Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In June 2011, Thomasenia Fowler, as administrator of her husband Willis Edenfield’s estate, initiated a wrongful death/product liability action against Union Carbide, a manufacturer and supplier of asbestos that Edenfield handled as a daily part of his 40-year job at an adhesive manufacturing plant (the Bloomfield Plant). In 1968, Union Carbide began placing a warning on its asbestos bags. In compliance with an emergency standard imposed by OSHA, the company changed the warning in 1972. The change notwithstanding, an in-house staff-member of Union Carbide notified the company that its warning inadequately addressed the lethal dangers of asbestos exposure, but Union Carbide declined to upgrade its label. Union Carbide presented evidence that it periodically provided information and various safety warnings about its asbestos products to Edenfield’s employers and requested that the information and warnings be made available to the employees. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a manufacturer or supplier that puts inadequate warnings on its asbestos products used in the workplace can fulfill its duty to warn by disseminating adequate information to the employer with the intention that such information will reach the workers using those products. The Court also considered whether, in charging on medical causation in this mesothelioma case, the trial court was required to give the frequency, regularity, and proximity language in Sholtis v. American Cyanamid Co., 238 N.J. Super. 8, 28-29 (App. Div. 1989), rather than the substantial factor test in the Model Civil Charge, as modified by the court. As to the duty to warn, the Court held that an asbestos manufacturer or supplier that places inadequate warnings on asbestos bags used in the workplace has breached its duty to the worker, regardless of whether it provides the employer with the correct information, which is reasonably intended to reach its employees. As to medical causation, the trial court’s modified Model Jury Charge on proximate cause sufficiently guided the jury. View "Fowler v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Inc." on Justia Law

On January 3, 2016, police found James Dewyer without a pulse in his silver Dodge on the side of a Mansfield, New Jersey road. That morning, Dewyer had picked up defendant Quinnizel Clark at a motel in Mansfield, and the men drove to a casino. Cameras in front of the motel showed defendant and Dewyer return to the motel and then depart in Dewyer’s car in the afternoon. Surveillance video showed defendant later return to the motel alone and then leave in different clothes. Ten days later, Detective Wayne Raynor and another officer interviewed defendant about Dewyer’s death. Defendant was read his Miranda rights and waived those rights. After approximately 40 minutes, Detective Raynor began to confront defendant with his belief that defendant murdered Dewyer and pressed defendant about his alibi. Defendant responded, “charge me, call my attorney Mr. Keisler over here, charge me and let’s go.” The interrogation continued and Detective Raynor expressed that if he were in defendant’s shoes, he would tell the officers who he was with so that he was “not on the hook for [the murder].” Detective Raynor suggested that defendant did not want to tell them who he had been with during the time of the murder because he was lying. Defendant said, “[i]f it’s game over, charge me, go get my attorney, charge me, and let’s go to court.” The interrogation ended when defendant requested his attorney a third time. Defendant was charged with first-degree murder and weapons offenses. In this appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether it was harmful error to allow the jury to hear the portion of defendant's statement to police after he invoked his right to counsel but the interrogation continued. Once defendant invoked his right to counsel, the interrogation should have stopped. The Court held that allowing the entire exchange to be played for the jury was harmful error. In addition, the error was compounded when the prosecutor commented on that portion of the statement that should have never been before the jury in the first place. The Appellate Division vacated defendant’s conviction and remanded the matter for further proceedings based on cumulative error. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Clark" on Justia Law

In November 2018, at approximately 10:20 p.m., Trenton detectives stopped defendant David Smith’s motor vehicle for a purported tinted windows violation after the detectives observed dark tinting on defendant’s rear windshield. Despite the rear windshield’s tint, detectives were able to see that defendant was alone in the car and was making a furtive “shoving” motion, raising suspicions that he was trying to conceal a weapon. When the detectives searched the vehicle, they found a firearm. The detectives cited defendant for a tinted windows violation and charged him with various weapons offenses. In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether a purported violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 based on tinted windows justified an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the stop at issue here was not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation. "Consistent with the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, reasonable and articulable suspicion of a tinted windows violation arises only when a vehicle’s front windshield or front side windows are so darkly tinted that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car." View "New Jersey v. Smith" on Justia Law

