Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court centered on a decision by a county prosecutor to seek waiver of three juveniles, aged sixteen at the time of their offenses, to adult court for acts of delinquency that, as charged, were equivalent to aggravated assault, robbery, and second-degree conspiracy. A Family Part judge found probable cause that the juveniles committed the offenses but denied the waiver motion. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the Family Part overstepped its bounds. The case called into question the standard of review to be exercised by a court reviewing such motions for waiver. "An abuse of discretion review does not allow the court to substitute its judgment for that of the prosecutor. Rather, a review for abuse of discretion involves a limited but nonetheless substantive review to ensure that the prosecutor’s individualized decision about the juvenile before the court, as set forth in the statement of reasons, is not arbitrary or abusive of the considerable discretion allowed to the prosecutor by statute. Cursory or conclusory statements as justification for waiver will not suffice to allow the court to perform its review under the abuse of discretion standard because such statements provide no meaningful explanation of the prosecutor’s reasoning." Applying that standard, the Court held that in this case the prosecutor’s explanation in the Statements of Reasons lacked detail. The Court reversed and remanded this case for a more full explanation by the prosecutor according to the new standard outlined in the Court's opinion. View "State In the Interest of V.A." on Justia Law

This case required the Court to address the standard to be applied by Family Part judges when they determine whether the prosecution has demonstrated probable cause under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a)(2). It arose from a 2009 shooting in which one victim was killed and one seriously injured, allegedly by a group of men led by Angel Ramos, the father of one of the two juveniles in this case -- A.D. #1. Ramos was alleged to be a leader in a street gang. The incident closely followed a fight in which A.D. #1 and A.D. #2 were beaten by an uncle of A.D. #2 and others. According to the prosecution, the two juveniles, motivated by a desire for revenge following the fight, contacted A.D. #1's father and participated in a conspiracy to murder A.D. #2's uncle and others, precipitating an assault in which the targeted uncle was unhurt, but another uncle of A.D. #2 was killed and A.D. #2's mother was severely wounded. The two juveniles, both approaching their eighteenth birthdays, were charged with murder, aggravated assault, conspiracy and attempted murder, among other offenses. The trial court denied the prosecution's application to waive the juveniles into adult criminal court, concluding that the State had not demonstrated probable cause under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a)(2). It found "no evidence" that the two juveniles had understood that their response to the fight would lead to murder. The State appealed, and an Appellate Division panel reversed the determination of the trial court, holding that the trial court had committed several legal errors in its application of the probable cause standard to the setting of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision: "the probable cause standard that governs waiver of juvenile complaints into adult criminal court under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 is similar to the standard that guides a grand jury's determination whether or not to indict. If the trial court finds that the State has presented evidence which, combined with reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, leads to a well-grounded suspicion or belief that the juvenile has committed one or more crimes enumerated in the statute, the "probable cause" standard of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 is satisfied. " View "In the Interest of A.D." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether a plaintiff, who was removed from public employment after positing a claim of employer retaliation in a civil service disciplinary proceeding, should have been barred from seeking to circumvent that discipline through a subsequent Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) action also alleging retaliation. Plaintiff was terminated from his position following two close-in-time proceedings involving separate disciplinary matters before the Civil Service Commission (Commission). The first resulted in a demotion and the imposition of a sixty-day suspension. The second proceeding involved a distinct set of charges relating to plaintiff's abuse of sick leave. Following full discovery practice before the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) and the commencement of an evidential proceeding in the second matter, the employer moved for partial summary decision, which was granted by the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ found it significant that despite plaintiff's defensive theme of employer retaliation, he did not provide support for that claim in his response to the employer's motion seeking partial summary judgment, and plaintiff's termination, for sick-leave misuse. "This matter raises significant and practical concerns about the intersection of administrative disciplinary proceedings and the important protection provided to whistle-blowing employees through CEPA. Although this matter does not present a textbook record for transparent application of the elements required for application of collateral estoppel, [the Supreme Court was] persuaded that preclusion should apply to plaintiff's subsequently filed retaliation claims against his former employer." The Court reversed the appellate court and held that under the facts of this case, plaintiff's CEPA action was barred. View "Winters v. No. Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue" on Justia Law

