Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Stephen Scharf was convicted of first-degree purposeful and knowing murder of his wife Jody, who fell to her death off a cliff at the Palisades. Defendant defended the charge by claiming the death was an accident. At trial, the court allowed the State to present, in rebuttal to the defense of accident, hearsay statements, under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3) and (c)(4), from Jody s friends and her therapist. The witnesses claimed that Jody repeatedly told them of her fear of defendant, particularly after she had served him with a divorce complaint, and told them that she had declined defendant's request to go to the Palisades cliffs with him shortly before her death. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction, concluding that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statements. The State appealed, raising the issue of whether the trial court erred in admitting the statements, and if the evidence was admissible, whether the evidence, cumulatively, constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion that caused defendant's trial to be unjust. Finding that the Appellate Division erred in reversing the trial court's judgment of conviction, the Supreme Court reversed, and the matter remanded for consideration of defendant's unaddressed appellate arguments. View "New Jersey v. Scharf" on Justia Law

In 2013, the State Board of Nursing invoked N.J.A.C. 13:37-1.3(c)(2) to deny accreditation to the Licensed Practical Nurse to Registered Nurse Bridge Program (Bridge Program), a nursing program instituted by Eastwick College (Eastwick). Interpreting the term graduating class in N.J.A.C. 13:37-1.3(c)(2) to include all graduates of the program who took the licensing examination during a given calendar year, regardless of the year a particular student graduated from the program, the Board found that Eastwick's Bridge Program's first and second graduating classes failed to achieve the 75% pass rate mandated by the regulation. Eastwick appealed the Board's determination, challenging the methodology used by the Board to calculate the pass rate of the Bridge Program's graduates on the licensing examination. Eastwick contended that only students who graduated during a specific calendar year and took the licensing examination in that year should be included in that year's graduating class. Using that methodology, Eastwick argued that its second graduating class had a pass rate in excess of 75%, and that the Board improperly declined to accredit its nursing program. An Appellate Division panel affirmed the Board's determination denying accreditation. Based on the plain language of N.J.A.C. 13:37-1.3(c)(2), the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the Board's construction of its regulation was plainly unreasonable, and accordingly held that the Board improperly denied accreditation to Eastwick's Bridge Program. The Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division's judgment affirming the Board's action, and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Revocation or the Suspension of the Provisional Accreditation of and/or the Imposition of Probation on Eastwick College LPN-to-RN Bridge Program" on Justia Law

Defendants Lixandra Hernandez and Jose G. Sanchez were charged in a State Grand Jury indictment with second-degree conspiracy to distribute more than five ounces of cocaine, first-degree distribution of more than five ounces of cocaine, second-degree distribution of cocaine within 500 feet of a public park, and third-degree possession of cocaine. The cooperating witness (the Witness) in defendants' case assisted the State in a number of drug investigations and prosecutions. In discovery, defendants were given the agreements between the State and the Witness in this case and in unrelated cases, and the State has represented that it would provide the defense with any known material false statements made by the Witness in those cases. Defendants nevertheless insisted that they were entitled to every statement made by the Witness in each case in which he has cooperated with the State, whether those statements are contained in a transcribed interview, recorded drug transaction, investigative report, or memorandum between members of the prosecutorial team. The trial court determined that such information, regardless of its lack of relevance, was discoverable under our court rules. The Appellate Division affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the discovery ordered by the trial court and Appellate Division exceeded the limits of Rule3:13-3(b) and was not supported by New Jersey jurisprudence. "Although our discovery rule generally requires that the State provide all evidence relevant to the defense of criminal charges, it does not open the door to foraging through files of other cases in search of relevant evidence. . . . The discovery order here requires disclosure of information not mandated by our discovery rule - information that has no ostensible relevance to the case to be tried." Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

