Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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In June 2011, defendant Christopher Radel pled guilty to a weapons offense. In October 2015, the court entered an order directing the local police department to confiscate any firearms at Radel's residence. Before carrying out the order, police learned: Radel resided at an address different than on the court order; Radel had two active municipal arrest warrants; and he possessed firearms other than a Beretta listed on the order. Police thereafter set in motion a plan to enforce the order to retrieve weapons and arrest Radel on the outstanding warrants. Performing a protective sweep, officers observed in plain view imitation firearms, butterfly knives, hatchets, bows and arrows, a ballistic vest, simulated police identification badges, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a glass pipe, and a safe capable of storing firearms. Police obtained a search warrant, netting the multiple weapons, drugs and related paraphernalia, and over $8,000 in cash found in the protective sweep. The trial court denied Radel’s motion to suppress the evidence, and the Appellate Division reversed, finding “no support for the [trial court’s] conclusion that the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that there were other persons inside the home or that they posed a risk to the police or others.” In 2017, a warrant for Tyler Fuller’s arrest was issued. Police learned Fuller might have been staying at a trailer park, in possession of a "large amount of narcotics." Four officers went directly to the front building where the trailer's owner (Terres) had said Fuller might be found. As police approached the front door, which was wide open, they observed two men inside, later identified as Mark Boston and William Willis. The officers announced their presence, Boston ran toward a bedroom, with one officer pursuing, believing that he might be Fuller. The officer struggled with Boston and eventually handcuffed him. A computer check revealed that both Boston and Willis had outstanding warrants for their arrest. During a protective sweep of the trailer, an offer peered into a hole in the floor, "large enough for a person to hide" under the residence. The next day a search warrant was issued, and multiple weapons were seized from the trailer. The trial court denied Terres’s motion to suppress the evidence, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that "a self-created exigency by the police cannot justify entry into the home or a protective sweep." Here, the Court found a protective sweep was not warranted in the Radel case, but was constitutionally justified in the Terres case. View "New Jersey v. Terres" on Justia Law

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Defendants Township of Sparta, Paul Austin, and Sparta Department of Public Works (collectively, defendants) challenged a denial of workers’ compensation benefits to plaintiff Diane Lapsley under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Lapsley was employed by the Township as a librarian for the Sparta Public Library. On February 3, 2014, Lapsley’s husband arrived at the library to drive Lapsley home. As they walked from the library to the car through the parking lot, they were suddenly struck by a snowplow owned by the Township and operated by Paul Austin, a Township employee. As a result, Lapsley suffered injuries to her leg requiring multiple surgeries and leaving her permanently disfigured. Lapsley filed a complaint against defendants in court, and later, a claim for workers’ compensation benefits against the Township in the Law Division of Workers’ Compensation. The Division found that Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment and were therefore compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Lapsley appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, finding Lapsley’s injuries were not compensable under the Act. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment because the parking lot where she was injured was owned and maintained by the Township, adjacent to her place of work, and used by Township employees to park. Lapsley was therefore entitled to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. View "Lapsley v. Township of Sparta" on Justia Law

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Defendants James Comer and James Zarate asked the New Jersey Supreme Court to find that a mandatory sentence of at least 30 years without parole was unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. Seventeen year old Comer was sentenced in 2004 to an aggregate term of 75 years in prison with 68.25 years of parole ineligibility for his participation in four armed robberies, one of which, an accomplice shot and killed a robbery victim. Zarate was convicted of participating in a brutal murder with his older brother. At the time of his offense in 2005, Zarate was 14 years old, less than one month shy of his 15th birthday. For the murder conviction, the court sentenced Zarate to life imprisonment, subject to an 85-percent period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (NERA), with consecutive sentences for two additional offenses. After weighing other statutory factors, Zarate was resentenced for murder to 50 years in prison. The Supreme Court reversed in both cases: "The statutory framework for sentencing juveniles, if not addressed, will contravene Article I, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution. To remedy the concerns defendants raise and save the statute from constitutional infirmity, the Court will permit juvenile offenders convicted under the law to petition for a review of their sentence after they have served two decades in prison. At that time, judges will assess a series of factors the United States Supreme Court has set forth in Miller v. Alabama, which are designed to consider the 'mitigating qualities of youth.'" View "New Jersey v. Comer" on Justia Law

