Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged under separate indictments for multiple charges involving misconduct with two minors, D.H. and D.M. Defendant was arrested on November 19, 2009, and was confined until sentencing, which took place on August 22, 2012. In total, defendant spent 1007 days in pre-sentence custody. Defendant was sentenced on both indictments on August 22, 2012. For the aggravated sexual assault conviction, the court sentenced defendant to ten years imprisonment subject to an 85 percent parole ineligibility period. For the endangering the welfare of a child conviction, the court sentenced defendant to a concurrent term of three years imprisonment. The court applied 1007 days of jail credit to the sentences imposed under one of the indictments. The jail credits applied to the terms of imprisonment and to defendant's parole ineligibility period. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court was whether a defendant who was simultaneously sentenced to consecutive sentences on two separate indictments was entitled to the application of jail credit against both indictments. The Court held that a proper application the controlling caselaw entitled defendant to only 1007 total days of jail credit. Nothing warranted the application of double jail credit. "Instead, defendant's sentences should be viewed together and jail credit applied to the front end of the aggregate imprisonment term for both indictments." View "New Jersey v. C.H." on Justia Law

Although New Jersey prosecutors lodged an interstate detainer with New York officials on August 12, 2011, defendant William Joe was not transferred to New Jersey custody until after he was sentenced for the New York charges. Defendant pleaded guilty to the narcotics charges in New Jersey and sought jail credits for the time he spent in pre-sentence custody in New York. The trial court denied the credits sought, and sentenced defendant to two five-year prison terms subject to a twenty-one-month period of parole ineligibility. The sentences were to be served concurrently to each other and to any sentence defendant was serving outside of New Jersey. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether incarceration outside of New Jersey on out-of-state charges entitled defendant to jail credit. The Court answered that question in the negative. View "New Jersey v. Joe" on Justia Law

Defendant Glenn Ciripompa was a tenured high school math teacher in the Bound Brook School District. Defendant's behavior came under the scrutiny of the Bound Brook Board of Education (Board) after the Board received copies of student Twitter posts alleging "Mr. C" was electronically transmitting nude photographs. An investigation uncovered defendant's pervasive misuse of his District-issued laptop and iPad, as well as evidence of inappropriate behavior toward female colleagues, often in the presence of students. The results of the investigation spurred the Board to seek defendant's termination from his tenured position and served as the substantive allegations of the two-count tenure complaint against defendant. In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether an arbitrator exceeded his authority by applying the standard for proving a hostile-work-environment, sexual-harassment claim in a law against discrimination (LAD) case to a claim of unbecoming conduct in the teacher disciplinary hearing. After review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitrator impermissibly converted the second charge of unbecoming conduct into one of sexual harassment. The arbitrator's review was not consonant with the matter submitted; rather, he imperfectly executed his powers as well as exceeded his authority by failing to decide whether Count II stated a successful claim of unbecoming conduct in support of termination. The arbitrator's award was therefore ruled invalid. View "Bound Brook Bd. of Edu. v. Ciripompa" on Justia Law

Defendant James Kucinski was arrested and taken to police headquarters for questioning about the bludgeoning death of his brother, John. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and he requested an attorney. The officers stopped the interrogation and met with their supervisor. After approximately eighty minutes they returned to the interview room and advised defendant that he was going to be charged with murder. Defendant then asked if he could speak with the officers. He was re-read his Miranda rights, which he waived. Defendant responded to a series of questions about events leading up to the fight and the injuries he sustained. As the interrogation went on, defendant continued to turn to other topics and to evade answering questions directly. Several times throughout the interrogation defendant answered questions with "I don't know." When asked how defendant felt about John's death, he said he would "rather just see a lawyer," and the interrogation ended. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statement to police and argued that the officers did not honor his invocation of the right to counsel. The court denied defendant's suppression motion, and the case proceeded to trial. The prosecutor asked one of the officers if defendant spoke in detail about the events on the day John died and if defendant was given an opportunity to explain what happened that day. When defense counsel objected, the trial judge sustained the objection but held that if defendant testified, the prosecutor would be permitted to cross-examine him on inconsistencies between his trial testimony and statements to police. Defendant elected to testify at trial and claimed to have acted in self-defense. On cross-examination, over defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor was permitted to question defendant about details defendant had testified to in his direct examination that contradicted what he said in his post-arrest statement to police. The prosecutor focused on details that defendant testified to but failed to mention to police during his interrogation. After further questioning by the prosecutor, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion but instructed the jury that defendant's right to remain silent should be limited to assessing defendant's credibility and may not be used to make the determination of guilt. Defense counsel did not object. The Appellate Division reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial, determining that the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination were improper. The panel found that defendant invoked his right to remain silent by telling the police that he did not want to talk about certain subjects and answer certain questions. The panel reasoned that, accordingly, the statements could not be used for any purpose, including impeachment. Further, the Appellate Division found the trial court's instructions to the jury were fatally flawed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division and affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Kucinski" on Justia Law

