Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This matter involved a legal challenge to the congressional redistricting map selected by the New Jersey Congressional Redistricting Commission (Commission). On December 22, 2021, a majority of the Commission’s members that included the Chair, voted in favor of the map the Democratic delegation presented. Plaintiffs, the Republican delegation to the Commission, filed an amended complaint on January 5, 2022 to challenge that map. Plaintiffs filed their complaint directly with the New Jersey Supreme Court, pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Supreme Court observed it had no role in the outcome of the redistricting process unless the map is "unlawful." The Supreme Court found none of plaintiffs' arguments asserted the plan was unlawful or the result of "invidious discrimination." Because plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted, defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice was granted. View "In the Matter of Establishment of Congressional Districts by the New Jersey Redistricting Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Graphnet, Inc. and defendant Retarus, Inc. were considered industry competitors -- they each provided, among other things, cloud-based facsimile services. In 2014, Retarus published a brochure containing allegedly defamatory statements about Graphnet. Graphnet representatives received a copy of the brochure at a May 2016 event. In August 2016, Graphnet filed a complaint against Retarus. Throughout discovery, Graphnet failed to produce requested documents and took no depositions. Based on Graphnet’s failure to present supporting evidence, the trial court dismissed all claims except for the defamation and slander claims. The trial court and the parties agreed that the court would charge the jury pursuant to Model Civil Jury Charge 8.46, “Defamation Damages (Private or Public),” which instructed a jury on the elements of defamation. The trial court’s instructions tracked the model charge closely, including Section D, which is devoted to “Nominal Damages for Slander Per Se or Libel.” In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether a new trial on all damages was required when the jury was improperly instructed on nominal damages and a plaintiff opposes remittitur. Graphnet argued the trial court erred as a matter of law by ordering remittitur without Graphnet’s consent. The Appellate Division affirmed in part, reversed in part, recognizing the jury’s $800,000 nominal damages award was “shockingly excessive and cannot stand” but concluded that the trial court improperly awarded Graphnet $500 in nominal damages in violation of the doctrine of remittitur. The appellate court remanded for a new trial on nominal damages only. As the Appellate Division found, the Supreme Court found remittitur was improper without Graphnet’s consent. But this matter required a new trial on all damages in which the jury was properly instructed on actual and nominal damages. The Supreme Court also referred Model Civil Jury Charge 8.46D to the Committee on Model Civil Jury Charges to be amended. View "Graphnet, Inc. v. Retarus, Inc." on Justia Law

In Spring 2015, plaintiffs Thomas and Julie Stewart were injured when they lost control of their motorcycle while riding over a Garden State Parkway overpass. Thomas testified that, after he and his wife passed through the Toms River toll plaza, their bike began to “shimmy,” and Thomas suspected that he had suffered a flat tire. As they tried to pull over, they crossed the expansion joint between the roadway and the bridge, and the bike’s back end bounced up and ejected Julie. Thomas then let go of the bike, slid to the ground, and both he and Julie suffered serious injuries. They brought this action against defendants, the New Jersey Turnpike Authority and several of its paving and roadwork contractors, including Earle Asphalt. The parties engaged in over two years of discovery, with plaintiffs requesting extensions seven times. During argument before the trial court on defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs changed their theory of liability. They argued, for the first time, that defendants failed to properly pave a portion of roadway on the overpass, leaving a height differential in the pavement. Under that newly asserted theory, plaintiffs alleged that it was the height differential in the roadway, rather than the joint, that caused them to lose control of the motorcycle. The trial court declined to consider the new theory and granted summary judgment to the Authority on its immunity defense and to Earle on its derivative immunity defense. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a genuine issue of material fact existed based on the testimony of one of the motorcyclists who accompanied plaintiffs and claimed to have seen a piece of metal in the roadway. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that plaintiffs’ new theory should not have been considered given its late presentation. Nonetheless, for completeness, the Court held that plaintiffs’ new theory also did not raise an issue of material fact. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants was reinstated, and the complaint was dismissed with prejudice. View "Stewart v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority" on Justia Law

In 2017, police questioned defendant Laura Gonzalez -- after providing her with her Miranda warnings -- in connection with the discovery that the infant for whom she served as a nanny had two fractures in his right leg and one in his left. In the middle of the interview, defendant asked, “But now what do I do about an attorney and everything?” Rather than seek clarification, the interviewing detective merely advised defendant, “That is your decision. I can’t give you an opinion about anything.” Ultimately, defendant admitted to abusing the child and, at the interviewing detective’s suggestion, wrote his parents an apology note. Defendant was charged with endangerment and aggravated assault. She moved to suppress portions of her statement and the note, arguing that she invoked her right to counsel during her interview. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, reasoning that defendant’s statement did not rise to the level of being an assertion of her right to counsel -- not even an ambiguous assertion of that right, which would have triggered a duty for the interviewing officer to seek clarification under New Jersey law. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded defendant’s question about the attorney was an ambiguous invocation of her right to counsel and that, under settled New Jersey law, the detective was required to cease questioning and clarify whether defendant was requesting counsel during the interview. "And, because the State played defendant’s recorded statement at trial and read the apology note -- written at the detective’s suggestion -- to the jury," the Court found the error to be harmful. View "New Jersey v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

