Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brian Ambroise, a Senior Correctional Police Officer at the Edna Mahan Correctional Facility for Women, faced disciplinary charges from the Department of Corrections (DOC) in December 2020. The charges included conduct unbecoming a public employee and undue familiarity with inmates, stemming from allegations that Ambroise had a sexual relationship with an inmate, J.O., and performed favors for her, such as bringing in contraband and passing messages. Ambroise admitted to kissing J.O. and failing to report it, as well as passing a message between inmates.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) modified the DOC’s penalty from removal to a twenty-day suspension, sustaining only the charge of failing to report the kiss and dismissing the others. The DOC appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which affirmed the ALJ’s finding on the failure to report but reversed the dismissal of the undue familiarity charge. The Commission imposed a six-month suspension, considering Ambroise’s previously unblemished record and the seriousness of his conduct.The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the case and found the Commission’s decision to be arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Court held that the Commission failed to adequately consider the DOC’s expertise in maintaining prison security and the seriousness of Ambroise’s offenses. The Court emphasized that Ambroise’s failure to report the kiss and his undue familiarity with inmates compromised prison security and discipline. Consequently, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and reinstated the DOC’s recommended sanction of removal, remanding the case to the Commission to redetermine the penalty in accordance with the Court’s decision. View "In the Matter of Brian Ambroise" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Susan Seago, a former paraprofessional who became a teacher in 2017. As a paraprofessional, she was a member of the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS), but upon becoming a teacher, she was required to join the Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund (TPAF). Seago attempted to transfer her PERS credits and contributions to her new TPAF account by filling out an "Application for Interfund Transfer" and sending it to her employer, the Edison Township Board of Education (Edison BOE), for completion. However, the Edison BOE failed to complete its portion of the application and submit it on time, resulting in the expiration of Seago's PERS account.The Edison BOE challenged the denial of Seago's interfund transfer application, admitting its mistake in not submitting the application on time. However, the TPAF Board denied the interfund transfer request, and the Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of New Jersey.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the TPAF Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably when it denied Seago’s interfund transfer application. The court found that Seago had acted in good faith and had taken reasonable steps to ensure that her interfund transfer application was filed. The court also noted that Seago would suffer significant harm from the denial of her interfund transfer application, as she would lose her "Tier 1" membership status and would have to wait an additional five years to retire, ultimately receiving a lower monthly pension allowance. The court concluded that under the unique facts of this case, equity required that the TPAF Board grant Seago’s interfund transfer application. The court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division and instructed the TPAF Board to grant Seago's application for an interfund transfer as if her application had initially been timely filed. View "Seago v. Board of Trustees, Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund" on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs Christopher Maia and Sean Howarth, who were employed as laborers for defendant IEW Construction Group. The company required them to perform “pre-shift” and “post-shift” work, for which they were not paid. Both Maia and Howarth were laid off in November 2021. In April 2022, they filed a class action complaint alleging that IEW violated the Wage Payment Law (WPL) and the Wage and Hour Law (WHL).The trial judge held that Chapter 212, which amended the WPL and WHL, does not apply retroactively and thus dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for conduct that arose prior to Chapter 212’s effective date of August 6, 2019. The Appellate Division reversed this decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted leave to appeal. The court held that Chapter 212 is to be applied prospectively to conduct that occurred on or after August 6, 2019, not retroactively to conduct that occurred before that date. The trial judge properly dismissed the portions of the complaint relying on Chapter 212 but arising from conduct prior to its effective date. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, reinstated the trial judge’s order partially dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maia v. IEW Construction Group" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between a real estate salesperson, James Kennedy II, and a real estate broker, Weichert Co. Kennedy worked for Weichert from 2012 to 2018 under two written agreements that identified him as an independent contractor. After his affiliation with Weichert ended, Kennedy filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Weichert violated the Wage Payment Law (WPL) by misclassifying him and other real estate salespersons as independent contractors and unlawfully deducting fees and expenses from their commissions.The trial court denied Weichert's motion to dismiss Kennedy's complaint, ruling that the question of Kennedy's status was not determined by the parties' agreement, but by the legal standard that generally governs employee classification issues under the WPL, known as the "ABC" test. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, but noted that the 2018 amendments to the New Jersey Real Estate License Act, or the Brokers Act, authorized real estate brokers and salespersons to enter into independent contractor relationships. However, it held that these amendments applied prospectively and thus governed only a brief portion of Kennedy's claim.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the lower courts' decisions. It held that the parties' agreement to enter into an independent contractor business affiliation is enforceable under N.J.S.A. 45:15-3.2, and Kennedy, as an independent contractor, was not subject to the WPL pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1(b). Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied Weichert’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The case was remanded for the dismissal of Kennedy’s complaint. View "Kennedy v. Weichert Co." on Justia Law

