Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mathi Kahn-Polzo and other experienced bicyclists were riding downhill on the shoulder of Parsonage Hill Road, which was owned and maintained by Essex County. She rode over a depression on the shoulder, lost control and fell, suffered a catastrophic head injury despite wearing a helmet, and died twenty-six days later. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the County could be held liable under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA). Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Donald Polzo, the Supreme Court could not conclude that the County was on constructive notice of a "dangerous condition" on the shoulder of its roadway that "created a reasonably foreseeable risk" of death, or that the failure to correct the depression before the accident was "palpably unreasonable." View "Polzo v. County of Essex" on Justia Law

The issue before the court was whether Defendant John Rogers was "exonerated" when his conviction was reversed and his case remanded for trial, or on the day his indictment was dismissed. Defendant sued the Cape May Public Defender's office for malpractice. The date the case was reversed would subject Defendant's claim to a one-year time bar, but a dismissal would not. One year later, his attorney filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of tort claim, which was denied. The trial judge determined that Defendant's claim accrued in 2007, and because he filed his notice more than one year later, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the late notice must be filed within one year after accrual of a claim; "exoneration" (and therefore accrual) occurred in 2007. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant was not "exonerated" until the indictment was dismissed with prejudice in 2008. His claim was thus not barred by the one year filing limitation. Nevertheless, because the claim was filed ten days beyond the ninety-day limit, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the "extraordinary circumstances" as defined by the governing statute was satisfied. View "Rogers v. Cape May County Office of the Public Defender" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was called to determine whether the heirs of an uninsured motorist killed in an automobile accident had a rightful claim under the Wrongful Death Act or whether N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) extinguished that claim, as it did the survival action. In 2005, Lawrence Aronberg was driving southbound on the New Jersey Turnpike when a tractor trailer careened into the rear of his car, killing him. The truck was operated by Wendell Tolbert and owned by Fleetwood Taggart (Fleetwood Trucking). On the day of the fatal accident, Aronberg, then thirty-four years old, was an uninsured motorist. Just three weeks earlier, Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company (Allstate) had cancelled Aronberg’s automobile insurance policy because of his failure to keep his premiums current. Plaintiff Sheila Aronberg, as General Administratrix of her son’s Estate, filed a survivorship and wrongful death action against defendants Tolbert and Fleetwood Trucking. The “Survivor’s Act” permits an appointed representative to file any personal cause of action that decedent could have brought had he lived. In contrast, the “Wrongful Death Act” provides to decedent’s heirs a right of recovery for pecuniary damages for their direct losses as a result of their relative’s death due to the tortious conduct of another. The trial court held that because the decedent did not carry insurance at the time of the accident, his estate could not recoup on its survival claim per N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a), but could recoup on the wrongful death action. The court found that the Wrongful Death Act granted heirs an independent right of recovery, regardless of the decedent’s failure to procure insurance. The Appellate Division granted defendants’ motion for leave to appeal and in a split decision affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held when an uninsured motorist’s cause of action is barred by the uninsured motorist statute, an heir has no right of recovery under the Wrongful Death Act. View "Aronberg v. Tolbert" on Justia Law

