Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jose Medina was tried and convicted for offenses related to a non-fatal slashing that occurred outside of a bar in the Township of Belleville, New Jersey. Although no physical evidence linked defendant to the crime, surveillance footage captured the incident, and the victim selected defendant’s picture from a photo array. A woman who witnessed the attack identified defendant as the attacker to police but was unwilling to give a formal statement or testify. At defendant’s trial, the prosecutor referenced the anonymous woman, after which an officer testified that, based on the “evidence . . . collected,” he included defendant’s picture in the photo array. Relying on New Jersey v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973), New Jersey v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427 (1989), and New Jersey v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338 (2005), the Appellate Division found that this testimony violated the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause by suggesting that the anonymous woman -- a non-testifying witness -- implicated defendant in the crime. Viewing the trial record in its entirety, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the officer’s testimony did not generate such an inference. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Appellate Division. View "New Jersey v. Medina" on Justia Law

Dr. Dominick Lembo employed Arlene Marchese in his dental practice as his office manager, and Karen Wright, a dental hygienist. Sometime before December 2011, Marchese and Wright unlawfully took possession of numerous checks totaling several hundred thousand dollars, forged Lembo’s indorsement on the checks, and deposited the proceeds from the forged checks into their personal accounts at TD Bank. In February 2015, Lembo filed a complaint against TD Bank, alleging that “TD Bank knew or should have known that Marchese and/or Wright were not permitted to negotiate checks made payable to [Lembo].” The complaint also alleged that by permitting them to negotiate checks with forged indorsements, TD Bank “aided and abetted Marchese and Wright in their fraudulent scheme and conduct.” The complaint did not assert that Lembo had a banking relationship with TD Bank. And Lembo did not file an action for conversion under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) within the three-year limitations period. Had Lembo done so, TD Bank would have been strictly liable for depositing or cashing those checks, subject to the defenses in N.J.S.A. 12A:3-405 or N.J.S.A. 12A:3-406. The trial court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss, finding that the UCC governed Lembo's remedies against the Bank, and “common law negligence is not such a remedy” in the absence of a “special relationship” between Lembo and the bank. The court also rejected Lembo’s argument that the Uniform Fiduciaries Law (UFL) provided an affirmative cause of action against the bank. The Appellate Division reversed, reading into the complaint the basis for an affirmative UFL claim, and remanded to allow Lembo to amend the complaint to assert such a claim. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the Appellate Division misconstrued the purpose of the UFL, finding the Legislature enacted the UFL not to create an affirmative cause of action against a bank but to provide a defense when the bank is sued for failing to take notice of and action on the breach of a fiduciary’s obligation. "The UFL confers a limited immunity on a bank, unless the bank acts in bad faith or has actual knowledge of a fiduciary breach." The Supreme Court found no affirmative cause of action arose under the statute; whether a UFL claim was adequately pled was therefore moot. Recognizing the predominant role the UCC plays in assigning liability for the handling of checks, the Supreme Court also found Lembo had no “special relationship” with the bank to sustain the common law causes of action. View "Lembo v. Marchese" on Justia Law

In the murder trial of defendants Cary Greene and Tyleek Lewis, the prosecutor opened to the jury that the State would present as a witness Greene’s grandmother, to whom he allegedly confessed his guilt in the shooting death of the victim. The prosecutor gave a detailed description of the grandmother’s expected testimony and a prediction of the emotional struggle she would encounter as a witness against her grandson. But before trial, Greene's grandmother recanted the statement she gave to police. At a hearing before the trial court, the grandmother asserted her Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. Despite the court’s order compelling her to testify with an assurance of immunity, the grandmother refused to do so, resulting in the court holding her in contempt and jailing her. To remediate any prejudice from the prosecutor’s failure to produce the grandmother, with counsels’ consent, the court instructed the jury that the prosecutor’s opening statement concerning the expected testimony of Greene’s grandmother was not evidence or to be considered in its deliberations. Defendants Greene and Lewis were convicted of murder and related charges. The Appellate Division overturned the convictions of both defendants, finding the prosecutor’s opening statement, informing the jury about Greene’s confession to his grandmother, was highly prejudicial and that the court’s curative instruction was inadequate. To this, the New Jersey Supreme Court concurred and affirmed reversing Greene's conviction, but reversed the overturning of Lewis' conviction. "It is well understood that a 'defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can admitted against him.' A confession made to one’s grandmother may have even greater persuasive power than one made to the police. The prosecutor’s detailed account of Greene’s incriminating statement to his grandmother was not likely forgotten by the jury, despite the trial court’s best efforts in providing a curative instruction." View "New Jersey v. Greene" on Justia Law

