Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Malik & Son, LLC owned property in the Borough of Merchantville. The Property contained a fifty-four unit apartment building and had been designated by the Borough as an area in need of redevelopment. Malik assumed a mortgage loan issued by LB-RPR REO Holdings, LLC’s (LB) predecessor, and defaulted on the loan. LB’s predecessor in interest filed a complaint to foreclose the mortgage, and Malik did not file an answer. In early 2011, the court entered a final judgment of foreclosure. LB’s predecessor in interest transferred all its rights and interest in the Property to LB the next day. Once it acquired the loan, LB had a receiver appointed for the Property and made substantial repairs to the building. In an effort to protect its interest in the Property, LB sought, and the court entered, an order that directed that Malik could not sell the Property without the express approval of the sale price by LB. Throughout 2010 and 2011, the Borough pursued a plan to redevelop the Property. The Borough designated Citadel Wellwood, LLC (Citadel) as the redeveloper of the Property, and adopted the redevelopment and rehabilitation plan for the Property. Months before Citadel was designated as the redeveloper of the Property, Citadel entered a contract to purchase it for $1,250,000. Richard DePetro, the principal of Citadel, cancelled the contract after seeking a $200,000 reduction in the purchase price due to the deteriorated condition of the building. Malik rejected the offer, citing the amount due on the LB mortgage. Prior to cancelling the contract, Citadel contacted LB and offered to purchase the Property for $1,250,000 if LB agreed to a short sale to permit satisfaction of other liens. In the course of those discussions, DePetro mentioned to LB’s representative that the Borough would probably condemn the Property. In June 2011, in response to an inquiry from an LB representative, the Borough denied any intention to condemn the Property. However, once the Borough adopted the redevelopment plan on September 26, 2011, the Borough engaged an appraiser to ascertain the fair market value of the Property. The appraiser opined that as of August 24, 2011, its fair market value was $0. He calculated that value because the cost to renovate the Property far exceeded its market value following renovation and rehabilitation. The appraiser also assigned a fair market value of $270,000 without renovations. In a letter dated November 11, 2011, the Borough offered Malik $270,000 for the Property. Malik declined the Borough's offer. That same date, LB’s attorney contacted the Borough, expressing its surprise that the Borough intended to condemn the Property and noted that the Borough’s offer was far less than the price offered by Citadel in June 2011. LB’s attorney informed the Borough that it had obtained a final judgment of foreclosure and that the Property was scheduled to be sold at Sheriff’s Sale. Noting that it would soon own the Property, LB expressed its desire to meet with the Borough to discuss reasonable compensation for the Property. In this appeal, the issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether N.J.S.A. 20:3-6 required a condemning authority to engage in bona fide negotiations with a mortgage holder that has obtained a final judgment of foreclosure for the property sought to be condemned. In this case, the condemning authority initiated eminent domain proceedings after the property owner rejected its offer to acquire the property, just days before the holder of the foreclosure judgment expected the property to be sold at a Sheriff’s Sale. The judgment holder contended it was the real party in interest, and that the condemning authority had an obligation to negotiate with it rather than the property owner prior to initiating condemnation proceedings. The trial court concluded that the condemning authority had properly submitted the offer to the owner of record, and the subsequent rejection of the offer satisfied the statutory requirement of bona fide negotiations prior to the exercise of eminent domain authority. The trial court also determined that the condemning authority had no obligation to advise the foreclosure judgment holder of its intention to condemn or to engage in bona fide negotiations with it. In a reported decision, the Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "Borough of Merchantville v. Malik & Son, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue this case posed to the New Jersey Supreme Court was presented by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: whether, under New Jersey law, a tax sale certificate purchaser holds a tax lien. In 1998, plaintiff Princeton Office Park, L.P. purchased a 220,000 square foot commercial building on thirty-seven acres of land in the Township of Lawrence. Princeton Office Park did not satisfy its real estate tax obligation to the Township of Lawrence. By 2005, Princeton Office Park owed the Township of Lawrence in back taxes and unpaid penalties. The Township conducted a public auction of municipal tax liens. Defendant Plymouth Park Tax Services, LLC bid on a tax sale certificate for Princeton Office Park’s property. As the owner of the tax sale certificate following the public auction, Plymouth Park paid municipal real estate taxes and charges for Princeton Office Park’s property through the second quarter of 2008. By operation of law, Plymouth Park’s additional payments were added to the sum required for Princeton Office Park to redeem the tax sale certificate owned by Plymouth Park. The redemption amount accrued interest at a rate of eighteen percent following the sale. In 2007, Plymouth Park filed a tax lien foreclosure action against Princeton Office Park seeking to enjoin Princeton Office Park from exercising any right of redemption of the certificate, and requesting a declaration that Plymouth Park was the owner in fee simple of the disputed property. The Chancery Division entered an order establishing a deadline by which Princeton Office Park could redeem the certificate. While Plymouth Park’s foreclosure action was pending in the Chancery Division, Princeton Office Park filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Plymouth Park filed an initial proof of claim in the Bankruptcy Court, citing “taxes” as the basis for its claim. Plymouth Park then objected to Princeton Office Park’s Plan of Reorganization. The United States Bankruptcy Court ruled in favor of Princeton Office Park. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed, substantially adopting the reasoning of the United States Bankruptcy Court. The District Court construed the Tax Sale Law to confer on the purchaser of a tax sale certificate a lien, but not a lien that would permit the holder of the certificate to collect unpaid taxes owed to the municipality. Plymouth Park appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The New Jersey Supreme Court answered the Third Circuit's question in the affirmative: the purchaser of a tax sale certificate possesses a tax lien on the encumbered property. View "In re: Princeton Office Park v. Plymouth Park Tax Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mazdabrook Commons Homeowner's Association, Inc. manages a common-interest community in which individual owners agree to certain common rules and restrictions for the benefit of the entire group. The Rules and Regulations of the community bar signs except as provided in a "Declaration." Defendant Wasim Khan lived in a planned townhouse community managed by Mazdabrook Commons. In 2005, Defendant ran for Parsippany Town Council and posted two signs in support of his candidacy at his private residence: one inside the window of his townhouse and another inside the door. Mazdabrook notified Defendant that the signs violated the association's rules and ordered their removal. Mazdabrook's regulations banned all residential signs except "For Sale" signs. Upon review, the Supreme Court "balance[ed] the minimal interference with Mazdabrook's private property interest against [Defendant's] free speech right to post political signs on his own property" and found that the sign policy in question violated the free speech clause of the State Constitution. View "Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners' Ass'n v. Khan" on Justia Law

Defendant Frank A. Louis, Esq. represented Plaintiff Julia Gere in connection with Plaintiff's divorce from Peter Ricker. Pursuant to the property settlement agreement, Plaintiff had a six month window, which ended in October 2000, to decide how she wished to proceed with respect to the parties' ancillary real estate investments. Plaintiff's understanding was that she would retain a one-half interest in those assets unless she affirmatively advised Ricker within six months that she did not wish to do so. One of those assets was Navesink Partners, which owned both the real estate and business operations of a marina. Based on Louis's interpretation of Plaintiff’s wishes after a discussion with her friend, Louis sent a letter dated October 11, 2000, to Ricker's attorney stating, "this will confirm that except for the Marina, Mrs. Ricker wishes to maintain one-half interest in all other properties." Subsequently, a dispute arose in which Ricker maintained that Plaintiff had waived any interest in Navesink Partners, and Plaintiff contended that she did not waive her interest, that she wanted to continue her ownership interest in the marina's real estate, and that she was entitled to fair value for her interest in the marina's business operations. Plaintiff ultimately sued Louis for malpractice over the purported waiver of her interests in the marina property. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether "Puder v. Buechel" (183 N.J. 428 (2005)) barred Plaintiff's malpractice action against her former attorney and whether that claim was time-barred. The appellate division affirmed the trial court decision that Plaintiff indeed was time barred, and that she voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement regarding the marina property which she testified was "fair and reasonable." Upon review, the Supreme Court found Plaintiff's case was materially distinguishable from "Puder," and that her legal malpractice claim was not barred. View "Gere v. Louis" on Justia Law

Defendants Maryse and Emilio Guillaume failed to make their mortgage payment in April 2008, and made no payments since. In May 2008, the mortgage servicer "ASC" delivered a Notice of Intention to Foreclose informing them that the lender intended to file a foreclosure action and that they should seek the advice of an attorney. The notice of intention identified ASC, with a telephone number, as the entity to contact if they wished to dispute the calculation of the payment due or that a default had occurred. The name and address of the lender, Plaintiff U.S. Bank, did not appear anywhere on the notice. One month later, the Bank filed a foreclosure action. The complaint warned that judgment could be entered if Defendants failed to file an answer to the complaint within thirty-five days and that exercising their rights to dispute the debt did not excuse them from this requirement. For several months thereafter, the Guillaumes corresponded with ASC about the possibility of a loan modification to reduce their payment and to restore the loan to active status. However, the Guillaumes did not file an answer in the foreclosure action. The court entered a final judgment of foreclosure. The Guillaumes attempted to vacate the default judgment against them, arguing that the failure to provide the lender's name on the May 2008 notice of intent to foreclose was in violation of the Fair Foreclosure Act. The trial court denied the motion to vacate. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that because the trial court ordered the Bank to reissue a notice of intention and because the Guillaumes' other arguments did not warrant relief, the Court affirmed the denial of their motion to vacate the default judgment. View "US Bank National Association v. Guillaume" on Justia Law

