Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff May Walker alleged that Defendant Carmelo Guiffre violated the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) and the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA). After finding that Defendant violated the CFA and TCCWNA, the trial court concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to a fee award. The trial court fixed the lodestar amount and applied a forty-five percent contingency enhancement. The Appellate Division found that the trial court's analysis of the reasonableness of Plaintiff's attorneys' hourly rate, based only on the judge's personal experience, did not satisfy the analysis found in "Rendine v. Pantzer" (141 N.J. 292 (1995)). In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the "Rendine" framework had been altered by the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Perdue v. Kenny A. (130 S.Ct. 1662 (2010)). The Court concluded that the mechanism for awarding attorneys' fees (including contingency enhancements) as adopted in "Rendine" remain in full force and effect as the governing principles for awards made pursuant to New Jersey fee-shifting statutes. View "Walker v. Guiffre" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a court may consider as part of its determination of an as-applied challenge to State law limiting places where sexually-oriented businesses may operate, the availability of alternate channels of communication located in another state. Defendant 35 Club began operating an "all nude gentlemen's cabaret" in Sayreville. Shortly after the club opened, the Borough brought suit to permanently enjoin the club from operating its business in the location it chose because it was within 1,000 feet of a public park or residential zone. The issue at trial was whether the applicable statute could constitutionally be applied to the club. The Borough's expert witness identified the so-called alternative channels of communication which still complied with the Borough's zoning statutes; the club's expert found none, and went outside the Borough but within the club's relevant market in making its determination. At the close of evidence, the Chancery Division concluded that the Borough had carried its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence the availability of adequate alternative channels of communication within the market area relevant to the club's business. In evaluating the adequacy of alternative channels of communication when deciding an as-applied constitutional challenge to the State's statute limiting the places where sexually-oriented businesses may operate, the Supreme Court held that trial courts are not precluded from considering the existence of sites that are located outside of New Jersey but that are found within the relevant market area as defined by the parties' experts. View "Borough of Sayreville v. 35 Club, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Selective Insurance Company of America declined to pay Defendant Arthur Rothman, MD's claims for needle electromyography (EMG) tests performed by his physician assistant (PA). Defendant took the insurance company to arbitration and won. Subsequently, he filed a complaint in the Law Division to confirm the arbitration award. He also initiated a proceeding in the Chancery Division to secure a declaration that PAs are authorized to perform EMGs. That complaint was transferred to the Law Division. In a consolidated opinion, the trial court affirmed the arbitration award and ruled that PAs are authorized to perform EMGs. The Appellate Division reversed, and Defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that PAs are not authorized to perform EMG tests, finding that needle EMG tests performed by physician assistants were not in the promulgated lists of authorized procedures from the Board of Medical Examiners. View "Selective Insurance Company of America v. Rothman" on Justia Law

Mathi Kahn-Polzo and other experienced bicyclists were riding downhill on the shoulder of Parsonage Hill Road, which was owned and maintained by Essex County. She rode over a depression on the shoulder, lost control and fell, suffered a catastrophic head injury despite wearing a helmet, and died twenty-six days later. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the County could be held liable under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA). Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Donald Polzo, the Supreme Court could not conclude that the County was on constructive notice of a "dangerous condition" on the shoulder of its roadway that "created a reasonably foreseeable risk" of death, or that the failure to correct the depression before the accident was "palpably unreasonable." View "Polzo v. County of Essex" on Justia Law

Elizabeth O'Brien was found stuffed inside a closet in her home on the afternoon of January 30, 2008. It was determined that she died from blunt force trauma to her head. Defendant Demetrius Diaz-Bridges was questioned and made no direct statements to inculpate him in the crime. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant's request for permission to speak with his mother in the midst of his custodial interrogation was an assertion of his right to silence that required officers to stop their questioning. The trial court concluded that it was, and ordered suppression of all statements made by Defendant after that request. The Appellate Division disagreed, but found that Defendant invoked his right to silence during one of his several subsequent reiterations of the request to speak with his mother, and ordered the suppression of a lesser portion of Defendant's recorded confession. Upon review of the trial court record and transcripts of Defendant's interrogations, the Supreme Court concluded that neither Defendant's statements about his wish to speak with his mother nor any of his other statements were assertions of his constitutionally-protected right to silence. Therefore, the Court held that suppression of any portion of Defendant's confession was in error. View "New Jersey v. Diaz-Bridges" on Justia Law

One evening in August 2008, a state trooper observed Defendant Reynold Regis' vehicle repeatedly swerve over the fog line and onto the shoulder of Route 280 near Roseland, New Jersey. Upon approaching the car, the trooper detected the odor of burnt marijuana. The trooper administered two field sobriety tests to Defendant, both of which he failed. Defendant and his passenger, Camilla Reynolds, were arrested. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance, possession of CDS, and failure to maintain a lane. The municipal court found Defendant not guilty of possession of CDS (Reynolds testified that the marijuana was hers) but guilty of driving under the influence and of failure to maintain a lane. Defendant appealed his conviction to the Law Division arguing the two clauses of the applicable statute were ambiguous as applied. The Law Division concluded that the State had proven the elements of the first offense identified in the statute, namely failure to drive "as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane." The Appellate Division held that the two clauses of the statute "clearly" described only one offense: failing to maintain a lane of travel by changing lanes without first ascertaining that the lane change can be conducted safely. Although it did not find the statute was ambiguous, the panel nonetheless invoked the rule of lenity to construe the statute in Defendant's favor and reversed his conviction. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: "the Appellate Division's limitation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b) to the violation identified in the statute's second clause would render the first clause inoperative. On the other hand, the court's construction gives meaning to all of the statute's language, and thereby effects the intent of the Legislature." View "New Jersey v. Regis" on Justia Law

