Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Andre Higgs and Latrena May had a child together. Defendant and May had been arguing when East Orange Police Officer Kemon Lee approached them after hearing a woman’s voice shout “police” several times while he patrolled the area. Officer Lee testified that shortly after exiting his patrol car, he asked May to come down from the porch, but defendant began shooting May. Officer Lee returned fire and shot defendant several times. Defendant testified to a different version of events. Defendant stated that May pulled out a gun during their argument, and defendant took the gun away from her. According to defendant, he tried to surrender as Officer Lee approached, but the officer fired his weapon at defendant which led to the involuntary discharge of the gun in defendant’s hand, causing May’s death. Defendant was convicted of murder, among other offenses, and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence, finding no error with the trial court’s rulings. The Court granted certification on the three issues raised in defendant’s petition: (1) whether the trial court erred in not allowing defendant access to Officer Lee’s internal affairs records and not allowing defense counsel to cross-examine Officer Lee regarding his prior on-duty shootings; (2) whether it was error pursuant to N.J.R.E. 701 to allow the lay opinion testimony of Detective Green regarding the image on the dashcam video; and (3) whether defendant’s remote convictions were improperly admitted for impeachment purposes. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed on all three issues and remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Higgs" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of May 13, 2016, defendant Joseph Macchia, an off-duty police officer wearing his service revolver in an off-duty holster, became involved in a physical fight with Michael Gaffney outside a bar in Union. The two exchanged blows and separated twice. According to witnesses, Gaffney then went inside the bar, but defendant stayed outside and stared at Gaffney to entice him to come back out. Gaffney did so, and they began to fight a third time. Defendant fell to the ground, and Gaffney got on top of him, punching him repeatedly. Witnesses heard defendant’s gun fire as they tried to pull Gaffney off defendant. Union police arrived and arrested defendant, who stated that Gaffney was “going for his gun.” In a recorded statement, defendant said that when Gaffney was “straddling” and “pummeling” him, defendant believed Gaffney’s hand went to his gun. Defendant stated that he feared for his life and he “had no choice but to fire to stop the threat.” At trial, defendant testified on his own behalf, consistent with his recorded statement. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on whether a unanimous verdict rejecting self- defense was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for reckless manslaughter, or whether the jury was also required to unanimously agree as to why it rejected Macchia’s claim of self-defense. The Court disagreed with defendant’s contention that the jury’s questions showed tangible indication of jury confusion, or a fragmented verdict. After the trial court answered the jury’s questions and accurately explained the law, the Court found there was no tangible indication that the jury was confused about what facts it needed to decide to determine guilt. Judgment was therefore affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Macchia" on Justia Law

After his employment was terminated in May 2008, plaintiff Harold Hansen brought claims against Rite Aid and other defendants alleging age discrimination, sexual orientation discrimination, and gender discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), as well as several common law claims. After three trials, a jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor on his LAD sexual orientation discrimination claim and awarded him a total of $420,500 in compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff moved for an award of counsel fees and costs. In plaintiff’s initial submission, he asked the trial court to determine that a reasonable hourly rate for his lead counsel and the attorney who assisted in the first of the three trials was $725, and that a reasonable number of hours spent on this matter was 3,252. He requested that the trial court determine the lodestar to be $2,355,892.50, and that the court apply a one hundred percent enhancement to the lodestar. Plaintiff also sought an award of costs. In total, plaintiff requested an award of $5,035,773.50. The trial court issued a seventy-three-page decision with a fifty-four-page spreadsheet reflecting its analysis of the time entries and disbursements set forth in plaintiff’s invoice. The court ruled that a reasonable hourly rate for plaintiff’s lead counsel in this case was $375 per hour and a reasonable hourly rate for the assistant attorney was $325 per hour. The court identified several categories of legal work improperly included in plaintiff’s fee application, including work on unrelated matters. The trial court also excluded all time entries reflecting plaintiff’s counsel’s representation of plaintiff in the Appellate Division and to the Supreme Court. Noting that plaintiff was successful on only one claim and that plaintiff’s lead counsel performed tasks that should have been assigned to a junior attorney or a paralegal, the trial court reduced the lodestar by twenty percent. Ultimately, the trial court awarded $741,387.97 in fees and costs. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it set the reasonable hourly rate for plaintiff’s counsel’s work, assessed the number of hours reasonably expended by plaintiff’s counsel in pretrial proceedings and at trial, reduced the lodestar because of plaintiff’s limited success and other factors, and determined plaintiff’s application for an award of costs. View "Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp." on Justia Law

