Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Insurance Law
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A man was injured while driving his employer’s vehicle, which was insured under a commercial policy issued by Zurich American Insurance Company. The policy had a general bodily injury liability limit of $2,000,000 but included an endorsement limiting underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage to $15,000 per person. The at-fault driver had a liability policy with a $100,000 limit. After settling with the at-fault driver’s insurer for $100,000, the injured employee sought UIM coverage from Zurich. Zurich denied the claim, stating that the at-fault driver’s coverage exceeded the policy’s UIM limit.The employee filed suit, requesting reformation of the policy to provide $2,000,000 in UIM coverage, arguing that the policy’s UIM limits violated New Jersey statutory requirements and public policy. The action was initially filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey but was removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. That court granted summary judgment in favor of Zurich, finding the policy did not violate the relevant statute or public policy. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which then certified two questions to the Supreme Court of New Jersey about the interpretation of N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(f).The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that, under N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(f), the maximum UIM coverage “available under the policy” for an employee is the limit actually selected for the named insured under the policy, not the general liability policy limit. The Court also held that endorsements limiting UIM coverage to less than the general liability limit do not violate the statute or public policy, provided employees and named insureds are afforded the same UIM limits and minimum statutory requirements are met. View "Chiaccheri v. Zurich American Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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An employee was injured in a car accident while driving his employer’s vehicle, which was insured under an automobile liability policy issued by Zurich American Insurance Company. The other driver involved in the accident was uninsured, triggering a claim for uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. The employer’s policy provided $1,000,000 in liability coverage but only $15,000 in UM coverage, the statutory minimum. The employee sought UM benefits up to the $1,000,000 liability limit, arguing that New Jersey law required the UM coverage to match the liability coverage limit.The Superior Court, Law Division, granted partial summary judgment in favor of the employee, ruling that the policy should be reformed to provide $1,000,000 in UM coverage. The court reasoned that providing only $15,000 in UM coverage to an employee, while the employer had $1,000,000 in liability coverage, violated N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(f) and was an attempt to circumvent the statute. Zurich’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and the Appellate Division declined to grant leave to appeal. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted leave to appeal limited to the statutory interpretation issue.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(f) does not require the UM coverage limit for employees to match the policy’s third-party liability limit. Instead, it mandates only that employees receive the same UM coverage as the named insured, which in this case is $15,000—the amount elected by the employer. The Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings, instructing that the Zurich policy’s UM coverage terms were consistent with statutory requirements and public policy. View "Travieso v. Crespo" on Justia Law

Posted in: Insurance Law
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A neurosurgeon who co-owned a medical practice and several unrelated businesses purchased disability insurance policies through insurance brokers employed by a financial group. The brokers allegedly advised him he would receive maximum benefits if disabled, without disclosing that his other business interests could reduce his benefits. After being diagnosed with a vision condition that prevented him from performing neurosurgery, the plaintiff claimed maximum benefits but received only partial payments because of his unrelated business interests. He filed a complaint asserting, among other claims, that the brokers violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) by failing to obtain sufficient disability insurance.The Superior Court, Law Division, granted the brokers’ motion to dismiss the CFA count, relying on Plemmons v. Blue Chip Insurance Services, Inc., which held insurance brokers are exempt from the CFA as “semi-professionals.” The trial court noted but did not resolve the tension between Plemmons and Shaw v. Shand, which narrowly construed the CFA's “learned professional” exception. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted leave to appeal the CFA count.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that insurance brokers, producers, and agents are not exempt from liability under the CFA, neither as “semi-professionals” nor under the “learned professional” exception. The Court found no support for a “semi-professional” exemption in the CFA’s text and determined that licensing or regulation alone does not justify exemption. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, vacated the CFA count’s dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings, also inviting legislative clarification on professional exemptions under the CFA. View "Lowe v. Audet" on Justia Law