The case involves Christine Savage, a police officer who filed a lawsuit against the Neptune Township Police Department and others for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation. The parties entered into a settlement agreement in 2014, which included a non-disparagement clause. Savage filed a second lawsuit in 2016, alleging continued and intensified discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The parties entered into another settlement agreement in 2020, which also included a non-disparagement clause. After a television interview with Savage aired in 2020, the defendants claimed that Savage violated the non-disparagement provision of the settlement agreement.The trial court granted the defendants' motion to enforce the second settlement agreement, finding that the Law Against Discrimination (LAD) barred only non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements, and that Savage violated a non-disparagement clause. The Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding the non-disparagement clause enforceable but holding that Savage had not violated it.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the non-disparagement clause in the settlement agreement is against public policy and cannot be enforced. The court found that the LAD protects Savage’s statements. The court concluded that the non-disparagement clause in the agreement directly conflicts with the LAD as it encompasses and would bar speech the statute protects. The court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case. View "Christine Savage v. Township of Neptune" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Viktoriya Usachenok, an employee of the Department of Treasury, who filed an internal complaint alleging sexual harassment and a hostile work environment created by her supervisor. As part of the investigation, Usachenok was directed not to discuss the investigation with others, a directive she was accused of violating when she consulted her husband, an attorney, about a document related to the investigation. Usachenok subsequently filed a complaint challenging the confidentiality directive.The Appellate Division rejected Usachenok’s constitutional challenge to the regulation, focusing on the change from a directive to a permissive “request” through an amendment. The court found that the plain language of the regulation did not restrict speech and did not constitute an improper prior restraint of speech.The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, disagreed with the Appellate Division. The court held that the regulation, which requires state investigators to request that anyone interviewed not discuss any aspect of the investigation with others, is overbroad under the State Constitution. The court found that the regulation chills constitutionally protected speech, as it encompasses a significant amount of protected speech and its consequences are real. The court therefore struck the relevant part of the regulation, reversing the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Usachenok v. State of New Jersey Department of the Treasury" on Justia Law

Above All Termite & Pest Control ("Above All") employed Henry Keim as a salaried pest-control technician and provided him with an employer authorized vehicle for work use. Above All’s policy limited the quantity of supplies technicians could keep in their authorized vehicles overnight. When technicians needed to replenish supplies, Above All authorized them to drive their vehicles to Above All’s shop instead of driving directly to a worksite, to retrieve whatever they required, and then to go from the shop to the scheduled sites. On the morning of the accident, Keim clocked in, received his schedule, and concluded that his vehicle lacked sufficient supplies. On his way to the shop for supplies, Keim sustained injuries in a car accident. The Judge of Compensation dismissed Keim’s claim petition with prejudice, concluding that Keim was merely commuting to work when he sustained injuries. The Appellate Division applied the “authorized vehicle rule” and reversed the dismissal order. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court, finding Keim was “in the course of employment” under the “authorized vehicle rule” at the time of the accident because Above All authorized a vehicle for him to operate and his operation of that identified vehicle was for business expressly authorized by Above All. View "Keim v. Above All Termite & Pest Control" on Justia Law

The Church of St. Theresa (St. Theresa’s) owned and operated the St. Theresa School. St. Theresa’s terminated art teacher and toddler room caregiver Victoria Crisitello for violating the terms of her employment agreement. That agreement required employees to abide by the teachings of the Catholic Church and forbade employees from engaging in premarital sex; Crisitello, who was unmarried, had become pregnant. In response to her firing, Crisitello filed a complaint against St. Theresa’s alleging employment discrimination in violation of the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), based on pregnancy and marital status. St. Theresa’s countered that its decision to terminate Crisitello was protected by both the First Amendment and the LAD. The New Jersey Supreme Court held: (1) the “religious tenets” exception of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) was an affirmative defense available to a religious entity when confronted with a claim of employment discrimination; and (2) the uncontroverted fact was that St. Theresa’s followed the religious tenets of the Catholic Church in terminating Crisitello. The Court thus concluded St. Theresa’s was entitled to summary judgment and that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint with prejudice. View "Crisitello v. St. Theresa School" on Justia Law