In July 2003, plaintiff Andrew McCarrell filed a products-liability action alleging that Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. (Roche) had failed to provide adequate warnings about the risks and side effects associated with taking Accutane. Plaintiff timely filed this products-liability action within New Jersey's statute of limitations, but Alabama's limitations period had expired by the time of the filing. The issue is which state's statute of limitations applied under New Jersey s choice-of-law jurisprudence. Roche moved for summary judgment, citing Alabama's two-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the governmental-interest test set forth in "Gantes v. Kason Corp.," (145 N.J.478 (1996)), directed that New Jersey's statute of limitations governed the case. The jury found in favor of McCarrell on the failure-to-warn claim, but the Appellate Division reversed based on evidentiary issues. The Appellate Division approved the trial court's application of New Jersey's statute of limitations to the case, however, and the Court denied Roche's petition for certification. After a new trial, a jury found Roche liable for failure to warn, awarding McCarrell $25,159,530. Roche challenged the verdict on the ground that the governmental-interest test had been supplanted by the most-significant-relationship test of sections 146, 145, and 6 of the Second Restatement of Conflicts of Law and argued that, under this test, Alabama's statute of limitations applied. The trial court denied the challenge as untimely. An appellate panel expressly declined to apply section 142 of the Second Restatement, vacated the jury's verdict and award, dismissed McCarrell's complaint as untimely, and did not reach the remaining issues raised by Roche on appeal. McCarrell's petition for certification was granted. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury's verdict and award. Analysis under section 142 of the Second Restatement lead to the conclusion that New Jersey's statute of limitations was properly applied to this action. The matter was remanded to the Appellate Division for consideration of unaddressed issues remaining on appeal. View "McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Givaudan Fragrances Corporation (Fragrances) faced liability as a result of environmental contamination from a manufacturing site that a related corporate entity operated in a facility in Clifton. The issue this case presented for review involved Fragrances' effort to obtain insurance coverage for environmental claims brought by governmental entities in response to discharges of hazardous substances that occurred during the pertinent policy periods running through January 1, 1986. Fragrances claimed that the defendant insurance companies (defendants) wrote liability policies for Givaudan Corporation during those relevant years. Fragrances argued that it was entitled, either as an affiliate of Givaudan Corporation or by operation of an assignment of rights, to have the insurers provide it with coverage for that environmental liability. Defendants claimed that they insured Givaudan Corporation as their named insured, not Fragrances, and that any assignment to Fragrances was invalid because defendants did not consent to the assignment, as was required for a valid assignment according to the language of the insurance policies. Therefore, collectively, defendants refused to honor Fragrances' right to bring insurance contract claims against them. Fragrances filed its complaint in February 2009 seeking a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to coverage under the policies. In February 2010, while the declaratory judgment action was pending, Fragrances notified defendants that Givaudan Roure Flavors Corporation (corporate successor-in-interest to Givaudan Corporation) planned to assign its post-loss rights under the insurance policies to Fragrances. Defendants refused to consent to the assignment. Nevertheless, Flavors executed the assignment to Fragrances. Both sides moved for summary judgment. Because Fragrances was not acquired by Givaudan Corporation during the policy period, the trial court determined that it could not be an affiliated corporation covered under the policies. The court also determined that the assignment in this case was an assignment of policies, which could not be assigned. The court denied Fragrances' motion and granted defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, explaining that although the anti-assignment clauses in the occurrence policies at issue would prevent an insured from transferring a policy without the consent of the insurer, once a loss occurs, an insured s claim under a policy may be assigned without the insurer s consent.The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that, once an insured loss has occurred, an anti-assignment clause in an occurrence policy may not provide a basis for an insurer s declination of coverage based on the insured's assignment of the right to invoke policy coverage for that loss. The assignment at issue in this case was a post-loss claim assignment and therefore the rule voiding application of anti-assignment clauses to such assignments applied. View "Givaudan Fragrances Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co." on Justia Law

