Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While driving from his residence to his mother's home one night in 2006, defendant Eugene Baum struck and killed two teenage girls who were walking in a bike lane of a major thoroughfare in Kinnelon. The responding officers found two beverage containers in defendant's car, one of which contained a liquid that was 7.7 percent ethyl alcohol (15 proof). Defendant could not maintain his balance, his speech was slurred, and he smelled strongly of alcohol. He told the police that he thought he had hit a deer, but was not sure. At the time of the incident, defendant's blood alcohol level was determined to be between .327 and .377, four times the legal limit. Defendant had taken a prescribed anti-depressant the night before, and Librium that morning to control his symptoms of alcohol withdrawal. Although he knew that Librium would intensify his intoxication, defendant stated that he consumed more than two alcoholic beverages, but did not know how much he actually consumed, before driving. Defendant stated that he drank because he was an alcoholic, and has struggled with alcoholism for approximately seven years. Defendant argued at trial that he lacked the mental capacity to act recklessly because of his intoxication, which he claimed was involuntary due to his mental diseases or defects of alcoholism and depression. The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree aggravated manslaughter and two counts of second-degree death by auto. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive twenty-year prison terms subject to eighty-five percent parole ineligibility. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction, but remanded for resentencing based on a reevaluation of the aggravating factors relied on by the sentencing court. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, alleging errors at trial constituted reversible error. Finding none, however, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Baum" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the standard governing revocation of direct access from a state highway to property used for commercial purposes pursuant to the State Highway Access Management Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 27:7-89 to -98, and the State Highway Access Management Code (Access Code), N.J.A.C. 16:47-3.5(e)(11) and -3.8(k)(2). Arielle Realty, L.L.C. was the owner of a three-tenant commercial property located on the northbound side of Route 166 in Toms River. The DOT informed Arielle that access to its property from Route 166 would be eliminated because the DOT intended to construct an additional northbound travel lane. The DOT also advised Arielle that it intended to construct a median to separate northbound and southbound traffic on Route 166. This design would eliminate the eight parking spaces in the front of the building. The plan would also prevent direct access to Arielle s property for motorists traveling south on Route 166 because a motorist would no longer be able to make a left-hand turn onto West Gateway. According to the DOT design plan, a southbound motorist on Route 166, who intends to access Arielle s property, would be required to drive past the property, turn right onto a local road, turn right onto another local road, turn left onto Route 166 at an intersection controlled by a traffic signal, and turn right onto West Gateway. This alternative route traversed approximately three-quarters of a mile. In affirming the DOT Commissioner's decision, the Appellate Division determined that the DOT met its burden of proof that the alternative access plan was not only reasonable but also provided a convenient, direct, and well-marked means to enter the business and to return to the state road. Accordingly, the Appellate Division determined that the property owner failed to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to the DOT design. The Supreme Court affirmed: "the Commissioner's analysis is ultimately aimed at selecting the plan that will best achieve the overarching goal of providing reasonable access to the state's system of highways rather than maximizing the business interests of a particular property owner." View "In re Revocation of the Access of Block #613" on Justia Law

During an encounter that lasted ten seconds, a woman was robbed at gunpoint. She surrendered her purse with her cell phone inside it, and the robber drove away in a car. She later identified defendant Julius Smith as her assailant. Six weeks after the robbery, the State Police recovered the victim's cell phone when they arrested a third person. Law enforcement officers contacted the victim, but the prosecutor and local police did not learn about the discovery of the phone until the middle of defendant s trial -- fifteen months later. Defense counsel twice moved for a mistrial to investigate this critical information. The trial court took alternate measures to try to remedy the belated disclosure but denied defendant's motion. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court found that it was an abuse of discretion not to grant a mistrial, particularly in light of the materiality of the evidence that surfaced mid-trial, defendant's inability to investigate it while the short trial proceeded, and the nature and strength of the evidence against defendant. The Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division, which affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Jersey v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-grandparents filed an action under N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 in the Family Part, seeking an order compelling defendant-mother to allow them periodic visits with their granddaughter. The trial court determined that in their complaint, supplemented by their testimony, plaintiffs failed to present a prima facie showing that the child would be harmed unless visitation were ordered. It found that plaintiffs had improperly instituted litigation before defendant had denied visitation with finality, and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's determination and remanded for reevaluation of the sufficiency of plaintiffs' complaint. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court centered on the procedures by which a Family Part judge determines whether a grandparent has made a prima facie showing of harm to the child sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, and manages the case if it continues beyond the pleading stage. The Supreme Court held that in order to overcome the presumption of parental autonomy, grandparents who bring visitation actions must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that denial of his or her application would result in harm to the child. If the grandparent meets that burden, the presumption in favor of parental decision-making is overcome, and the court sets a visitation schedule in the best interests of the child. In this case, plaintiffs alleged in detail their involvement in their granddaughter's life prior to the death of their son (the child's father) and contended on that basis that their alienation from the child caused her harm. The trial court should have denied defendant's motion to dismiss and given plaintiffs the opportunity to satisfy their burden to prove harm. View "Major v. Maguire" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review concerned a challenge to the validity of a municipal ordinance authorizing the issuance of $6,300,000 in bonds to finance a redevelopment project in the Township of West Orange. Plaintiffs filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs claiming that the Township failed to secure the statutorily required approval for the bond ordinance from the Local Finance Board, which is a part of the Division of Local Government Services within New Jersey's Department of Community Affairs. As a result, plaintiffs claim the bond ordinance was invalid. The trial court dismissed the action because plaintiffs filed their complaint fifty-three days after final publication of the bond ordinance (well outside the twenty-day period permitted by Rule 4:69-6(b)(11)). The Appellate Division affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court held that because plaintiffs did not present any extraordinary circumstances to allow the trial and appellate courts to consider their claims, those courts properly dismissed plaintiffs' petition. View "In re Petition for Referendum to Repeal Ordinance 2354-12 of the Twp. of W. Orange" on Justia Law