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In July 2001, victim C.S. was sexually assaulted by an unknown assailant. The New Jersey State Police Lab (“Lab”) created a profile for the suspect’s DNA sample, Specimen 12A, retrieved from C.S.’s body. In 2002, the Lab entered the DNA profile into the national Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”). The DNA profile in CODIS did not include certain exclusionary data; without that data, it would have been impossible for Specimen 12A to generate a match with another DNA profile entered into CODIS. In 2004, defendant Bradley Thompson’s DNA sample was collected in an unrelated matter and his DNA profile entered into CODIS in 2006. In 2010, the FBI updated the National DNA Index System (“NDIS”) Operational Procedures Manual to explicitly allow the exclusionary data withheld from Specimen 12A to be entered into the system. In 2016, the Lab entered the exclusionary data for Specimen 12A into CODIS and was alerted that the specimen matched defendant’s DNA sample that had been entered into CODIS years earlier. Based on that match, defendant was indicted in May 2017 for offenses related to the July 2001 sexual assault. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the five-year statute of limitations began to run in 2004, when the State possessed both the physical evidence from the crime and defendant’s DNA sample. The trial court denied his motion and concluded that the statute of limitations started running when the State had evidence of a match. Defendant was ultimately convicted of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact and fourth-degree criminal trespass. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction, finding that the statute of limitations began to run in 2016 when the State received a DNA match. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding the statute of limitations began to run in 2010, when the FBI’s updated scientific guidance rendered the Lab capable of generating a match based on the DNA samples in its possession. View "New Jersey v. Thompson" on Justia Law

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In this appeal, a detective administered Miranda warnings but repeatedly undermined them throughout an interrogation. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the detective here repeatedly contradicted and minimized the significance of the Miranda warnings -- starting at the outset of the interrogation and continuing throughout -- meaning the State could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights. The Appellate Division concluded defendant's statement made to police in violation of his Miranda rights had to be suppressed, and the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. O.D.A.-C." on Justia Law

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The Bergen County Improvement Authority (BCIA) issued a request for qualification (RFQ) for a redeveloper to act as general contractor in the rehabilitation of the Bergen County Courthouse. Nine companies, including plaintiff Dobco, Inc., submitted proposals in response to the RFQ. The BCIA notified four firms that they were selected to proceed, and it notified Dobco and the other firms not selected for the short list. Dobco and plaintiff Hossam Ibrahim, the vice president and a shareholder of Dobco, and a resident and taxpayer of Bergen County, immediately filed separate, but essentially identical, complaints alleging that defendants’ actions violated the Local Public Contracts Law (LPCL) and were arbitrary and capricious. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaints with prejudice for failure to state a claim, concluding that the project was “not subject to the LPCL because it has been designated a redevelopment project” under the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (LRHL). The judge determined that plaintiffs were barred from seeking equitable relief because Dobco responded to the RFQ and Ibrahim had not challenged the procurement process or the RFQ prior to filing his complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of Dobco’s complaint, finding “that Dobco is estopped from now complaining that a process in which it willingly participated violated the law.” The Appellate Division, however, reversed as to Ibrahim, determining that he could proceed with his suit as a taxpayer and remanding to the trial court to enter an order permanently restraining the BCIA from proceeding with the procurement process contemplated by the RFQ. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed the appellate court's opinion. The Court required that, going forward, a plaintiff claiming taxpayer standing in an action challenging the process used to award a public contract for goods or services had to file a certification with the complaint. As to the merits of this appeal, the Court departed from the Appellate Division’s decision in only one respect: the Court did not rely on the leasing and financing arrangements contemplated by the BCIA and defendant County of Bergen. View "Dobco, Inc. v. Bergen County Improvement Authority " on Justia Law

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Eighty-five year old Sundiata Acoli had been imprisoned for forty-nine years for his role in the 1973 murder of a New Jersey State Trooper, and the wounding of another. During his time in prison, Acoli had consistently received positive institutional reports from the Federal Bureau of Prisons, completed over a hundred programs and counseling sessions, served on the Honor Unit in his institution, taught a course to younger inmates on rational thinking and emotional control, and learned employable skills. Since 1993, the New Jersey State Parole Board denied Acoli parole every time he became eligible for release. On each occasion, including in 2016 when Acoli was seventy-nine years old, the Parole Board determined that there was a substantial likelihood that Acoli would commit a crime if released. The Board, however, did not indicate what crime it feared Acoli might commit at his advanced age. In 2010, the Parole Board denied Acoli parole, despite psychological assessments that favored his release. The Appellate Division overturned the Board’s decision, finding no substantial support in the record to justify Acoli’s continued imprisonment, and ordered his release. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed on procedural grounds to allow the full Board to take firsthand witness testimony before deciding whether to grant parole to Acoli. At a hearing in 2016, the Parole Board called only one witness, Acoli, who was then suffering from cardiovascular disease and hearing loss. Acoli testified that, if released, he planned to reside with his daughter, a Wall Street risk analyst, and his grandchildren. The State’s psychological expert, despite issuing a report less favorable than the previous one, described Acoli’s risk of committing another offense as low to moderate. The Board again denied parole, stating “that concerns remain that [Acoli] would commit a crime if released on parole.” The Board imposed a fifteen-year future eligibility term. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the Parole Board did not establish “by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a substantial likelihood that [Acoli] will commit a crime” if placed on parole. "The Parole Board’s decision is entitled to deference -- but not blind deference." View "Acoli v. New Jersey State Parole Board" on Justia Law