This appeal posed a narrow question for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review: whether a particular defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial was violated. Defendant Marcus Mackroy-Davis was arrested on November 11, 2019 in connection with a drive-by shooting in which one person was killed. A complaint against Mackroy-Davis charged him with conspiracy to commit murder, and the State moved to detain him pending trial. The court entered an order of detention on December 23, 2019. On February 13, 2020, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Mackroy-Davis with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and obstruction. Defendant maintained his innocence and stated he intended to go to trial. Consistent with guidance from public health officials, the Judiciary for more than a year was unable to summon jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and the parties for in-person jury trials in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the Supreme Court entered fourteen omnibus orders that tolled the clock for the start of criminal trials for a total of 461 days. The New Jersey Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA) replaced New Jersey’s prior system of pretrial release with a risk-based system that, for the first time, allowed judges to detain high-risk defendants pretrial. In October 2021, the State obtained a superseding indictment that added three new charges against Mackroy-Davis stemming from information the State learned from a codefendant in May 2020. The parties returned to court to arraign Mackroy-Davis on the superseding indictment on November 15, 2021. Over defendant’s objection, the court ordered excludable time “due to extenuating circumstances.” The following day, the court entered two orders for excludable time, one for 59 days and a second for 159 days. The court also set a trial date of April 22, 2022, at which time, the State announced it was ready to proceed. The Supreme Court determined that because the prosecution announced it was ready to proceed to trial at the two-year mark, defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court and remanded the case for trial. View "New Jersey v. Mackroy-Davis" on Justia Law

In 2013, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s holding that Koger Distributed Solutions, Inc. (KDS) and Koger Professional Services, Inc. (KPS) had value as independent entities rather than being solely dependent on their parent company, Koger Inc. (Koger). The Court also held that Robert Sipko’s relinquishment of his 50 percent interests in KDS and KPS in 2006 was void for lack of consideration. The matter was remanded the trial court to determine what, if any, remedy was appropriate to compensate Robert for his interests in KDS and KPS -- companies that were rendered valueless by the time the matter reached the Supreme Court. In 2016, the trial court held that the appropriate remedy was a buyout of Robert’s interests in the companies given the court’s finding that George and Rastislav Sipko deliberately stripped the companies of value for the specific purpose of putting the money beyond Robert’s reach. The trial court accepted Robert’s expert’s valuation of the companies and found that KDS and KPS, at the time Robert filed the complaint in 2007, were worth approximately $1.5 million and $34.9 million, respectively. Accordingly, Robert’s 50 percent ownership in both companies totaled over $18 million, plus interest. On appeal, the Appellate Division agreed that a buyout was the appropriate remedy given the record. The court, however, remanded the matter for the trial court to determine whether a marketability discount should be applied. In light of all the defendants’ conduct regarding KDS and KPS to strip Robert of his rightful interests, “equity cannot abide imposing a marketability discount to the benefit of defendants.” The trial court’s acceptance of Robert’s expert’s valuation of the company fell within its broad discretion and was fully supported by the record. Defendants were given the opportunity to present an expert valuation of the companies on remand but made the strategic decision not to do so. Therefore, the Supreme Court declined to provide defendants with “another bite of this thoroughly chewed apple,” and reinstated the judgment of the trial court. View "Sipko v. Koger, Inc." on Justia Law

On the morning of February 24, 2014, defendant Abayuba Rivas went to the Police Department and reported that his wife Karla Villagra Garzon was missing. Over the next several days, Rivas gave statements to the police to assist in the missing-persons investigation. Rivas stated that he had left his two-year-old daughter home alone while he drove around looking for Karla, who, he thought, may have had a liaison with someone. Rivas was ultimately arrested and incarcerated for child endangerment and providing false information to the police. After a suicide attempt while held in jail, Rivas was taken to a local hospital. After reading Rivas his Miranda rights, the detectives questioned him, and Rivas soon departed from his earlier story. The next afternoon, on March 18, detectives returned to the hospital and began a nearly six-hour question-and-answer session. The detectives had Rivas read aloud each of his Miranda rights and then asked him if he understood those rights. He answered in the affirmative but repeatedly queried the detectives about his right to an attorney. During the continued interrogation, Rivas confessed to killing Karla. On March 19, Rivas was discharged from the hospital and transported to the police station, where he gave a videotaped statement. Rivas was read his Miranda rights and informed that his family was prepared to retain an attorney to represent him. Despite that information, Rivas waived his rights and indicated his willingness to speak with the detectives. The trial court ultimately found that Rivas’s statements about his desire to secure counsel were “objectively unclear and ambiguous,” and therefore the detectives had the duty either to clarify the ambiguity or cease questioning. The trial court suppressed the March 18 statement but found the March 19 statements admissible. The New Jersey Supreme Court suppressed the March 19 statements too, finding Rivas never freely initiated further conversations with the detectives, further questioning of defendant was barred. “That Rivas waived his Miranda rights on March 19 -- a day later -- does not alter the equation. A violation under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), is not subject to an attenuation analysis. Therefore, Rivas’s March 19 statements must be suppressed.” View "New Jersey v. Rivas" on Justia Law