In 1996, defendant Duquene Pierre was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, and several other offenses, arising from a fatal shooting in Elizabeth. Defendant was one of several suspects arrested for the shooting. He maintained that when the crime occurred at 3:19 a.m. on March 20, 1994, he and one of his codefendants were not in New Jersey, but on their way to Florida to visit defendant's relatives. This appeal stems from the denial of defendant's application for post-conviction relief (PCR), based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. In evidentiary hearings before the PCR court, defendant presented evidence that, if called to testify, his brother Kirby Pierre and sister Astrid Pierre would have stated that in March 1994, Kirby did not know how to drive and did not travel to Florida. Defendant also presented evidence that the remainder of Reid s telephone bill, not offered into evidence at trial, would have supported his contention that he was in Florida in the days that followed the Elizabeth shooting. Finally, three of defendant's relatives testified that defendant visited each of them in Florida in March 1994, but defendant's trial counsel did not contact them to ascertain their knowledge of those visits. The PCR court denied defendant's PCR application, and the Appellate Division affirmed that determination. By virtue of the combined errors of his trial counsel, the Supreme Court reversed the PCR and the appellate courts' decisions denying relief, finding that defendant was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Court concluded defendant was entitled to a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Pierre" on Justia Law

In June 2005, O.M. disclosed that her stepfather, defendant R.P., sexually abused her beginning when she was twelve years old. The abuse resulted in two pregnancies, one of which was terminated and one of which resulted in the birth of M.M. when O.M. was sixteen or seventeen years old. Following DNA testing of O.M., M.M., and defendant, M.M.'s DNA profile was consistent with that of an offspring of O.M. and defendant. A Grand Jury returned a superseding indictment charging defendant with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was less than thirteen years old; first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was at least thirteen but less than sixteen years old, and defendant was related to O.M. by affinity; first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while using physical force or coercion, and O.M. sustained severe personal injury; and second-degree sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was at least sixteen but less than eighteen years old. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count two), first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count three), and second-degree sexual assault (count four); the jury was unable to reach a verdict on count one, first-degree aggravated sexual assault. Defendant was sentenced to a twenty-six-year aggregate term of imprisonment with a thirteen-year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court committed plain error by failing to charge the jury on second-degree sexual assault as a lesser-included offense of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count three). The appellate panel determined that because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have convicted defendant of second-degree sexual assault, the trial court's failure to issue such an instruction on count three was plain error. The panel reversed the conviction on count three, remanded for a new trial on that charge, and vacated defendant's sentence. The panel did not comment on the State's request that the verdict be molded to reflect a conviction for second-degree sexual assault as to count three. The State then moved for reconsideration and clarification as to whether the Appellate Division considered the State's contention that the verdict on count three should be molded to a conviction for second-degree sexual assault. The Appellate Division denied reconsideration without explanation. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that defendant was "given his day in court," that all the elements of sexual assault were included in the crime of aggravated sexual assault, and that there was no prejudice to defendant. The Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the matter to the trial court for entry of judgment against defendant on the lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault (count three) and for resentencing. View "New Jersey v. R.P." on Justia Law