Defendant Manaf Stas, was convicted of allowing an intoxicated person to operate a vehicle over which he had custody and control. Defendant and another individual, Joseph Putz, were involved in an automobile accident in a minivan owned by defendant's sister, minutes after leaving a bar where both had been drinking. After police arrived on the scene, Putz told the investigating police officer that he had been driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. After failing field sobriety tests, Putz was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI). Defendant stood nearby in silence as Putz told police that he had driven the car, failed field sobriety tests, and was arrested. He offered no comment on Putz's confession to being the driver at the time of the accident. Given Putz's admission that he was the driver, the police did not subject defendant to field sobriety tests or administer a breathalyzer. Instead, defendant was given a summons for allowing Putz, while intoxicated, to drive the minivan. Defendant and Putz were jointly tried in municipal court. Rejecting the proffered testimony, the municipal court found defendant and Putz guilty of different violations of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). Defendant appealed, and the Law Division also convicted defendant. The Law Division relied upon defendant’s silence while Putz was questioned and arrested, construing that silence to be "an admission on [defendant's] part." Defendant appealed, and an Appellate Division panel affirmed. The panel concluded that if the Law Division's invocation of defendant's silence constituted error, it was harmless. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the municipal court for a new trial. The Court concluded that defendant was entitled to the protection of the constitutional, statutory and common law privilege against self-incrimination in the quasi-criminal proceedings before the municipal court and the Law Division, and that the use of defendant's silence as substantive evidence of his guilt and for the purpose of assessing his credibility violated defendant's federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and his state statutory and common law privilege against self-incrimination. View "New Jersey v. Stas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jamie and Rebecca Gannon, maintained that plaintiff Jamie Gannon developed a form of brain cancer because of a series of polio vaccines he was given as a child. Plaintiffs pursued various forms of relief in both federal and state courts. In the federal court action, they sought relief from the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, contending that the federal government was negligent in permitting the polio vaccine to be sold to the public. Plaintiffs' federal action was dismissed following a partial bench trial, based on the government's motion for judgment on partial findings, and that judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Proceeding on a parallel track, plaintiffs sought relief in New Jersey state courts. In the state court action, they raised product liability claims against defendants American Home Products, Inc., American Cyanamid Company, Lederle Laboratories, and Wyeth-Lederle Vaccines, which they asserted were the entities that had manufactured or distributed the polio vaccine given to plaintiff Jamie Gannon. In the state court litigation, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants based on two grounds: (1) the trial court concluded that plaintiffs lacked sufficient evidence to prove the identity of the manufacturer of the polio vaccine that plaintiff Jamie Gannon was given; (2) the trial court concluded that plaintiffs were collaterally estopped from bringing the cause of action based on the prior judgment entered in federal court. The Appellate Division reversed both aspects of the trial court's judgment and remanded the matter for further discovery and for trial. The panel first concluded that the trial court had utilized an incorrect standard in evaluating the sufficiency of the product identification evidence because it failed to afford plaintiffs the benefit of the inferences to which they were entitled as the non-moving parties in the context of a summary judgment motion. The panel then concluded that there were equitable considerations that militated against granting collateral estoppel effect to the judgment of the federal court, including the status of discovery in the state court matter and the pendency of similar state court litigation involving other plaintiffs. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the Appellate Division’s collateral estoppel analysis was in error, the Court reversed. View "Gannon v. American Products, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, the Pension and Health Care Benefits Act (Chapter 78) was enacted into law, a law that applied to all public employees, including Supreme Court justices and Superior Court judges then in service. Article VI, Section 6, Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution provides that justices and judges "shall receive for their services such salaries as may be provided by law, which shall not be diminished during the term of their appointment" (the No-Diminution Clause). The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Chapter 78 violated the New Jersey Constitution by diminishing the salaries of justices and judges during the terms of their appointments. Upon review, the Court concluded that it did. "Whatever good motives the Legislature might have, the Framers' message is simple and clear. Diminishing judicial salaries during a jurist's term of appointment is forbidden by the Constitution." View "DePascale v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

In this appeal the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a pet owner should be permitted to recover for emotional distress caused by observing the traumatic death of her pet. Upon review, the Court concluded was no basis in law or public policy to expand the traditionally and intentionally narrow grounds established in "Portee v. Jaffee," (84 N.J. 88 (1980)), which permits compensation for the traumatic loss of carefully defined classes of individuals, to include emotional distress claims arising from observing a pet's death. "Although humans may share an emotional and enduring bond with pets, permitting that bond to support a recovery for emotional distress would require the Court to vastly expand the classes of human relationships that would qualify for Portee damages or to elevate relationships with animals above those shared with other human beings." View "McDougall v. Lamm" on Justia Law

In this appeal the Supreme Court considered the extent to which the Board of Governors of Rutgers, the State University (University) complied with the requirements of the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA), and if its compliance was deficient, the extent to which plaintiff was entitled to a judicial remedy. Plaintiff Francis McGovern is an alumnus of the University who attended regularly the meetings of the University's Board of Governors. Concerned at what he perceived to be a persistent disregard on the part of the Board for OPMA's mandates, he filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs. The trial court ultimately granted defendants' motion to dismiss this complaint. Plaintiff appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the case for entry of an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint. View "McGovern, Jr. v. Rutgers, State University of New Jersey" on Justia Law

Defendant F.M. (Fernanda) appealed the termination of her parental rights to her now five-year-old daughter, Quinn, and four-year-old son, Troy, Jr. Both children were born of a relationship between Fernanda and T.J. (Troy). The family court found that Troy had committed an act of domestic violence against Fernanda, had an intractable drug-addiction problem, and suffered from mental illness that induced delusional thoughts that he was God. On this basis, the court considered Troy a danger to the physical well-being of the children. The termination of Fernanda's parental rights was premised on the court's findings that she was incapable and unwilling to protect her children from the dangers presented by Troy. The court barred Troy from having unsupervised contact with Quinn, the only child born of their relationship at the time. In violation of court orders and earlier consent agreements with the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), Fernanda allowed Troy to have access to Quinn in her home. Fernanda's inability to shield Quinn from her father led to the child's removal from the home and later to the removal of Troy, Jr. after his birth. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Fernanda never raised any objection to "care or custody" before the family court, she was barred from doing so on appeal based on laches. Furthermore, the Court upheld the family court's determination to terminate Fernanda's parental rights, deferring to the lower court's findings as adequately supported by the record. View "New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. F.M." on Justia Law

Defendant, who was convicted at trial of sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child, argued that the trial court and the Appellate Division, which affirmed his convictions and sentence, deprived him of a fair trial. Finding no merit to Defendant's arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "New Jersey v. J.D." on Justia Law