At issue in this case before the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether the Township of West Orange improperly designated the site of its public library as an area in need of redevelopment under the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (LRHL), N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -49. The local Planning Board hired a consulting firm to evaluate the Library. The firm concluded the Library met the statutory conditions. The Board, in turn, adopted that conclusion and recommended the site of the Library be designated an area in need of redevelopment. The Township Council agreed. Plaintiff Kevin Malanga, who lived in West Orange, filed a lawsuit to challenge the designation. The trial court rejected his arguments and dismissed the complaint, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court found the Township’s designation was not supported by substantial evidence in the record: the record did not establish that it suffered from obsolescence, faulty arrangement, or obsolete layout in a way that harmed the welfare of the community. The Township argued that even though the Library actively provided services to the residents of West Orange, it could have better served the public if it had more programming and computers, among other things. "That laudable concept, by itself, does not satisfy the standards in the LRHL." View "Malanga v. West Orange Twp." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration involved the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, as articulated in New Jersey v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015), and whether police could conduct a warrantless search of defendant Kyle Smart’s vehicle after an investigative stop. In particular, the Court considered whether the police actions giving rise to probable cause to search the vehicle were prompted by circumstances that were “unforeseeable and spontaneous,” as required under Witt. Officer Louis Taranto identified a 2017 GMC Terrain parked at a condo complex as a vehicle that had been involved in prior drug deals and that was used by a drug dealer known as “Killer.” Taranto conducted a database search and learned defendant had been listed with the moniker “Killer” and had multiple arrests and felony convictions involving controlled dangerous substances. Taranto surveilled the GMC. After about thirty minutes, he observed a female (the driver), defendant, and a child enter the GMC. Taranto followed them to a residence where he saw activity consistent with a drug transaction. At some point, Officer Samantha Sutter followed the GMC to the residence. Taranto and Sutter reasonably suspected that defendant had previously engaged in drug deals at the residence. Considering information from a confidential informant and a "concerned citizen," Taranto’s investigation, and the surveillance by Taranto and Sutter, Officers Taranto and Sutter determined they had reasonable and articulable suspicion to perform an investigative stop. The Supreme Court concluded the circumstances giving rise to probable cause in this case were not “unforeseeable and spontaneous.” The Court therefore affirmed the order suppressing the physical evidence seized from the vehicle. View "New Jersey v. Smart" on Justia Law

The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to decide “whether the testimony of an officer who is a certified Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) is admissible at trial and, if so, under what circumstances.” At the heart of the case was whether there was a reliable scientific basis for a twelve-step protocol that is used to determine (1) whether a person was impaired, and (2) whether that impairment was likely caused by ingesting one or more drugs. For decades, issues like this in criminal cases were analyzed under the test outlined in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). That standard turned on whether the subject of expert testimony was “generally accepted” in the relevant scientific community. The New Jersey Court moved away from the Frye test over time. In civil cases, New Jersey shifted toward an approach that focused directly on reliability by evaluating the methodology and reasoning underlying proposed expert testimony. After an extensive evidentiary hearing before a Special Master, the Court asked the parties and amici to submit their views on whether to depart from Frye and adopt the principles of Daubert in criminal cases. After review, the Court concluded Daubert offered a superior approach to evaluate the reliability of expert testimony. This case was remanded back to the Special Master to apply the standard announced here to the DRE evidence in the first instance. View "New Jersey v. Olenowski" on Justia Law

