Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Samolyk v. Berthe
Plaintiff Ann Samolyk sustained neurological and cognitive injuries when she entered a lagoon in Forked River to rescue her neighbors’ dog, which had fallen or jumped into the water. Samolyk’s husband filed a civil action against defendants, alleging they were liable under the rescue doctrine by negligently allowing their dog to fall or jump into the water, prompting Samolyk to attempt to save the dog. Neither the Law Division nor the Appellate Division found the doctrine applicable. The issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review reduced to whether the common law rescue doctrine could be expanded to permit plaintiffs to recover damages for injuries sustained as a proximate result of attempting to rescue defendants’ dog. After reviewing the "noble principles that infuse the public policy underpinning this cause of action," the Supreme Court declined to consider property, in whatever form, to be equally entitled to the unique value and protection bestowed on a human life. The Court nevertheless expanded the rescue doctrine to include acts that appear to be intended to protect property but were in fact reasonable measures ultimately intended to protect a human life. Judgment was affirmed. View "Samolyk v. Berthe" on Justia Law
Sullivan v. Max Spann Real Estate & Auction Co.
Defendant Mengxi Liu, the successful bidder in a real estate auction conducted by defendant Max Spann Real Estate and Auction Co. (Max Spann), asserted as a defense to the seller’s breach of contract action that the contract she signed to purchase the property was void and unenforceable. In her appeal of the trial court’s judgment finding her in breach of her contract, Liu argued that the agreement was unenforceable because a licensed real estate salesperson employed by Max Spann wrote her name and address as the buyer and purchase price information on blank spaces in a template sales contract following the auction. Liu contended that this activity constituted the unauthorized practice of law because the contract did not provide for the three-day attorney review period as mandated by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division that a residential real estate sale by absolute auction was distinct from a traditional real estate transaction in which a buyer and seller negotiate the contract price and other terms and memorialize their agreement in a contract. In an absolute auction or an auction without reserve, the owner unconditionally offers the property for sale and the highest bid creates a final and enforceable contract at the auction’s conclusion, subject to applicable contract defenses. “Were we to impose the three-day attorney review prescribed in [the controlling case law] on residential real estate sales conducted by absolute auction, we would fundamentally interfere with the method by which buyers and sellers choose to conduct such sales.” The Court found no unauthorized practice of law in this case and held that the contract signed by Liu was valid and enforceable. View "Sullivan v. Max Spann Real Estate & Auction Co." on Justia Law
New Jersey v. Derry
In 2010, a joint task force of local and federal law enforcement began investigating Mykal Derry, the leader of a drug organization, and his brother, Malik, among others. During the course of the investigation, a man was shot and killed in Atlantic City. A federal grand jury indicted nineteen individuals involved with the Derry drug organization in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Defendants were convicted of various drug offenses, as well as the discharge of a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime. Following their federal convictions, the Atlantic County Prosecutor’s Office indicted defendants, as relevant here, for murder and conspiracy to commit murder. In federal court, defendants received a sentence enhancement that applied if a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder. The federal prosecutor did not seek restitution because he was informed that New Jersey had charged defendants with murder and would seek restitution in state court. The District Court ultimately sentenced defendants to life without parole on the drug trafficking conviction; a concurrent term of four years on all other drug and conspiracy convictions; ten years on the discharge of a firearm conviction, to be served consecutively to the life sentence; and ten years’ supervised release. Defendants moved to dismiss their state-court indictment under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(f), arguing that the federal prosecution already captured the murder because the discharge of a firearm charge covered the shooting of the victim. They further contended that the sentencing enhancement and resultant term of life-plus-ten-years adequately served New Jersey’s interests such that dismissal was in the interest of justice. The trial court denied their motion. Based on the differences between the federal and state proceedings, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment. View "New Jersey v. Derry" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Jeter v. Sam’s Club
Plaintiff Aleice Jeter filed a negligence claim against Sam’s Club after sustaining injuries when she slipped on one or more grapes. Plaintiff stated that she fell while walking away from the checkout area, “halfway past” the fruit and vegetable aisle. Sam’s Club asserted several defenses, including lack of actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition -- loose grapes on the floor. The trial court, after acknowledging that no party had moved for summary judgment, sua sponte conducted an N.J.R.E. 104(a) hearing to determine whether the "mode of operation" rule applied and, if not, whether plaintiff could provide some evidence of actual or constructive notice. The court agreed with Sam’s Club that the mode of operation rule did not apply, then proceeded to analyze the case under traditional negligence principles that require actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition -- grapes on the floor. Finding that there was no evidence as to “how long this particular grape [was] on the floor,” the court held that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving actual or constructive notice and dismissed the case with prejudice. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jeter v. Sam's Club" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Business Law, Personal Injury
Haviland v. Lourdes Medical Center of Burlington County, Inc.
