Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Ramon and Jeffrey Cuevas were brothers who were employees of defendant Wentworth Property Management Corporation (Wentworth). In May 2005, Michael Mendillo, president and chief executive officer of Wentworth, hired Ramon to serve as a regional vice president; months later, Wentworth hired Jeffrey as a portfolio manager. Jeffrey was promoted to executive director in July 2007. In the new position, Jeffrey reported directly to defendant Arthur Bartikofsky, Wentworth's executive vice president of operations. Ramon also reported to Bartikofsky. Plaintiffs claimed that they encountered racial discrimination and a hostile work environment while under Bartikofsky's supervision. Many of the degrading remarks directed at Ramon occurred at senior executive meetings, where Mendillo, Bartikofsky, Alan Trachtenberg (in-house counsel), other executives, and regional vice presidents were present. Jeffrey corroborated most of his brother's account. When Jeffrey complained to Trachtenberg, he replied that Jeffrey should calm down and that the remarks should not be taken so seriously. Within the next month, both Ramon and Jeffrey were terminated. Plaintiffs filed an action under New Jersey s Law Against Discrimination (LAD) claiming that they were victims of race-based discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliatory firings. Ramon also claimed that Wentworth failed to promote him based on his race. In its defense, Wentworth contended that plaintiffs were terminated for poor work performance. The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict against defendants on all claims other than Ramon's failure-to-promote claim. The jury awarded overall damages in the amount of $2.5 million to the two brothers, including $800,000 in emotional-distress damages to Ramon and $600,000 in emotional-distress damages to Jeffrey. The trial court rejected defendants post-trial motions to vacate the jury's verdict and the damages award. In particular, the court denied defendants motion for a remittitur of the emotional-distress damages. In doing so, the court distinguished the comparable cases and verdicts selected by defendants. In the court's view, the award fell far short of one that would be shocking to the conscience. The trial judge also stated that she would refrain from applying her own feel for the case under "He v. Miller," (207 N.J.230 (2011)). The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's judgment. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed too. View "Cuevas v. Wentworth Group" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Township of Franklin (the Township) adopted an ordinance revising its regulation of signs, including billboards. The ordinance permits billboards, subject to multiple conditions, in a zoning district proximate to an interstate highway but expressly prohibited digital billboards anywhere in the municipality. A company seeking to install a digital billboard challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Law Division declared unconstitutional that portion of the ordinance barring digital billboards. The trial court viewed the Township's treatment of such devices as a total ban on a mode of communication. In a reported opinion, the Appellate Division reversed. Applying the "Central Hudson" commercial speech standard and the "Clark/Ward" time, place, and manner standard to content-neutral regulations affecting speech, the appellate panel determined that the ban on digital billboards passed constitutional muster. The Supreme Court disagreed: "simply invoking aesthetics and public safety to ban a type of sign, without more, does not carry the day." The Court declared the 2010 ban on digital billboards as unconstitutional and reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "E&J Equities v. Board of Adjustment of Franklin Township" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought treatment for sleep apnea from an orthodontist. Plaintiff used the appliance given to him for treatment but complained that it caused the dislocation of some teeth. Contending that the orthodontist did not inform him that the appliance may dislocate teeth, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the treating orthodontist provided insufficient information to permit him to make an informed decision to proceed with the recommended treatment. Presented for the Supreme Court's review was the "vexing and recurring" issue of whether an affidavit of merit submitted by a plaintiff in an action alleging negligence by a licensed professional satisfied the requirements of the Affidavit of Merit statute (AOM statute). The trial court conducted a "Ferreira" conference and determined that plaintiff submitted a timely affidavit of merit; however, the court dismissed with prejudice plaintiff's complaint because plaintiff submitted the affidavit from a dentist who specialized in prosthodontics and the treatment of sleep apnea. The court stated that plaintiff knew that the dentist who treated him was an orthodontist and that the statute required submission of an affidavit of merit from a like-qualified dentist. In other words, the court determined that plaintiff was required to submit an affidavit of merit from an orthodontist rather than an affidavit from a board-certified prosthodontist who had specialized in the treatment of sleep apnea for twenty years. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the affidavit of merit submitted by plaintiff satisfied the credential requirements of the AOM statute. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Meehan v. Antonellis" on Justia Law

