Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In June 2005, O.M. disclosed that her stepfather, defendant R.P., sexually abused her beginning when she was twelve years old. The abuse resulted in two pregnancies, one of which was terminated and one of which resulted in the birth of M.M. when O.M. was sixteen or seventeen years old. Following DNA testing of O.M., M.M., and defendant, M.M.'s DNA profile was consistent with that of an offspring of O.M. and defendant. A Grand Jury returned a superseding indictment charging defendant with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was less than thirteen years old; first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was at least thirteen but less than sixteen years old, and defendant was related to O.M. by affinity; first-degree aggravated sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while using physical force or coercion, and O.M. sustained severe personal injury; and second-degree sexual assault, by committing an act of sexual penetration with O.M. while she was at least sixteen but less than eighteen years old. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count two), first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count three), and second-degree sexual assault (count four); the jury was unable to reach a verdict on count one, first-degree aggravated sexual assault. Defendant was sentenced to a twenty-six-year aggregate term of imprisonment with a thirteen-year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court committed plain error by failing to charge the jury on second-degree sexual assault as a lesser-included offense of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (count three). The appellate panel determined that because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have convicted defendant of second-degree sexual assault, the trial court's failure to issue such an instruction on count three was plain error. The panel reversed the conviction on count three, remanded for a new trial on that charge, and vacated defendant's sentence. The panel did not comment on the State's request that the verdict be molded to reflect a conviction for second-degree sexual assault as to count three. The State then moved for reconsideration and clarification as to whether the Appellate Division considered the State's contention that the verdict on count three should be molded to a conviction for second-degree sexual assault. The Appellate Division denied reconsideration without explanation. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that defendant was "given his day in court," that all the elements of sexual assault were included in the crime of aggravated sexual assault, and that there was no prejudice to defendant. The Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the matter to the trial court for entry of judgment against defendant on the lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault (count three) and for resentencing. View "New Jersey v. R.P." on Justia Law

In May 2013, the Division of Child Protection and Permanency filed an Order to Show Cause for Care and Supervision of T.E. (Tommy), the six-year-old son of K.N.(mother) and K.E.(father). The Family Part investigated allegations of domestic violence and drug use in Tommy's home and awarded temporary custody of Tommy to the Division. The Division temporarily placed Tommy in the home of his maternal grandmother, where he had been residing for several months, and conducted an on-site evaluation of the home. A later evaluation revealed that Tommy's maternal step-grandfather had been the subject of a domestic-violence complaint, which was dismissed. The Division substantiated the domestic violence claim and determined that the maternal grandparents home could not be licensed under the Resource Family Parent Licensing Act. As a result, the Division removed Tommy from his maternal grandparents' home and placed him with his maternal great aunt who was eligible to be licensed as a resource family parent and receive financial assistance under the Act. At the permanency hearings that followed Tommy s placement with his maternal great aunt, the Law Guardian argued that Tommy should be returned to the home of his maternal grandparents because Tommy was developing attachment issues and experiencing personality changes. The Division maintained that Tommy could not be returned to the home because the maternal step-grandfather had been the subject of a domestic violence complaint that was substantiated by the Division. At the conclusion of the hearings, the Family Part judge ordered the Division to return Tommy to the home of his maternal grandparents and to provide them with the financial assistance available to a resource family parent licensed under the Act. The Division filed an emergent appeal to stay the Family Part s order. The Appellate Division held that the Family Part had the authority to place Tommy with his maternal grandparents, but remanded the matter for further consideration of all relevant statutory and regulatory factors to determine the suitability of the placement. The Supreme Court affirmed, substantially for the reasons expressed in the Appellate Division opinion, that the Family Part judge had the authority to determine that the child s best interests were served by his continued placement with a relative not licensed as a resource family parent under the Act, and that the Family Part judge did not have the authority to compel the Division to pay financial assistance under the Act to a relative not licensed as a resource family parent. However, because the Division returned Tommy to the care and custody of his mother, the Court dismissed as moot the Appellate Division's remand to the Family Part to consider factors relevant to a placement review, including the claim of prior domestic violence involving the maternal step-grandfather. View "New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. K.N." on Justia Law

