Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rosette Martinez was home with her daughter and her daughter's friend on Christmas Day in 2015 when she heard footsteps coming up the stairs. A man opened the door and stated, “I’m here for your dad, George,” leading her to believe he was there to fix something at the house. Martinez believed she recognized the intruder as someone who had recently done contracting work on their house. He then pulled out a “long gun,” instructed the women to lay face down, tied their hands behind their backs, and began to rifle through possessions. At some point during the robbery, the women heard the intruder’s phone ring and announce a “[c]all from” a name. The daughter testified that she heard the intruder’s phone announce an “incoming text” message from a name she did not recognize, but the message was not read aloud. All three women testified that they heard clicking noises that indicated to them that the intruder was taking pictures with his phone. After the intruder left, the women untied themselves and called 911. In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether it was cumulative error for the trial court to admit two pieces of evidence: expert testimony that defendant Roberson Burney’s cell phone was likely near a crime scene based on a “rule of thumb” approximation for cell tower ranges in the area, and a first-time in-court identification of defendant by a witness who had previously identified another person as the perpetrator in a photo lineup. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in admitting both the testimony placing defendant’s phone at or near the crime scene and the first-time in-court identification. Those errors, in combination, deprived defendant of a fair trial. View "New Jersey v. Burney" on Justia Law

In January 2017, an individual wearing a baseball cap and gloves robbed a bank in North Brunswick, New Jersey. Bank surveillance footage captured the entire 57-second robbery. In November 2017, defendant was charged in three other robberies after his former girlfriend, “Joan,” identified him in a wanted photo from one of those robberies. After the office investigating the other robberies notified police about defendant, he became a suspect in the North Brunswick robbery as well. In September 2018, a detective showed the teller six photos, one at a time, and asked if he could identify the person who robbed the bank. The teller picked a photo of someone other than defendant and said at trial that he was 75-90 percent sure of the identification. At trial, the prosecutor asked the teller if he could identify the robber in court. The teller identified defendant, who was seated in between his lawyers at counsel table. The teller said he was “maybe like . . . 80 percent” sure. The prosecution did not provide advance notice of the in-court identification, and defense counsel did not object to it. During cross-examination, the teller revealed that he had met with the prosecutor prior to trial and that the prosecutor had “informed [him] that the individual who was accused of committing this robbery is in court seated at the defense table.” Joan also testified at trial. She was shown two still photos from the bank surveillance video and testified she was 100 percent positive that each depicted defendant. A police sergeant testified about the investigation, in which he was asked a series of questions while the video was played for the jury. The more open-ended questions invited and led to more open-ended narrative responses. A jury found defendant guilty of robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding: (1) the inherently suggestive nature of first-time in-court identifications, conducted in front of a jury, risks depriving defendants of their due process rights; and (2) narration evidence, or "running commentary" on video evidence by someone who has merely studied a recording, violated defendant's right to confrontation. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Watson" on Justia Law