This appeal as of right arose from defendants' alleged breach of a settlement agreement executed by defendants and one of the plaintiffs in this action, Globe Motor Company (Globe), to resolve prior litigation between the parties. Shortly after defendants sent two checks totaling $75,000 to plaintiffs to settle the earlier action, a Trustee appointed to represent the estate of an insolvent Minnesota entity brought an adversary proceeding against plaintiffs. The Trustee demanded that plaintiffs disgorge the settlement funds, on the ground that those funds had belonged to the bankrupt entity, not to defendants, and that the transactions were therefore voidable under provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 544 and 548. Plaintiffs paid $22,500 to resolve the bankruptcy Trustee's claim. Plaintiffs filed this action against defendants, seeking to recover the money that they paid to settle the bankruptcy proceeding as well as attorneys' fees and costs. The motion judge entered summary judgment for plaintiffs on their breach of contract claim. An Appellate Division panel affirmed that determination, with one judge dissenting. After its review, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the motion judge improperly granted summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor. The Court concluded that the record did not establish plaintiffs' right to judgment as a matter of law. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "GlobeMotor Company v. Igdalev" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a law firm practicing as a limited liability partnership (LLP) failed to maintain professional malpractice insurance to cover claims against it, and, if so, whether that failure should cause the revocation of the firm's LLP status, rendering innocent partners personally liable. In July 2009, Mortgage Grader hired Olivo of Ward & Olivo (W&O) to pursue claims of patent infringement against other entities. Mortgage Grader entered into settlement agreements in those matters. In exchange for one-time settlement payments, Mortgage Grader granted those defendant-entities licenses under the patents, including perpetual rights to any patents Mortgage Grader received or obtained through assignment, regardless of their relationship to the patents at issue in the litigation. It is those provisions of the settlement agreement that allegedly gave rise to legal malpractice. In 2011, W&O dissolved and entered into its windup period. W&O continued to exist as a partnership for the sole purpose of collecting outstanding legal fees and paying taxes. The next day, Ward formed a new LLP and began to practice with a new partner. Mortgage Grader filed a complaint against W&O, Olivo, and Ward in October 2012, alleging legal malpractice by Olivo, and claiming that the settlement agreements resulting from Olivo's representation harmed Mortgage Grader's patent rights. The motion court denied Ward's motion to dismiss, first determining that Mortgage Grader had failed to comply with the statutory requirement to serve an affidavit of merit (AOM) on each defendant named in the complaint, and rejected its substantial compliance argument. However, the court also determined that W&O failed to maintain the requisite insurance, which caused its liability shield to lapse and relegated W&O to a GP. Thus, the motion court concluded that Ward could be held vicariously liable for Olivo's alleged legal malpractice. The Appellate Division reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that law firms organized as LLPs that malpractice insurance did not extend to the firm's windup period, and tail insurance coverage was not required. View "Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. Ward & Olivo, L.L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Tonique Griffin, Virginia Best and Rosalyn Walker, employees of the City of East Orange, alleged that they were sexually harassed by a supervisor. In the wake of plaintiffs' internal reports of the alleged harassment, the City retained an attorney to conduct an investigation of their claims. Corletta Hicks an aide to the City's then-Mayor, Robert Bowser, and a close friend of Griffin, made statements to the investigator that undermined Griffin's allegations and supported the credibility of the alleged harasser. The investigator relied in part on Hicks's statements in rejecting plaintiffs' contention that, by virtue of the supervisor's harassment, they were subjected to a hostile work environment. Plaintiffs filed complaints under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), alleging hostile work environment sexual harassment, quid pro quo sexual harassment, and retaliation, and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. During discovery, Hicks testified at her deposition that Mayor Bowser spoke with her before she was interviewed by the investigator, directing her to make negative comments about Griffin and to praise the supervisor accused of harassment, and that pursuant to his instructions, she provided the investigator with misleading information. The trial court barred Hicks from testifying at trial on the ground that her proposed testimony was irrelevant to plaintiffs' claims. The court granted a directed verdict dismissing some of plaintiffs' claims, and the jury rejected the remaining claims. An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court's judgment. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred when it barred plaintiffs from presenting Hicks' testimony to the jury. Mayor Bowser's alleged instructions to Hicks were directly pertinent to plaintiffs' claims for compensatory and punitive damages arising from hostile work environment sexual harassment, and therefore met the relevancy standard of N.J.R.E. 401. The hearsay statements attributed to Mayor Bowser constituted statements by a party's agent or servant offered against the party, and were thus within the exception to the hearsay rule prescribed by N.J.R.E. 803(b)(4). The Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division's judgment affirming the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for hostile work environment sexual harassment, and remanded the matter to the trial court for a new trial on those claims. We affirm the Appellate Division's judgment with respect to plaintiffs remaining claims. View "Griffin v. City of East Orange" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert Smith was a certified emergency medical technician and paramedic associated with defendant Millville Rescue Squad (MRS), which provided medical transportation and rescue services. Plaintiff started off as a volunteer, but assumed a paid position in January 1996. At the time of his termination in February 2006, plaintiff served as Director of Operations until June 1998. Plaintiff s direct supervisor was co-defendant John Redden, MRS's Chief Executive Officer. Plaintiff's wife at the time, Mary, was also employed by MRS, as were her mother and two sisters. In early 2005, plaintiff commenced an extramarital affair with an MRS volunteer, who was supervised directly by plaintiff. In June 2005, Mary learned of plaintiff's affair and reported it to Redden. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff informed Redden of the affair. The MRS volunteer left MRS in 2005, but the affair continued, leading to irreconcilable discord between plaintiff and Mary. On January 1, 2006, plaintiff moved out of the marital home. On January 2, 2006, plaintiff informed Redden that his marriage to Mary had collapsed. According to plaintiff's testimony, Redden thanked plaintiff for keeping him informed and asked to be notified of any developments regarding his marital status. When informed that plaintiff would divorce, he was terminated. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review addressed the scope of the marital status protection afforded to employees by the Law Against Discrimination (LAD). After review, the Court held that the LAD protected all employees who have declared that they will marry, have separated from a spouse, have initiated divorce proceedings, or have obtained a divorce from discrimination in the workplace. Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the employer harbored discriminatory animus against divorcing employees and that this animus bore directly on the decision to terminate plaintiff s employment. The trial court therefore erred when it dismissed the complaint at the close of plaintiff's case. View "Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad" on Justia Law