A warrant secured by the police authorized a no-knock entry and search of defendant Antoine Watts' apartment and a search of defendant for controlled dangerous substances. Before executing the search warrant, police officers waited until defendant left his apartment. The officers detained defendant one and one-half blocks away on a busy urban street, frisking him for weapons and taking his apartment keys to avoid a forced entry of his residence. The officers decided not to conduct a more intrusive search of his person in public view. Defendant was then placed in an unmarked police car and taken back to his apartment. After defendant exited the vehicle, four bundles of heroin fell from the leg of his pants. Defendant moved to suppress the drugs, claiming that the police were forbidden from conducting a second search of his person after the pat down on the street. After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion, finding that the police acted unreasonably, and therefore unconstitutionally, by exposing defendant to successive searches. The court suppressed the drugs, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether police acted unconstitutionally unreasonably. The Court held that the police did not act in an objectively unreasonable manner in violation of our Federal and State Constitutions. "The initial search was limited in scope and did not bar the police from moving defendant to a more controlled location to complete the search for drugs in accordance with the warrant. We therefore reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings." View "New Jersey v. Watts" on Justia Law

Defendant Sean Stoddard, D.P.M. practiced podiatry at a clinic with offices in Toms River and Lakewood. In 2007, he applied to the Rhode Island Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association (RIJUA) for medical malpractice liability insurance. Among other representations, the application indicated that at least fifty-one percent of Dr. Stoddard's practice was generated in Rhode Island; that answer was false. Dr. Stoddard submitted renewal applications from 2008 through 2011, each of which stated that at least fifty-one percent of Dr. Stoddard's practice was generated in Rhode Island. Dr. Stoddard performed three surgeries on plaintiff Thomas DeMarco, a New Jersey resident. In October 2011, DeMarco and his wife filed a medical malpractice complaint in New Jersey alleging that Dr. Stoddard negligently performed the third surgery. Dr. Stoddard forwarded the complaint to the RIJUA, which responded with a reservation of rights letter stating that the RIJUA only provided coverage for physicians who maintained fifty-one percent of their professional time and efforts in Rhode Island. The Appellate Division granted the RIJUA s motion for leave to appeal, and affirmed the trial court order. The panel determined that New Jersey law should have applied, and concluded that innocent third parties should be protected for a claim arising before rescission. The panel concluded that the RIJUA owed a duty to indemnify Dr. Stoddard up to $1 million, the amount of medical malpractice liability insurance that a physician licensed to practice medicine and performing medical services in New Jersey was required to maintain. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed after review of the appellate court record, finding that RIJUA owed neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify Dr. Stoddard, who misrepresented that a portion of his practice was generated in Rhode Island, which was a fact that formed the basis of his eligibility for insurance. View "DeMarco v. Stoddard" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs James Jarrell and his wife filed a complaint against Dr. Kaul and the Market Street Surgical Center (MSSC). On summary judgment, the court found that there was no cause of action against Dr. Kaul for deceit, misrepresentation, lack of informed consent, or battery based on his failure to maintain insurance. The trial court also dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against MSSC because they lacked an expert who would testify that MSSC deviated from accepted standards of medical care by failing to properly ascertain Dr. Kaul’s credentials and by permitting an uninsured physician to perform spinal procedures in its facility. Trial proceeded against Dr. Kaul limited to the issue of medical negligence, and the jury found that Dr. Kaul negligently performed the spinal fusion, which proximately caused James Jarrell’s injury. Dr. Kaul appealed and plaintiffs cross-appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the summary judgment orders, the jury verdict, and the damages award. The panel held that the trial court properly dismissed all claims against Dr. Kaul based on his lack of insurance because N.J.S.A.45:9-19.17 did not provide a private cause of action for injured parties. For the same reasons, the panel concluded that N.J.S.A.45:19-17(b), did not permit a direct action by a patient against a surgical center that permitted an uninsured or underinsured physician to use its facilities. The Supreme Court denied Dr. Kaul’s petition for certification, but granted plaintiffs cross-petition. Although it was undisputed that Dr. Kaul was uninsured for the procedure he performed on Jarrell, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Jarrell’s