Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the nature and extent of fees that may be recovered from a litigant in a matrimonial dispute by an individual who has been appointed to serve as a parenting coordinator. More specifically, the Court addressed the circumstances under which and the basis upon which a litigant who raises a grievance against the parenting coordinator may be called upon to answer for fees incurred by the parenting coordinator in responding to a grievance; in resisting discovery demands relating to the grievance; in participating in discovery about the grievance; in pursuing enforcement of a fee award in the trial court; and in participating in the appellate process. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division to the extent that it affirmed the trial court's order awarding fees to the parenting coordinator for her work responding to the grievances and to the extent that it affirmed the trial court's rejection of the husband's argument that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his grievances; in all other respects the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed. View "Segal v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal concerned the validity of Chapter 37 of the Laws of 2009, "Kyleigh’s Law." Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that Chapter 37 is preempted by the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act; violates equal protection; and constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint and the Appellate Division affirmed. The panel found that the decal requirement was not preempted by the federal statute because disclosure of a person's age group is not "personal information" under the Act; that the decal requirement does not violate equal protection because it is a rational and suitable means of furthering a legitimate and appropriate government interest; and that the decal requirement does not give rise to an unreasonable search and seizure because a driver has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her age group and an officer's examination of the decal is not a "search." Upon review, the Supreme Court substantially affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that Chapter 37 is not preempted by federal law, does not violate equal protection, and does not give rise to an unconstitutional search and seizure. View "Trautmann v. Christie" on Justia Law

Police responded to an unverified 9-1-1 call reporting "a domestic dispute possibly involving a handgun" at a Carteret residence. Outside her apartment, Kamilah Richardson told the police that there was no problem in her home and that her eleven-year-old son was inside alone. Against her will, the police entered the apartment to assure the safety of the young boy. The police found him unharmed, without any visible injuries or signs of distress and no indication of a domestic disturbance inside the apartment. The police removed defendant Shareef Edmonds from an adjoining room, where he was watching television, and frisked him. Without evidence to corroborate the earlier domestic-violence report and without first securing a warrant, the police searched the area where defendant had been seated. A handgun was found under a pillow. Defendant, who was charged with the unlawful possession of the gun, claimed that the warrantless search yielding the weapon was unconstitutional. The trial court agreed, determining that the search of the home without a warrant was objectively unreasonable and could not be justified by either the emergency-aid or community-caretaking exception to the constitutional warrant requirement. The court suppressed the gun, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found credible evidence in the record to support the trial court's ruling. View "New Jersey v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether defendants were entitled to racial profiling discovery to challenge their convictions for attempted murder. The convictions relate to defendants' attack on a law enforcement officer after a motor vehicle stop. A New Jersey State Trooper stopped two Hispanic men for speeding on the New Jersey Turnpike in 1992. As the officer questioned the men immediately after the stop, they tried to overpower him. One defendant grabbed the officer around the neck and began to choke him, while the other tried to get control of the officer's firearm. During that struggle, the officer ultimately broke the second defendant's grip, retrieved his weapon, and fired twice, hitting defendants. The police later obtained a search warrant for defendants' car and found about fourteen ounces of cocaine in it. Both defendants were convicted for drug charges as well as attempted murder and related offenses. Years later, in a motion for post-conviction relief, defendants sought racial profiling discovery to prove that the stop was racially motivated. After a series of rulings at the trial and appellate levels, the Attorney General dismissed the drug convictions, leaving only defendants' convictions for attempted murder and related offenses. Defendants pressed for profiling discovery to challenge the remaining convictions. They contended that they needed the discovery to demonstrate that the drug evidence should have been suppressed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply in this case, there was no need for further discovery to determine whether the stop was in fact illegal. Furthermore, the Court concluded that defendants offered no viable theory to use possible evidence of racial profiling at trial. The Appellate Division order directing that discovery be produced was reversed. View "New Jersey v. Herrerra" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether defendant Aurelio Ray Cagno's 2004 conviction for racketeering conspiracy was time-barred under the general five-year statute of limitations governing criminal prosecutions. If not, the Court had to determine whether certain evidence was improperly introduced during defendant's 2004 trial to establish the continuation of the criminal conspiracy and whether that evidence was so prejudicial that defendant's murder conviction, achieved at the same trial that resulted in his RICO conviction, was "irremediably tainted" and should have been reversed. Defendant also challenged certain of the trial court's instructions that were provided to the jury that found defendant guilty of all the charges he faced. Finally, defendant raised an issue related to his sentence. After study of the extensive record of this case, the Supreme Court was satisfied that defendant presented no basis upon which his convictions or sentence should be reversed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Cagno" on Justia Law