In this products liability matter involving “pelvic mesh” medical devices, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether defendant C.R. Bard, Inc., was denied a fair trial by the trial court’s determination that defendant could not present 510(k) clearance evidence -- evidence that, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 360c, the devices were allowed to be marketed without premarket clinical trials -- to counter the product liability claims brought by plaintiffs Mary and Thomas Walsh McGinnis. North Carolina surgeon Dr. Elizabeth Barbee implanted Bard’s “Align TO” and “Avaulta Solo” pelvic mesh devices. In the months following surgery, McGinnis had to undergo numerous invasive surgeries to remove the mesh and repair internal damage, with limited success. In 2011, plaintiffs filed suit against defendant Bard under North Carolina law. Counsel agreed that the substantive issues would be tried under the law of North Carolina but that the issue of damages would be tried under New Jersey law. Plaintiffs moved in limine to bar defendant from presenting any evidence of the devices’ 510(k) clearance to the jury. The trial court found the 510(k) evidence inadmissible. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the exclusion of any 510(k) evidence deprived defendant of a fair trial on the issue of negligence. The Supreme Court agreed that 510(k) evidence was generally inadmissible because the 510(k) clearance process solely determines substantial equivalency, and not safety and efficacy. However, in a products liability claim premised on the reasonableness of a manufacturer’s conduct in not performing clinical trials or studies, the Court held evidence of 510(k) clearance had significant probative value under N.J.R.E. 401 that was not substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice and potential juror confusion under N.J.R.E. 403. Therefore, under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division and remanded for a new trial. The Court disagreed with the Appellate Division’s decision regarding the scope and admissibility of 510(k) evidence and a Rule 104 hearing. To this, the Supreme Court believed the scope and admissibility of 510(k) evidence should be resolved at the hearing on a motion in limine, which was how the issue was and, presumably, would be raised. View "Hrymoc v. Ethicon, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Rami Amer moved to dismiss his New Jersey indictment for offenses related to a series of burglaries, alleging a violation of his speedy trial rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). Defendant was arrested in New Jersey in November 2016 in connection with seventeen burglaries. He was arrested the next month in Pennsylvania in connection with a series of burglaries committed in that state. In October 2017, defendant pled guilty to the charges pending against him in Pennsylvania and was incarcerated there. On February 23, 2018, the State received defendant’s notice under the IAD, in which he requested the prompt disposition of his New Jersey charges. Defendant was transported from Pennsylvania to New Jersey the same day. On May 21, defendant filed two motions to suppress, which were denied on July 13. During jury selection on July 24, the trial judge informed counsel that after July 31, the trial would resume on September 13. Neither party objected to that proposed schedule, but when jury selection resumed the next day, defense counsel stated that the IAD required the trial to begin on August 22, 2018, and argued that defendant’s rights under the IAD would be violated if, for example, the court began a trial but “put it off [for] six months.” The trial court ultimately entered an order stating that trial had commenced for IAD purposes on July 24, 2018, when jury selection began, and that the IAD’s 180-day time period had been tolled between the filing and the denial of defendant’s motions. In an August 28, 2018 letter, defendant contended that the trial court had violated his rights under the IAD. Treating defendant’s letter as a motion to dismiss his indictment, the trial court denied the motion. In October 2018, the jury convicted defendant on four counts. The Appellate Division affirmed on that issue. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the trial court did not violate defendant’s speedy trial rights under the IAD, and it properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment. The Court did not agree with the Appellate Division that defense counsel waived defendant’s rights under the IAD. But the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s other determinations: that the IAD’s 180-day time period was tolled during the pendency of defendant’s pretrial motions, and that defendant was “brought to trial” when jury selection began prior to the deadline. View "New Jersey v. Amer" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on whether Facebook could be compelled to provide the contents of two users’ accounts every 15 minutes for 30 days into the future based only on probable cause, the ordinary standard for a search warrant, or whether the State must instead satisfy certain requirements and apply for a wiretap order, which required an enhanced showing -- one beyond probable cause -- because gaining access to private communications in real time is considerably more intrusive than a typical search. In the two matters under review, trial courts quashed the State’s request for prospective information based on a Communications Data Warrant (CDW), which was the equivalent of a search warrant and can be issued on a showing of probable cause. The Appellate Division consolidated the cases and held that the State could obtain prospective electronic communications with a CDW, reasoning that the wiretap statute applied to the contemporaneous interception of electronic communications, not efforts to access communications in storage. The Supreme Court concluded that based on the language and structure of the relevant statutes, the State’s request for information from users’ accounts invokes heightened privacy protections. "The nearly contemporaneous acquisition of electronic communications here is the functional equivalent of wiretap surveillance and is therefore entitled to greater constitutional protection. New Jersey’s wiretap act applies in this case to safeguard individual privacy rights under the relevant statutes and the State Constitution." View "Facebook, Inc. v. State of New Jersey" on Justia Law

After receiving a “be on the lookout” (BOLO) email based on a tip from a confidential informant (CI) that defendant Cornelius Cohen would be traveling to the Carolinas to pick up firearms and bring them back to New Jersey to sell, State Trooper Charles Travis noticed one of the cars described in the BOLO email traveling on the New Jersey Turnpike, and pulled the vehicle over for traffic violations. When Travis approached the vehicle, he noticed multiple air fresheners hanging from the rearview mirror. Travis testified that he smelled “a strong odor of raw marijuana” in the vehicle during the stop and observed “greenish-brown vegetation” on the driver’s beard and shirt, which the trooper identified as marijuana. With defendant and his passenger handcuffed and in separate patrol cars, Travis started searching the passenger compartment, where he recovered from the glove compartment a 9mm spent shell casing. The search of the passenger compartment did not reveal any marijuana. Travis did not apply for a search warrant based on the information supplied by the CI, but instead proceeded to the front of the vehicle where he opened the vehicle’s hood and searched the engine compartment. There he found a rifle and a revolver. Travis then searched the trunk, where he found a duffle bag containing hollow point bullets. No marijuana was recovered from the car, defendant, or the passenger. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the car search. The trial court held that “[t]he odor of raw marijuana emanating from a vehicle without a detectible pinpoint establishes probable cause to search the entire vehicle.” Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of unlawful possession of a weapon, and appealed his eventual conviction. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that expanding the search to the engine compartment and trunk went beyond the scope of the automobile exception. As a result, the seized evidence should be suppressed. View "New Jersey v. Cohen" on Justia Law

