Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Billie Cornett received a drug-eluting stent to treat coronary artery disease. Five months later, a blood clot formed near the site of the stent and Cornett suffered a subacute stent thrombosis. Eleven days later, he died. In 2008, his widow, Vonnie Cornett, filed suit in New Jersey seeking damages for the injuries suffered by her husband and his estate. The issue presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether Vonnie Cornett filed her complaint within the statute of limitations, which required the New Jersey Court to determine whether the law of Kentucky or New Jersey applied to this case. The stent used in this case is a Class III medical device that was subject to the rigorous pre-market approval (PMA) process of the Food & Drug Administration (FDA). Therefore, another issue for the Court to decide was whether the various state statutory and common law claims are preempted by federal law governing approval of this medical device. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Kentucky statute of limitations governed this case and that Kentucky applies a discovery rule to product liability actions involving latent injuries and illnesses, but Cornett did not timely file her complaint. The Court also concluded that the great bulk of the state statutory and common law claims were preempted by federal law. View "Vonnie Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

A "discrete, narrow legal question" came before the Supreme Court: is a health care provider who has received an assignment of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits from an insured obligated upon request to furnish to the insurer broad information with respect to the provider’s ownership structure, billing practices, and regulatory compliance? Plaintiffs in this matter consist of six “Selective Insurance Company” entities. Individuals insured by Selective sought medical treatment from defendants for injuries received in automobile accidents. Those insureds assigned to defendants the benefits to which they were entitled under their PIP coverage, giving defendants the contractual right to seek PIP reimbursement under those policies. In reviewing claims submitted for payment, Selective detected what it considered to be suspicious patterns in both the treatments defendants had provided and the corporate links among the treating entities. Selective requested that defendant supply to it a variety of data with respect to their ownership, structure, billing practices, and compliance with certain regulations. In support of its request, Selective cited the provision within the insureds’ insurance policies requiring the insureds to cooperate with Selective in the investigation of any claim under the policy. When defendants refused to supply the material Selective sought, Selective sued, alleging that defendants' failure to supply the information was a breach of they duty to cooperate and a violation of the PIP discovery statute. After hearing oral argument, the trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss and granted Selective the relief it had requested by directing defendants to respond to Selective’s discovery requests. Defendants thereafter moved for reconsideration, but the trial court denied that motion, together with defendants’ request for a stay. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that an insured had no duty to provide information to plaintiff with respect to the ownership structure, billing practices, or referral methods of the medical providers from whom he or she sought treatment for his or her injuries. Because an insured had no obligation to supply that information to plaintiff, the assignment of benefits executed by an insured could not serve to impose that duty on the providers. View "Selective Insurance Company of America v. Hudson East Pain Management" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Court determined whether N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 provided immunity to the Plainfield Rescue Squad as an entity, regardless of any negligent delay in transporting a gunshot victim to a hospital. According to the report of the Plaintiff's expert, the Rescue Squad members "wasted over 30 minutes" performing ineffective CPR, depriving the decedent of "any chance of surviving his injury." The decedent needed an immediate transport to the nearby emergency room, where a surgical trauma team could have opened his chest and taken him to the operating room for surgical repair. Had the decedent been transported promptly, he would have had a twenty to thirty percent chance of surviving. The expert concluded that the Squad members engaged in "significant deviations" from usual standards of practice that were significant contributing factors to the decedent's death. Plaintiffs filed a wrongful-death/survival action against the Plainfield Rescue Squad and others. Ultimately, the trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. With respect to the Rescue Squad, the trial court found immunity under both N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 and another statute. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, determining that only N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 shielded the Squad from civil liability. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed: "[a]lthough N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 provides immunity to 'officers and members' of a rescue squad for civil damages in rendering 'intermediate life support services in good faith,' the plain language of the statute does not provide immunity to a rescue squad as an entity. Thus, Plainfield Rescue Squad is subject to a civil suit for negligence based on the facts alleged by plaintiffs." View "Geraldine Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court clarified the factors that courts may consider as part of their review of petitions for expungment of a criminal record. The Court concluded that defendants seeking expungement have the burden of proof to demonstrate why their case warrants relief under the statute's public-interest prong. In early 2000, law enforcement officials investigated the sale of controlled dangerous substances (CDS) at a nightclub in Somers Point, New Jersey. Defendant was indicted for three counts of distribution of CDS, three counts of possession of CDS with intent to distribute, three counts of distribution of CDS within 500 feet of a public zone, and three counts of possession of CDS. The trial court sentenced Defendant to forty-five days in county jail (subject to daily reporting), a three-year period of probation, and various fines and penalties. After eighteen months, Defendant successfully completed all of the conditions of probation. Seven and one-half years later, Defendant filed a petition to expunge his conviction. In support of his application, he offered proof that he completed college and received a Bachelor of Science degree, and certified that he worked full-time while in school and had become active in various community service projects. The trial court in this case found that expungement was "not consistent with the public interest." Defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that balancing of the factors that remained in the record of this case suggested that expungement was in the public interest. "In an abundance of caution," the Court remanded the case to the trial court to weigh the relevant factors again in light of the above principles and to evaluate petitioner's conduct since the court denied his petition in 2010. View "In re Kollman, Jr." on Justia Law