direct claim against the physician for his failure to maintain insurance. The statute imposing the medical malpractice liability insurance requirement did not expressly authorize a direct action against a noncompliant physician and neither the language nor the purpose of the statute supported such a claim. Although a reasonably prudent patient may consider a physician’s compliance with the statutorily imposed liability insurance requirement material information, lack of compliance or failure to disclose compliance does not necessarily provide the predicate for an informed consent claim. The Court reversed and remanded plaintiffs’ claim against MSSC, holding that a cause of action for negligent hiring could be asserted against a facility that granted privileges to physicians for its continuing duty to ensure that those physicians had and maintained the required medical malpractice liability insurance or have posted a suitable letter of credit that conformed with the statutory requirement. View "Jarrell v. Kaul" on Justia Law

In a series of decisions arising from personal injuries sustained by business invitees on the premises of businesses whose operations involve customer self-service, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized a principle known as “mode of operation.” This appeal arose from a slip-and-fall accident that occurred at a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Cherry Hill. On the evening of her accident, plaintiff Janice Prioleau and her adult son and daughter, Richard Prioleau and Adriana Prioleau, were on a trip from their home in Delaware to New Jersey. Plaintiff and her children recalled that the weather that evening was rainy; plaintiff stated that there was a torrential storm. Plaintiff and her children decided to stop at the Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant to have dinner. Plaintiff testified that, because of the heavy rain outside, she and her children tracked water into the restaurant. As she approached the restroom, plaintiff slipped and fell, landing on her buttocks and hands. According to plaintiff, the floor near the restroom felt greasy and wet. She stated that there were no mats or warning signs in the area where she fell. Plaintiff s children agreed with her that the floor near the restroom at the restaurant was slippery and greasy. Plaintiff’s testimony established that she had not yet ordered or purchased her dinner when her accident occurred. Instead, by her own account, plaintiff fell immediately after entering the restaurant. She asserted a negligence claim and specifically alleged that defendants failed to exercise reasonable care by failing to provide plaintiff, an invitee, with a safe place to traverse the premises. The jury found defendants negligent, without identifying the theory of negligence on which its verdict was based, and concluded that defendants’ negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s accident. Defendants appealed the trial court’s judgment. A divided Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. The majority reasoned that the unifying factor in case law recognizing the “mode-of-operation” doctrine was the negligence [that] resulted from the business’s method of operation, which was designed to allow patrons to directly handle merchandise or products without intervention from business employees, and entailed an expectation of customer carelessness. Finding no reversible error in the Appellate Division’s judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Prioleau v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant William Witt was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person. The police initiated a stop of defendant’s car because he did not dim his high beams when necessary, and a search of his vehicle uncovered the handgun. Defendant moved to suppress the gun on the ground that the police conducted an unreasonable search in violation of the New Jersey Constitution. Defendant’s sole argument was that the police did not have exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search of his car under “New Jersey v. Pena-Flores,” (198 N.J.6 (2009)). The Appellate Division granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal and affirmed the suppression of the gun because of the “utter absence” of any exigency to support the warrantless vehicle search that occurred, and because there was no justification for this motor vehicle stop. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed, holding that exigent-circumstances standard set forth in “Pena-Flores: was “unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.” View "New Jersey v. Witt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Bruce Kaye, the controlling principal of three entities that sold and managed timeshare interests in resort properties in Atlantic County, hired defendant Alan Rosefielde, an attorney admitted to practice law in New York but not in New Jersey, initially as outside counsel, and then as an employee. After defendant had worked closely with plaintiff for approximately four months, the parties entered an agreement providing that, as compensation for his services, defendant would earn an annual salary of $500,000. For approximately two years, defendant served as Chief Operating Officer for several of the timeshare entities, and effectively functioned as their general counsel. In that capacity, defendant committed serious misconduct by acting on his own behalf instead of for his employers benefit, and exposing his employers to potential liability. Based on this misconduct, and dissatisfaction with defendant’s performance, plaintiff