The issue before the court was whether Defendant John Rogers was "exonerated" when his conviction was reversed and his case remanded for trial, or on the day his indictment was dismissed. Defendant sued the Cape May Public Defender's office for malpractice. The date the case was reversed would subject Defendant's claim to a one-year time bar, but a dismissal would not. One year later, his attorney filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim, which was denied. The trial judge determined that Defendant's claim accrued in 2007, and because he filed his notice more than one year later, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the late notice must be filed within one year after accrual of a claim; "exoneration" (and therefore accrual) occurred in 2007. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant was not "exonerated" until the indictment was dismissed with prejudice in 2008. His claim was thus not barred by the one year filing limitation. Nevertheless, because the claim was filed ten days beyond the ninety-day limit, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the "extraordinary circumstances" as defined by the governing statute was satisfied. View "Rogers v. Cape May County Office of the Public Defender" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a trial court erred in denying Defendant Stanford Yough's motion for a mistrial after the victim of a robbery testified that he observed the perpetrator more times than he had indicated in his statement to police. At trial, the victim testified during his direct examination that he was certain Defendant was one of his attackers. But on cross-examination, defense counsel highlighted the inconsistency between the victim's direct testimony and the statement he gave to police. In charging the jury on identification, the judge instructed the jury that it could consider the victim's testimony that he knew the perpetrator from having seen him before the incident. The instructions did not suggest that the victim observed Defendant after the robbery. Defense counsel did not object to the jury charge or request a limiting instruction on the use of the victim's testimony. The jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree robbery and imposed a fifteen-year term of imprisonment subject to the No Early Release Act. Despite defense counsel’s failure to object to the victim's testimony as "prior bad-acts evidence" or to the jury charge, and his failure to seek a curative charge, the majority of the Appellate Court found the statement inadmissible and highly prejudicial "that undermined the fairness of the trial to the extent that cautionary or limiting instructions were not a feasible alternative." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: "[t]rials are not perfectly orchestrated productions. The testimony of witnesses may not always be predictable, particularly in criminal cases where depositions are not a typical tool of discovery. On the stand, a witness may give testimony that is different from or more expansive than an out-of-court statement recorded by the police. In many instances, discrepancies will advantage a defense attorney attempting to discredit a witness -- but not always. Every witness's digression from a prior statement cannot be grist for the granting of a new-trial motion." View "New Jersey v. Yough" on Justia Law

Rodney Harper was shot to death in a Camden apartment early in the morning on January 1, 2003. James Womble was present when two men forcefully entered the apartment, seeking to collect money from Harper. Womble knew one of the men, co-defendant, George Clark, but the other man was a stranger. According to the State's evidence, Clark shot Harper while the stranger held a gun on Womble in a small, dark hallway. Thirteen days later, police showed Womble a photo array from which he identified Defendant Larry Henderson as the stranger. At trial, additional evidence relevant to Womble's identification was adduced. Neither Clark nor Defendant testified at trial. The primary evidence against Defendant was Womble's identification and a detective’s testimony about Defendant’s post-arrest statement. The jury acquitted Defendant of murder and aggravated manslaughter charges, and convicted him of reckless manslaughter, aggravated assault, and weapons charges. He was sentenced to an aggregate eleven-year term subject to a parole ineligibility period of almost six years. The Appellate Division reversed, presuming that the identification procedure in this case was impermissibly suggestive under the first prong of the "Manson/Madison" test. The court remanded for a new 'Wade' hearing to determine whether the identification was nonetheless reliable under the test's second prong. The panel contained its finding to what it considered to be a material breach of the Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the current legal standard for assessing eyewitness identification evidence must be revised because it does not offer an adequate measure for reliability; does not sufficiently deter inappropriate police conduct; and overstates the jury's ability to evaluate identification evidence. The Court held that Defendant was entitled to a new pretrial hearing, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Henderson" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was called to determine whether the heirs of an uninsured motorist killed in an automobile accident had a rightful claim under the Wrongful Death Act or whether N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) extinguished that claim, as it did the survival action. In 2005, Lawrence Aronberg was driving southbound on the New Jersey Turnpike when a tractor trailer careened into the rear of his car, killing him. The truck was operated by Wendell Tolbert and owned by Fleetwood Taggart (Fleetwood Trucking). On the day of the fatal accident, Aronberg, then thirty-four years old, was an uninsured motorist. Just three weeks earlier, Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company (Allstate) had cancelled Aronberg’s automobile insurance policy because of his failure to keep his premiums current. Plaintiff Sheila Aronberg, as General Administratrix of her son’s Estate, filed a survivorship and wrongful death action against defendants Tolbert and Fleetwood Trucking. The “Survivor’s Act” permits an appointed representative to file any personal cause of action that decedent could have brought had he lived. In contrast, the “Wrongful Death Act” provides to decedent’s heirs a right of recovery for pecuniary damages for their direct losses as a result of their relative’s death due to the tortious conduct of another. The trial court held that because the decedent did not carry insurance at the time of the accident, his estate could not recoup on its survival claim per N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a), but could recoup on the wrongful death action. The court found that the Wrongful Death Act granted heirs an independent right of recovery, regardless of the decedent’s failure to procure insurance. The Appellate Division granted defendants’ motion for leave to appeal and in a split decision affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held when an uninsured motorist’s cause of action is barred by the uninsured motorist statute, an heir has no right of recovery under the Wrongful Death Act. View "Aronberg v. Tolbert" on Justia Law