Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In a matter of first impression, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether a criminal defendant must be provided in-person interpreting services, rather than video remote interpreting (VRI) services, at his jury trial. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court announced amendments to the New Jersey Judiciary’s Language Access Plan (LAP) and expanded the circumstances in which remote interpreting services may be used. Prior to the update, VRI was allowed only for “emergent matters” or “short non-emergent matters of 30 minutes or less.” The 2022 LAP now allows VRI for both “emergent and routine proceedings,” subject to judicial discretion. In 2019, defendant Oscar R. Juracan-Juracan, a native speaker of Kaqchikel -- a language spoken by approximately 450,000 people worldwide -- was charged with several offenses related to an alleged sexual assault. During pre-trial proceedings, he requested a Kaqchikel interpreter and one was provided. The interpreter, however, resided on the West Coast, so he appeared remotely. Additionally, the Kaqchikel interpreter did not speak English, only Kaqchikel and Spanish, so a second interpreter was required to translate to and from Spanish and English. After the court advised counsel that the Kaqchikel interpreter would continue to participate virtually during the jury trial, defendant moved for in-person interpretation services. During the motion hearing, the Kaqchikel interpreter expressed concerns about his ability to provide interpretation services remotely during the trial. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, advising the Kaqchikel interpreter that the court would give him “as much time as you need, understanding the complexities, not only of interpretations, interpreting through two individuals, and also virtually.” The trial court reasoned that proceeding with VRI during the trial was “what’s financially feasible, what’s fair, what’s just.” The Appellate Division denied defendant’s motion for leave to appeal in light of the VRI policy change. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. "In a criminal jury trial, there is a presumption that foreign language interpretation services will be provided in person, which is consistent with the New Jersey Judiciary’s longstanding practice." The Court set forth guidelines and factors to assist trial courts in deciding whether VRI should be used during criminal jury trials, and it remanded this matter for the trial court to reconsider whether VRI was appropriate in this case after assessing those factors. View "New Jersey v. Juracan-Juracan" on Justia Law

The Church of St. Theresa (St. Theresa’s) owned and operated the St. Theresa School. St. Theresa’s terminated art teacher and toddler room caregiver Victoria Crisitello for violating the terms of her employment agreement. That agreement required employees to abide by the teachings of the Catholic Church and forbade employees from engaging in premarital sex; Crisitello, who was unmarried, had become pregnant. In response to her firing, Crisitello filed a complaint against St. Theresa’s alleging employment discrimination in violation of the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), based on pregnancy and marital status. St. Theresa’s countered that its decision to terminate Crisitello was protected by both the First Amendment and the LAD. The New Jersey Supreme Court held: (1) the “religious tenets” exception of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) was an affirmative defense available to a religious entity when confronted with a claim of employment discrimination; and (2) the uncontroverted fact was that St. Theresa’s followed the religious tenets of the Catholic Church in terminating Crisitello. The Court thus concluded St. Theresa’s was entitled to summary judgment and that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint with prejudice. View "Crisitello v. St. Theresa School" on Justia Law

In summer 2010, plaintiff Carol Conforti obtained a restraining order against her husband. On September 8, he was arrested for violating the restraining order by returning to the marital home to see his son. Conforti was taken to the OCJ, where he was evaluated by a staff member of Correctional Health Services (CHS). A CHS staff member wrote on the “Intake Receiving and Screening” form that Conforti reported: (1) drinking half a gallon of vodka each day; (2) major surgery that left him with rods and screws in his back; (3) feeling “hopeless or helpless”; and (4) the “[r]ecent significant loss” of his marriage. A physician prescribed him one extra mattress and medicine for back pain and alcohol dependence, and instructed that he not be assigned work or a top bunk. After 27 days, Conforti was released. Just over a week later, Conforti was arrested for again returning to the marital home to see his son. He arrived at OCJ on October 13, 2010. A document from Conforti’s file acknowledged his previous incarceration and history of binge drinking but stated he had “[n]o current mental health issues/concerns” and was cleared for OCJ’s general population. On October 16, he requested medical attention for back pain. On October 20, Conforti wrote a suicide note to his parents, closed the door to his cell, covered the cell door window with a sheet, and hung himself. During discover, plaintiff submitted an expert report who opined that defendants the County of Ocean and the Ocean County Jail acted negligently by failing to adequately train and supervise OCJ staff to prevent inmate suicide. The County defendants moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA). A jury found defendant negligent and apportioned liability 60% against the County and 40% against Correctional Health Services (CHS). Defendants moved for JNOV, reasserting their medical-facility-immunity argument. The New Jersey Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence count at the summary judgment stage, and no error in refusing to overturn the jury’s verdict after trial. View "Conforti v. County of Ocean, et al." on Justia Law