While surveilling a street corner in Newark, two detectives observed several men loitering in the area. A detective testified that one of the individuals, later identified as defendant Tywaun Hedgespeth, adjusted his clothes, at which point officers saw what looked like the butt of a gun. Backup units were told to apprehend the men and to be cautious with defendant. A detective apprehended defendant, ordered him to show his hands, took him to the ground, and then alerted fellow officers that he found a weapon. Defendant was searched by the arresting officers who discovered crack cocaine on his person. No fingerprints were found on the gun. Defendant went to trial on a drug possession charge and an unlawful possession of a weapon charge. The jury found defendant guilty on both counts, and he pleaded guilty to a certain-persons offense the same day. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court committed harmful error in permitting impeachment of defendant by his prior convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in admitting an affidavit by a non-testifying officer. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded after review of the record that the trial court erred in allowing the State to enter into evidence information set forth in the affidavit of a non-testifying officer concerning the no-permit results from a search of the State firearm registry, and that violation was not cured by testimony concerning the search of an Essex County firearm database. Further, the trial court’s incorrect N.J.R.E. 609 ruling constituted harmful error requiring reversal of the conviction. However, the Court declined to adopt the position that an evidentiary ruling that results in a defendant’s decision not to testify can never be harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed. View "New Jersey v. Hedgespeth" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review in this appeal was who bore the primary responsibility for the payment of Dale Mecouch’s medical bills arising from an automobile accident that took place before December 5, 1980: the issuer of an automobile insurance policy or Medicare. In 2016, Mecouch was hospitalized for approximately two months at Cooper Hospital University Medical Center (Cooper) due to complications arising from a 1977 automobile accident that left him paralyzed from the waist down. At the time of his accident, Mecouch had a no-fault automobile insurance policy with Selective Insurance Company of America (Selective), which provided Mecouch with unlimited personal-injury-protection (PIP) benefits. Sometime after 1979 but before 2016, Mecouch was enrolled in Medicare. Selective continued to pay Mecouch’s medical expenses related to the 1977 accident until December 11, 2015, when it notified Mecouch by letter that, going forward, “Medicare is the appropriate primary payer for any treatment related to” the 1977 accident. After Mecouch’s 2016 hospital stay, Cooper forwarded to Selective a bill for over $850,000 for medical services rendered to Mecouch. Instead of paying that bill, Selective directed Cooper to seek reimbursement from Medicare. Cooper was a participating Medicare provider, and, at that time, Mecouch was a Medicare enrollee. Cooper then billed Medicare, which issued a payment of under $85,000. Selective eventually agreed to reimburse Cooper for Mecouch’s co-payments and deductibles. Cooper filed a complaint against Selective, seeking the total cost of Mecouch’s care. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Cooper, awarding Cooper the cost of Mecouch’s care minus the amount covered by Medicare. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding Medicare was the “primary payer” for Mecouch's medical bills at Cooper. The Supreme Court concluded that because Mecouch was a Medicare enrollee in 2016, Cooper was required to bill and accept payment from Medicare, which promptly covered Mecouch’s medical expenses in accordance with its fee schedule. Cooper could not seek payment from Selective other than for reimbursement of the Medicare co-payments and deductibles. View "Cooper Hospital University Medical Center v. Selective Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law

Defendant Jose Carrion appealed his conviction by jury on weapons and drug offenses, as well as assault. Specifically he appealed the denial of his motion to suppress a statement that he made to law enforcement and for which he received Miranda warnings, but that he made after an earlier, unwarned statement. At trial, the prosecution sought to admit an affidavit of Brett Bloom of the State Firearms Investigative Unit, asserting that Bloom searched and found no record that Carrion had a firearm permit. The State asked the court to submit the affidavit as a self-authenticating document under N.J.R.E. 902(k) and under the absence-of-a-public-record exception to the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(10). Defense counsel objected, arguing that there were hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues. The court found the document both reliable and admissible under N.J.R.E. 902(k) and exceptions to the hearsay rule. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the State’s reliance on an affidavit by a non-testifying witness to introduce over defendant’s objection the results of the database search violated defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. And, under the totality of the circumstances, Carrion’s second statement should have been suppressed because the Miranda warnings issued to Carrion prior to his second statement to police were insufficient in these circumstances to ensure that his waiver of rights was voluntary and knowing. Because of its holding on the suppression issue, the Court could not conclude that the denial of defendant’s right to confrontation constituted harmless error. View "New Jersey v. Carrion" on Justia Law