Under the New Jersey Affidavit of Merit statute, plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must provide an affidavit from an equivalently credentialed physician attesting that there is a reasonable probability that the defendant physician’s treatment fell outside acceptable professional standards. Plaintiff Robert Buck sued defendant Dr. James Henry, who had diagnosed Buck as suffering from depression and insomnia and prescribed an anti-depressant and a sleep aid. Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Henry failed to properly treat him. In March 2009, Plaintiff provided an affidavit of merit signed by Dr. Larry Kirstein, a licensed psychiatrist, who concluded that Dr. Henry’s treatment fell outside acceptable standards. In April 2009, due to a clerical error, the trial court mistakenly issued an order stating that “all issues involving the Affidavit of Merit statute have been addressed” and “there is no need” for a Ferreira conference. Dr. Henry moved for summary judgment, claiming that the affidavits were not from equivalent specialists. The court found that Dr. Henry was a family-medicine specialist based on his certification and, thus, Plaintiff was required to obtain an affidavit from a specialist in family medicine. The court therefore granted Dr. Henry’s motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate and trial courts and remanded a Ferreira conference. The Court found Plaintiff acted in good faith in filing affidavits of merit from two different medical specialists; and if the conference had been conducted as required and the trial court found deficiencies, Plaintiff would have had additional time to submit an affidavit that conformed to the merit statute. View "Buck v. Henry" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court is whether a condominium complex is liable in tort for injury sustained by a pedestrian on its abutting sidewalk. "551 Observer Highway" is the site of a 104-unit condominium complex (the Building). Each unit is owned in fee simple by individual residents who have an undivided interest in the common elements. Every unit owner is a member of the Skyline at Hoboken Condominium Association, Inc. (Skyline), and only an owner may be a Skyline member. The Master Deed requires owners to pay an “Annual Common Expense” assessment, which is used for, among other things, maintaining the common elements and paying insurance premiums. According to the Master Deed, “common elements” included “[a]ll curbs, sidewalks, stoops, hallways, stairwells, porches and patios.” On the morning of February 14, 2006, while walking on the sidewalk abutting the Building, Plaintiff Richard Luchejko slipped on a sheet of ice and was injured. Plaintiff sued Skyline, CM3 (its property manager), the City of Hoboken, and D&D (a snow-clearing services company) alleging negligence for an unsafe sidewalk. All Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Skyline, CM3, and Hoboken, but not to D&D. Plaintiff then settled his claim with D&D and unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment to the remaining Defendants. Upon review of the appellate record, the Supreme Court found that the Appellate Division properly analyzed the facts of this case and concluded that no sidewalk liability attached for the injury to Plaintiff. View "Luchejko v. City of Hoboken" on Justia Law

Defendant DuPont Chambers Works (DuPont) manufactures chemical products, and employed Plaintiff John Seddon for approximately thirty years. In 2002, Mr. Seddon worked as an operator technician in one of DuPont's facilities. Among Mr. Seddon's duties was to ensure the safe operation of equipment and the safe handling of chemicals in the building. Mr. Seddon expressed concern over certain dangerous conditions he saw at the plant. When DuPont did nothing to ameliorate the situation, Mr. Seddon filed an OSHA complaint. From 2003 to 2005, Mr. Seddon alleged that DuPont retaliated against him for making the OSHA complaint by cutting his overtime, reducing his work hours, changing his shifts, and giving him poor performance evaluations. He filed suit against DuPont under the state Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA). A jury returned a verdict in Mr. Seddon's favor and awarded him over $2 million for wages lost as a result of DuPont's actions. The award also included punitive damages and attorney fees. DuPont appealed, and the appellate court reversed and entered judgment in favor of DuPont. The appellate court concluded that Mr. Seddon could not prevail on a lost-wage claim under the CEPA unless he proved "actual or constructive discharge," and vacated the $2 million damages award. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Seddon challenged the appellate court's holding that he had to prove "lost-wages" under CEPA. Upon consideration of the briefs and the applicable legal authorities, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Court found that lost wages are recoverable in a CEPA case, even in the absence of a "constructive discharge." The Court reinstated the jury verdict and damages award in favor of Mr. Seddon. View "Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works" on Justia Law