terminated defendant’s employment. Kaye, in his individual capacity and as trustee of two trusts, Kaye’s son Jason Kaye, and the business entities that Kaye owned, sued Rosefielde and several other entities. Plaintiffs asserted claims based on Rosefielde’s breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, legal malpractice, unlicensed practice of law, and breach of the duty of loyalty. Following a lengthy bench trial, the trial court found that Rosefielde engaged in egregious conduct constituting a breach of his duty of loyalty, breach of his fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, and civil fraud. The trial court rescinded Rosefielde’s interest in several entities, awarded compensatory damages, punitive damages, and legal fees, and dismissed Rosefielde’s counterclaims. It declined, however, to order the equitable disgorgement of Rosefielde’s salary as a remedy for his breach of the duty of loyalty, on the ground that his breach did not result in damage or loss to the entities that employed him. The Appellate Division affirmed that determination, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification on the issue of equitable disgorgement. “In imposing the remedy of disgorgement, depending on the circumstances, a trial court should apportion the employee’s compensation, rather than ordering a wholesale disgorgement that may be disproportionate to the misconduct at issue. . . . If an agent is paid a salary apportioned to periods of time, or compensation apportioned to the completion of specified items of work, he is entitled to receive the stipulated compensation for periods or items properly completed before his renunciation or discharge. This is true even if, because of unfaithfulness or insubordination, the agent forfeits his compensation for subsequent periods or items.” The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed with respect to the remedy of equitable disgorgement, and the matter was remanded to the trial court to decide whether plaintiffs were entitled to disgorgement. If so, the trial court should apportion Rosefielde’s compensation, ordering disgorgement only for monthly pay periods in which he committed acts of disloyalty. View "Kaye v. Rosefielde" on Justia Law

Defendant Corey Morris appealed an order that denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Defendant was indicted on multiple counts of armed robbery, weapons offenses and eluding the police. At his first trial, defendant was convicted of eluding, but the jury deadlocked on all other charges. Prior to retrial, defendant and the State reached a plea agreement where defendant pled guilty to three armed robbery charges, and received three sentences of twenty years (to run concurrent to the twenty-year sentence for eluding), subject to the No Early Release Act. Defendant was permitted to represent himself on appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that “defendant’s arguments [were] without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.” View "New Jersey v. Morris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Anna Mae Cashin owned a parcel of land in Hoboken. Two separate structures were located on that property: a six-unit apartment building, and a two-story single-family home built in a converted garage. Plaintiff has rented out five units of the apartment building and used the sixth for storage. Plaintiff lived in the single-family home with her late husband for four years until 1971, when they began renting it out. In 1973, defendant Marisela Bello moved into that unit. Defendant occupied the space with her son. Defendant's rent was $345 per month, five dollars more than the rent she initially paid in 1973. Plaintiff tried to regain possession of the house several times. She first asked defendant to leave in the 1980s so that plaintiff's daughter could live there. In June 2009, plaintiff again asked defendant to leave so that plaintiff's son could live there to be closer to his parents during his father's illness. At that time, plaintiff sent defendant a notice to quit, giving her sixty days to vacate the house. In response, defendant's attorney sent a letter indicating that defendant refused to leave. Plaintiff took no further action to evict defendant at that time. On January 4, 2012, plaintiff, through her attorney, sent defendant another notice to quit. Plaintiff demanded possession of the house under N.J.S.A.2A:18-61.1(l)(3), asserting that the unit was a single-family home and that she, the owner, wished to reside there. Defendant refused to leave, and plaintiff filed a complaint for possession of the house on April 2, 2012. In this appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether the Anti-Eviction Act, which permits the owner of a building of three residential units or less to oust a tenant if the owner intends to personally occupy a unit, could be applied to remove a tenant (defendant) from the two-story single-family house built in a converted garage. To that end, the Court had to determine whether "building" denotes a single, unattached physical structure or whether it includes all structures owned by an individual located on the same parcel of land. The Supreme Court found that the Legislature's use of the word "building," in its singular form, was both deliberate and dispositive. "Building" designates a discreet physical structure, not a number of such structures connected only by the ownership of the land on which they sit. By the plain language of N.J.S.A.2A:18-61.1(l)(3), the converted garage constituted its own building for purposes of the Act, and plaintiff could evict defendants. View "Cashin v. Bello" on Justia Law