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A car driven by defendant Rashaun Bell crashed into two teenaged boys riding a bicycle on a roadway in Jersey City. Both boys died as a result of the accident. Defendant and his three passengers fled the scene. Defendant was eventually apprehended and indicted on two counts of leaving the scene of an accident; he moved to dismiss one of the counts, arguing that, as applied here, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 violated the rule against multiplicity. The trial court denied defendant’s motion and concluded N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 holds a driver who knowingly flees the scene of an accident criminally responsible for each person who dies in the accident. Defendant thereafter pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement as to both counts of the indictment. Consistent with the agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive five-year terms of imprisonment. In response to defendant’s appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s ruling, dismissed one of the convictions, vacated the five-year term of imprisonment for that conviction, and remanded the matter to the trial court to amend the judgment of conviction accordingly. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the number of fatalities caused by the accident was not an element of the second-degree offense codified in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1. Therefore, the Court affirmed the part of the Appellate Division's judgment, but reversed with respect to that court's sua sponte amendment to defendant's sentence, "in a manner not contemplated by the terms of the plea agreement negotiated by the parties in good faith and approved by the trial court under Rule 3:9-2. Under these circumstances, the appellate court should have remanded the case to the trial court to permit the parties to negotiate a new plea agreement that the trial court finds acceptable or otherwise schedule the case for trial." View "New Jersey v. Bell" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Hamid Harris alleged that Donald Stabile, a Newark Police Department detective, falsely accused him of four armed robberies that were committed in Newark in January 2015, and unlawfully arrested him in connection with those robberies based on an improperly issued arrest warrant. After the charges against plaintiff were dismissed, he filed this action. Defendants the City of Newark, Detective Donald Stabile, and Police Officer Angel Romero following the trial court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment, contended the trial court erred in denying them qualified immunity as a defense to Harris’s claims brought under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA). Defendants contended the trial court’s order denying summary judgment was a legal determination and should therefore be deemed appealable as of right, in keeping with both New Jersey appellate practice and federal law. The trial court reasoned that because Stabile did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and because Stabile’s belief that plaintiff committed the robberies was objectively unreasonable, defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Appellate Division ruled that “[t]he appeal is interlocutory as it is not from a final order” and dismissed defendants’ notice of appeal. The appellate court also denied defendants’ motion for leave to appeal. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the trial court’s order was a decision premised on factual findings as well as legal conclusions, not an exclusively legal determination. "In an NJCRA action, a defendant seeking to challenge a trial court’s order denying qualified immunity prior to final judgment must proceed by motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal in accordance with Rules 2:2-4 and 2:5-6. View "Harris v. City of Newark, et al." on Justia Law

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Defendant Anthony Sims, Jr. challenged his conviction of attempted murder and weapons offenses arising from the April 9, 2014 shooting of P.V. One of the issues this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on the Appellate Division majority’s holding that police officers, prior to interrogation, were required to inform an arrestee of the charges that will be filed against him, even when no complaint or arrest warrant has been issued identifying those charges. Here, the divided panel found that the police officers who interrogated defendant violated his Miranda rights by not providing that information. Further, this case presented the issue of whether the trial court’s decision to admit at trial P.V.’s prior testimony at a pretrial hearing violated the rule against hearsay and the Confrontation Clause. P.V. was indicted for the murder of defendant’s brother. Although offered an immunity agreement by the State and ordered to testify by the trial court, P.V. asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify. The trial court permitted the State to present at trial P.V.’s testimony at the Wade/Henderson hearing as the prior testimony of an unavailable witness. The Appellate Division vacated defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial. A divided panel held that the police officers who interrogated defendant violated his Miranda rights. The court unanimously held that the trial court’s decision to admit at trial P.V.’s prior testimony violated the rule against hearsay and the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court declined to adopt the Appellate Division's analysis, and found no plain error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police. The Court also concurred with the trial court that the victim’s testimony at the pretrial hearing was admissible under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(1)(A)’s exception to the hearsay rule for the prior testimony of a witness unavailable at trial, and that the admission of that testimony did not violate defendant’s confrontation rights. View "New Jersey v. Sims" on Justia Law