What began as a fight between two students, C.W. and D.W., ended in the death of one of them. N.H., who was seventeen years old at the time, attended the fight to support his friend, D.W. N.H. allegedly grabbed a handgun from another individual and shot C.W. four times, including once in the back of the head. A video captured parts of the incident, and several witnesses made statements to the police that implicated N.H. N.H. also spoke to the police and said that he had shot only at the ground. At oral argument before the New Jersey Supreme Court, the State explained that it had not disclosed certain items in its possession which it did not intend to rely on at the waiver hearing. Those materials included additional witness statements, other police reports, and other videos of the event taken from different angles. N.H. moved for full discovery before the waiver hearing, and the trial court granted the request. The court analogized the filing of a juvenile complaint to the filing of a criminal indictment, which would trigger full discovery under Rule 3:13-3(b). The trial court stayed its order pending the outcome of the State's motion for leave to appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's order. The issue raised by the State's appeal in this matter was whether a juvenile was entitled to full discovery when the State sought to waive jurisdiction and transfer a case from juvenile to adult court. The Supreme Court held the State is indeed required to disclose all discovery in its possession when it seeks to waive jurisdiction and transfer a case from juvenile to adult court. View "New Jersey in the Interest of N.H." on Justia Law

This dispute arose from the construction of Cypress Point, a luxury condominium complex in Hoboken. Co-defendants Adria Towers, LLC, Metro Homes, LLC, and Commerce Construction Management, LLC (collectively, the developer) served as the project's developer and general contractor, and subcontractors carried out most of the work. During construction, the developer obtained four CGL policies from Evanston Insurance Company, covering a four-year period, and three from Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company, covering a subsequent three-year period (collectively, the policies). In this appeal, issue before the Supreme Court was whether rain water damage caused by a subcontractor's faulty workmanship constituted property damage and an occurrence under the developer's commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. In a published decision, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that, under the plain language of the CGL policies, the unintended and unexpected consequential damages caused by the subcontractors faulty workmanship constituted property damage and an occurrence. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed, finding that the consequential damages caused by the subcontractors faulty workmanship constituted property damage, and the event resulting in that damage water from rain flowing into the interior of the property due to the subcontractors faulty workmanship was an occurrence under the plain language of the CGL policies at issue here. View "CypressPoint Condominium Association, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Cushing was indicted on five counts: first-degree maintaining a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) production facility (count one); second-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute ten or more but less than fifty marijuana plants (count two); second-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute within 500 feet of a public park (count three); third-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property (count four); and fourth-degree failure to notify law enforcement of a change of employment as required under Megan's Law (count five). Lisa Mylroie called police to have defendant removed from the home of her 85-year-old mother, Betty Cushing. Ms. Cushing was not at home when police answered the call and arrived at her home; Mylroie invited the responding officer inside, and led the officer to defendant's bedroom where the marijuana was. After seeing the bedroom, the responding officer called the station to obtain a search warrant. In executing the search warrant, police seized from defendant's bedroom sixteen marijuana plants, several five-gallon buckets used to hold the plants, ventilation units, and drug paraphernalia. Officers also seized a Ziploc bag of marijuana that was discovered in a backyard shed. After the trial court conducted a hearing and denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his bedroom in his grandmother's home where he resided, defendant negotiated a plea agreement. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to counts two through five in exchange for the dismissal of count one. The trial court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed on the issue of suppression. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification on the validity of the third-party consent to search. The State argued that Betty Cushing had actual authority to consent to the search of defendant's room, which flowed to Mylroie through her power of attorney. The State also contended that Mylroie had apparent authority as well, on which the police reasonably relied under the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed: the record contained "ample evidence" to support the Appellate Division's conclusion that Betty Cushing did not have actual authority to consent to the search of defendant's room, and Betty could not have conferred through any power of attorney an authority that she did not possess herself. In addition, it was not objectively reasonable for the responding officer to rely on an apparent authority by Mylroie as the basis for valid third-party consent to his initial search of defendant's bedroom. View "New Jersey v. Cushing" on Justia Law

The police arrested defendant Gary Lunsford after they executed a search warrant at his home based on suspected criminal activity involving transactions in controlled dangerous substances (CDS). As part of its continuing investigation, the Monmouth County Grand Jury issued a subpoena duces tecum to a wireless telephone service provider requesting subscriber information associated with defendant's cell phone number, which was the contact for the controlled drug buys that led to defendant's arrest. Defendant filed a motion to quash, which the trial court granted, stating that a communications data warrant (CDW - the equivalent of a search warrant), was needed to obtain telephone billing records. The Attorney General, who superseded the Monmouth County Prosecutor s Office to litigate the constitutional question raised by the trial court's decision, sought leave to appeal, which the Appellate Division denied. On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Attorney General did not dispute that telephone billing records were entitled to protection under the State Constitution. He argued instead that a grand jury subpoena, based on a relevancy standard rather than probable cause, was sufficient to safeguard the privacy rights at stake here. "Using a cell phone to determine the location of its owner can be far more revealing than acquiring toll billing, bank, or Internet subscriber records. It is akin to using a tracking device and can function as a substitute for 24/7 surveillance without police having to confront the limits of their resources. It also involves a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not anticipate." Here, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of the motion to quash, noting that the State could apply for a court order to obtain defendant's cell phone records consistent with the Court's discussion of protected privacy interests in this opinion. View "New Jersey v. Lunsford" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a conflict among the three members of IE Test, LLC (IE Test). After a dispute between defendant Kenneth Carroll and the other members, Patrick Cupo and Byron James, IE Test filed an action to expel Carroll, pursuant to the Limited Liability Company Act (LLCA). In 2004,Carroll and Cupo formed Instrumentation Engineering, LLC. Carroll owned a fifty-one percent interest in Instrumentation Engineering, and Cupo owned the remaining forty-nine percent. James was employed by Instrumentation Engineering, initially as Business Development Manager and later as Vice President. Carroll, Cupo, and James entered into a preliminary agreement stating intention to enter into an operating agreement for IE Test. Carroll claimed that Instrumentation Engineering owed substantial sums to him and his companies, and that became a point of contention among Cupo, James, and Carroll soon after they agreed to share ownership of IE Test. Carroll acknowledged that IE Test had no legal obligation to repay him for losses sustained because of Instrumentation Engineering's bankruptcy, but pressed for compensation that would allow him to recover some of his lost investment. By early 2010, Cupo and James were actively pursing a strategy to use the LLCA to expel Carroll as a member of the LLC. The trial court found in IE Test's favor on its claim based on subsection 3(c), reasoning that the "not reasonably practicable" language imposed a less stringent standard than did subsection 3(a). The trial court granted IE Test's motion for partial summary judgment and expelled Carroll as an LLC member. Carroll appealed. In an unpublished opinion, an Appellate Division panel affirmed, construing N.J.S.A.42:2B-24(b)(3), and its counterpart provision in the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA), N.J.S.A.42:2C-46(e), to mandate that a trial judge engage in predictive reasoning in order to evaluate the future impact of an LLC member's current conduct. The panel found that Carroll's relationship with Cupo and James never recovered from Carroll's demand that he be compensated in a manner that permitted him to recoup his lost investment. The Supreme Court reversed. Applied to the record of this case, the standard of subsection 3(c) did not warrant a grant of partial summary judgment expelling Carroll from IE Test. View "IE Test, LLC v. Carroll" on Justia Law

