Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury found defendant Robert Goodwin guilty of second-degree insurance fraud. In doing so, the jury concluded that defendant knowingly made or caused to be made false statements of material fact concerning an insurance claim for damage to his girlfriend's sport utility vehicle (SUV). The heart of the State's case was that defendant falsely reported the theft of the vehicle, which was found severely damaged as the result of arson. The insurance company discovered the lie during an investigation when defendant recanted his earlier story that the SUV had been stolen. As a result, the carrier did not reimburse the loss. The Appellate Division overturned defendant's conviction because the jury was not told that a finding of insurance fraud could be returned only if the carrier actually relied on defendant's false statements. In the Appellate Division's view, the trial court erred by charging a relaxed standard: that guilt could be found if the false statements had the capacity to influence the insurance company s decision to pay the claim. The Supreme Court reversed: a person violates the insurance fraud statute even if he does not succeed in duping an insurance carrier into paying a fraudulent claim. Because the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in its charge to the jury, defendant's conviction was reinstated. View "New Jersey v. Goodwin" on Justia Law

Defendant Howard Jones was charged with third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, and fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, arising from events that took place one morning in the spring of 2009 involving C.W., a fourteen-year-old girl. According to C.W.'s testimony, she was on her way to school when she saw a man standing there with his penis out. C.W. ran toward her school, and quickly encountered Leonard Wimbush. According to Wimbush, he saw a man emerge from the bushes and followed after him, but was unable to continue his pursuit after the man jumped a fence. Wimbush returned to the front of the building and waited for the police. When officers arrived, Wimbush joined police to search for the suspect. During the search, the responding officer came upon an individual wearing a gray sweatshirt, and asked the man (later identified as defendant) if he had seen anyone suspicious in the area. The man responded, "The gentleman who was exposing himself is on the track bed." Because the officer had not mentioned that he was looking for an individual who had exposed himself, he became interested. Defendant started to walk toward the back of the house to obtain his identification, and then ran away. Wimbush tackled the man, and the officer placed defendant under arrest. Following the close of the State's case, defendant moved to strike C.W.'s identification, arguing that it was tainted. Defense counsel noted that C.W. did not see defendant's face, that she recognized defendant only once the jacket was placed on him, that the officers never showed her any other suspects, and that Wimbush and the officer were standing next to defendant when he was identified. The trial court denied the motion, noting that, although one-on-one showup identifications are inherently suggestive, C.W.'s testimony was reliable because it was corroborated by Wimbush, who identified defendant and who provided a description that was essentially the same as the one provided by C.W. Defendant appealed, contending that [b]y placing the incriminating jacket on defendant after C.W. failed to identify defendant without the jacket, the police violated defendant's [due process] right to be free from suggestive police identification procedures that create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Defendant also challenged his sentence and the trail court's failure to charge lewdness as a lesser-included offense. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the State's argument that what occurred at this showup was an identification of an inanimate object. Here, C.W. was not simply identifying a jacket being shown to her by the police because it had been found near where defendant was located. "Placing a jacket on a person after his arrest and using that item of clothing during the eyewitness identification procedure when a witness is having difficulty identifying the suspect raises due process concerns." The case was remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Jones" on Justia Law