In November 2017, Defendant Stephen Zadroga was driving over the speed limit when he was involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle. Defendant’s passenger, and best friend, died in the crash. Pursuant to a warrant, the State seized and tested what they thought was Defendant’s blood. The blood alcohol content (BAC) came back as 0.376%, more than four times the legal limit. Relying on that evidence, the grand jury charged Defendant with aggravated manslaughter, death by auto, and three counts of driving while intoxicated. After the nurse who drew defendant’s blood testified for the State at trial, the State realized that the blood they believed to be Defendant’s had actually come from a person who had died seven months before the accident. After the State discovered the error, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice because the grand jury had relied on false testimony to indict him. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion as to the counts of driving while intoxicated but denied the motion as to counts one and two, aggravated manslaughter and death by auto. The court found that allowing Defendant to be retried on the counts unrelated to intoxication would not violate his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause both because he consented to the trial’s termination and because there was a manifest necessity to terminate the trial. The Appellate Division affirmed on manifest necessity grounds, adding that while the State could present counts one and two to a new grand jury, it could not present any evidence that defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the collision. Defendant appealed, arguing that a retrial, even on the counts unrelated to intoxication, was barred by both the New Jersey and federal constitutions. Finding no constitutional violation, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Zadroga" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Suzanne Cardali and defendant Michael Cardali entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA), which was incorporated in their judgment of divorce in December 2006. The PSA provided that defendant’s obligation to pay plaintiff alimony would end upon her “cohabitation,” as defined by New Jersey law. In December 2020, defendant moved to terminate alimony, stating he believed that plaintiff and an individual named Bruce McDermott had been in “a relationship tantamount to marriage” for more than 8 years, over the course of which they attended family functions and other social events as a couple, memorialized their relationship on social media, and vacationed together. Defendant submitted the report of a private investigator indicating that plaintiff and McDermott were together on all of the 44 days that they were under surveillance, and that they were together overnight on more than half of those days. The investigator’s report included photographs of plaintiff and McDermott carrying groceries, bags of personal belongings, and laundry in and out of one another’s residences. The investigator stated plaintiff had access to McDermott’s home when McDermott was not at home. The trial court denied defendant’s application, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a movant need not present evidence on all of the “Konzelman” cohabitation factors in order to make a prima facile showing. “If the movant’s certification addresses some of the relevant factors and is supported by competent evidence, and if that evidence would warrant a finding of cohabitation if unrebutted, the trial court should find that the movable has presented prima facie evidence of cohabitation.” View "Cardali v. Cardali" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason O’Donnell was a candidate for mayor of Bayonne, New Jersey in 2018. During the campaign, he allegedly accepted $10,000 in cash in a paper Baskin- Robbins bag from an individual. The State argued that in exchange for the money, defendant promised to appoint the individual as tax counsel for the city. The State charged defendant under the bribery statute. Defendant did not win the election. He contended the applicable statute did not apply to him because it did not cover candidates who accepted improper payments but were not elected. The trial court dismissed the indictment, finding that N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(d) did not apply to defendant. The Appellate Division reversed. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed: the bribery statute applied to any “person” who accepts an improper benefit -- incumbents, candidates who win, and candidates who lose. The statute also expressly states that it is no defense to a prosecution if a person “was not qualified to act.” View "New Jersey v. O’Donnell" on Justia Law

