Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Peter Risko filed a wrongful death action against Defendant Thomson Muller Automotive Group. His wife Camille slipped and fell in the automobile showroom. Mr. Risko alleged that because of this fall, a chain reaction of injuries was set in motion that ultimately ended in her premature death. During his summation, Mr. Risko's attorney cited the Eighth Amendment, stating that "prisoners of war are not supposed to be tortured ... Camille went through torture and defendant has to pay for that." Counsel told the jury to report to the judge if any of them could not find for more than $1 million in damages because they would be "ignoring the law." The trial judge interrupted Plaintiff's counsel, held a sidebar, and stated that he was considering a mistrial because of the outlandish statements. The judge did not ask the attorneys to argue on whether to mistry the case, nor did defense counsel object to continuing the case. The jury returned a verdict against the dealership, and awarded $1.75 million in damages. The dealership then moved for a new trial, arguing that opposing counsel's summation tainted the verdict. The judge acknowledged that he should have given immediate cautionary instructions to the jury. He felt compelled to grant a new trial on all issues. The appellate court reversed the trial court's new trial order. The court noted that the trial court did not strike the offending remarks nor issue a curative instruction to the jury, and defense counsel did not request a mistrial or offer a corrective jury charge "which would be expected if they truly found the summation objectionable." The Supreme Court disagreed with the majority appellate opinion, and reversed its holding pertaining to the damages award. The Court held that a new trial on the damages issue was warranted based on the "cumulative effect of counsel's comments during summation." The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Risko v. Thompson Muller Automotive Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Zarik Rose was incarcerated in 1995 on charges relating to the to the attempted murder of Charles Mosely. While awaiting trial, Defendant allegedly told one of the State's witnesses against him that he wanted to have Mosely "whacked," and that Defendant solicited the witness to kill Mosely. The State moved to admit Defendant's comments at trial. The trial court found some of the evidence admissible as "res gestae." During the trial, the court provided instructions to guide the jury's use of that evidence. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that, among other things, all evidence relating to his incarceration on attempted murder charges was improperly admitted at trial. In this appeal, the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed Defendant's conviction, finding that the trial court appropriately instructed the jury on use of the admitted statements. However, by this case, the Court ended the practice of using "res gestae" as an explanation for the admission of evidence: "[e]vidence of uncharged misconduct that is not intrinsic evidence of the crime is inadmissible unless proffered for a proper purpose. ... The Court direct[ed] trial courts to make the Rules of Evidence the touchstone for the analysis of all bad acts categories of res gestae evidence, and disapproves further use of res gestae to support evidential rulings." View "New Jersey v. Rose" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Denise Perrelli appealed a trial court decision in favor of Defendants Bridget and Paul Pastorelle. Plaintiff believed the last time she sent her car insurance company a check for coverage was in 2005. She believed she had coverage on August 4, 2006, the day she got into an accident with Defendants. Geovanni Velverde, a friend, was driving at the time of the accident. He died of his injuries, and Plaintiff suffered serious injuries. Plaintiff sued Defendants alleging that her injuries were caused by Defendants' negligence. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that as an uninsured motorist, Plaintiff had no right to sue. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court found that under the state's "No Fault Act," a person injured while a passenger in her on uninsured vehicle was barred from suing for her injuries.

Plaintiff Frederick Voss was injured when his motorcycle collided with a vehicle operated by Defendant Kristoffe Tranquilino. Plaintiff alleged that prior to the accident, he was a dining at Tiffany's (a restaurant) and was negligently served alcoholic beverages that contributed to the accident and caused his injuries. Plaintiff was charged with DWI and subsequently pled guilty to the charge. Plaintiff sued Tiffany's. Tiffany's moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the state "Dram Shop Act" barred Plaintiff from bringing suit because he pled guilty to DWI. Tiffany's lost at trial, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, including the legislative history of the Dram Shop Act, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court, in quoting the appellate panel, found that "immunizing liquor licensees from liability in such circumstances would me inimical to the State's police of curbing drunk driving."

Defendant stated he could not perform field sobriety tests because of a handicap. After failed attempts, he was arrested. At headquarters officers read Miranda warnings and a standard statement that the law requires breath samples and that a separate summons will issue for refusal. The statement provides that any ambiguous or conditional response will be treated as a refusal; if a defendant remains silent or indicates that he has a right to remain silent, wishes to consult an attorney or other person, or if the response is ambiguous or conditional, the officer shall read an additional statement. The defendant consented and indicated that he understood instructions. He twice provided samples that were not of sufficient length or volume. An officer told defendant that if he did not give a long continuous breath, it would be considered a refusal. When defendant again failed, he was charged with violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. Law Division held that the officer was not required to read the additional statement; Appellate Division reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction. Defendant unequivocally consented to the test; his failures to provide the necessary volume and length of samples did not render his consent ambiguous or conditional. Defendant was not entitled to the additional statement.

