sidewalk immunity applied in "Luchejko v. City of Hoboken," (207 N.J. 191 (2011)), in the context of injuries that occurred on a public sidewalk adjoining a residential condominium community, was applicable to claims for personal injuries sustained on a private sidewalk owned and controlled by a homeowners association of a common-interest community. After review, the Supreme Court reversed: immunity did not apply based on the facts of this case. "Here, the by-laws of the homeowners association spell out the association's duty to manage and maintain the community s common areas, including sidewalks. This association also has a statutory obligation to manage the common elements of which the sidewalks are a part. . . .the limited immunity given to a qualified common interest community under N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-13 is a legislative acknowledgement that common-law tort liability extends to the private areas of such a community." View "Qian v. Toll Brothers Inc." on Justia Law

At the conclusion of the first day of jury deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court asking if a particular juror could be excused from the case. The court responded to the question appropriately, generally explaining that a juror could not be excused for reasons related to differences with other jurors, but could for personal reasons, such as illness. The court gave the jurors the opportunity to raise the issue the next day at sidebar. No one did. The following day, Juror Number 2 did not appear for service. Over the objection of defense counsel, the trial court impanelled an alternate juror. The court declined defense counsel's request that the jurors be questioned about whether Juror Number 2 was the subject of the previous day's note. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the juror substitution. That motion was denied. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court erred in making the substitution before exploring whether the juror's failure to return to court was for reasons personal to the juror or due to the juror's interaction with the jury. The Supreme Court did not agree with the Appellate Division that the trial court's decision to place an alternate juror on the panel, without inquiring of the jury about the reasons for Juror Number 2's absence, was a fatal error requiring that the jury's verdict be overturned. "The court was well within its discretion to make the juror substitution under Rule1:8-2(d)(1) - even without an inquiry of the jury. . . .A juror's unexplained absence from the courthouse on deliberation day cannot, alone, sabotage a trial." View "New Jersey v. Musa" on Justia Law