Defendant Ashley Bailey and Edwin Ingram married in 2011 and remained married until Ingram’s death in 2016. They had two children. In April 2014, the New Jersey State Police commenced an investigation of an alleged drug distribution network operating in Camden. The investigators identified Ingram and his brother, his half-brother, and three other men as targets of the investigation. Investigators wiretapped phones associated with defendant, her husband, and other targets of the investigation. Police arrested targets of the investigation and defendant in October 2014. Defendant gave two statements in the immediate aftermath of her arrest, admitting she had accessed the LEAA system to review police reports on Ingram and his associates, but denied that her actions were intended to benefit Ingram or anyone else. Defendant claimed that she made numerous phone calls to her husband’s associates in an attempt to locate him and denied that the abrupt decrease in the number of calls was related to the wiretaps. Shortly before trial, defendant moved to exclude the text messages that she exchanged with Ingram on the ground that they were protected by the marital communications privilege. Defendant argued that because the Legislature had not yet amended N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22 to adopt the crime-fraud exception to the marital communications privilege when she and Ingram exchanged the text messages, the trial court should not apply that exception. The trial court admitted the text messages into evidence, and the State read them into the record. The jury acquitted defendant of conspiracy but convicted her of both counts of official misconduct. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the crime-fraud exception could not be properly applied to marital communications that preceded the Legislature’s amendment of N.J.R.E. 509. The Court found no evidence that the Legislature intended that amendment to retroactively apply to otherwise privileged marital communications that occurred prior to that amendment. The trial court’s admission of the text messages therefore constituted error. However, that error was harmless given the extensive evidence presented by the State in support of defendant’s official misconduct convictions. View "New Jersey v. Bailey" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 to add a new mitigating factor fourteen: “[t]he defendant was under 26 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14). It provided that “[t]his new act shall take effect immediately.” L. 2020, c. 110, § 2. In this appeal, the Court considers defendant Rahee Lane’s argument that the new mitigating factor should be applied to defendants who were under twenty-six years old at the time of their offenses, if their direct appeals were pending when the statute was amended. The New Jersey Supreme Court construed N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14) to be prospective, finding in the statutory language no indication that mitigating factor fourteen applied to defendants sentenced prior to the provision’s effective date. The Court viewed N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14)’s legislative history to confirm the Legislature’s intent to authorize sentencing courts to consider the new mitigating factor in imposing a sentence on or after the date of the amendment. View "New Jersey v. Lane" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ann Samolyk sustained neurological and cognitive injuries when she entered a lagoon in Forked River to rescue her neighbors’ dog, which had fallen or jumped into the water. Samolyk’s husband filed a civil action against defendants, alleging they were liable under the rescue doctrine by negligently allowing their dog to fall or jump into the water, prompting Samolyk to attempt to save the dog. Neither the Law Division nor the Appellate Division found the doctrine applicable. The issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review reduced to whether the common law rescue doctrine could be expanded to permit plaintiffs to recover damages for injuries sustained as a proximate result of attempting to rescue defendants’ dog. After reviewing the "noble principles that infuse the public policy underpinning this cause of action," the Supreme Court declined to consider property, in whatever form, to be equally entitled to the unique value and protection bestowed on a human life. The Court nevertheless expanded the rescue doctrine to include acts that appear to be intended to protect property but were in fact reasonable measures ultimately intended to protect a human life. Judgment was affirmed. View "Samolyk v. Berthe" on Justia Law

Defendant Mengxi Liu, the successful bidder in a real estate auction conducted by defendant Max Spann Real Estate and Auction Co. (Max Spann), asserted as a defense to the seller’s breach of contract action that the contract she signed to purchase the property was void and unenforceable. In her appeal of the trial court’s judgment finding her in breach of her contract, Liu argued that the agreement was unenforceable because a licensed real estate salesperson employed by Max Spann wrote her name and address as the buyer and purchase price information on blank spaces in a template sales contract following the auction. Liu contended that this activity constituted the unauthorized practice of law because the contract did not provide for the three-day attorney review period as mandated by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division that a residential real estate sale by absolute auction was distinct from a traditional real estate transaction in which a buyer and seller negotiate the contract price and other terms and memorialize their agreement in a contract. In an absolute auction or an auction without reserve, the owner unconditionally offers the property for sale and the highest bid creates a final and enforceable contract at the auction’s conclusion, subject to applicable contract defenses. “Were we to impose the three-day attorney review prescribed in [the controlling case law] on residential real estate sales conducted by absolute auction, we would fundamentally interfere with the method by which buyers and sellers choose to conduct such sales.” The Court found no unauthorized practice of law in this case and held that the contract signed by Liu was valid and enforceable. View "Sullivan v. Max Spann Real Estate & Auction Co." on Justia Law