Defendant Andreas Erazo was convicted for the 2017 rape and murder of eleven-year-old A.S. The Appellate Division found that defendant’s confession, obtained during a second interview, five hours after his initial 90-minute interview, was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and should have been suppressed. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding defendant was not in custody at the time of the pre-confession interview, thus Miranda was not implicated. The Supreme Court also found that the detectives’ tactics during the Mirandized interrogation were not coercive, did not minimize the Miranda warnings, and were consistent with New Jersey v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189 (2022). Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress. View "New Jersey v. Erazo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC (Gannett) sought an award of attorneys’ fees from its common law right of access claim to Internal Affiars (IA) files pertaining to a former Neptune Township, New Jersey police officer. In 2015, the former officer, Philip Seidel, killed his former wife. After a local prosecutor’s office issued a report on the Seidel case that was based in part on Seidle’s IA files, Gannett submitted an Open Public Records Act (OPRA) request and one under the common law, seeking copies of those files. The Township denied the request. A trial court ultimately dismissed Gannett’s OPRA claim but ordered the release of the contested records, redacted in accordance with guidelines prescribed in the court’s opinion, on the sole basis of the common law right of access. The trial court granted a partial fee award. The Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) it affirmed the trial court’s determination that Gannett had no claim under OPRA but was entitled to a redacted version of Seidle’s IA files pursuant to the common law; and (2) it held that the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a right to counsel fees in common law right of access cases under certain circumstances in Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 57 (2008). On the facts presented, however, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s partial award of counsel fees. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, the Appellate Division’s judgment. “Imposing fee-shifting in this category of cases would venture far beyond the narrow exceptions to the American Rule that New Jersey courts have adopted to date. Accordingly, Gannett is not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees in this appeal.” View "Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC v. Township of Neptune" on Justia Law

In three personal injury actions, the defendants required the plaintiffs to submit to a defense medical examination (DME). Plaintiffs, who had alleged cognitive limitations, psychological impairments, or language barriers, sought to record the examinations or to be accompanied by a third-party observer (TPO) at the examination. After various trial court rulings, the Appellate Division consolidated the cases for purposes of its opinion, and remanded all three for reconsideration in light of its six-part holding. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s core holding that trial courts determine on a case-by-case basis what conditions, if any, to place on a DME -- including who may attend and whether it may be recorded -- with no absolute prohibitions or entitlements. The Court further affirmed that video recording, in addition to audio recording, should be included in the range of options; that the parties shall enter into a protective order when a defense expert is concerned about the disclosure of proprietary information; that when third-party observation is permitted, the trial court shall impose reasonable conditions to prevent any disruption of or interference with the exam; and that, if a foreign or sign language interpreter is needed, a neutral interpreter shall be selected by the parties or, failing agreement, by the court. The Court departed from the Appellate Division only in declining to place the burden on the plaintiff to show special reasons why third-party observation or recording should be permitted in each case. Instead, once the defendant issues notice to the plaintiff of a Rule 4:19 exam, the plaintiff should inform the defendant if they seek to bring a neutral observer or unobtrusively record the examination. If the defendant objects, the two sides should meet and confer to attempt to reach agreement. If agreement is impossible, the defendant may move for a protective order under Rule 4:10-3 seeking to prevent the exam from being recorded, or to prevent a neutral third-party observer from attending. View "DiFiore v. Pezic; Deleon v. The Achilles Foot & Ankle Group; Remache-Robalino v. Boulos" on Justia Law

The Board of Education of the Borough of Somerville challenged the award of relief to former teacher Catherine Parsells in a tenure dispute. The Board employed Parsells as a full-time preschool teacher from September 2010 to June 2016. Parsells earned tenure in 2013. In May 2016, she wrote to the superintendent, expressing an interest in a temporary part-time preschool teaching position that included health benefits “for as long as [such a position] is available, or until my family decides that full-time work would be in our best interests again,” so that she could “pursu[e] [her] career goals while also being able to spend time with [her] son during his precious first few years.” Even though Parsells never formally applied for a part-time teaching job, and without addressing her assertion that she understood that her switch would be temporary, the superintendent notified Parsells that the Board approved her transfer from the full-time preschool teacher to the part-time position. Parsells began the 2016-17 school year as a part-time tenured teacher with health benefits. After requesting and receiving approval for maternity leave followed by a childcare leave of absence from February through June 2017, Parsells re-expressed interest in remaining a temporary part-time teacher for the 2017-18 school year. In an email to the school’s principal, the new superintendent noted that Parsells “was under the impression that she had the option of coming back full-time if she wanted to” and had “stated that if she had known all of this before changing to part-time, she would not have made the change.” Parsells returned to her part-time tenured teaching job in September 2018, but without health benefits. Parsells then applied for a full-time teaching position, and the Board rejected her applications, hiring non-tenured teachers from outside the district for some of those positions. Parsells filed a petition against the Board alleging it violated her tenure rights by hiring non-tenured teachers for the full-time positions to which she applied and that she had not voluntarily relinquished her tenure rights by moving temporarily to a part-time position. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined Parsells did not knowingly waive her tenured right to a full-time teaching position, and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision upholding the Commissioner’s award of “full back pay, benefits, and emoluments, less mitigation.” View "Parsells v. Borough of Somerville Board of Education" on Justia Law