The question raised in this appeal was whether records of a legal clinic at a public law school were subject to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA). The Rutgers Environmental Litigation Clinic represented a private group that opposed a plan to build an outlet mall. The mall's developer, Sussex Commons Associates, LLC (Sussex Commons or Sussex), sought documents from the Clinic under OPRA. The trial court concluded that the Clinic was exempt from OPRA requests, and the Appellate Division reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and held that records related to cases at public law school clinics are not subject to OPRA. "[The Court found] no evidence that the Legislature intended to apply OPRA to teaching clinics that represent private clients, or that it meant to cause harm to clinical programs at public law schools when it enacted OPRA." The Court also concluded that the common law right of access does not extend to case-related records of law school clinics. View "Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Memorial Properties, LLC (Memorial) and Mount Hebron Cemetery Association (Mt. Hebron) are respectively the manager and owner of Liberty Grove Memorial Gardens. Mt. Hebron was sued in 2007 and 2008 in seven lawsuits in the Superior Court of New Jersey and the Supreme Court of New York by family members of decedents whose remains were sent by funeral directors to Liberty Grove for cremation in 2003, 2004 and 2005. The New Jersey and New York plaintiffs alleged that prior to being sent to Liberty Grove, the decedents’ bodies were unlawfully dissected, and that tissue, bone and organs were removed for commercial sale. The families contended that they did not discover the illegal harvesting scheme until 2006, when law enforcement officials who investigated and prosecuted the perpetrators advised them that their relatives’ body parts had been illegally harvested. Memorial and Mt. Hebron contended that they received the decedents’ remains in closed containers and were unaware that the remains had been tampered with before being turned over to the crematory. Memorial and Mt. Hebron were not prosecuted as a result of the criminal investigation of the illegal harvesting. This appeal arose from Memorial’s and Mt. Hebron’s pursuit of a defense and indemnification with respect to the New Jersey and New York litigation, under two insurance policies. The first policy, issued by Assurance Company of America (Assurance), provided coverage for the year 2003 for claims arising from damage to human remains and bodily injury, including mental anguish. The second, issued by Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland), provided analogous coverage for the year 2006, but contained an "improper handling" exclusionary clause, barring coverage for bodily injury or property damage arising from specified acts and omissions including "[f]ailure to bury, cremate or properly dispose of a 'deceased body.'" In 2008, Memorial and Mt. Hebron demanded that Assurance and Maryland defend and indemnify them. Assurance declined coverage on the ground that the occurrences were outside of the policy period, invoking plaintiffs' claims that they learned of the harvesting scheme in 2006. Maryland declined coverage, citing the "improper handling" exclusionary clause in its 2006 policy. Memorial and Mt. Hebron filed a declaratory judgment action on May 14, 2008, naming as defendants Assurance, Maryland and Zurich North American Insurance Company (Zurich), and demanding defense and indemnification. Assurance and Maryland cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the summary judgment motion filed by Memorial and Mt. Hebron, but granted defendant insurers' cross-motion for summary judgment, identifying the year 2006 as the time frame of the "occurrence" in the two cases for which the insureds sought coverage. The Appellate Division affirmed both of the trial court’s orders granting the summary judgment motions filed by Assurance and Maryland. After its review, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that neither the Assurance policy nor the Maryland policy required the insurer to defend or indemnify Memorial and Mt. Hebron for claims asserted in the New Jersey and New York litigation. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division's ruling. View "Memorial Properties, LLC v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In September 2005, Defendant Leroy Munroe was charged with murder and weapons offenses for the shooting death of Christian Natal. In March 2007, he pled guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter in exchange for dismissal of the murder count and other charges. At the plea hearing, defendant admitted that he and Natal had a dispute, he shot Natal at close range, and Natal died. Also, defendant’s attorney stated: “I would stipulate that it’s circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” Shortly after the plea hearing, a probation officer interviewed defendant to prepare the presentence investigation report. During the interview, defendant stated that he had been robbed by Natal more than once, so he armed himself with a gun for protection. Defendant further stated that on the day in question, Natal “pulled out a knife on him,” defendant backed up while Natal was swinging his knife, and, at a point when defendant was leaning on a car, he shot Natal in “self-defense.” Nothing in the presentence report, which included the State’s version of events, directly contradicted that account. Indeed, at the scene, police found a box cutter in Natal’s hand. Before sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that he had a viable affirmative defense of self-defense. The