The insured, who had been sued for damages by plaintiffs, entered into a settlement whereby it agreed to assign its rights and interests under the insurance policy to plaintiffs. However, when plaintiffs sought to recover under the policy, the insurer denied coverage because the insured breached the policy's notice conditions. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurance company, finding that notice was not given as soon as practicable, and that the insurance company need not show appreciable prejudice as a result of the delay in notice in order to refuse coverage. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed substantially for the reasons given by the trial court. After its review, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that because this Directors and Officers claims made policy was not a contract of adhesion but was agreed to by sophisticated parties, the insurance company was not required to show that it suffered prejudice before disclaiming coverage on the basis of the insured's failure to give timely notice of the claim. View "Templo Fuente De Vida Corp., et al. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was a narrow one of appellate jurisdiction of an agency decision and the appropriate response by an appellate tribunal when it encounters on its calendar an interlocutory order from which leave to appeal was neither sought nor granted. A school principal was returned to teaching due to a reduction-in-force (RIF), which included elimination of all vice-principal positions throughout the school district. The principal filed a petition with the Commissioner of Education to establish her tenure and seniority rights as a vice-principal. Her employer, the Board of Education of the City of Elizabeth, challenged the validity of her principal certification, which challenge, if successful, affected her tenure and seniority rights. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) adopted the Elizabeth Board's position, but the Commissioner rejected the Initial Decision and remanded the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for calculation of the principal's tenure and seniority rights. The ALJ complied, the Commissioner adopted the Initial Decision, and the Elizabeth Board appealed. The Appellate Division held that the Commissioner's first decision was a final order from which the Elizabeth Board could have filed an appeal as of right. Having failed to do so, the panel concluded that the Elizabeth Board waived its right to appeal the Commissioner's first decision. The appellate panel raised the issue of the timeliness of the appeal sua sponte and determined that the Commissioner's first decision rejecting the ALJ s Initial Decision was a final order from which the employer should have taken an appeal. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the Commissioner's order became a final decision from which an appeal could be filed as of right only when the Commissioner adopted the decision of the ALJ following the remand proceedings. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Education of the City of Elizabeth" on Justia Law

While driving from his residence to his mother's home one night in 2006, defendant Eugene Baum struck and killed two teenage girls who were walking in a bike lane of a major thoroughfare in Kinnelon. The responding officers found two beverage containers in defendant's car, one of which contained a liquid that was 7.7 percent ethyl alcohol (15 proof). Defendant could not maintain his balance, his speech was slurred, and he smelled strongly of alcohol. He told the police that he thought he had hit a deer, but was not sure. At the time of the incident, defendant's blood alcohol level was determined to be between .327 and .377, four times the legal limit. Defendant had taken a prescribed anti-depressant the night before, and Librium that morning to control his symptoms of alcohol withdrawal. Although he knew that Librium would intensify his intoxication, defendant stated that he consumed more than two alcoholic beverages, but did not know how much he actually consumed, before driving. Defendant stated that he drank because he was an alcoholic, and has struggled with alcoholism for approximately seven years. Defendant argued at trial that he lacked the mental capacity to act recklessly because of his intoxication, which he claimed was involuntary due to his mental diseases or defects of alcoholism and depression. The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree aggravated manslaughter and two counts of second-degree death by auto. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive twenty-year prison terms subject to eighty-five percent parole ineligibility. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction, but remanded for resentencing based on a reevaluation of the aggravating factors relied on by the sentencing court. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, alleging errors at trial constituted reversible error. Finding none, however, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Baum" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the standard governing revocation of direct access from a state highway to property used for commercial purposes pursuant to the State Highway Access Management Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 27:7-89 to -98, and the State Highway Access Management Code (Access Code), N.J.A.C. 16:47-3.5(e)(11) and -3.8(k)(2). Arielle Realty, L.L.C. was the owner of a three-tenant commercial property located on the northbound side of Route 166 in Toms River. The DOT informed Arielle that access to its property from Route 166 would be eliminated because the DOT intended to construct an additional northbound travel lane. The DOT also advised Arielle that it intended to construct a median to separate northbound and southbound traffic on Route 166. This design would eliminate the eight parking spaces in the front of the building. The plan would also prevent direct access to Arielle s property for motorists traveling south on Route 166 because a motorist would no longer be able to make a left-hand turn onto West Gateway. According to the DOT design plan, a southbound motorist on Route 166, who intends to access Arielle s property, would be required to drive past the property, turn right onto a local road, turn right onto another local road, turn left onto Route 166 at an intersection controlled by a traffic signal, and turn right onto West Gateway. This alternative route traversed approximately three-quarters of a mile. In affirming the DOT Commissioner's decision, the Appellate Division determined that the DOT met its burden of proof that the alternative access plan was not only reasonable but also provided a convenient, direct, and well-marked means to enter the business and to return to the state road. Accordingly, the Appellate Division determined that the property owner failed to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to the DOT design. The Supreme Court affirmed: "the Commissioner's analysis is ultimately aimed at selecting the plan that will best achieve the overarching goal of providing reasonable access to the state's system of highways rather than maximizing the business interests of a particular property owner." View "In re Revocation of the Access of Block #613" on Justia Law