This insurance coverage dispute between a public entity joint insurance fund (JIF) and Star Insurance Company (Star), a commercial general liability insurance company, turned on whether the JIF provided “insurance” to its members or, instead, the JIF members protect against liability through “self-insurance.” That distinction was pertinent here because Star’s insurance policy included a clause under which its coverage obligations began only after coverage available through “other insurance” has been exhausted; the clause, however, did not mention “self-insurance.” Star argued the JIF provided insurance and therefore Star’s coverage was excess to the JIF; the JIF disagreed, contending that because its members were instead “self-insured,” Star’s coverage was primary. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that under the plain language of N.J.S.A. 40A:10-48, a JIF “was not an insurance company or an insurer under New Jersey law, and its “authorized activities . . . do not constitute the transaction of insurance nor doing an insurance business.” By the statute’s plain terms, JIFs cannot provide insurance in exchange for premiums, as insurance companies typically do; instead, JIF members reduce insurance costs by pooling financial resources, distributing and retaining risk, and paying claims through member assessments. Therefore, JIFs protect members against liability through “self-insurance.” “Self-insurance” is not insurance. The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the JIF and denial of summary judgment to Star. View "Statewide Insurance Fund v. Star Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether claims brought under the Insurance Fraud Protection Act (IFPA) and the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) by plaintiffs Liberty Insurance Corp. and LM Insurance Corp. (Liberty) against defendants Techdan, LLC (Techdan), Exterior Erecting Services, Inc. (Exterior), Daniel Fisher, Robert Dunlap, and Carol Junz were subject to the apportionment procedure of the Comparative Negligence Act (CNA). Liberty issued workers’ compensation policies to Techdan from 2004 to 2007. It alleged defendants misrepresented the relationship between Techdan and Exterior and the ownership structure of the two entities and provided fraudulent payroll records to reduce the premiums for workers’ compensation insurance. Techdan was indicted for second-degree theft by deception, and Dunlap entered a guilty plea to that charge on Techdan’s behalf. The court granted partial summary judgment as to Liberty’s IFPA claim for insurance fraud against Techdan, Exterior, Dunlap, and Fisher; partial summary judgment as to Liberty’s workers’ compensation fraud claim against all defendants; and partial summary judgment as to Liberty’s breach of contract claim against Techdan and Exterior. The court denied summary judgment as to Liberty’s remaining claims. The jury found Techdan liable for $454,660 in compensatory damages and found Exterior liable for $227,330 in compensatory damages, but awarded no compensatory damages against Dunlap, Fisher, or Junz. It awarded punitive damages in the amount of $200,000 against Dunlap, $10,000 against Fisher, and $45,000 against Junz, but awarded no punitive damages against Techdan or Exterior. The trial court determined all defendants should be jointly and severally liable for the $756,990 awarded as compensatory damages. The Appellate Division held the trial court erred when it imposed joint and several liability on defendants rather than directing the jury to allocate percentages of fault to defendants in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(a)(2). The Division concluded the trial court’s cumulative errors warranted a new trial, and it remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court: the trial court should have charged the jury to allocate percentages of fault and should have molded the judgment based on the jury’s findings; the trial court’s failure to apply the CNA warranted a new trial on remand. The Court did not disturb the first jury’s findings on the issues of liability under the IFPA, the WCA, or Liberty’s common-law claims, or its determination of total compensatory damages. The Court found no plain error in the trial court’s failure to give the jury an ultimate outcome charge. View "Liberty Insurance Corp. v. Techdan, LLC" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether people such as defendants Richard Gomes and Moataz Sheira, who received conditional discharges for marijuana offenses before the 2021 adoption of the Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA), were statutorily ineligible for admission into the pretrial intervention (PTI) program for new offenses. Both defendants received a previous conditional discharge stemming from a possessory marijuana offense that was no longer unlawful in New Jersey after CREAMMA. They were both charged with new offenses and applied for admission into PTI. A trial court concluded Sheira was statutorily ineligible for PTI because of his previous conditional discharge for marijuana possession, but a different trial court reached the contrary conclusion as to Gomes. Applying the “one diversion only” general limitation of the PTI statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(g)(1), and the terms of expungement statutes enacted before CREAMMA, the Appellate Division held that the defendants here were statutorily barred from PTI eligibility. The Supreme Court concluded persons who had pre-CREAMMA convictions for those marijuana offenses were no longer categorically precluded from future admission into PTI. Instead, prosecutors and reviewing courts must consider the merits of their PTI applications, without regard to the existence or circumstances of the earlier marijuana-related conditional discharges. "The holding harmonizes CREAMMA and its manifest legislative intent with the pre-existing general language of the PTI and expungement statutes, including the Legislature’s command in CREAMMA to apply its reforms to 'any case' that arose before its enactment." View "New Jersey v. Gomes" on Justia Law

Defendant Terrell Chambers was indicted and charged with second- degree sexual assault following a victim’s allegation that he performed non-consensual oral sex upon her several times over the course of a night when they drank alcohol at a gathering with friends and family. Defendant and several witnesses spoke about the victim’s alleged pre-incident mental illness. Defendant stated that the victim “was in the psychiatric home before, she went crazy before,” implying that she suffered from an illness that impaired her ability to recount the incident, or at a minimum, that she imagined or fabricated the incident. Defense counsel moved to compel the State to obtain and produce the victim’s pre-incident mental health records. Alternatively, counsel requested that the State make such records available for an in camera inspection. The State opposed the motion and argued it was not in possession, custody, or control of the records, and that it was without knowledge of their existence. The judge granted defendant’s motion and ordered the State to obtain and produce, for an in camera inspection, the victim’s mental health records -- extending six months before the incident and six months after the incident. The judge accepted defense counsel’s argument that “[t]he possibility of mistaken perception or recollection of an incident presents a legitimate need for the information which outweighs any possible prejudice.” The victim had no notice of the motion and therefore had no opportunity to be heard. The Appellate Division denied the State’s emergent motion seeking leave to appeal and a stay, noting that the State could renew its motion after the judge “issues an order regarding the use of the victim’s psychiatric records” following the in camera inspection. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a heightened discovery standard governed a defendant’s motion for pre-incident mental health records from a sexual assault victim. The Court established the standard applicable to a formally filed motion and also outlined a less formal process through which defendants could make requests for discovery of the pre-incident mental health records of an alleged sexual assault victim by letter to the prosecutor’s office. So that the new procedural and analytical framework could be applied in this case, the Court vacated the orders appealed here and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Chambers" on Justia Law