In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court in this case was whether a plaintiff had to submit an affidavit of merit (AOM) in support of a vicarious liability claim against a licensed health care facility based on the alleged negligent conduct of an employee who was not a “licensed person” under the AOM statute. Plaintiff Troy Haviland brought a claim against defendant Lourdes Medical Center of Burlington County, Inc., alleging, as relevant here, that an unnamed radiology technician employed by defendant negligently performed his radiological imaging examination, causing serious injuries. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to serve an AOM, which was granted. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that an AOM was not required when a plaintiff’s claim against a licensed person was limited solely to vicarious liability, based upon the alleged negligence of an employee who was not a licensed person under the AOM statute. To this the Supreme Court concurred: the AOM statute did not require submission of an AOM to support a vicarious liability claim against a licensed health care facility based only on the conduct of its non-licensed employee. View "Haviland v. Lourdes Medical Center of Burlington County, Inc." on Justia Law
New Jersey v. Myers
Around midnight on May 7, 2011, a 7-Eleven was robbed. At approximately 12:15 a.m., Sergeant Mark Horan of the Hamilton Township Police Department received a transmission about the armed robbery, which “had just occurred.” Horan testified that the dispatch described the suspects “as two Black males, one with a handgun.” Horan activated the lights and sirens on his marked patrol car and drove towards the 7-Eleven. Approximately three-quarters of a mile from the 7-Eleven, Horan saw a car approaching in the oncoming traffic lane. He illuminated the inside of the vehicle and observed three Black males; “[t]he description of the suspects was two Black males so at that point I decided to issue a motor vehicle stop on the second vehicle.” Horan later explained that he was also struck by the lack of reaction to the spotlight by the occupants of the car, and that he “took into consideration the short distance from the scene, as well as the short amount of time from the call” as he made the stop. Defendant Peter Nyema was sitting in the passenger seat, and defendant Jamar Myers was in the rear passenger-side seat. The dispatcher advised Horan that the vehicle had been reported stolen. All three occupants were placed under arrest. More officers arrived on the scene, and while several officers secured the arrestees, others assisted Horan in searching for a weapon. Officers searched other parts of the vehicle, locating additional clothing in the trunk and a black semi-automatic handgun under the hood. Searches of the men themselves yielded just under $600 cash. Approximately $600 was reported stolen from the 7-Eleven. The vehicle was then impounded, and police transported the three men to the police station. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review in this case was whether reasonable and articulable suspicion existed when Horan conducted an investigatory stop of defendants' vehicle. The Supreme Court determined the only information the officer possessed at the time of the stop was the race and sex of the suspects, with no further descriptors. "That information, which effectively placed every single Black male in the area under the veil of suspicion, was insufficient to justify the stop of the vehicle and therefore does not withstand constitutional scrutiny." View "New Jersey v. Myers" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Jersey v. Terres
In June 2011, defendant Christopher Radel pled guilty to a weapons offense. In October 2015, the court entered an order directing the local police department to confiscate any firearms at Radel's residence. Before carrying out the order, police learned: Radel resided at an address different than on the court order; Radel had two active municipal arrest warrants; and he possessed firearms other than a Beretta listed on the order. Police thereafter set in motion a plan to enforce the order to retrieve weapons and arrest Radel on the outstanding warrants. Performing a protective sweep, officers observed in plain view imitation firearms, butterfly knives, hatchets, bows and arrows, a ballistic vest, simulated police identification badges, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a glass pipe, and a safe capable of storing firearms. Police obtained a search warrant, netting the multiple weapons, drugs and related paraphernalia, and over $8,000 in cash found in the protective sweep. The trial court denied Radel’s motion to suppress the evidence, and the Appellate Division reversed, finding “no support for the [trial court’s] conclusion that the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that there were other persons inside the home or that they posed a risk to the police or others.” In 2017, a warrant for Tyler Fuller’s arrest was issued. Police learned Fuller might have been staying at a trailer park, in possession of a "large amount of narcotics." Four officers went directly to the front building where the trailer's owner (Terres) had said Fuller might be found. As police approached the front door, which was wide open, they observed two men inside, later identified as Mark Boston and William Willis. The officers announced their presence, Boston ran toward a bedroom, with one officer pursuing, believing that he might be Fuller. The officer struggled with Boston and eventually handcuffed him. A computer check revealed that both Boston and Willis had outstanding warrants for their arrest. During a protective sweep of the trailer, an offer peered into a hole in the floor, "large enough for a person to hide" under the residence. The next day a search warrant was issued, and multiple weapons were seized from the trailer. The trial court denied Terres’s motion to suppress the evidence, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that "a self-created exigency by the police cannot justify entry into the home or a protective sweep." Here, the Court found a protective sweep was not warranted in the Radel case, but was constitutionally justified in the Terres case. View "New Jersey v. Terres" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Lapsley v. Township of Sparta