During an encounter that lasted ten seconds, a woman was robbed at gunpoint. She surrendered her purse with her cell phone inside it, and the robber drove away in a car. She later identified defendant Julius Smith as her assailant. Six weeks after the robbery, the State Police recovered the victim's cell phone when they arrested a third person. Law enforcement officers contacted the victim, but the prosecutor and local police did not learn about the discovery of the phone until the middle of defendant s trial -- fifteen months later. Defense counsel twice moved for a mistrial to investigate this critical information. The trial court took alternate measures to try to remedy the belated disclosure but denied defendant's motion. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court found that it was an abuse of discretion not to grant a mistrial, particularly in light of the materiality of the evidence that surfaced mid-trial, defendant's inability to investigate it while the short trial proceeded, and the nature and strength of the evidence against defendant. The Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division, which affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Jersey v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-grandparents filed an action under N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 in the Family Part, seeking an order compelling defendant-mother to allow them periodic visits with their granddaughter. The trial court determined that in their complaint, supplemented by their testimony, plaintiffs failed to present a prima facie showing that the child would be harmed unless visitation were ordered. It found that plaintiffs had improperly instituted litigation before defendant had denied visitation with finality, and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's determination and remanded for reevaluation of the sufficiency of plaintiffs' complaint. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court centered on the procedures by which a Family Part judge determines whether a grandparent has made a prima facie showing of harm to the child sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, and manages the case if it continues beyond the pleading stage. The Supreme Court held that in order to overcome the presumption of parental autonomy, grandparents who bring visitation actions must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that denial of his or her application would result in harm to the child. If the grandparent meets that burden, the presumption in favor of parental decision-making is overcome, and the court sets a visitation schedule in the best interests of the child. In this case, plaintiffs alleged in detail their involvement in their granddaughter's life prior to the death of their son (the child's father) and contended on that basis that their alienation from the child caused her harm. The trial court should have denied defendant's motion to dismiss and given plaintiffs the opportunity to satisfy their burden to prove harm. View "Major v. Maguire" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review concerned a challenge to the validity of a municipal ordinance authorizing the issuance of $6,300,000 in bonds to finance a redevelopment project in the Township of West Orange. Plaintiffs filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs claiming that the Township failed to secure the statutorily required approval for the bond ordinance from the Local Finance Board, which is a part of the Division of Local Government Services within New Jersey's Department of Community Affairs. As a result, plaintiffs claim the bond ordinance was invalid. The trial court dismissed the action because plaintiffs filed their complaint fifty-three days after final publication of the bond ordinance (well outside the twenty-day period permitted by Rule 4:69-6(b)(11)). The Appellate Division affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court held that because plaintiffs did not present any extraordinary circumstances to allow the trial and appellate courts to consider their claims, those courts properly dismissed plaintiffs' petition. View "In re Petition for Referendum to Repeal Ordinance 2354-12 of the Twp. of W. Orange" on Justia Law

In 1996, defendant Duquene Pierre was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, and several other offenses, arising from a fatal shooting in Elizabeth. Defendant was one of several suspects arrested for the shooting. He maintained that when the crime occurred at 3:19 a.m. on March 20, 1994, he and one of his codefendants were not in New Jersey, but on their way to Florida to visit defendant's relatives. This appeal stems from the denial of defendant's application for post-conviction relief (PCR), based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. In evidentiary hearings before the PCR court, defendant presented evidence that, if called to testify, his brother Kirby Pierre and sister Astrid Pierre would have stated that in March 1994, Kirby did not know how to drive and did not travel to Florida. Defendant also presented evidence that the remainder of Reid s telephone bill, not offered into evidence at trial, would have supported his contention that he was in Florida in the days that followed the Elizabeth shooting. Finally, three of defendant's relatives testified that defendant visited each of them in Florida in March 1994, but defendant's trial counsel did not contact them to ascertain their knowledge of those visits. The PCR court denied defendant's PCR application, and the Appellate Division affirmed that determination. By virtue of the combined errors of his trial counsel, the Supreme Court reversed the PCR and the appellate courts' decisions denying relief, finding that defendant was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Court concluded defendant was entitled to a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Pierre" on Justia Law