Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff May Walker alleged that Defendant Carmelo Guiffre violated the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) and the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA). After finding that Defendant violated the CFA and TCCWNA, the trial court concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to a fee award. The trial court fixed the lodestar amount and applied a forty-five percent contingency enhancement. The Appellate Division found that the trial court's analysis of the reasonableness of Plaintiff's attorneys' hourly rate, based only on the judge's personal experience, did not satisfy the analysis found in "Rendine v. Pantzer" (141 N.J. 292 (1995)). In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the "Rendine" framework had been altered by the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Perdue v. Kenny A. (130 S.Ct. 1662 (2010)). The Court concluded that the mechanism for awarding attorneys' fees (including contingency enhancements) as adopted in "Rendine" remain in full force and effect as the governing principles for awards made pursuant to New Jersey fee-shifting statutes. View "Walker v. Guiffre" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a court may consider as part of its determination of an as-applied challenge to State law limiting places where sexually-oriented businesses may operate, the availability of alternate channels of communication located in another state. Defendant 35 Club began operating an "all nude gentlemen's cabaret" in Sayreville. Shortly after the club opened, the Borough brought suit to permanently enjoin the club from operating its business in the location it chose because it was within 1,000 feet of a public park or residential zone. The issue at trial was whether the applicable statute could constitutionally be applied to the club. The Borough's expert witness identified the so-called alternative channels of communication which still complied with the Borough's zoning statutes; the club's expert found none, and went outside the Borough but within the club's relevant market in making its determination. At the close of evidence, the Chancery Division concluded that the Borough had carried its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence the availability of adequate alternative channels of communication within the market area relevant to the club's business. In evaluating the adequacy of alternative channels of communication when deciding an as-applied constitutional challenge to the State's statute limiting the places where sexually-oriented businesses may operate, the Supreme Court held that trial courts are not precluded from considering the existence of sites that are located outside of New Jersey but that are found within the relevant market area as defined by the parties' experts. View "Borough of Sayreville v. 35 Club, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Mathi Kahn-Polzo and other experienced bicyclists were riding downhill on the shoulder of Parsonage Hill Road, which was owned and maintained by Essex County. She rode over a depression on the shoulder, lost control and fell, suffered a catastrophic head injury despite wearing a helmet, and died twenty-six days later. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the County could be held liable under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA). Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Donald Polzo, the Supreme Court could not conclude that the County was on constructive notice of a "dangerous condition" on the shoulder of its roadway that "created a reasonably foreseeable risk" of death, or that the failure to correct the depression before the accident was "palpably unreasonable." View "Polzo v. County of Essex" on Justia Law

The issue before the Court was whether the New Jersey League of Municipalities was a "public agency" that possessed "government record[s]" within the meaning of the Open Public Records Act (OPRA). Fair Share filed a verified complaint alleging that the League was in violation of OPRA and the common law right of access by refusing to make available certain requested documents. The League responded that it "is not a 'public agency' as defined by [OPRA], and as such the League’s records were not 'government records' or 'public records.'" The trial court dismissed Fair Share’s complaint, holding that the League is not a "public agency" because it is not an "instrumentality within or created by a political subdivision of the State or combination of subdivisions," such as a county health board or regional planning board. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the League of Municipalities is a "public agency" under the Open Public Records Act and must provide access to "government record[s]" that are not subject to an exemption. View "Fair Share Housing Center, Inc. v. New Jersey State League of Municipalities" on Justia Law