Peter Risko filed a wrongful death action against Defendant Thomson Muller Automotive Group. His wife Camille slipped and fell in the automobile showroom. Mr. Risko alleged that because of this fall, a chain reaction of injuries was set in motion that ultimately ended in her premature death. During his summation, Mr. Risko's attorney cited the Eighth Amendment, stating that "prisoners of war are not supposed to be tortured ... Camille went through torture and defendant has to pay for that." Counsel told the jury to report to the judge if any of them could not find for more than $1 million in damages because they would be "ignoring the law." The trial judge interrupted Plaintiff's counsel, held a sidebar, and stated that he was considering a mistrial because of the outlandish statements. The judge did not ask the attorneys to argue on whether to mistry the case, nor did defense counsel object to continuing the case. The jury returned a verdict against the dealership, and awarded $1.75 million in damages. The dealership then moved for a new trial, arguing that opposing counsel's summation tainted the verdict. The judge acknowledged that he should have given immediate cautionary instructions to the jury. He felt compelled to grant a new trial on all issues. The appellate court reversed the trial court's new trial order. The court noted that the trial court did not strike the offending remarks nor issue a curative instruction to the jury, and defense counsel did not request a mistrial or offer a corrective jury charge "which would be expected if they truly found the summation objectionable." The Supreme Court disagreed with the majority appellate opinion, and reversed its holding pertaining to the damages award. The Court held that a new trial on the damages issue was warranted based on the "cumulative effect of counsel's comments during summation." The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Risko v. Thompson Muller Automotive Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Denise Perrelli appealed a trial court decision in favor of Defendants Bridget and Paul Pastorelle. Plaintiff believed the last time she sent her car insurance company a check for coverage was in 2005. She believed she had coverage on August 4, 2006, the day she got into an accident with Defendants. Geovanni Velverde, a friend, was driving at the time of the accident. He died of his injuries, and Plaintiff suffered serious injuries. Plaintiff sued Defendants alleging that her injuries were caused by Defendants' negligence. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that as an uninsured motorist, Plaintiff had no right to sue. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court found that under the state's "No Fault Act," a person injured while a passenger in her on uninsured vehicle was barred from suing for her injuries.

Plaintiff Frederick Voss was injured when his motorcycle collided with a vehicle operated by Defendant Kristoffe Tranquilino. Plaintiff alleged that prior to the accident, he was a dining at Tiffany's (a restaurant) and was negligently served alcoholic beverages that contributed to the accident and caused his injuries. Plaintiff was charged with DWI and subsequently pled guilty to the charge. Plaintiff sued Tiffany's. Tiffany's moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the state "Dram Shop Act" barred Plaintiff from bringing suit because he pled guilty to DWI. Tiffany's lost at trial, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, including the legislative history of the Dram Shop Act, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court, in quoting the appellate panel, found that "immunizing liquor licensees from liability in such circumstances would me inimical to the State's police of curbing drunk driving."

In 2001, Petitioner Police Officer Gregory Russo and his partner responded to a house fire. Officer Russo went into the burning structure, located an adult and two children trapped inside and saved them. The officer heard cries for help on the second floor, and went back inside to try to find more persons trapped by the fire. When inside, the intense heat and smoke overwhelmed him. Firefighters escorted the officer from the burning building, but not before the person who had cried out for help had died. Outside, the officer received first aid, and witnessed firefighters remove the victim from the burning building. Firefighters laid the victim’s body on the lawn in front of Officer Russo. The family blamed the officer for the victim’s death. The officer later reported he had trouble sleeping, stomach disorders, suicidal thoughts and depression. Eventually the officer would be diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Officer Russo applied for “accidental” disability retirement benefits in 2004. The Police & Fireman’s Retirement System Board of Trustees had an expert evaluate Officer Russo. He would be classified as “totally and permanently disabled” as a result of the fire in 2001. The Board, however, denied Officer Russo’s claim, and granted him an “ordinary” disability pension. The Officer appealed, and a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). While the ALJ’s decision was pending, the Supreme Court decided “Patterson v. Board of Trustees, State Police Retirement System,” which addressed the applicable standards to determining accidental disability pensions. The ALJ concluded that Officer Russo was eligible for an accidental disability pension. The Board adopted the ALJ’s findings, but rejected the decision. The appellate court upheld the Board’s conclusion that Officer Russo did not qualify for accidental disability benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the officer was improperly denied accidental disability benefits for his injury because both the Board and appellate court misapplied the standards set out in its decision in the “Patterson” case. The Court reversed the appeals court’s decision and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. View "Russo v. Bd. of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement Sys." on Justia Law