In 1995, Jazz Photo Corp., one of several commercial entities (collectively referred to as the Jazz Entities), entered into a factoring agreement with Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. Jazz Photo sold Rosenthal its accounts receivable in return for cash. Five years later, Vanessa Benun, the daughter of Jack Benun, a principal of the Jazz Entities, guaranteed Jazz Photo's obligations under that agreement. At that time, Benun also executed a mortgage on real property she owned in Monmouth County as security for her personal guaranty. In March 2005, another of the Jazz Entities, Ribi Tech Products, LLC entered into a factoring agreement with Rosenthal. Benun personally guaranteed Ribi Tech's obligations to Rosenthal. In March 2007, Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland & Perretti, L.L.P. (Riker), a law firm providing legal services to Jack Benun and the Jazz Entities, obtained a third mortgage from Benun on the same real property. This mortgage was executed in favor of Riker to secure Jack Benun's personal debt under a letter agreement. When Benun executed the mortgage, Jack Benun owed Riker $1,679,701.33 in unpaid legal fees, and the letter agreement reflected his obligations to Riker and Riker's promise to provide continuing legal representation. Riker's mortgage was recorded on April 13, 2007. Rosenthal received actual notice of the Riker mortgage in August 2007. Despite notice of the Riker mortgage, Rosenthal continued to make advances to the Jazz Entities that totaled millions of dollars. In September 2009, Jazz Products filed for bankruptcy. The Jazz Entities defaulted on their obligations to Rosenthal, owing Rosenthal close to $4 million. Benun, in turn, defaulted on her personal guaranty to secure the debt. After Riker recorded its mortgage on the Monmouth County property, it continued to perform legal services for Jack Benun, and his unpaid legal fees ballooned to over $3 million. Jack Benun, and the Jazz Entities defaulted on their obligation to Riker and Benun defaulted on her guaranty. Rosenthal filed a foreclosure complaint against Benun, her husband, and Riker. Benun and her husband did not respond, and Rosenthal requested that a default judgment be entered against them. Riker answered, disputing the priority of Rosenthal's mortgages. Later, both Rosenthal and Riker filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the priority of their respective mortgages. The trial court granted Rosenthal's motion, determining that the dragnet clauses in the Rosenthal mortgages were fully enforceable. With regard to priority, the trial court held that Riker's argument that its mortgage displaced the two Rosenthal mortgages was legally flawed because the firm accepted a mortgage on the property with knowledge of two prior mortgages, each securing an obligation of up to $1 million, and with knowledge of the anti-subordination clauses. The court concluded that there was no convincing justification for rewarding Riker a superior priority. Riker appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division, finding that Rosenthal had advance notice of the law firm's intervening lien but nonetheless proceeded to make optional advances to the commercial entities. "Having done so, its mortgages securing those optional future advances were subordinated to the law firm's intervening lien." View "Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. Benun" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lamar Williams worked and owned a car in Alaska. In February 2010, he arranged through his employer to have the car shipped to New Jersey by defendant American Auto Logistics. After the car arrived, Williams visited the American Auto Logistics facility in New Jersey to pick it up. Williams inspected the car, found no apparent damage, and drove away. On leaving the facility, however, he heard swishing noises in the back of the car. He found water in the trunk and returned to the facility, where defendant's employees removed the accumulated water and offered a small amount of money for water damage. Williams rejected the offer. Williams sought out a mechanic who estimated the repairs would cost more than $10,000. He called American Auto Logistics and offered to settle for less than that amount, but the company rejected the offer and refused to pay anything for the damage. American Auto Logistics followed up by sending Williams a letter that disclaimed any responsibility and claimed the car was not damaged during shipping. Williams was twice denied his right to a jury trial by a trial court in the Special Civil Part. On both occasions, the trial court relied on Rule 4:25-7, prescribing certain pre-trial procedures, and sanctioned Williams for failure to comply by denying his right to a jury. In this appeal, the issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether a litigant could lose his constitutionally protected right to a jury trial as a sanction for failure to comply with procedural rules. The case also presented a question about the court rules applicable to the Superior Court's Law Division, Special Civil Part. The Court held trial courts could not deprive civil litigants of their constitutionally protected right to a jury trial as a sanction for failure to comply with a procedural rule. The Court further instructed that Rule 4:25-7 did not apply to proceedings in the Special Civil Part. View "Williams v. American Auto Logistics" on Justia Law