In April 2011, detectives were engaged in an undercover drug patrol in Woodbridge when they observed defendant Taiwan Bacome driving a blue Ford Bronco. S.R., the owner of the Bronco, was riding in the front passenger seat. Having previously encountered both men, detectives knew the men used and dealt narcotics. The police department had also received complaints from defendant's neighbors of a lot of traffic coming and going from [his] apartment, which, in the detectives' experience, is often indicative of narcotics activity. In their unmarked vehicle, the detectives followed the Bronco, losing sight of it shortly after arriving in an area of Newark known for crime and drug trafficking. In an attempt to pick up the Bronco's trail, the detectives drove back to Woodbridge, presuming that defendant and S.R. would return there with newly purchased drugs. About an hour later, the detectives observed the Bronco re-enter Woodbridge. The detectives resumed surveillance and, after they both observed S.R. in the passenger seat not wearing his seatbelt, they conducted a traffic stop. In this appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified the circumstances under which police officers may require a passenger in an automobile to exit a vehicle after a valid stop. The first detective reported that he saw defendant lean forward as if he were reaching under his seat and immediately ordered defendant to exit the vehicle. The second detective then ordered S.R. out of the passenger's seat. Both occupants complied. Defendant specifically challenged S.R.'s removal from the vehicle. The trial court found that defendant's reaching under the seat created the heightened caution that warranted S.R.'s removal. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the detectives failed to prove "heightened caution." The Supreme Court reversed, finding that while the heightened caution standard remained the proper test for determining the appropriateness of ordering a passenger from a car, defendant's movements inside the stopped car was an objectively reasonable basis to justify removal of the passenger. View "New Jersey v. Bacome" on Justia Law

In 1991 and 1992, defendant Rodney Bull was sentenced to two extended-term sentences, the second of which was imposed for crimes that occurred before defendant’s first sentencing took place. In 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the plain language of N.J.S.A.2C:44-5(b)(1) prohibited the imposition of a second discretionary extended-term sentence for an offense committed before entry of the first extended-term sentence. There is no question that defendant’s second extended-term sentence would have been illegal under “New Jersey v. Hudson,” (209 N.J.513 (2012)). The question this case presented for the Court’s review was whether “Hudson” should be applied retroactively. The Court found “Hudson” : “illuminated a longstanding rule of law rather than announce[d] a new one.” The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s determination that “Hudson” applied retroactively. Defendant’s second extended-term sentence was remanded for re-sentencing. View "New Jersey v. Bull" on Justia Law

Police detectives observed defendant DeShaun Wilson engage in the apparent sale of crack cocaine in a public park in Elizabeth. Wilson was charged with third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, and second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute in or within 500 feet of a public park. During trial, the State sought to admit into evidence three related documents: a map of the park with a legend noting that the map was certified in 1998 by a Union County Engineer ; an affidavit by an assistant Union County prosecutor stating that he had personally worked with the Engineer in contracting a third party to produce maps depicting each 500-foot zone within the county; and Resolution No. 1513-99, passed by the Union County Board of Chosen Freeholders, depicting the 500-foot areas for the purposed of introducing the map as evidence of the locations and boundaries of those areas within Union County in criminal prosecutions under N.J.S.A.2C:35-7.1. Wilson objected to the admission of the three documents, arguing that the map had not been properly authenticated and that the affidavit was inadmissible hearsay. Wilson emphasized that he never had an opportunity to cross-examine the Union County prosecutor. The trial court disagreed and admitted the documents into evidence. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, and the court declared a mistrial. When the State moved to enter the map at the retrial, defense counsel objected that the map was inadmissible. The trial court admitted all three documents into evidence. Wilson was convicted of all charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the map was nontestimonial and that its admission did not violate Wilson’s confrontation rights. The Supreme Court agreed that the map was nontestimonial and its admission therefore did not violate Wilson’s confrontation rights. Further, such maps are admissible, if properly authenticated and as public records. However, the Court found the map was not properly authenticated and the Supreme Court felt constrained to reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment that the map was properly admitted into evidence at trial. The matter was remanded for a new trial because defendant’s conviction depended on the map. View "New Jersey v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The defendants in these appeals committed very serious, violent crimes when they were juveniles. One was serving a sentence of 110 years imprisonment and would not be eligible for parole until he spent 55 years in jail. At that time, he would be about 72 years old. The second was serving a 75-year term and was ineligible for parole until he served 68 years and 3 months in jail. He would then be 85 years old. The United States Supreme Court recognized the mitigating qualities of youth and directed that judges in those cases consider a number of factors at sentencing, including immaturity and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; family and home environment; family and peer pressures; an inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors or the juvenile s own attorney; and the possibility of rehabilitation. The New Jersey Court found the same concerns applied to sentences that were the practical equivalent of life without parole, like the ones in these appeals. "The proper focus belongs on the amount of real time a juvenile will spend in jail and not on the formal label attached to his sentence. To satisfy the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution, which both prohibit cruel and unusual punishment, we direct that defendants be resentenced and that the 'Miller' factors be addressed at that time. [. . .] In short, judges should exercise a heightened level of care before they impose multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles which would result in lengthy jail terms." Both cases were remanded for resentencing. View "New Jersey v. Zuber" on Justia Law