The trial court excused and replaced a juror who had a preplanned vacation and who had been part of deliberations after the jury announced that they had reached a partial verdict. The judge did not have the jury return a partial verdict. Instead, the court excused the juror and reconstituted the jury with a replacement juror. The court denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial and defendant’s request to voir dire the jury to determine its ability to begin anew with the replacement juror. The jury reached a unanimous verdict three days later. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. The Supreme Court found that in light of the defendant facing charges of murder, attempted murder, and weapons possession offenses, "we cannot know whether the jury will 'start anew' with the entry of a substitute juror and discard their views simply because there is a new juror amongst them. Nor can we know if the new juror will exercise independence or simply go along with the opinions of the existing jurors. We cannot know or speculate whether the replacement juror was a 'full participant[] in the mutual exchange of ideas.' The safest and fairest course is to take a partial verdict, declare a mistrial, and constitute a new jury to hear the remaining counts." View "New Jersey v. Horton" on Justia Law

In 2005, U.S. Home Corporation entered into a contract to purchase two contiguous tracts of land, one of which was owned by West Pleasant-CPGT, Inc. Under the contract, West Pleasant and the other landowner were to gain certain approvals permitting development of the properties. Pursuant to the contract, U.S. Home paid advances to the landowners totaling over $1.5 million. As security for the advances, West Pleasant executed a mortgage and note on its property; the other landowner did not. When a contract dispute arose in 2006, U.S. Home sought to terminate the contract and get a return of its total advance. U.S. Home prevailed in arbitration and was awarded a judgment in the full amount of the advance, plus interest. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment in 2009. When the judgment was not satisfied, U.S. Home commenced foreclosure actions against the properties. The foreclosure proceedings were stayed when West Pleasant and the other property owner filed for bankruptcy. In West Pleasant’s bankruptcy action, U.S. Home moved to dismiss and for relief from the automatic stay. West Pleasant and U.S. Home executed a Consent Order, in which West Pleasant dismissed its bankruptcy proceeding, waived a fair market valuation and its right to object to a sheriff’s sale of its property, and released U.S. Home from any claims in law or equity. U.S. Home never proceeded with any deficiency action against either landowner. Nonetheless, the landowners commenced the affirmative litigation that gave rise to this appeal, seeking a declaration that the arbitration award was fully satisfied, as well as compensation “in the amount of the excess fair market value of the properties obtained by defendant[] U.S. Home over the amount of its outstanding judgment.” The second property owner then assigned its rights to West Pleasant. After trial, the court valued the second property as worth almost $2.4 million and West Pleasant’s property as worth almost $2 million. The court ordered U.S. Home to pay the fair market value of the West Pleasant property, plus interest, and extinguished the arbitration award on the second property. On appeal, the Appellate Division determined that West Pleasant had waived its right to a fair market valuation on its property but that it was owed a fair market value credit for the second property. The Appellate Division remanded the matter to the trial court for recalculation of damages. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding use of fair market value credit by this debtor to obtain a money judgment against a creditor, in the absence of a deficiency claim threatened or pursued or any objection being raised at the time of the sheriff’s sales, was "inconsistent with sound foreclosure processes and, moreover, inequitable in the circumstances presented." The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "West Pleasant-CPGT, Inc. v. U.S. Home Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Regina Little asserted claims on her own behalf and on behalf of other New Jersey owners and lessees of 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000 Kia Sephia vehicles distributed by defendant Kia Motors America, Inc., alleging that those vehicles had a defective brake system. The central question in this appeal was whether the trial court properly permitted plaintiff’s theory of damages based on the cost of brake repairs to be asserted classwide, supported only by aggregate proofs. The jury determined that defendant had breached its express and implied warranties and that the class had sustained damages. The jury found that the class members had suffered $0 in damages due to diminution in value but that each class member had sustained $750 in damages “[f]or repair expenses reasonably incurred as a result of the defendant’s breach of warranty.” The trial court granted defendant’s motion to decertify the class as to the quantum of damages each individual owner suffered. The parties cross-appealed. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s post-trial determinations, reinstated the jury’s award for out-of-pocket repair costs based on plaintiff’s aggregate proofs, and remanded for an award of attorneys’ fees. The appellate court held that, notwithstanding the jury’s rejection of plaintiff’s diminution-in-value theory, the trial court should have ordered a new trial on both theories of damages, which it found were not “fairly separable from each another.” Although aggregate proof of damages can be appropriate in some settings, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered such proof improper as presented in this case. The trial court erred when it initially allowed plaintiff to prove class-members’ out-of-pocket costs for brake repairs based on an estimate untethered to the experience of plaintiff’s class. The trial court properly ordered individualized proof of damages on plaintiff’s brake-repair claim based on the actual costs incurred by the class members. Thus, the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motions for a new trial and for partial decertification of the class were a proper exercise of its discretion. View "Little v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in this appeal was whether a high-end restaurant operated by a for-profit entity, but housed in a building on the Kean University campus, qualified for a local property tax exemption. Gourmet Dining, LLC, owned and operated a fine dining restaurant named Ursino in a Kean University building. In October 2011, the Kean University Foundation, Inc., and Gourmet Dining entered into a Management Subcontract Agreement (MSA), which conferred on Gourmet Dining the exclusive right to operate, manage, and control Ursino. Gourmet Dining agreed to pay the Foundation an annual “management fee” and a percentage of Ursino’s gross revenue. The Tax Court granted summary judgment in favor of Union Township. Concluding that Gourmet Dining had not established that the subject property is used for a public purpose pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.3, or that its actual use of the property was for “colleges, schools, academies or seminaries” as required by N.J.S.A 54:4-3.6, the court held that Gourmet Dining was not entitled to tax exemption under either provision. The Appellate Division reversed, relying on a holistic view: the restaurant is located on-campus; University students and their parents regularly dined there; Gourmet Dining’s annual management fees were used for scholarships; many of the restaurant’s employees are students; and the restaurant used produce grown on theUniversity grounds and provides the University with compostable waste. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the arrangement by which Gourmet Dining operates Ursino was taxable as a lease or lease-like interest. The public-benefit-oriented exemption provisions in issue were not intended to exempt the for-profit operator of a high-end, regionally renowned restaurant situated on a college campus, when the overriding purpose of the endeavor was focused on profitmaking. "Gourmet Dining, as the exclusive operator and manager of this restaurant establishment, must bear its fair share of the local real property tax burden." View "Gourmet Dining, LLC v. Union Township" on Justia Law

