Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court is whether a condominium complex is liable in tort for injury sustained by a pedestrian on its abutting sidewalk. "551 Observer Highway" is the site of a 104-unit condominium complex (the Building). Each unit is owned in fee simple by individual residents who have an undivided interest in the common elements. Every unit owner is a member of the Skyline at Hoboken Condominium Association, Inc. (Skyline), and only an owner may be a Skyline member. The Master Deed requires owners to pay an “Annual Common Expense” assessment, which is used for, among other things, maintaining the common elements and paying insurance premiums. According to the Master Deed, “common elements” included “[a]ll curbs, sidewalks, stoops, hallways, stairwells, porches and patios.” On the morning of February 14, 2006, while walking on the sidewalk abutting the Building, Plaintiff Richard Luchejko slipped on a sheet of ice and was injured. Plaintiff sued Skyline, CM3 (its property manager), the City of Hoboken, and D&D (a snow-clearing services company) alleging negligence for an unsafe sidewalk. All Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Skyline, CM3, and Hoboken, but not to D&D. Plaintiff then settled his claim with D&D and unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment to the remaining Defendants. Upon review of the appellate record, the Supreme Court found that the Appellate Division properly analyzed the facts of this case and concluded that no sidewalk liability attached for the injury to Plaintiff. View "Luchejko v. City of Hoboken" on Justia Law

Disciplinary proceedings against Respondent Steven Perskie (who retired from the judiciary in 2010) began with the filing of grievances with the Advisory Committee in July 2008 by Alan Rosefielde, a party to a civil action over which respondent presided between February 2005 and October 2006. The litigation was a business dispute involving issues that arose from Rosefielde's employment with and eventual termination from a business based in Atlantic City. Rosefielde contended that his termination was due to his recommendation that his employer end its business relationship with an insurance broker named Frank Siracusa, whom Rosefielde alleged had engaged in improper and questionable business practices. Siracusa was a central witness to Rosefielde’s counterclaim. Respondent had a longstanding business, social, political, and personal relationship with Siracusa, but informed the parties to the litigation several times that notwithstanding his relationship with Siracusa, he was not uncomfortable presiding over the case and evaluating Siracusa's credibility if Siracusa were to appear as a witness. The Advisory Committee recommended that respondent be censured for violating multiple Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Respondent violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B, and 3C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and R. 1:12-1(f). The Court censured Respondent. View "In the Matter of Steven P. Perskie, a Former Judge" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the termination of Defendant R.D.’s parental rights to his two youngest children. In November 2004, defendant’s adult step-daughter reported to the New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services (DYFS) that defendant had been sexually molesting one of her step-sisters. A DYFS investigation resulted in the emergency removal and temporary foster care placement of the children. DYFS filed a complaint, and the Chancery Division issued an order to show cause for protective services, determining that removal was necessary to avoid an ongoing risk to the children. On the return date, the court reaffirmed its determinations and scheduled a fact-finding hearing, noting that the burden of proof "is preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing" evidence. The court eventually concluded that it was in the children's best interests to place them outside the home. After further proceedings, the Title Nine court determined that termination of parental rights followed by adoption was an appropriate plan because defendant had failed to complete services, and thus there continued to be a risk of harm to the children. Defendant never appealed the Title Nine court’s determinations. The central issue in this appeal was whether determinations made in the adjudication of an abuse or neglect proceeding under Title Nine can be given collateral estoppel effect in a later guardianship/termination of parental rights proceeding under Title Thirty. The Supreme Court held that unless the parties are on notice that Title Nine abuse or neglect proceedings are to be conducted under the "clear and convincing" evidence standard constitutionally required for guardianship/termination of parental rights proceedings under Title Thirty and appropriate accommodations are made for the fundamentally different natures of these proceedings, Title Nine determinations cannot be given preclusive effect in later Title Thirty proceedings. View "Division of Youth & Family Services v. R.D." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the statement of reasons issued by the City of Ocean City adequately explained why a candidate for firefighter was bypassed for appointment in favor of two candidates who ranked lower on a competitive civil service examination. In 2007, the City of Ocean City (the City) sought to fill three vacant firefighter positions. On May 24, 2007, a list of eligible candidates for the positions was certified by the Civil Service Commission (Commission) to the City, the appointing authority. Each candidate on the eligible list was ranked according to scores obtained on a competitive examination. Nicholas Foglio ranked second on that list. At the time the list was certified, Foglio had served for eight years as a fireman/emergency medical technician (EMT) in multiple volunteer fire departments, logging over one-thousand total hours. Foglio was the only candidate on the eligible list with any prior firefighting experience and training. The City appointed eligible candidates ranked first (a student-teacher), third (a bartender), and fourth (a lifeguard), bypassing Foglio. In accordance with the provisions of state law, the City reported to the Department of Personnel (DOP) that it had bypassed Foglio, a higher-ranked candidate, because the two lower-ranked eligible candidates best met the needs of Department. Foglio sought review by the Commission. The Commission concluded that Foglio had failed to satisfy his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the appointing authority’s decision to bypass him was improper. In its ruling, it observed that the appointing authority selected two lower-ranked eligible candidates because "they best met the needs” of the fire department. Because Foglio did not assert, much less prove, an unlawful motive, such as discrimination or political influence, the Commission held that, "the appointing authority’s bypass of [Foglio’s] name on the Fire Fighter eligible list was proper." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the City should have provided a statement of "legitimate" reasons for the bypass. Here, the reason advanced was boilerplate and insufficient to satisfy the appointing authority’s reporting obligation. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Foglio" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether plaintiff International Schools Services, Inc. (ISS) was properly denied a tax exemption for 2002 and 2003 under the state tax code. ISS has owned and occupied the West Windsor Township property at issue in this case since 1989. ISS is a nonprofit corporation and maintains a tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Service Code. Although West Windsor Township granted ISS a property tax exemption from 1990 through 2001 for the portions of ISS's property that it actually occupied, the exemption was denied for 2002 and 2003 based on the Township's review of ISS's activities. ISS appealed to the Tax Court which found that ISS had not satisfied the first prong of a three-part test (the "Paper Mill Playhouse" test) requiring that the entity seeking tax exemption be "organized exclusively for the moral and mental improvement of men, women, and children." The Appellate Division reversed that decision, and remanded for the Tax Court to address the remaining prongs of the test. On remand, the Tax Court held that ISS had not satisfied the second prong of the test because the schools, not ISS, were performing the activities sufficient for tax exemption, and ISS was merely assisting them. Focusing on the rates charged for rent to some of its for-profit affiliates, the Tax Court found also that ISS had not satisfied the third prong of the test. The Appellate Division disagreed with the Tax Court with regard to the second prong of the test, but found that ISS failed the third prong due to the subsidies it provided to its affiliates. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that West Windsor Township properly denied a property tax exemption to ISS for the tax years 2002 and 2003 because the commingling of its effort and entanglement of its activities and operations with its profit-making affiliates was significant and substantial, with the benefit in the form of direct and indirect subsidies flowing only one way-from ISS to the for-profit entities. View "International Schools Services, Inc. v. West Windsor Township" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs William and Vivian Allen contracted defendant V and A Brothers, Inc. (V&A) to landscape their property and build a retaining wall to enable the installation of a pool. At the time, V&A was wholly owned by two brothers, Defendants Vincent DiMeglio, who subsequently passed away, and Angelo DiMeglio. The corporation also had one full-time employee, Defendant Thomas Taylor. After V&A completed the work, Plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint naming both corporate and individual defendants. The first count was directed solely to V&A and alleged that the corporation breached its contract with Plaintiffs by improperly constructing the retaining wall and using inferior backfill material. The second count was directed to the corporation and Vincent's estate, Angelo, and Taylor individually, alleging three "Home Improvement Practices" violations of the state Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Before trial, the trial court granted the individual defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint against them, holding that the CFA did not create a direct cause of action against the individuals. Plaintiffs' remaining claims were tried and the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on all counts, awarding damages totaling $490,000. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's order dismissing the claims against the individual defendants under the CFA. The panel remanded the matter to determine whether any of the individual defendants had personally participated in the regulatory violations that formed the basis for Plaintiffs' CFA complaint. The panel precluded relitigation of the overall quantum of damages found by the jury in the trial against the corporate defendant. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that employees and officers of a corporation might be individually liable under the CFA for acts they undertake through the corporate entity. Furthermore, individual defendants are not collaterally estopped from relitigating the quantum of damages attributable to the CFA violations. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant DuPont Chambers Works (DuPont) manufactures chemical products, and employed Plaintiff John Seddon for approximately thirty years. In 2002, Mr. Seddon worked as an operator technician in one of DuPont's facilities. Among Mr. Seddon's duties was to ensure the safe operation of equipment and the safe handling of chemicals in the building. Mr. Seddon expressed concern over certain dangerous conditions he saw at the plant. When DuPont did nothing to ameliorate the situation, Mr. Seddon filed an OSHA complaint. From 2003 to 2005, Mr. Seddon alleged that DuPont retaliated against him for making the OSHA complaint by cutting his overtime, reducing his work hours, changing his shifts, and giving him poor performance evaluations. He filed suit against DuPont under the state Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA). A jury returned a verdict in Mr. Seddon's favor and awarded him over $2 million for wages lost as a result of DuPont's actions. The award also included punitive damages and attorney fees. DuPont appealed, and the appellate court reversed and entered judgment in favor of DuPont. The appellate court concluded that Mr. Seddon could not prevail on a lost-wage claim under the CEPA unless he proved "actual or constructive discharge," and vacated the $2 million damages award. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Seddon challenged the appellate court's holding that he had to prove "lost-wages" under CEPA. Upon consideration of the briefs and the applicable legal authorities, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Court found that lost wages are recoverable in a CEPA case, even in the absence of a "constructive discharge." The Court reinstated the jury verdict and damages award in favor of Mr. Seddon. View "Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether Defendant George Calleia's convictions were appropriately reversed because the State used the deceased victim's "state-of-mind" hearsay statements as evidence to suggest Defendant's motive. The victim in this case was Susan Calleia, Defendant's wife. Her body was found wrapped in a yoga mat in the cargo area of the family's SUV parked at an arts center two miles from their home. Mrs. Calleia was strangled to death. Before trial, the court denied Defendant's motion to preclude statements that Mrs. Calleia made to friends that she was unhappy, wanted a divorce, and was seeking a lawyer. The court found them admissible as "state-of-mind" evidence to show the nature of her relationship with Defendant and whether it had significance in establishing his motive to kill her. The court instructed the jury that Mrs. Calleia's statements could only be considered as her state of mind and plans, and as evidence of the nature of her and Defendant's relationship, but not towards his motive to kill her. The jury found Defendant guilty of murder, and sentenced him to fifty years in prison. On appeal, Defendant challenged the admission of his wife's "state of mind" statements. Upon consideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling in admitting the statements. "If a victim's state-of-mind hearsay statements are relevant to show the victim's conduct, and if such conduct also can give rise to motive when it is known or probably known to the defendant, then the statements are admissible" to establish motive. The Court held that any error in this case that stemmed from the admission was harmless. View "New Jersey v. Calleia" on Justia Law

A mother and her adult son were found dead and bound together in the son's home. Each had been killed by a gunshot wound to the back of the head, and the son's throat had been slashed. An investigation lead police to three suspects: Keith Mercer, Defendant Dwayne Gillispie and Defendant Gregory Buttler. Before trial, the State moved to introduce evidence that Gillispie and Buttler had participated in a robbery and shooting that took place in a New York barbershop twenty days before the murders. The trial court conducted a joint hearing to determine whether "other-crimes" evidence was admissible under state law. The court found the evidence was probative to identify who committed the murders. Although the court acknowledged the evidence was prejudicial, it concluded that the probative value outweighed the prejudice and admitted it. Gillispie and Buttler were tried separately, and separate juries found Gillispie and Buttler guilty on all charges against them. In an unpublished decision, the appellate court reversed the convictions and remanded the cases for new trials. The appellate court found that the other-crimes evidence was too prejudicial, and that the probative value did not outweigh the prejudice. Upon consideration of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, and affirmed its decision. The Court held that the admission of this evidence was harmless error that ultimately would not have affected the outcome of the trials. The Court remanded the cases back to the appellate panel for disposition of other issues unanswered due to its "new trial" order. View "New Jersey v. Gillispie" on Justia Law

Defendant Andrea Hernandez was arrested in 2006 in connection with a series of armed robberies. While in custody awaiting trial on robbery charges, in 2007, she was charged in another county for burglary and theft charges. She pled guilty and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for burglary which was to run concurrently to any sentence she received on robbery charges. With the burglary conviction, Ms. Hernandez was awarded 213 days of credit for the time she spent in jail awaiting trial. Ultimately, Ms. Hernandez pled to concurrent sentences of twenty years for the robbery charges. At the robbery sentencing hearing, Ms. Hernandez objected to the amount of credit she received for the burglary charges. She believed she should have received more credit. In 2006, Defendant Derrick Rose allegedly sold cocaine and heroin to an undercover officer. He was not arrested at the time. In 2007, Mr. Rose was arrested for theft, and charged with theft and the earlier drug charges. Mr. Rose pled guilty, and received two five-year sentences on the drug charges, and a four-year sentence for theft, all to run concurrently. Mr. Rose was awarded 357 days of credit for time spent in jail awaiting trial. On appeal, Mr. Rose argued that the allocation of his jail credit should have gone towards his longer sentences so as to improve his chances of being accepted into a drug treatment program. In both the Hernandez and Rose cases, the appellate courts affirmed the calculation of credit awarded. The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases, and reversed the trial courts' calculation of credit in both cases. The Court found that the lower courts misapplied the rule for calculating credit based on a defendant's time spent awaiting sentencing. The Court remanded both cases for reconsideration of jail credit. View "New Jersey v. Rose" on Justia Law