Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a mother, J.C. (Jan), who was diagnosed with bipolar disorder with psychotic features. The New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) became involved with Jan and her family in 2018 when she was involuntarily hospitalized for manic and paranoid behavior. The Division implemented a safety plan that mandated temporary supervision of Jan’s contact with her children. After a series of referrals and investigations, the Division filed a complaint in 2020, and the Family Part granted the Division care and supervision of the children. In 2021, the Law Guardian sought to dismiss the Title 30 action due to Jan’s lack of cooperation with the Division. The court discontinued the Division’s care and supervision of the children but dismissed the litigation with restraints, considering Jan's mental health issues.The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's decision, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification. The Appellate Division held that the family court could dismiss a Title 30 action while maintaining restraints on a parent’s conduct. The court reasoned that the family court did not enter permanent restraints but continued the restraints that existed during the litigation.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the family court does not have the authority under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 to dismiss a Title 30 action and continue restraints on a parent’s conduct. If the family court finds that it is in the best interests of the child to continue the restraints on a parent’s conduct, it must keep the case open to facilitate judicial oversight of the Division’s continued involvement, while safeguarding a parent’s right to counsel. The case was remanded to the Family Part to reinstate the Title 30 action or dismiss the case without restraints. View "New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. J.C. and K.C." on Justia Law

The case revolves around the University Hospital's decision to award a contract for the design, construction, and operation of an on-site pharmacy to a bidder other than Sumukha LLC. Sumukha challenged the decision, but the hospital's hearing officer denied the protest. Sumukha then appealed to the Appellate Division. While the appeal was pending, Sumukha filed a second protest challenging the decision to change the pharmacy's planned location. When the hospital failed to respond, Sumukha filed a second appeal in the Appellate Division.The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal from Sumukha’s first protest, concluding that University Hospital’s determination was not directly appealable to the Appellate Division. It later dismissed Sumukha’s second appeal. Both dismissals were without prejudice to Sumukha’s right to file an action in the Law Division. The Court granted certification and consolidated the appeals.The Supreme Court of New Jersey found no evidence in University Hospital’s enabling statute that the Legislature intended the Hospital to be a “state administrative agency” under Rule 2:2-3(a)(2). The court held that University Hospital’s decisions and actions may not be directly appealed to the Appellate Division. The court affirmed the dismissal of the appeals, without prejudice to Sumukha’s right to file actions in the Law Division. View "In re Protest of Contract for Retail Pharmacy Design, Construction, Start-Up and Operation, Request for Proposal No. UH-P20-006" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Susan Seago, a former paraprofessional who became a teacher in 2017. As a paraprofessional, she was a member of the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS), but upon becoming a teacher, she was required to join the Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund (TPAF). Seago attempted to transfer her PERS credits and contributions to her new TPAF account by filling out an "Application for Interfund Transfer" and sending it to her employer, the Edison Township Board of Education (Edison BOE), for completion. However, the Edison BOE failed to complete its portion of the application and submit it on time, resulting in the expiration of Seago's PERS account.The Edison BOE challenged the denial of Seago's interfund transfer application, admitting its mistake in not submitting the application on time. However, the TPAF Board denied the interfund transfer request, and the Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of New Jersey.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the TPAF Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably when it denied Seago’s interfund transfer application. The court found that Seago had acted in good faith and had taken reasonable steps to ensure that her interfund transfer application was filed. The court also noted that Seago would suffer significant harm from the denial of her interfund transfer application, as she would lose her "Tier 1" membership status and would have to wait an additional five years to retire, ultimately receiving a lower monthly pension allowance. The court concluded that under the unique facts of this case, equity required that the TPAF Board grant Seago’s interfund transfer application. The court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division and instructed the TPAF Board to grant Seago's application for an interfund transfer as if her application had initially been timely filed. View "Seago v. Board of Trustees, Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, Beth, who gave birth to a child, Mia, in June 2020. Both mother and child tested positive for marijuana at the hospital. Beth was discharged from the hospital two days after delivery, but Mia remained. Beth never returned to the hospital, and the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) was unable to contact or locate her because Beth provided incorrect contact information. Mia stayed in the hospital two days longer than she would have if Beth returned to take custody of her. The Division took custody of Mia and placed her in a resource home. The Division filed an action against Beth, arguing that she abused and neglected Mia because she failed to exercise a minimum degree of care in supplying Mia with food, clothing, and shelter. The trial court concluded that the Division met its burden in proving that Beth abused and neglected Mia. The Appellate Division affirmed.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that although Beth left the hospital and did not return, she left Mia in a hospital where she was undoubtedly well taken care of and her needs were met. Nothing in the facts suggested that Beth’s actions impaired Mia or put Mia in imminent danger of being impaired while she remained in the safety of the hospital’s care. The Division therefore failed to meet its burden of establishing abuse or neglect. The court reversed the Appellate Division's decision and vacated the trial court’s finding of abuse and neglect. View "New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. B.P." on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs Christopher Maia and Sean Howarth, who were employed as laborers for defendant IEW Construction Group. The company required them to perform “pre-shift” and “post-shift” work, for which they were not paid. Both Maia and Howarth were laid off in November 2021. In April 2022, they filed a class action complaint alleging that IEW violated the Wage Payment Law (WPL) and the Wage and Hour Law (WHL).The trial judge held that Chapter 212, which amended the WPL and WHL, does not apply retroactively and thus dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for conduct that arose prior to Chapter 212’s effective date of August 6, 2019. The Appellate Division reversed this decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted leave to appeal. The court held that Chapter 212 is to be applied prospectively to conduct that occurred on or after August 6, 2019, not retroactively to conduct that occurred before that date. The trial judge properly dismissed the portions of the complaint relying on Chapter 212 but arising from conduct prior to its effective date. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, reinstated the trial judge’s order partially dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maia v. IEW Construction Group" on Justia Law