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A limited liability company obtained a Directors and Officers insurance policy from an insurer. The policy included a capacity exclusion, which barred coverage for losses associated with wrongful acts committed by an insured person in their capacity as a member, manager, or director of any entity other than the insured company or a specifically listed outside entity. The underlying claims concerned allegations that a principal of the insured company engaged in self-dealing through his roles in both the insured company and several other entities he controlled, including transferring valuable rights and assets among these entities to the detriment of others.After lawsuits were filed alleging this misconduct, the insured company sought coverage under the policy. The insurer initially reimbursed a small portion of legal fees but reserved all rights under the policy and specifically referenced the capacity exclusion in its communications. The insurer ultimately withdrew from participating in the defense and refused to contribute to a global settlement, citing that the claims fell outside the policy period and invoked the capacity exclusion.The Superior Court, Law Division, granted partial summary judgment in favor of the insured, ruling that the insurer had forfeited its right to rely on the capacity exclusion by unreasonably withholding consent to the settlement and requiring the insurer to provide coverage up to the policy limit. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the claims fell within the capacity exclusion and that the insurer had no obligation to contribute to the settlement.The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed as modified. It held that the underlying claims clearly fell within the capacity exclusion and that the insurer properly and repeatedly reserved its rights. The Court found that the doctrines of forfeiture and estoppel did not apply because the insurer had not acted in bad faith and had consistently notified the insured of its intent to rely on the exclusion. Thus, the insurer was not required to provide coverage or contribute to the settlement. View "Mist Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Berkley Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Posted in: Insurance Law
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Dionicio Rodriguez, an employee of SIR Electric LLC (SIR), was injured while working and filed for workers' compensation benefits under SIR's policy with Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company (Hartford). After receiving benefits, Rodriguez filed a personal injury lawsuit against SIR, alleging negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and intentional wrongdoing. SIR requested Hartford to defend against the lawsuit, but Hartford refused, citing policy exclusions. SIR then filed a third-party complaint against Hartford, claiming wrongful disclaimer of defense coverage.The trial court granted Hartford's motion to dismiss SIR's complaint, ruling that the policy excluded intent-based claims. SIR's motion for reconsideration and to amend its complaint, arguing that the policy's enhanced intentional injury exclusion (EII exclusion) violated public policy, was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that Hartford has no duty to defend SIR. The court determined that Rodriguez's claims of negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness are subject to the workers' compensation exclusivity bar and are not covered under Part One of the policy. These claims are also excluded from coverage under Part Two of the policy. Additionally, Rodriguez's claims of intentional wrongdoing are excluded under the policy's EII exclusion.The court concluded that the trial judge properly denied SIR's motion to amend its third-party complaint, as the EII exclusion does not violate public policy. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment, upholding the dismissal of SIR's third-party complaint against Hartford. View "Rodriguez v. Shelbourne Spring, LLC" on Justia Law

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In November 2021, David Goyco was struck and injured by an automobile while operating a low-speed electric scooter (LSES). Goyco filed a claim for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under his personal automobile policy with Progressive Insurance Company. Progressive denied the claim, arguing that Goyco's LSES did not meet the definition of an "automobile" and that Goyco could not be considered a "pedestrian" under the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act, commonly known as the No-Fault Act. Goyco filed a complaint, asserting that LSES riders should be considered "pedestrians" entitled to PIP benefits under the No-Fault Act. The trial court denied relief to Goyco, and the Appellate Division affirmed.The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that an LSES rider does not fall within the definition of "pedestrian" for purposes of the No-Fault Act. The court found that Goyco's LSES was a "vehicle" that used a rechargeable electric motor and was therefore "propelled by other than muscular power" and was "designed for use on highways, rails and tracks." The court also rejected Goyco's reliance on a 2019 statute that provides that an LSES should be considered equivalent to a bicycle, stating that the statute was not intended to have any effect on the No-Fault Act. The court concluded that Goyco was not a pedestrian entitled to PIP benefits under Progressive's No-Fault insurance policy. View "Goyco v. Progressive Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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Ocean Walk, LLC, a company that operates a casino and other entertainment facilities in New Jersey, sought coverage under its commercial property insurance policies for losses sustained during the COVID-19 pandemic. The company claimed that the presence of the virus in its facilities and the government-mandated temporary suspension of its operations constituted a “direct physical loss” or “direct physical damage” to its property under the terms of the insurance policies issued by several defendants. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, disagreed with this interpretation and held that Ocean Walk’s allegations failed to meet the policy language's requirements. The court ruled that to demonstrate a “direct physical loss” or “direct physical damage,” Ocean Walk needed to show that its property was destroyed or altered in such a way that rendered it unusable or uninhabitable. The court noted that the company’s allegations did not suggest that the property suffered a physical change; rather, the company was simply not allowed to use its property due to the executive orders. Furthermore, the court ruled that even if Ocean Walk had pled facts supporting the finding of a covered “loss” or “damage,” the losses it claimed were excluded from coverage by the policies’ contamination exclusion. The court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Ocean Walk’s complaint. View "AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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This insurance coverage dispute between a public entity joint insurance fund (JIF) and Star Insurance Company (Star), a commercial general liability insurance company, turned on whether the JIF provided “insurance” to its members or, instead, the JIF members protect against liability through “self-insurance.” That distinction was pertinent here because Star’s insurance policy included a clause under which its coverage obligations began only after coverage available through “other insurance” has been exhausted; the clause, however, did not mention “self-insurance.” Star argued the JIF provided insurance and therefore Star’s coverage was excess to the JIF; the JIF disagreed, contending that because its members were instead “self-insured,” Star’s coverage was primary. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that under the plain language of N.J.S.A. 40A:10-48, a JIF “was not an insurance company or an insurer under New Jersey law, and its “authorized activities . . . do not constitute the transaction of insurance nor doing an insurance business.” By the statute’s plain terms, JIFs cannot provide insurance in exchange for premiums, as insurance companies typically do; instead, JIF members reduce insurance costs by pooling financial resources, distributing and retaining risk, and paying claims through member assessments. Therefore, JIFs protect members against liability through “self-insurance.” “Self-insurance” is not insurance. The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the JIF and denial of summary judgment to Star. View "Statewide Insurance Fund v. Star Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether claims brought under the Insurance Fraud Protection Act (IFPA) and the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) by plaintiffs Liberty Insurance Corp. and LM Insurance Corp. (Liberty) against defendants Techdan, LLC (Techdan), Exterior Erecting Services, Inc. (Exterior), Daniel Fisher, Robert Dunlap, and Carol Junz were subject to the apportionment procedure of the Comparative Negligence Act (CNA). Liberty issued workers’ compensation policies to Techdan from 2004 to 2007. It alleged defendants misrepresented the relationship between Techdan and Exterior and the ownership structure of the two entities and provided fraudulent payroll records to reduce the premiums for workers’ compensation insurance. Techdan was indicted for second-degree theft by deception, and Dunlap entered a guilty plea to that charge on Techdan’s behalf. The court granted partial summary judgment as to Liberty’s IFPA claim for insurance fraud against Techdan, Exterior, Dunlap, and Fisher; partial summary judgment as to Liberty’s workers’ compensation fraud claim against all defendants; and partial summary judgment as to Liberty’s breach of contract claim against Techdan and Exterior. The court denied summary judgment as to Liberty’s remaining claims. The jury found Techdan liable for $454,660 in compensatory damages and found Exterior liable for $227,330 in compensatory damages, but awarded no compensatory damages against Dunlap, Fisher, or Junz. It awarded punitive damages in the amount of $200,000 against Dunlap, $10,000 against Fisher, and $45,000 against Junz, but awarded no punitive damages against Techdan or Exterior. The trial court determined all defendants should be jointly and severally liable for the $756,990 awarded as compensatory damages. The Appellate Division held the trial court erred when it imposed joint and several liability on defendants rather than directing the jury to allocate percentages of fault to defendants in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(a)(2). The Division concluded the trial court’s cumulative errors warranted a new trial, and it remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court: the trial court should have charged the jury to allocate percentages of fault and should have molded the judgment based on the jury’s findings; the trial court’s failure to apply the CNA warranted a new trial on remand. The Court did not disturb the first jury’s findings on the issues of liability under the IFPA, the WCA, or Liberty’s common-law claims, or its determination of total compensatory damages. The Court found no plain error in the trial court’s failure to give the jury an ultimate outcome charge. View "Liberty Insurance Corp. v. Techdan, LLC" on Justia Law

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This action was brought by plaintiff Nancy Holm, administratrix of the estate of her husband, Christopher Friedauer, who died in 2015 after falling at his workplace, Holmdel Nurseries, LLC. As a longtime employee of the family-owned business, Christopher had been covered by workers’ compensation insurance, but he was no longer covered after he became a member of the LLC in 2012. Plaintiff claimed that defendant Daniel Purdy, who served as the insurance broker for Holmdel Nurseries from 2002 to 2015, failed to provide to the LLC the notice mandated by N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, and that Christopher was unaware that he no longer had workers’ compensation coverage in his new role as an LLC member. She alleged that as a result of defendant’s negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, Friedauer’s dependents were deprived of a workers’ compensation death benefit to which they would have been entitled under N.J.S.A. 34:15-13 had he been covered by workers’ compensation insurance at the time of his death. Defendant asserted that Friedauer’s father, Robert Friedauer, the LLC’s managing member for insurance issues, instructed defendant in 2002 that Holmdel Nurseries did not want to purchase workers’ compensation coverage for its LLC members because of the cost of that coverage. At the close of a jury trial, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b) and his motion for judgment at trial pursuant to Rule 4:40-1. Informed by the New Jersey Legislature’s expression of public policy in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, the New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division that defendant had a duty to advise the LLC members, at the time of the workers’ compensation policy’s purchase or renewal, that an LLC member actively performing services on the LLC’s behalf was eligible for workers’ compensation coverage, but that the LLC must elect to purchase such coverage in order to obtain it. Consistent with N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, however, the Supreme Court held that defendant could not be held liable for breach of that duty unless the damages alleged were caused by defendant’s willful, wanton or grossly negligent act of commission or omission. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court’s assessment of the evidence presented by plaintiff on the question of proximate cause. Accordingly, the Court concurred that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion to dismiss and his motion for judgment at trial, and affirmed as modified the Appellate Division’s judgment. The case was thus remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Holm v. Purdy" on Justia Law