Defendants Township of Sparta, Paul Austin, and Sparta Department of Public Works (collectively, defendants) challenged a denial of workers’ compensation benefits to plaintiff Diane Lapsley under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Lapsley was employed by the Township as a librarian for the Sparta Public Library. On February 3, 2014, Lapsley’s husband arrived at the library to drive Lapsley home. As they walked from the library to the car through the parking lot, they were suddenly struck by a snowplow owned by the Township and operated by Paul Austin, a Township employee. As a result, Lapsley suffered injuries to her leg requiring multiple surgeries and leaving her permanently disfigured. Lapsley filed a complaint against defendants in court, and later, a claim for workers’ compensation benefits against the Township in the Law Division of Workers’ Compensation. The Division found that Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment and were therefore compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Lapsley appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, finding Lapsley’s injuries were not compensable under the Act. The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded Lapsley’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment because the parking lot where she was injured was owned and maintained by the Township, adjacent to her place of work, and used by Township employees to park. Lapsley was therefore entitled to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. View "Lapsley v. Township of Sparta" on Justia Law
New Jersey v. Comer
Defendants James Comer and James Zarate asked the New Jersey Supreme Court to find that a mandatory sentence of at least 30 years without parole was unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. Seventeen year old Comer was sentenced in 2004 to an aggregate term of 75 years in prison with 68.25 years of parole ineligibility for his participation in four armed robberies, one of which, an accomplice shot and killed a robbery victim. Zarate was convicted of participating in a brutal murder with his older brother. At the time of his offense in 2005, Zarate was 14 years old, less than one month shy of his 15th birthday. For the murder conviction, the court sentenced Zarate to life imprisonment, subject to an 85-percent period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (NERA), with consecutive sentences for two additional offenses. After weighing other statutory factors, Zarate was resentenced for murder to 50 years in prison. The Supreme Court reversed in both cases: "The statutory framework for sentencing juveniles, if not addressed, will contravene Article I, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution. To remedy the concerns defendants raise and save the statute from constitutional infirmity, the Court will permit juvenile offenders convicted under the law to petition for a review of their sentence after they have served two decades in prison. At that time, judges will assess a series of factors the United States Supreme Court has set forth in Miller v. Alabama, which are designed to consider the 'mitigating qualities of youth.'" View "New Jersey v. Comer" on Justia Law
New Jersey v. Thompson
In July 2001, victim C.S. was sexually assaulted by an unknown assailant. The New Jersey State Police Lab (“Lab”) created a profile for the suspect’s DNA sample, Specimen 12A, retrieved from C.S.’s body. In 2002, the Lab entered the DNA profile into the national Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”). The DNA profile in CODIS did not include certain exclusionary data; without that data, it would have been impossible for Specimen 12A to generate a match with another DNA profile entered into CODIS. In 2004, defendant Bradley Thompson’s DNA sample was collected in an unrelated matter and his DNA profile entered into CODIS in 2006. In 2010, the FBI updated the National DNA Index System (“NDIS”) Operational Procedures Manual to explicitly allow the exclusionary data withheld from Specimen 12A to be entered into the system. In 2016, the Lab entered the exclusionary data for Specimen 12A into CODIS and was alerted that the specimen matched defendant’s DNA sample that had been entered into CODIS years earlier. Based on that match, defendant was indicted in May 2017 for offenses related to the July 2001 sexual assault. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the five-year statute of limitations began to run in 2004, when the State possessed both the physical evidence from the crime and defendant’s DNA sample. The trial court denied his motion and concluded that the statute of limitations started running when the State had evidence of a match. Defendant was ultimately convicted of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact and fourth-degree criminal trespass. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction, finding that the statute of limitations began to run in 2016 when the State received a DNA match. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding the statute of limitations began to run in 2010, when the FBI’s updated scientific guidance rendered the Lab capable of generating a match based on the DNA samples in its possession. View "New Jersey v. Thompson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law