In November 2021, David Goyco was struck and injured by an automobile while operating a low-speed electric scooter (LSES). Goyco filed a claim for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under his personal automobile policy with Progressive Insurance Company. Progressive denied the claim, arguing that Goyco's LSES did not meet the definition of an "automobile" and that Goyco could not be considered a "pedestrian" under the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act, commonly known as the No-Fault Act. Goyco filed a complaint, asserting that LSES riders should be considered "pedestrians" entitled to PIP benefits under the No-Fault Act. The trial court denied relief to Goyco, and the Appellate Division affirmed.The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that an LSES rider does not fall within the definition of "pedestrian" for purposes of the No-Fault Act. The court found that Goyco's LSES was a "vehicle" that used a rechargeable electric motor and was therefore "propelled by other than muscular power" and was "designed for use on highways, rails and tracks." The court also rejected Goyco's reliance on a 2019 statute that provides that an LSES should be considered equivalent to a bicycle, stating that the statute was not intended to have any effect on the No-Fault Act. The court concluded that Goyco was not a pedestrian entitled to PIP benefits under Progressive's No-Fault insurance policy. View "Goyco v. Progressive Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between a real estate salesperson, James Kennedy II, and a real estate broker, Weichert Co. Kennedy worked for Weichert from 2012 to 2018 under two written agreements that identified him as an independent contractor. After his affiliation with Weichert ended, Kennedy filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Weichert violated the Wage Payment Law (WPL) by misclassifying him and other real estate salespersons as independent contractors and unlawfully deducting fees and expenses from their commissions.The trial court denied Weichert's motion to dismiss Kennedy's complaint, ruling that the question of Kennedy's status was not determined by the parties' agreement, but by the legal standard that generally governs employee classification issues under the WPL, known as the "ABC" test. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, but noted that the 2018 amendments to the New Jersey Real Estate License Act, or the Brokers Act, authorized real estate brokers and salespersons to enter into independent contractor relationships. However, it held that these amendments applied prospectively and thus governed only a brief portion of Kennedy's claim.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the lower courts' decisions. It held that the parties' agreement to enter into an independent contractor business affiliation is enforceable under N.J.S.A. 45:15-3.2, and Kennedy, as an independent contractor, was not subject to the WPL pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1(b). Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied Weichert’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The case was remanded for the dismissal of Kennedy’s complaint. View "Kennedy v. Weichert Co." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Andrew Higginbotham, who was charged with sixteen counts of endangering the welfare of a child under a specific subsection of New Jersey law. This law makes it a crime to depict a child in a sexually suggestive manner for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification, where the depiction lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The charges arose from photographs Higginbotham had distributed of a five-year-old girl, over which he superimposed sexually explicit, obscene text. Higginbotham moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the law was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.The trial court denied Higginbotham's motion, but the Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the definitions of "portray a child in a sexually suggestive manner" were unconstitutionally overbroad because they criminalized images that were neither child pornography nor obscenity. The case was then brought to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the specific subsection of the law under which Higginbotham was charged was unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalized a large amount of material that was neither obscenity nor child pornography. The court did not reach a decision on whether the law was also unconstitutionally vague. The court did not comment on the validity of other subsections of the law, as Higginbotham was not charged under those subsections and did not challenge them. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision as modified and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "State of New Jersey v. Higginbotham" on Justia Law

The case involves Christine Savage, a police officer who filed a lawsuit against the Neptune Township Police Department and others for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation. The parties entered into a settlement agreement in 2014, which included a non-disparagement clause. Savage filed a second lawsuit in 2016, alleging continued and intensified discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The parties entered into another settlement agreement in 2020, which also included a non-disparagement clause. After a television interview with Savage aired in 2020, the defendants claimed that Savage violated the non-disparagement provision of the settlement agreement.The trial court granted the defendants' motion to enforce the second settlement agreement, finding that the Law Against Discrimination (LAD) barred only non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements, and that Savage violated a non-disparagement clause. The Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding the non-disparagement clause enforceable but holding that Savage had not violated it.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the non-disparagement clause in the settlement agreement is against public policy and cannot be enforced. The court found that the LAD protects Savage’s statements. The court concluded that the non-disparagement clause in the agreement directly conflicts with the LAD as it encompasses and would bar speech the statute protects. The court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case. View "Christine Savage v. Township of Neptune" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Viktoriya Usachenok, an employee of the Department of Treasury, who filed an internal complaint alleging sexual harassment and a hostile work environment created by her supervisor. As part of the investigation, Usachenok was directed not to discuss the investigation with others, a directive she was accused of violating when she consulted her husband, an attorney, about a document related to the investigation. Usachenok subsequently filed a complaint challenging the confidentiality directive.The Appellate Division rejected Usachenok’s constitutional challenge to the regulation, focusing on the change from a directive to a permissive “request” through an amendment. The court found that the plain language of the regulation did not restrict speech and did not constitute an improper prior restraint of speech.The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, disagreed with the Appellate Division. The court held that the regulation, which requires state investigators to request that anyone interviewed not discuss any aspect of the investigation with others, is overbroad under the State Constitution. The court found that the regulation chills constitutionally protected speech, as it encompasses a significant amount of protected speech and its consequences are real. The court therefore struck the relevant part of the regulation, reversing the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Usachenok v. State of New Jersey Department of the Treasury" on Justia Law