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the New Jersey Supreme Court. The matter before the federal court involved a dispute between a workers' compensation insurance carrier and its insured, a public employer. Both plaintiff, the City of Asbury Park (the City), and its insurance carrier, defendant Star Insurance Company (Star), sought reimbursement of monies paid toward an injured firefighter’s workers’ compensation claim from funds he recouped through settlement with a third-party tortfeasor. The funds available for reimbursement will not cover the full amount paid collectively by the City and Star. The question was whether, under the equitable “made-whole” or “make-whole” doctrine, the City had priority to recover what it paid before Star could recover any of its losses. The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative. Under equitable principles of New Jersey law, the made-whole doctrine did not apply to first-dollar risk, such as a self-insured retention or deductible, that is allocated to an insured under an insurance policy. View "City of Asbury Park v. Star Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Defendant Rahsjahn Courtney agreed to a negotiated plea agreement with the State, in which he pled guilty to a first-degree possession of heroin and a distribution charge in exchange for a fourteen-year prison sentence with a sixty-three-month period of parole ineligibility. As a part of the plea agreement, the State agreed not to request a mandatory extended-term sentence for which defendant was eligible under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). The State alerted the court and defendant that defendant qualified for a mandatory extended term, but it agreed to defense counsel’s offered sentence. Defendant entered a guilty plea under the terms of the negotiated plea agreement. The court imposed the agreed-upon sentence. Defense counsel and defendant both acknowledged their understanding of the terms of the guilty plea and raised no objections regarding defendant’s eligibility for an extended term; the plea form and supplemental plea form reflected that agreement. Defendant, defense counsel, and the prosecutor signed both forms. Despite acknowledging the plea agreement, defense counsel requested a reduced sentence. The sentencing judge denied the request. The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting defendant’s argument that the sentencing court had discretion to lower his sentence because the State failed to file a formal application requesting the extended mandatory term. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, finding that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 did not require a formal application when a prosecutor agrees not to request a mandatory extended-term sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) yet seeks the benefit of a Section 12 plea agreement. Given the importance of ensuring consistency and accuracy in sentencing, the Court provided guidance for future cases where the State agrees not to request an extended term but still seeks the benefit of a negotiated waiver of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987's mandatory sentencing requirements under Section 12. View "New Jersey v. Courtney" on Justia Law

Defendant Javier Torres signed a promissory note (Note) secured by a residential mortgage (Mortgage). Torres defaulted on the Note. CitiMortgage, Inc., discovered that it had lost the original Note but had retained a digital copy setting forth its terms. CitiMortgage assigned the Mortgage and its interest in the Note to plaintiff Investors Bank (Investors). In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review was whether Investors could enforce the Note. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: Investors Bank could enforce the note. Relying on two statutes addressing assignments, N.J.S.A. 2A:25-1 and N.J.S.A. 46:9-9, as well as common-law assignment principles, the Court held Investors had the right as an assignee of the Mortgage and transferee of the Note to enforce the Note. The Court construed N.J.S.A. 12A:3-309 to address the rights of CitiMortgage as the possessor of a note or other instrument at the time that the instrument was lost, but not to supplant New Jersey assignment statutes and common law in the setting of this appeal or to preclude an assignee in Investors’ position from asserting its rights according to the Note’s terms. Read together, "N.J.S.A. 12A:3-309, N.J.S.A. 2A:25-1, and N.J.S.A. 46:9-9 clearly authorized the assignment and entitled Investors to enforce its assigned Mortgage and transferred Note." View "Investors Bank v. Torres" on Justia Law