Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff American Dream at Marlboro, L.L.C., is the successor in interest to Beacon Road Associates, L.L.C., an entity that served as the residential developer of a series of lots. In 1994 and 1995, Plaintiff’s predecessor sought the approval of the Marlboro Township Planning Board for "Beacon Woods I." In 1995, the Planning Board granted preliminary major subdivision approval specifically conditioned on the inclusion of a restriction in the deed for a "flag lot" that would preclude its further subdivision. In 1999, Defendant Patricia Cleary entered into a contract with Plaintiff to purchase one of the properties in the originally-approved development. Defendant's lot backed onto the flag lot. The Planning Board approved Plaintiff's application for a new subdivision. The resolution made no reference to the deed restriction. Plaintiff closed on the purchase of the additional land and vacated the easement that had provided that parcel with separate access to a nearby road. In 2002, when Plaintiff entered into an agreement to sell the new subdivision to another developer, Plaintiff realized that it failed to reserve the easement that it needed to cross Defendant's property. When negotiations to secure Defendant's consent to the easement failed, Plaintiff redesigned the roadway so as to obviate the need the easement. In 2006, Plaintiff returned to the Planning Board and requested that it act on its 2003 application for an amendment to the subdivision approval, but the Board rejected it, noting that prior approvals had expired. In April 2003, Plaintiff filed suit for a declaration that its 2003 application had been approved by default. Defendant as intervenor, filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the flag lot was prohibited from being subdivided because of the earlier-imposed deed restriction, along with an order directing Plaintiff to record the deed restriction. The trial court concluded that the Planning Board could not approve the amended application because it lacked jurisdiction to eliminate the deed restriction. The court therefore entered an order declaring that all of the prior approvals for the subdivision were void, and it permitted Plaintiff to amend its complaint to eliminate the deed restriction based on changed circumstances. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification, and after review concluded the trial court misapplied the governing standards for considering the application to eliminate the restriction based on changed circumstances. View "AmericanDream at Marlboro, L.L.C. v. Marlboro Township Planning Board" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant KPMG already was in the process of auditing Papel Giftware's 1998 and 1999 financial statements when merger discussions began with Plaintiff Cast Art. In a November 1999 letter to Papel’s audit committee, KPMG explained that the audit was planned "to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. Absolute assurance is not attainable . . . ." The letter cautioned that there is a risk that "fraud" and "illegal acts may exist and not be detected by an audit performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards," and that "an audit is not designed to detect matters that are immaterial to the financial statements." In September 2000, KPMG delivered completed audits to Papel. KPMG's accompanying opinion letter, addressed to Papel's audit committee, stated that the audits were conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. The letter concluded by observing that as of December 31, 1999, Papel was not in compliance with certain agreements with its lenders, which raised "substantial doubt" about Papel's "ability to continue as a going concern." Three months later, Cast Art and Papel consummated their merger. Soon, Cast Art had difficulty collecting accounts receivable that it had believed Papel had outstanding prior to the merger. Cast Art investigated and learned that Papel's 1998 and 1999 financial statements were inaccurate and that Papel had accelerated revenue. Cast Art sought to recover from KPMG for the loss of its business. Cast Art alleged that KPMG was negligent; that if KPMG had performed a proper audit, it would have uncovered the fraudulent accounting activity that was taking place at Papel; and that Cast Art would not have proceeded with the merger if it had been alerted to the fraud. KPMG argued, among other things, that Cast Art had not retained KPMG and was not its client, and thus Cast Art's claim was barred by the Accountant Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-25. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because Cast Art failed to establish that KPMG either "knew at the time of the engagement by the client," or later agreed Cast Art could rely on its work for Papel in proceeding with the merger, Cast Art failed to satisfy the prerequisites of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-25(b)(2).View "Cast Art Industries, LLC v. KPMG LLP" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case arose from the November 8, 2011 election of Gabriela Mosquera to the fourth Legislative district of the General Assembly. Shelley Lovett, who received the next highest number of votes, challenged the election alleging that Mosquera was ineligible because she failed to meet the one-year durational residency requirement set forth in Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 2 of the New Jersey Constitution. Complicating the matter was the decision and accompanying order in "Robertson v. Bartels," (150 F. Supp.2d 691 (D.N.J. 2001)), wherein a federal trial court had concluded that the durational residency requirement of the State Constitution violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and had enjoined the New Jersey Attorney General and Secretary of State from enforcing the provision’s one-year durational residency requirement for eligibility for General Assembly office. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that The New Jersey Constitution's durational residency requirement for members of the General Assembly does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; this decision was not a new ruling and the Court therefore declined to limit its judgment to prospective application. Because Mosquera was the incumbent at the time of the vacancy, the Democratic Party, with which Mosquera was affiliated at the time of the election, could select an interim successor for the vacant seat. Further, in construing the vacancy-filling provisions the Court recognized that Mosquera would meet eligibility requirements for appointment as interim successor, if she were selected by her party. View "In re: Contest of November 8, 2011 General Election" on Justia Law

This appeal was a companion to "New Jersey v. Hudson," (___ N.J. ___ (2012), decided on the same day), because it also involved the application of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b) to an extended-term sentence. Here, the sentence was imposed on Defendant Sally McDonald for an offense committed prior to an offense for which she already was serving another extended-term sentence. As in "Hudson," the second extended term was imposed in a separate sentencing proceeding from that in which the first extended-term sentence was imposed. Consistent with the interpretation given N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5 in "Hudson," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for resentencing because it was error for the sentencing court to have imposed a second extended-term sentence on Defendant in these circumstances. View "New Jersey v. McDonald" on Justia Law

In this appeal and in "New Jersey v. McDonald," (2012), separately conducted sentencing proceedings resulted in sentences that imposed (in the aggregate) multiple extended-term sentences. In previous cases, the Supreme Court addressed N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(1)'s prohibition against sentencing a defendant to multiple extended terms in a single sentencing proceeding. In this appeal, the Court addressed for the first time the importance of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(1)'s incorporation of subsection a's prohibitions to certain offenses and sentencing proceedings, when sentencing was conducted in separate proceedings. Defendant Kevin Hudson was sentenced to a second extended-term sentence for an offense committed prior to the imposition of the extended-term sentence he was serving. The Appellate Division affirmed, recognizing that multiple extended terms may not be imposed in a single sentencing proceeding, but concluded that because Defendant sought severance and subjected himself to two separate sentencing proceedings, his sentence was not illegal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that in this case, because the indictment was severed resulting in two trials and two sentencing proceedings, and the first sentencing court imposed an extended-term prison sentence, it was error for the second court also to impose an extended-term sentence. The timing and sequence of the offenses and sentencings brought Defendant squarely under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(1)'s proscription against multiple extended-term sentences. View "New Jersey v. Hudson" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether it was proper for a police officer to testify at trial about how and why he assembled a photo array. In 2005, Angel Chalco left his home in Newark and headed toward the subway station to catch a train to work. As he walked down the stairs, the men grabbed Chalco, pulled him backward, and demanded money. The men took Chalco’s wallet and his cell phone. They then hit him on the head and kicked his stomach, causing him to lose consciousness. After he returned home, he called the police. Soon after, he met with a New Jersey Transit Police Detective and described one of his assailants. That description was broadcast to patrol units. At police headquarters, Chalco viewed about thirty photographs but did not identify anyone as his assailant. A police sketch artist worked with Chalco and prepared a sketch of the assailant based on Chalco’s description. The composite drawing was then disseminated. Days later, the detective came across an arrest photo of Defendant Danny Lazo taken after he had jumped a turnstile. The detective thought Defendant’s photo closely resembled the composite sketch and included a picture of Defendant in an array he compiled. To comply with guidelines from the Attorney General, the detective used a two-year-old photo of Defendant instead of the more recent arrest photo. The detective showed Chalco the photo array, and Chalco identified the picture of Defendant as his assailant. Defendant was arrested the following day. Defendant vigorously objected to both the introduction of the arrest photo and the testimony. The Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for certification. Upon review, the Court found that the officer’s testimony about the photo array had no independent relevance, merely served to bolster the victim’s account, and should not have been admitted at trial in light of the principles outlined in “New Jersey v. Branch” (182 N.J. 338 (2005)). View "New Jersey v. Lazo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Officer Willie Rowe, was patrolling a particular area as part of the police department’s “Safe Block” initiative. Plaintiff had visited Defendants Mazel Thirty, LLC’s building once before on a similar patrol. As he descended the stairs that led from the sidewalk down to the basement door, grasping the handrail and shining his flashlight, the cement that was covering the steps broke, causing him injuries. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Defendants carelessly and negligently supervised, maintained and controlled their premises and failed to adequately warn him of the hazardous conditions. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s presence was unforeseen and that he was aware of the condition of the steps. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the officer stood in the shoes of a licensee to whom the landowner owed a duty to warn of any dangerous conditions of which the owner knew or had reason to know and of which the officer was reasonably unaware. Because the record presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding the officer’s awareness of the dangerous condition, “the grant of summary judgment was a usurpation of the jury’s function.” View "Rowe v. Mazel Thirty, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the "spouse privilege" could be pierced using the three-part test set forth in "In re Kozlov" (79 N.J. 232 (1979) to prevent that spouse from testifying in a criminal proceeding against her husband. In 2006, "Joanne" worked in Defendant Dr. James Mauti's medical office. Her sister Jeannette also worked in Defendant's office as the office manager. Jeannette was his live-in girlfriend. Joanne complained of back pain one day, and Defendant offered to treat her. He gave her a a pain pill and a small liquid described as a muscle relaxant. Joanne recalled that Defendant asked her to change into a pair of his boxer shorts "in case he needed to crack her back." After Defendant gave her a second cup of liquid, she became incapacitated. However, she remembered Mauti heating towels to apply to her back, loosening and pulling down her boxer shorts, and sexually assaulting her. She also remembered a sound that reminded her of a digital camera or cellular phone taking a picture. Joanne claimed Defendant sexually assaulted her. The State subpoenaed Jeannette to appear before a grand jury in late 2006. In the summer of 2007, Jeannette and Defendant announced their wedding engagement. Defendant was charged in August. Jeannette informed the State that she would invoke the spousal privilege with regard to her testimony. The State moved to compel Jeannette to testify. The trial court held that the privilege could be pierced under "Kozlov" because the evidence sought from Jeannette was legitimately needed and could not be secured from a less-intrusive source. The Appellate Division reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed, finding Jeannette was entitled to exercise the spousal privilege of refusing to testify in his criminal trial because there was no conflict between Jeannette's exercise of the privilege and a constitutional right, and she did not waive her right to exercise the privilege. View "New Jersey v. Mauti" on Justia Law

A grand jury returned a fifty-count indictment against Defendant Roy Friedman for offenses against his wife and children. Defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to three counts of second-degree aggravated assault upon his wife that occurred during three separate periods of time in 2006. The State agreed to recommend sentences of six years, seven years, and seven years, respectively, for the three offenses, each subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA) and to run consecutively to the others. The remaining forty-seven counts would be dismissed. Defendant agreed to waive any argument against imposing consecutive sentences. At the plea hearing, the trial court carefully questioned defendant about his understanding of and agreement with the terms of the plea. Defendant admitted that during the periods of time in question, he burned his wife's arm and thigh with hot oven racks from a toaster oven; as a result, she was hospitalized for life-threatening infections and skin grafts. From his appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether Defendant must serve the periods of post-release parole supervision that are part of a NERA sentence consecutively or concurrently; and whether "State v. Hess" (207 N.J. 123 (2011)), required invalidation of a portion of the plea bargain under which Defendant agreed that his attorney would not argue for concurrent sentences, as opposed to the consecutive sentences to which he had agreed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that when a defendant has been sentenced to consecutive custodial terms under NERA, the periods of parole supervision that follow must be served consecutively. The Court did not reach whether "Hess" applied in this case because the trial court recognized its inherent sentencing authority, and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it was appropriate to impose consecutive sentences for three separate assaults Defendant admitted committing upon his wife. View "New Jersey v. Friedman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court consolidated this case with "Walker v. Guiffre" because it implicated the state's fee-shifting statutes. The Appellate Division found that the trial court's analysis of the reasonableness of Plaintiff's attorneys' hourly rate in "Walker" did not satisfy the analysis found in "Rendine v. Pantzer" (141 N.J. 292 (1995)). The Supreme Court considered whether the "Rendine" framework had been altered by the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Perdue v. Kenny A." (130 S.Ct. 1662 (2010)). The Court concluded that the mechanism for awarding attorneys' fees (including contingency enhancements) as adopted in "Rendine" remain in full force and effect as the governing principles for awards made pursuant to New Jersey fee-shifting statutes. View "Humphries v. Powder Mill Shopping Plaza" on Justia Law