In May 2013, the Division of Child Protection and Permanency filed an Order to Show Cause for Care and Supervision of T.E. (Tommy), the six-year-old son of K.N.(mother) and K.E.(father). The Family Part investigated allegations of domestic violence and drug use in Tommy's home and awarded temporary custody of Tommy to the Division. The Division temporarily placed Tommy in the home of his maternal grandmother, where he had been residing for several months, and conducted an on-site evaluation of the home. A later evaluation revealed that Tommy's maternal step-grandfather had been the subject of a domestic-violence complaint, which was dismissed. The Division substantiated the domestic violence claim and determined that the maternal grandparents home could not be licensed under the Resource Family Parent Licensing Act. As a result, the Division removed Tommy from his maternal grandparents' home and placed him with his maternal great aunt who was eligible to be licensed as a resource family parent and receive financial assistance under the Act. At the permanency hearings that followed Tommy s placement with his maternal great aunt, the Law Guardian argued that Tommy should be returned to the home of his maternal grandparents because Tommy was developing attachment issues and experiencing personality changes. The Division maintained that Tommy could not be returned to the home because the maternal step-grandfather had been the subject of a domestic violence complaint that was substantiated by the Division. At the conclusion of the hearings, the Family Part judge ordered the Division to return Tommy to the home of his maternal grandparents and to provide them with the financial assistance available to a resource family parent licensed under the Act. The Division filed an emergent appeal to stay the Family Part s order. The Appellate Division held that the Family Part had the authority to place Tommy with his maternal grandparents, but remanded the matter for further consideration of all relevant statutory and regulatory factors to determine the suitability of the placement. The Supreme Court affirmed, substantially for the reasons expressed in the Appellate Division opinion, that the Family Part judge had the authority to determine that the child s best interests were served by his continued placement with a relative not licensed as a resource family parent under the Act, and that the Family Part judge did not have the authority to compel the Division to pay financial assistance under the Act to a relative not licensed as a resource family parent. However, because the Division returned Tommy to the care and custody of his mother, the Court dismissed as moot the Appellate Division's remand to the Family Part to consider factors relevant to a placement review, including the claim of prior domestic violence involving the maternal step-grandfather. View "New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. K.N." on Justia Law

A warrant secured by the police authorized a no-knock entry and search of defendant Antoine Watts' apartment and a search of defendant for controlled dangerous substances. Before executing the search warrant, police officers waited until defendant left his apartment. The officers detained defendant one and one-half blocks away on a busy urban street, frisking him for weapons and taking his apartment keys to avoid a forced entry of his residence. The officers decided not to conduct a more intrusive search of his person in public view. Defendant was then placed in an unmarked police car and taken back to his apartment. After defendant exited the vehicle, four bundles of heroin fell from the leg of his pants. Defendant moved to suppress the drugs, claiming that the police were forbidden from conducting a second search of his person after the pat down on the street. After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion, finding that the police acted unreasonably, and therefore unconstitutionally, by exposing defendant to successive searches. The court suppressed the drugs, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether police acted unconstitutionally unreasonably. The Court held that the police did not act in an objectively unreasonable manner in violation of our Federal and State Constitutions. "The initial search was limited in scope and did not bar the police from moving defendant to a more controlled location to complete the search for drugs in accordance with the warrant. We therefore reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings." View "New Jersey v. Watts" on Justia Law

Defendant Sean Stoddard, D.P.M. practiced podiatry at a clinic with offices in Toms River and Lakewood. In 2007, he applied to the Rhode Island Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association (RIJUA) for medical malpractice liability insurance. Among other representations, the application indicated that at least fifty-one percent of Dr. Stoddard's practice was generated in Rhode Island; that answer was false. Dr. Stoddard submitted renewal applications from 2008 through 2011, each of which stated that at least fifty-one percent of Dr. Stoddard's practice was generated in Rhode Island. Dr. Stoddard performed three surgeries on plaintiff Thomas DeMarco, a New Jersey resident. In October 2011, DeMarco and his wife filed a medical malpractice complaint in New Jersey alleging that Dr. Stoddard negligently performed the third surgery. Dr. Stoddard forwarded the complaint to the RIJUA, which responded with a reservation of rights letter stating that the RIJUA only provided coverage for physicians who maintained fifty-one percent of their professional time and efforts in Rhode Island. The Appellate Division granted the RIJUA s motion for leave to appeal, and affirmed the trial court order. The panel determined that New Jersey law should have applied, and concluded that innocent third parties should be protected for a claim arising before rescission. The panel concluded that the RIJUA owed a duty to indemnify Dr. Stoddard up to $1 million, the amount of medical malpractice liability insurance that a physician licensed to practice medicine and performing medical services in New Jersey was required to maintain. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed after review of the appellate court record, finding that RIJUA owed neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify Dr. Stoddard, who misrepresented that a portion of his practice was generated in Rhode Island, which was a fact that formed the basis of his eligibility for insurance. View "DeMarco v. Stoddard" on Justia Law