Around midnight on May 7, 2011, a 7-Eleven was robbed. Approximately three-quarters of a mile from the 7-Eleven, Sergeant Mark Horan saw a car approaching in the oncoming traffic lane. Using the spotlight mounted to his police vehicle to illuminate the inside of the car, he observed that the occupants were a man and a woman and let them pass. Sergeant Horan testified that as he continued on, a second set of headlights approached. He illuminated the inside of the vehicle and observed three Black males; “[t]he description of the suspects was two Black males so at that point I decided to issue a motor vehicle stop on the second vehicle.” Horan later explained that he was also struck by the lack of reaction to the spotlight by the occupants of the car, and that he “took into consideration the short distance from the scene, as well as the short amount of time from the call” as he made the stop. Horan radioed headquarters with the license plate number and a description of the car, and two more officers arrived. Defendant Peter Nyema was sitting in the passenger seat and Jamar Myers was in the rear passenger-side seat. The dispatcher advised Horan that the vehicle had been reported stolen. All three occupants were placed under arrest. The question this case presented was whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion existed when a police officer conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle in which defendants Peter Nyema and Jamar Myers were riding with co-defendant Tyrone Miller. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the only information the officer possessed at the time of the stop was the race and sex of the suspects, with no further descriptors. "That information, which effectively placed every single Black male in the area under the veil of suspicion, was insufficient to justify the stop of the vehicle and therefore does not withstand constitutional scrutiny." View "New Jersey v. Nyema" on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals presented an issue of first impression for the New Jersey Supreme Court: whether police have a right to conduct a protective sweep of a home when an arrest is made outside the home and, if so, the requisite justification for a warrantless entry and protective sweep. In doing so, the Court balanced two important values: an individual’s fundamental privacy right in the home and the significant state interest in officer safety. The Court concluded that when an arrest occurs outside a home, the police may not enter the dwelling or conduct a protective sweep in the absence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person or persons are present inside and pose an imminent threat to the officers’ safety. "This sensible balancing of the fundamental right to privacy in one’s home and the compelling interest in officer safety will depend on an objective assessment of the particular circumstances in each case, such as the manner of the arrest, the distance of the arrest from the home, the reasonableness of the officers’ suspicion that persons were in the dwelling and likely to launch an imminent attack, and any other relevant factors. A self-created exigency by the police cannot justify entry into the home or a protective sweep." In the case of Christopher Radel, a protective sweep was not warranted, but was constitutionally justified in Keith Terres' case. View "New Jersey v. Radel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michele Meade served as Township Manager for Livingston Township for eleven years, from 2005 until her termination in 2016 by Resolution of the Township Council. The Council cited a number of performance areas in the Resolution. An area central to this appeal was Meade’s supervision of Police Chief Craig Handschuch. In 2013, pre-school teachers at the Livingston Community Center observed a man dressed in camouflage, carrying a rifle bag, in the parking lot. The classes went into lockdown and patrol cars were dispatched. Handschuch and Sergeant Kenneth Hanna alerted the responders that the man was an officer involved in a training exercise. Meade went to the Community Center during or in the aftermath of the incident. Days later, Hanna signed a complaint alleging that Meade had violated N.J.S.A. 2C:33-28 by using “unreasonably loud and offensive coarse or abusive language” in addressing him. Meade emailed a report to Handschuch concluding that he and the unit conducting the training were responsible for the incident. That same day, Hanna signed a second complaint against Meade, alleging obstruction. Meade was acquitted of all charges in 2014. Meanwhile, the record reflected ongoing concerns with Handschuch’s performance. An email from one council member following Handschuch’s failure to appear at meetings called by the Council stated, “Bring [Chief Handschuch] up on charges, bring in an investigator or do nothing. . . . [H]e is YOUR employee . . . .” Nevertheless, Meade testified that certain members of the Council did not authorize hiring an investigator. In addition, Meade filed a certification that “Councilman Al Anthony . . . suggested to me that maybe Chief Handschuch did not like reporting to a woman and should report to him as the Mayor instead,” a claim Anthony disputed in his deposition. Meade filed a complaint aalleging that the Council terminated her and replaced her with a male Manager “to appease the sexist male Police Chief.” The trial court granted Livingston’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Meade was terminated for poor work performance and that the record revealed no gender discrimination in her termination. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding sufficient evidence was present for a reasonable jury to find that what Livingston Township Councilmembers perceived to be Police Chief Handschuch’s discriminatory attitude toward Township Manager Meade influenced the Council’s decision to terminate her, in violation of the Law Against Discrimination. View "Meade v. Township of Livingston" on Justia Law