Plaintiff Donald Sachau and Defendant Barbara Sachau were married in 1964, and divorced in 1979. At the time of their divorce, the partiesâ two children lived with Mrs. Sachau. Pursuant to the divorce judgment, Mr. Sachau was to pay his wife child support, and Mrs. Sachau would remain in the marital home until the youngest child reached age eighteen. At that time, the house would be appraised and listed for sale within 30 days of the childâs birthday. The proceeds from the sale would then be split according to the divorce judgment. In 1984, the youngest child turned eighteen, triggering the sale provision. For the next twenty-two years, neither party took action to enforce their rights under the judgment. Mrs. Sachau remained in the home, and in 1990, began making inconsistent payments to her husband. In 2005, Mr. Sachau was unable to support himself, and as a result, sought to enforce his rights under the 1979 divorce judgment. In 2006, he sued to compel the sale of the marital home. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge ruled that the marital home should be sold and that Mrs. Sachau should receive full credit for all the payments she made. Mrs. Sachau filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied and she was ordered to sign a listing agreement. Mrs. Sachau appealed, and the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Sachau appealed the trial courtâs evidentiary findings, but the appellate court adopted the trial courtâs findings. The Supreme Court found that the divorce judgment was silent on how the parties should value the marital home. The Court reversed the appellate court decision and remanded the case to the trial court for re-evaluation of its conclusions.

In 2001, Petitioner Police Officer Gregory Russo and his partner responded to a house fire. Officer Russo went into the burning structure, located an adult and two children trapped inside and saved them. The officer heard cries for help on the second floor, and went back inside to try to find more persons trapped by the fire. When inside, the intense heat and smoke overwhelmed him. Firefighters escorted the officer from the burning building, but not before the person who had cried out for help had died. Outside, the officer received first aid, and witnessed firefighters remove the victim from the burning building. Firefighters laid the victim’s body on the lawn in front of Officer Russo. The family blamed the officer for the victim’s death. The officer later reported he had trouble sleeping, stomach disorders, suicidal thoughts and depression. Eventually the officer would be diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Officer Russo applied for “accidental” disability retirement benefits in 2004. The Police & Fireman’s Retirement System Board of Trustees had an expert evaluate Officer Russo. He would be classified as “totally and permanently disabled” as a result of the fire in 2001. The Board, however, denied Officer Russo’s claim, and granted him an “ordinary” disability pension. The Officer appealed, and a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). While the ALJ’s decision was pending, the Supreme Court decided “Patterson v. Board of Trustees, State Police Retirement System,” which addressed the applicable standards to determining accidental disability pensions. The ALJ concluded that Officer Russo was eligible for an accidental disability pension. The Board adopted the ALJ’s findings, but rejected the decision. The appellate court upheld the Board’s conclusion that Officer Russo did not qualify for accidental disability benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the officer was improperly denied accidental disability benefits for his injury because both the Board and appellate court misapplied the standards set out in its decision in the “Patterson” case. The Court reversed the appeals court’s decision and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. View "Russo v. Bd. of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement Sys." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ming Yu He was in an automobile accident with Defendant Enilma Miller. A jury found Defendant was negligent, and awarded Plaintiff $1.7 million for pain, suffering, injury, and loss of consortium. Defendant moved for a new trial or remittitur. The trial court granted the remittitur and reduced the money award to approximately $1.5 million. The court concluded that Plaintiff did not appear to be affected by her injuries at trial, and because she decided against surgery on her spine, and she was still able to drive a motor vehicle, she was not as injured as the juryâs original award would suggest. The appellate court reversed the trial courtâs decision. The Supreme Court summarily reversed part and remanded part of the case to the trial court, ordering the trial court to perform a factual analysis of how the award in Plaintiffâs case compared to similar awards given in New Jersey. On remand, the trial court noted that it had never seen such high damages in similar cases, and that his observations of Plaintiff during trial supported the remittitur. The appellate court again reversed the trial courtâs decision, concluding that the record fell short of what remittitur required. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, and reversed, finding that the trial court provided a sufficient explanation for remititur and that the record supported its decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial courtâs remittitur.

Defendant R.T.âs nephew lived with him between 1997 and 2003. In 2004, the nephew told his mother that Defendant had sexually assaulted him multiple times. The mother reported the allegations. Defendant voluntarily presented himself to the prosecutorâs office, was advised of the allegations, received Miranda warnings, and waived his rights. During the audiotaping of his statement, Defendant denied the allegations. However, he âconfessedâ to having a drinking problem, and that if he had abused his nephew, it âprobablyâ would have been while he was intoxicated. Defendant was indicted on counts of aggravated sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant moved to suppress his statement, but the trial court denied his motion. Defendantâs confession and taped statement, and the nephewâs videotaped statement were admitted into evidence at trial. After the close of the case, the court called the parties together to discuss jury instructions. The judge asked about a âvoluntary intoxicationâ charge. Defense counsel objected, asserting that Defendant never used âvoluntary intoxicationâ as a defense, and didnât want that matter brought up for the jury to consider. The judge found that Defendant himself âopened the doorâ to the intoxication issue in his audiotaped confession. The court used the âvoluntary intoxicationâ instruction in its charge to the jury. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Defendant was sentenced to a 25-year custodial term. The appellate court was split in its decision, but reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The majority concluded that Defendantâs own statements in his audiotaped statement were too vague for a jury to conclude he intended his actions against his nephew. The court also noted that the jury instruction should be given over counselâs objection when the evidence deems it appropriate to do so. With the Supreme Court being equally divided as the appellate court, it affirmed the appellate courtâs decision to reverse the decision in the case and remand it for a new trial.