In May 2013, plaintiffs Annemarie Morgan and Tiffany Dever filed suit against defendants Sanford Brown Institute, its parent company, Career Education Corporation, and Sanford Brown's chief executive officer, admission and financial aid officers, and clinical director. Sanford Brown was a private, for-profit educational institution with a campus in Trevose, Pennsylvania, that offered medical-related training programs. In the complaint, plaintiffs claimed that defendants misrepresented the value of the school's ultrasound technician program and the quality of its instructors, instructed students on outdated equipment and with inadequate teaching materials, provided insufficient career-service counseling, and conveyed inaccurate information about Sanford Brown's accreditation status. The complaint further alleged that Sanford Brown employed high-pressure and deceptive business tactics that resulted in plaintiffs financing their education with high-interest loans, passing up the study of ultrasound at a reputable college, and losing career advancement opportunities. The Sanford Brown enrollment agreement included payment terms for tuition and fees, disclaimers, and an arbitration provision. Without answering the complaint, defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. The Appellate Division found the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed an arbitrator would determine issues of arbitrability and that plaintiffs failed to specifically attack the delegation clause. The panel therefore determined that arbitrability [was] for the arbitrator to decide. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Appellate Division and trial court did not have the benefit of "Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp.," (219 N.J. 430, 436 (2014), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2804, 192 L. Ed.2d 847 (2015)) at the time they rendered their decisions. The New Jersey Court held in "Atalese" that an arbitration provision in a consumer contract that fails to explain in some minimal way that arbitration is a substitute for a consumer s right to pursue relief in a court of law was unenforceable. This case was therefore remanded for further proceedings in light of Atalese. View "Morgan v. Sanford Brown Institute" on Justia Law

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in this case was whether the 2011 suspension of State pension cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) contravened a term of the contract right granted under the earlier enacted non-forfeitable right statute, L.1997, c.113 (codified as N.J.S.A.43:3C-9.5). Qualifying members of the State's public pension systems or funds were granted a non-forfeitable right to receive benefits as provided under the laws governing the retirement system or fund. By codifying that non-forfeitable right to receive benefits, the Legislature provided that the benefits program, for any employee for whom the right has attached, could not be reduced. Whether COLAs were part of the benefits program protected by N.J.S.A. 43:3C-9.5 depended on whether the Legislature, in enacting N.J.S.A. 43:3C-9.5(a) and (b), intended to create a contractual right to COLAs. The Supreme Court found in this instance, proof of unequivocal intent to create a non-forfeitable right to yet-unreceived COLAs was lacking. Although both plaintiff retirees and the State advanced plausible arguments on that question, "the lack of such unmistakable legislative intent dooms plaintiffs' position." The Court concluded that the Legislature retained its inherent sovereign right to act in its best judgment of the public interest and to pass legislation suspending further COLAs. Having determined that there was no contract violation, and because the additional arguments advanced by plaintiffs were not meritorious, the Court reversed the Appellate Division's judgment holding to the contrary. View "Berg v. Christie" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sofia Torres alleged that she was seriously injured in a rear-end collision between her car and a garbage truck owned by defendant Suburban Disposal, Inc., and operated by defendant Javier Pabon. Plaintiff alleged that, as a result of defendants negligent maintenance of the truck s taillights, she was unaware that the truck was ahead of her. She contended that Pabon drove negligently, causing the collision. Defendants denied plaintiff's allegations and asserted that plaintiff's own negligence caused the accident. The case was tried before a jury, which found both parties negligent but allocated fifty-five percent of the fault to defendants, and awarded a substantial verdict. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's judgment. The New Jersey Supreme Court found too many errors at trial, reversed and remanded for a new trial. First, the trial court improperly directed the jury to consider drawing an adverse inference against defendants from Pabon s failure to testify after plaintiff presented Pabon's deposition testimony to the jury. Second, the trial court permitted plaintiff to read to the jury requests for admissions, served by plaintiff immediately before trial, which improperly sought defendants admissions to medical opinions offered by one of their expert witnesses. Third, the trial court erroneously issued a second "Clawans" charge, again authorizing the jury to draw an adverse inference against defendants because they decided not to call their expert as a witness. Fourth, the trial court made significant errors in its jury instruction regarding the duty of a driver to maintain a safe distance behind another driver. Finally, notwithstanding plaintiff's testimony before the jury that she had significant medical bills and lacked the resources to pay them, the trial court failed to instruct the jury that plaintiff was not entitled to medical expenses as an element of damages, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. View "Torres v. Pabon" on Justia Law