court did not accept defendant’s asserted justification for the use of deadly force and denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion and should have allowed defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in the interests of justice. "Defendant asserted a colorable claim of innocence based on a plausible defense of self-defense; there would not have been undue delay or prejudice had the case proceeded to trial; and the factual issues in dispute identified by the trial court should have been decided by a jury." View "New Jersey v. Munroe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kenneth Van Dunk and his wife filed this suit in the Law Division after he suffered serious injuries in a trench collapse at a construction site workplace. Following discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment to the employer-defendants Reckson Associates Realty Corporation and James Construction Company, Inc. Based on its assessment of the totality of circumstances, the court concluded that plaintiff did not demonstrate an intentional wrong within the meaning of the Act, notwithstanding that the employer was issued a federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) "willful violation" citation as a result of the incident. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, and returned the matter to the trial court. The Supreme Court granted the Defendants' petition for certification seeking review of that judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendants' conduct fell short of an intentional wrong creating a substantial certainty of bodily injury or death. Therefore the workers' compensation statutory bar against common-law tor actions precluded this suit, and the appellate court's ruling was reversed. View "Van Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant Jean Millman worked as a sales representative for Plaintiff Target Industries, an industrial bag company. Plaintiff Thomas F. Fox was Target's director of development and purchased all of its assets after Target filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 1999. Plaintiffs asserted that Millman signed a confidentiality agreement when hired. Target terminated Millman on September 7, 2000. Several days later, Defendant Polymer Packaging Inc., an industrial bag company owned by Defendants Larry and William Lanham, hired Millman knowing that she had previously worked for Target. The Lanhams asserted that Millman assured them that she was not subject to the terms of either a confidentiality agreement or a non-compete clause. The Lanhams did not verify independently the truth of that assertion. The Lanhams conceded that Millman provided Polymer with a list of customers, but contended that she described it as a customer base that she had developed over the years, thereby implying that she had generated the list on her own. The list did not identify Target or bear any indication that it was not Millman's own, and the Lanhams did not further inquire into the genesis of the list. Millman sold products for Polymer to former Target customers and, before leaving Polymer in October 2004, was responsible for generating substantial sales for the company. The core dispute over the list gave rise to a series of rulings by the trial court prior to and following a jury verdict based on special interrogatories, all of which were affirmed by the Appellate Division. Plaintiffs' petition for certification to the Supreme Court asserted that it was error for the trial court to permit Defendants to raise the defense of laches. In particular, they argued that permitting a laches defense, in circumstances in which the statute of limitations had not expired, would erase clearly defined deadlines and therefore create ambiguity, lead to confusion and engender inconsistent results in application. Further, Plaintiffs asserted that the trial and appellate courts erred in rejecting the continuing violation doctrine, in misapplying settled precedents from the Supreme Court recognizing that customer lists are protected as trade secrets, and in failing to require Defendants to inquire independently about the proprietary nature of the customer list prior to utilizing it. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the equitable doctrine of laches could not be used to bar an action at law that was commenced within the time constraints of an applicable statute of limitations. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Fox v. Millman" on Justia Law

In 2004, an argument escalated into an altercation which left Julio Colon dead. Defendant Reynaldo Galicia and Hector Cordero drove from Vineland to Newark to confront Colon about a sport utility vehicle (SUV) that he had borrowed but failed to return. Cordero implored Colon to renew a romantic relationship the two shared, and both Cordero and Defendant begged Colon to return to Vineland with them. The three men battled over the keys to the SUV, and Colon exchanged punches and kicks with Cordero and Defendant. With Cordero in the passenger seat, Defendant twice drove his car toward Colon, prompting Colon to climb on the hood of the car and bang his fists on the window. As Colon clung to the car, Defendant accelerated and drove several blocks, running a stop sign. Defendant abruptly stopped the car, and Colon fell from the hood to the pavement. He sustained severe head injuries and died a week later. Tried separately from Cordero, Defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated manslaughter, second-degree aggravated assault, disorderly persons theft and weapons charges. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Appellate Division. At issue was New Jersey's "passion/provocation" statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the facts of this case, as developed in the trial record, did not support passion/provocation finding under the statute. The Court further held that the verdict sheet used at trial incorrectly guided the jury in its consideration of the passion/provocation issue, and reversed that portion of the Appellate Division's decision that deemed the sheet not to constitute error ("[n]otwithstanding the trial court's correct instruction to the jury that it could not find Defendant guilty of murder unless it concluded that passion/provocation did not apply, the verdict sheet improperly directed the jury not to consider the issue of passion/provocation unless it had already reached a guilty verdict on the murder charge." The Court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision that rejected Defendant's belated invocation of self-defense as a defense to the charges against him. View "New Jersey v. Galicia" on Justia Law