Leander Williams pled guilty to non-violent third- and fourth-degree drug offenses. His primary parole eligibility date was approximately eight months after the New Jersey Earn Your Way Out Act (EYWO Act) became effective. During his prison sentence, Williams successfully completed multiple alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs, including an 87-day Alcoholics Anonymous program and a residential program in the "Bo Robinson" for 187 days. After the Bo Robinson program and while remaining in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Williams resided at the Harbor Residential Community Release Program for 90 days for further rehabilitation. Approximately one month before his primary parole eligibility date, a panel of the Parole Board certified that Williams met the “criteria for administrative parole release” under the EYWO Act, which entitled him to automatic administrative parole release. The panel imposed 21 general parole conditions and the “special” condition that Williams participate in an RTP for a minimum term of 180 days. Williams administratively appealed to the Parole Board, arguing that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59 precluded the panel from requiring an RTP as a condition of his administrative parole release under the EYWO Act. The panel upheld the imposition of residential treatment but recommended that the Board reduce his mandated “term” of 180 days to 90 days. Williams appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the Parole Board’s determination. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Parole Board could not mandate participation in an RTP for inmates administratively paroled under the EYWO Act. "Although N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59 generally authorizes the Parole Board to impose parole conditions on adult inmates who have been administratively released under the EYWO Act, an RTP is not among the conditions that can be imposed in that setting." View "Williams v. New Jersey State Parole Board" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal before the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether defendant Dante Allen was denied a fair trial because the trial court permitted a detective to present lay opinion testimony in which he narrated a video recording. According to defendant’s trial testimony, he was carrying a handgun he had recently acquired after a confrontation with a gang member made him fear for his safety. Officer Terrence McGhee suspected defendant had a weapon based on his behavior when McGhee passed in a patrol car, approached defendant and asked to speak. According to McGhee, defendant ran into a vacant lot, turned around, raised his gun, and fired at McGhee. McGhee testified that he then fired at and wounded defendant. Defendant was ultimately arrested and taken to a hospital. Shortly thereafter, Detective Michael Campanella, the lead forensic detective in the case, arrived at the scene. He inspected the gun and reviewed two surveillance videos from nearby buildings. During defendant’s trial, McGhee testified, in part narrating the videos as they were played for the jury. Campanella testified later, describing the steps taken in the investigation. After the State indicated its intent to replay the surveillance videos that the jury had already viewed during McGhee’s testimony, defense counsel objected. The State countered that Campanella would explain how the video “led him [to find] evidence, such as the shell casings and the bullets.” The trial court overruled the objection. The jury convicted defendant of attempted murder and other offenses. The Appellate Division found that the trial court had abused its discretion when it permitted Campanella to narrate the surveillance video but held that the error was harmless and affirmed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the trial court should have excluded all the detective’s narration of the surveillance video. The Supreme Court found the trial court properly permitted the detective to testify about the manner in which he used the surveillance video to guide his investigation. But the detective’s testimony opining that the video showed defendant turning and firing his weapon should have been excluded from evidence. However, the Court found that error was harmless given the strength of the State’s evidence. View "New Jersey v. Allen" on Justia Law

Rosette Martinez was home with her daughter and her daughter's friend on Christmas Day in 2015 when she heard footsteps coming up the stairs. A man opened the door and stated, “I’m here for your dad, George,” leading her to believe he was there to fix something at the house. Martinez believed she recognized the intruder as someone who had recently done contracting work on their house. He then pulled out a “long gun,” instructed the women to lay face down, tied their hands behind their backs, and began to rifle through possessions. At some point during the robbery, the women heard the intruder’s phone ring and announce a “[c]all from” a name. The daughter testified that she heard the intruder’s phone announce an “incoming text” message from a name she did not recognize, but the message was not read aloud. All three women testified that they heard clicking noises that indicated to them that the intruder was taking pictures with his phone. After the intruder left, the women untied themselves and called 911. In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether it was cumulative error for the trial court to admit two pieces of evidence: expert testimony that defendant Roberson Burney’s cell phone was likely near a crime scene based on a “rule of thumb” approximation for cell tower ranges in the area, and a first-time in-court identification of defendant by a witness who had previously identified another person as the perpetrator in a photo lineup. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in admitting both the testimony placing defendant’s phone at or near the crime scene and the first-time in-court identification. Those errors, in combination, deprived defendant of a fair trial. View "New Jersey v. Burney" on Justia Law

In January 2017, an individual wearing a baseball cap and gloves robbed a bank in North Brunswick, New Jersey. Bank surveillance footage captured the entire 57-second robbery. In November 2017, defendant was charged in three other robberies after his former girlfriend, “Joan,” identified him in a wanted photo from one of those robberies. After the office investigating the other robberies notified police about defendant, he became a suspect in the North Brunswick robbery as well. In September 2018, a detective showed the teller six photos, one at a time, and asked if he could identify the person who robbed the bank. The teller picked a photo of someone other than defendant and said at trial that he was 75-90 percent sure of the identification. At trial, the prosecutor asked the teller if he could identify the robber in court. The teller identified defendant, who was seated in between his lawyers at counsel table. The teller said he was “maybe like . . . 80 percent” sure. The prosecution did not provide advance notice of the in-court identification, and defense counsel did not object to it. During cross-examination, the teller revealed that he had met with the prosecutor prior to trial and that the prosecutor had “informed [him] that the individual who was accused of committing this robbery is in court seated at the defense table.” Joan also testified at trial. She was shown two still photos from the bank surveillance video and testified she was 100 percent positive that each depicted defendant. A police sergeant testified about the investigation, in which he was asked a series of questions while the video was played for the jury. The more open-ended questions invited and led to more open-ended narrative responses. A jury found defendant guilty of robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding: (1) the inherently suggestive nature of first-time in-court identifications, conducted in front of a jury, risks depriving defendants of their due process rights; and (2) narration evidence, or "running commentary" on video evidence by someone who has merely studied a recording, violated defendant's right to confrontation. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Watson" on Justia Law