In November 2013, plaintiff Philip Pantano, a mechanic employed by Container Services of New Jersey (CSNJ), was injured at work while attempting to move a heavy piece of industrial equipment. Lawrence Giamella, who was also working on the site that day, tried to help plaintiff move the equipment with a forklift; plaintiff’s foot was crushed in the process. Plaintiff collected workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, CSNJ. He and his wife also brought a personal injury action against numerous defendants, including Marine Transport, Inc. (MT). MT and CSNJ were related companies owned by the same person. The core of the parties’ dispute concerned which entity or entities employed Giamella at the time of the accident: MT, CSNJ, or both. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CSNJ because of the statutory bar established by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8. MT also moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not Giamella’s employer and was therefore not vicariously liable for his negligence. Although Giamella was on MT’s payroll, MT raised the affirmative defense that he was a “borrowed servant” or “special employee” working for CSNJ at the time of the accident, applying the multi-factor test set forth in Galvao v. G.R. Robert Construction Co., 179 N.J. 462 (2004). The pretrial judge denied MT’s motion. At the close of plaintiff’s case, MT moved for judgment pursuant to Rule 4:40-1, founded on the same borrowed-employee theory it had raised earlier in its summary judgment motion. The trial judge did not rule on the motion, reserving judgment for after the jury verdict. The jury awarded plaintiff damages for pain and suffering, lost wages, and loss of consortium. Pursuant to an agreement reached by counsel, the jury was asked to presume that MT was vicariously liable and was not asked to resolve the borrowed-employee question. Instead, counsel assented to have the court resolve the borrowed-employee argument through the mechanism of MT’s yet-to-be-decided Rule 4:40-1 motion. The trial judge vacated the verdict and awarded judgment to MT, concluding that Giamella was a borrowed employee working for CSNJ when the accident occurred. The Appellate Division reversed, vacated the directed verdict, and reinstated the jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pantano v. New York Shipping Association" on Justia Law

After his employment was terminated in May 2008, plaintiff Harold Hansen brought claims against Rite Aid and other defendants alleging age discrimination, sexual orientation discrimination, and gender discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), as well as several common law claims. After three trials, a jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor on his LAD sexual orientation discrimination claim and awarded him a total of $420,500 in compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff moved for an award of counsel fees and costs. In plaintiff’s initial submission, he asked the trial court to determine that a reasonable hourly rate for his lead counsel and the attorney who assisted in the first of the three trials was $725, and that a reasonable number of hours spent on this matter was 3,252. He requested that the trial court determine the lodestar to be $2,355,892.50, and that the court apply a one hundred percent enhancement to the lodestar. Plaintiff also sought an award of costs. In total, plaintiff requested an award of $5,035,773.50. The trial court issued a seventy-three-page decision with a fifty-four-page spreadsheet reflecting its analysis of the time entries and disbursements set forth in plaintiff’s invoice. The court ruled that a reasonable hourly rate for plaintiff’s lead counsel in this case was $375 per hour and a reasonable hourly rate for the assistant attorney was $325 per hour. The court identified several categories of legal work improperly included in plaintiff’s fee application, including work on unrelated matters. The trial court also excluded all time entries reflecting plaintiff’s counsel’s representation of plaintiff in the Appellate Division and to the Supreme Court. Noting that plaintiff was successful on only one claim and that plaintiff’s lead counsel performed tasks that should have been assigned to a junior attorney or a paralegal, the trial court reduced the lodestar by twenty percent. Ultimately, the trial court awarded $741,387.97 in fees and costs. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it set the reasonable hourly rate for plaintiff’s counsel’s work, assessed the number of hours reasonably expended by plaintiff’s counsel in pretrial proceedings and at trial, reduced the lodestar because of plaintiff’s limited success and other factors, and determined plaintiff’s application for an award of costs. View "Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp." on Justia Law