Plaintiff American Dream at Marlboro, L.L.C., is the successor in interest to Beacon Road Associates, L.L.C., an entity that served as the residential developer of a series of lots. In 1994 and 1995, Plaintiff’s predecessor sought the approval of the Marlboro Township Planning Board for "Beacon Woods I." In 1995, the Planning Board granted preliminary major subdivision approval specifically conditioned on the inclusion of a restriction in the deed for a "flag lot" that would preclude its further subdivision. In 1999, Defendant Patricia Cleary entered into a contract with Plaintiff to purchase one of the properties in the originally-approved development. Defendant's lot backed onto the flag lot. The Planning Board approved Plaintiff's application for a new subdivision. The resolution made no reference to the deed restriction. Plaintiff closed on the purchase of the additional land and vacated the easement that had provided that parcel with separate access to a nearby road. In 2002, when Plaintiff entered into an agreement to sell the new subdivision to another developer, Plaintiff realized that it failed to reserve the easement that it needed to cross Defendant's property. When negotiations to secure Defendant's consent to the easement failed, Plaintiff redesigned the roadway so as to obviate the need the easement. In 2006, Plaintiff returned to the Planning Board and requested that it act on its 2003 application for an amendment to the subdivision approval, but the Board rejected it, noting that prior approvals had expired. In April 2003, Plaintiff filed suit for a declaration that its 2003 application had been approved by default. Defendant as intervenor, filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the flag lot was prohibited from being subdivided because of the earlier-imposed deed restriction, along with an order directing Plaintiff to record the deed restriction. The trial court concluded that the Planning Board could not approve the amended application because it lacked jurisdiction to eliminate the deed restriction. The court therefore entered an order declaring that all of the prior approvals for the subdivision were void, and it permitted Plaintiff to amend its complaint to eliminate the deed restriction based on changed circumstances. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification, and after review concluded the trial court misapplied the governing standards for considering the application to eliminate the restriction based on changed circumstances. View "AmericanDream at Marlboro, L.L.C. v. Marlboro Township Planning Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Blanca Gonzalez, and Monserate Diaz purchased a home as tenants in common. Diaz borrowed the downpayment from Cityscape Mortgage Corporation (Cityscape) and executed a note. Plaintiff did not sign the note. Plaintiff and Diaz secured that loan by mortgaging their home to Cityscape. Over time, Plaintiff fell behind on the payments and U.S. Bank obtained a foreclosure judgment. The trial court ordered that the home be sold to satisfy the judgment. Before the sheriff’s sale, Plaintiff entered into a written agreement with Defendant Wilshire Credit Corporation (Wilshire), U.S. Bank’s servicing agent. Plaintiff was represented by a Legal Services attorney who helped negotiate the agreement. Plaintiff missed four payments to Wilshire. A scheduled sheriff’s sale was cancelled when the parties entered into a second agreement. Plaintiff was contacted and dealt with directly; neither Wilshire nor U.S. Bank notified the Legal Services attorney. Although Plaintiff had not missed a single payment required by the second agreement, instead of dismissing the foreclosure action as promised, Wilshire sent a letter to Plaintiff noting that the second agreement was about to expire and that a new agreement needed to be negotiated to avoid foreclosure. Plaintiff contacted the Legal Services attorney. When the attorney questioned Wilshire, it could not explain how it had come to the arrears amount set in the second agreement, or why Plaintiff was not deemed current on the loan. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Wilshire and U.S. Bank engaged in deceptive and unconscionable practices in violation of the CFA. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Wilshire and U.S. Bank, finding that the CFA did not apply to post-judgment settlement agreements entered into to stave off a foreclosure sale. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated plaintiff’s CFA claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the post-foreclosure-judgment agreements in this case constituted stand-alone extensions of credit. In fashioning and collecting on such a loan, a lender or its servicing agent cannot use unconscionable practices in violation of the CFA. View "Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp." on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendants decided to purchase, renovate, and resell a home located in Medford Lakes. According to their plan, Defendants Christopher Masso and John Torrence would finance the purchase; Defendant James Githens would perform the renovations; and Defendant real estate agent Jennifer Lynch would serve as the listing agent. Plaintiff Debra Lombardi viewed the home and made an offer. The sales contract, which was signed by Masso and Torrence, indicated that the house was being sold to Lombardi “as is” and that any guarantees, unless set in writing, would be void. However, handwritten into the contract was a notation to “see construction addendum attached.” That addendum reflected at least seventy repairs and renovations. At the closing, the house was nowhere near completion. Masso agreed to place money in escrow to ensure completion of the renovations. The escrow was to be held until which time the renovations would be completed. Against her realtor’s advice, Lombardi went ahead with the closing. Thereafter, the house remained unfinished and Plaintiff filed suit. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendants, finding that Lombardi accepted the property “as is,” Defendants did not breach the contract, Defendants could not be held liable under the Consumer Fraud Act, and they made no misrepresentations. Later the trial judge would write a letter to the parties, including the dismissed defendants, informing them that he was going to reconsider his order granting summary judgment and was scheduling a new hearing on the issue. The judge ultimately vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Appellate Division granted defendants’ motion for leave to appeal, remanded to the trial court for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ultimately reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the Appellate Division correctly determined that the trial court’s original summary judgment order dismissing several of the defendants was issued in error, the trial judge was well within his discretion in revisiting and vacating the summary judgment order. View "Lombardi v. Masso" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court is whether a condominium complex is liable in tort for injury sustained by a pedestrian on its abutting sidewalk. "551 Observer Highway" is the site of a 104-unit condominium complex (the Building). Each unit is owned in fee simple by individual residents who have an undivided interest in the common elements. Every unit owner is a member of the Skyline at Hoboken Condominium Association, Inc. (Skyline), and only an owner may be a Skyline member. The Master Deed requires owners to pay an “Annual Common Expense” assessment, which is used for, among other things, maintaining the common elements and paying insurance premiums. According to the Master Deed, “common elements” included “[a]ll curbs, sidewalks, stoops, hallways, stairwells, porches and patios.” On the morning of February 14, 2006, while walking on the sidewalk abutting the Building, Plaintiff Richard Luchejko slipped on a sheet of ice and was injured. Plaintiff sued Skyline, CM3 (its property manager), the City of Hoboken, and D&D (a snow-clearing services company) alleging negligence for an unsafe sidewalk. All Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Skyline, CM3, and Hoboken, but not to D&D. Plaintiff then settled his claim with D&D and unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment to the remaining Defendants. Upon review of the appellate record, the Supreme Court found that the Appellate Division properly analyzed the facts of this case and concluded that no sidewalk liability attached for the injury to Plaintiff. View "Luchejko v. City of Hoboken" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs William and Vivian Allen contracted defendant V and A Brothers, Inc. (V&A) to landscape their property and build a retaining wall to enable the installation of a pool. At the time, V&A was wholly owned by two brothers, Defendants Vincent DiMeglio, who subsequently passed away, and Angelo DiMeglio. The corporation also had one full-time employee, Defendant Thomas Taylor. After V&A completed the work, Plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint naming both corporate and individual defendants. The first count was directed solely to V&A and alleged that the corporation breached its contract with Plaintiffs by improperly constructing the retaining wall and using inferior backfill material. The second count was directed to the corporation and Vincent's estate, Angelo, and Taylor individually, alleging three "Home Improvement Practices" violations of the state Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Before trial, the trial court granted the individual defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint against them, holding that the CFA did not create a direct cause of action against the individuals. Plaintiffs' remaining claims were tried and the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on all counts, awarding damages totaling $490,000. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's order dismissing the claims against the individual defendants under the CFA. The panel remanded the matter to determine whether any of the individual defendants had personally participated in the regulatory violations that formed the basis for Plaintiffs' CFA complaint. The panel precluded relitigation of the overall quantum of damages found by the jury in the trial against the corporate defendant. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that employees and officers of a corporation might be individually liable under the CFA for acts they undertake through the corporate entity. Furthermore, individual defendants are not collaterally estopped from relitigating the quantum of damages attributable to the CFA violations. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc." on Justia Law