Defendant Barrington McDonald appealed a trial court's denial of his motion to vacate his plea of guilty to three offenses arising from an automobile accident. Defendant, driving under the influence of alcohol, struck and seriously injured a pedestrian. He was indicted for second-degree assault by automobile while driving in a school zone, and was issued summonses for several motor vehicle offenses. Several months after the accident, defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State. The plea agreement called for defendant to plead guilty to second-degree assault by auto in a school zone, driving while intoxicated (DWI), and driving with a suspended license. The prosecutor agreed to recommend a single, three-year sentence for all three offenses. The same day, defendant pled guilty to the three offenses, and the trial court found that he had knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Prior to sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that he had not entered into his plea agreement knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily. He challenged the State's contention that his motor vehicle accident occurred within 1,000 feet of school property. The trial court denied the motion, and sentenced defendant to a term of imprisonment, a license suspension and fines for the three offenses. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court should have permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea. An Appellate Division panel affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for the school-zone offense, merged defendant's DWI conviction into his conviction for assault by auto in a school zone, remanded for a determination of whether defendant should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea on the offense of driving with a suspended license, and corrected minor sentencing errors. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because his accident occurred within 1,000 feet of a school property used for school purposes that meets the statutory standard, and because the statute clearly applies at all times of the day and night, defendant could not present a colorable claim that he did not commit the offense of assault by auto in a school zone. Furthermore, the Court rejected defendant's argument with regard to withdrawing his guilty plea, and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "New Jersey v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the trial court erred in not sua sponte including the variation of the insanity-defense jury charge recognized in "State v. Worlock," (117 N.J. 596 (1990)), specifically including additional language to separate defendant's ability to appreciate legal wrong from moral wrong based on "deific commands" to kill. The trial testimony showed that defendant had developed a set of delusional religious beliefs derived from his interpretation of scripture. Both defendant's and the State's expert diagnosed him with schizoaffective disorder. Defendant's expert testified that defendant believed that he was supposed to kill because God was telling him to do it and he had to follow God's word. The State's expert emphasized that defendant admitted to not hearing voices at the time of the killing and opined that defendant was merely acting on his interpretation of what God wanted. According to the State's expert, defendant stated that he only heard the voices when sleeping, that the communications were not actual voices, but were rather subconscious thoughts, and that he had not heard any voices on the night of the incident. The State's expert also opined that other considerations indicated that defendant knew that killing was wrong, including a history of violence toward woman; that he stabbed his victim to put her out of her misery; that he drank alcohol and smoked marijuana afterwards; that his forensic evaluation test results indicated that he was trying to make himself look better by claiming that God had him do it; and that he decided to evade police. The court and all parties agreed to use the Model Jury Charge for the insanity defense. The jury rejected defendant's insanity defense and convicted him of murder and the other charges. In a motion for a new trial, defendant claimed for the first time that the jury should have been provided with the deific-command variant of the insanity-defense jury charge recognized in Worlock. The trial court denied defendant's motion. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to give, sua sponte, a Worlock charge as part of the insanity-defense jury instruction. The evidence did not clearly indicate defendant killed as a result of a deific command. View "New Jersey v. Singleton, Jr." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether weapons recovered from a defendant's premises during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon "reasonable cause" under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act could be admitted in a subsequent criminal prosecution of defendant for possession of those weapons consistent with Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendant moved to suppress, arguing that because the items were found during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant issued under the domestic violence statute, they could not be used as evidence in a later criminal case. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that a search under the domestic violence statute is constitutional only because it serves "a legitimate state interest," and thus evidence gathered during the search cannot have criminal repercussions. The Appellate Division affirmed the suppression of the handguns, noting that the warrant did not issue upon probable cause, but upon the lesser standard of reasonable cause; the purpose of the search had been to provide protection to the alleged victim, rather than to uncover evidence of criminal conduct; the handguns were not within the searching officers' plain view; and the fact that the Colt revolver was stolen was not immediately apparent but required further investigation through the State Police database. The panel recognized, however, that police may immediately have known it was illegal to possess an assault rifle and large capacity magazines. Thus, it reversed the suppression of those items and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that the items seized could serve as the basis for a subsequent criminal prosecution if their illegal nature is immediately apparent. A firearm's serial number is visible simply by looking at the weapon. Recording that number does not constitute a seizure, and entry of that number into the NCIC system and review of the results does not constitute a search. Whether the officers could recognize immediately that the assault rifle and large capacity magazines were illegal to possess were factual determinations that must be remanded to the trial court. View "New Jersey v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant Norman Jackson entered Murul Chowdhury's taxi through the front passenger door and demanded Chowdhury's money at gunpoint. Chowdhury handed over cash and his wallet. Defendant then ordered Chowdhury to drive him to a location blocks away. At gunpoint, Chowdhury drove defendant approximately eight-tenths of a mile. Defendant departed the taxi without injuring the driver. Defendant and was arrested shortly thereafter. No weapon was found at the scene of his arrest. At police headquarters, police attempted to conduct a more thorough search of defendant, which triggered an altercation that injured defendant and revealed a concealed gun. That night, the interrogating officer drafted a false report that did not reveal the failure to locate defendant's gun at the scene of his arrest. Later that same night, Of the officer prepared and filed a second report that made clear that defendant's weapon was not recovered until after they returned to police headquarters. Before a grand jury, the officer testified falsely based on his initial fabricated report, which later prompted the State to dismiss the indictment. Defendant filed a civil suit against the officer arising out of his altercation with defendant and his false grand jury testimony. Before a second grand jury, the officer testified based on the accurate police report. Defendant was indicted for first-degree robbery and second-degree kidnapping, in addition to other charges. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether comments made by the prosecutor during summation required a mistrial. The Court also determined whether the evidence supported defendant's conviction for kidnapping. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for a mistrial because the prosecutor's improper comments did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Jersey v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Wade Stancil was injured in 1995 while employed by Orient Originals. He received workers' compensation benefits from his employer's compensation carrier, defendant ACE USA (ACE). In 2006, following a trial, the court of compensation determined that Stancil was totally disabled. In 2007, Stancil filed a motion in the compensation court seeking an order compelling ACE to pay outstanding medical bills. During a hearing on the motion, the compensation judge commented that ACE had a history of failing to make payments when ordered to do so. The compensation judge granted Stancil's motion, warned ACE against any further violation of the order to pay, and awarded Stancil counsel fees. The parties returned to the compensation court for a further proceeding relating to the disputed bills. After finding that the bills identified in the earlier order remained unpaid and that ACE's failure to make payment was a willful and intentional violation of the order, the court issued another order compelling ACE to make immediate payment and again awarding counsel fees. In 2008, Stancil underwent additional surgery and psychiatric treatment. Stancil's physician attributed the need for additional treatment to an earlier treatment delay caused by the carrier's delay in paying medical providers. N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -142 (the Act), is the exclusive remedy for the claims pled in the complaint and therefore no damages could be awarded. The trial court granted ACE's motion effectively denying payments for Stancil's 2008 treatment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the employee could sue the carrier for pain and suffering caused by the carrier's delay in paying for medical treatment, prescriptions, and other services. Upon review, the Court concluded that an injured employee does not have a common law right of action against a workers' compensation carrier for pain and suffering caused by the carrier's delay because: (1) the workers' compensation system was designed to provide injured workers with a remedy outside of the ordinary tort or contract remedies cognizable in the Superior Court; (2) in amending the Workers' Compensation Act in 2008, the Legislature rejected a provision that would have given the compensation courts broader permission to authorize a resort to the Superior Court and adopted a remedy that permits compensation courts to act through a contempt power; and (3) allowing a direct common-law cause of action against a carrier would undermine the workers' compensation system by substituting a cause of action that would become the preferred manner of securing relief. View "Stancil v. ACE USA" on Justia Law