New Jersey uses a three-factor formula to calculate a multi-state corporation’s New Jersey Corporate Business Tax (CBT) by apportioning income between New Jersey and the rest of the world. For taxpayers with regular places of business outside of New Jersey, the portion of entire net worth and entire net income that is subject to New Jersey tax is determined by multiplying each by an allocation factor that is the sum of the property fraction, the payroll fraction, and two times the sales fraction, divided by four. The sales fraction is at issue in this case. Without the "Throw-Out Rule," the sales fraction is calculated by dividing the taxpayer’s receipts (sales of tangible personal property, services, and all other business receipts) in New Jersey by total receipts. The Throw-Out Rule increases a corporation’s New Jersey tax liability by “throwing out” sales receipts that are not taxed by other jurisdictions from the denominator of the sales fraction. This always increases the sales fraction, causing the apportionment formula and resulting CBT to increase. Whirlpool Properties, Inc. appealed its assessment from 2002, arguing that the Throw-Out Rule was unconstitutional. Upon review of the applicable legal authorities, the Supreme Court held that corporate taxpayers having a substantial nexus to New Jersey may constitutionally apply the Throw-Out Rule to untaxed receipts from states that lack jurisdiction to tax it due to an insufficient connection with the corporation but not to receipts that are untaxed because a state chooses not to impose an income tax. View "Whirlpool Properties, Inc. v. Div. of Taxation" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court is whether a condominium complex is liable in tort for injury sustained by a pedestrian on its abutting sidewalk. "551 Observer Highway" is the site of a 104-unit condominium complex (the Building). Each unit is owned in fee simple by individual residents who have an undivided interest in the common elements. Every unit owner is a member of the Skyline at Hoboken Condominium Association, Inc. (Skyline), and only an owner may be a Skyline member. The Master Deed requires owners to pay an “Annual Common Expense” assessment, which is used for, among other things, maintaining the common elements and paying insurance premiums. According to the Master Deed, “common elements” included “[a]ll curbs, sidewalks, stoops, hallways, stairwells, porches and patios.” On the morning of February 14, 2006, while walking on the sidewalk abutting the Building, Plaintiff Richard Luchejko slipped on a sheet of ice and was injured. Plaintiff sued Skyline, CM3 (its property manager), the City of Hoboken, and D&D (a snow-clearing services company) alleging negligence for an unsafe sidewalk. All Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Skyline, CM3, and Hoboken, but not to D&D. Plaintiff then settled his claim with D&D and unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment to the remaining Defendants. Upon review of the appellate record, the Supreme Court found that the Appellate Division properly analyzed the facts of this case and concluded that no sidewalk liability attached for the injury to Plaintiff. View "Luchejko v. City of Hoboken" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the statement of reasons issued by the City of Ocean City adequately explained why a candidate for firefighter was bypassed for appointment in favor of two candidates who ranked lower on a competitive civil service examination. In 2007, the City of Ocean City (the City) sought to fill three vacant firefighter positions. On May 24, 2007, a list of eligible candidates for the positions was certified by the Civil Service Commission (Commission) to the City, the appointing authority. Each candidate on the eligible list was ranked according to scores obtained on a competitive examination. Nicholas Foglio ranked second on that list. At the time the list was certified, Foglio had served for eight years as a fireman/emergency medical technician (EMT) in multiple volunteer fire departments, logging over one-thousand total hours. Foglio was the only candidate on the eligible list with any prior firefighting experience and training. The City appointed eligible candidates ranked first (a student-teacher), third (a bartender), and fourth (a lifeguard), bypassing Foglio. In accordance with the provisions of state law, the City reported to the Department of Personnel (DOP) that it had bypassed Foglio, a higher-ranked candidate, because the two lower-ranked eligible candidates best met the needs of Department. Foglio sought review by the Commission. The Commission concluded that Foglio had failed to satisfy his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the appointing authority’s decision to bypass him was improper. In its ruling, it observed that the appointing authority selected two lower-ranked eligible candidates because "they best met the needs” of the fire department. Because Foglio did not assert, much less prove, an unlawful motive, such as discrimination or political influence, the Commission held that, "the appointing authority’s bypass of [Foglio’s] name on the Fire Fighter eligible list was proper." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the City should have provided a statement of "legitimate" reasons for the bypass. Here, the reason advanced was boilerplate and insufficient to satisfy the appointing authority’s reporting obligation. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Foglio" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether plaintiff International Schools Services, Inc. (ISS) was properly denied a tax exemption for 2002 and 2003 under the state tax code. ISS has owned and occupied the West Windsor Township property at issue in this case since 1989. ISS is a nonprofit corporation and maintains a tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Service Code. Although West Windsor Township granted ISS a property tax exemption from 1990 through 2001 for the portions of ISS's property that it actually occupied, the exemption was denied for 2002 and 2003 based on the Township's review of ISS's activities. ISS appealed to the Tax Court which found that ISS had not satisfied the first prong of a three-part test (the "Paper Mill Playhouse" test) requiring that the entity seeking tax exemption be "organized exclusively for the moral and mental improvement of men, women, and children." The Appellate Division reversed that decision, and remanded for the Tax Court to address the remaining prongs of the test. On remand, the Tax Court held that ISS had not satisfied the second prong of the test because the schools, not ISS, were performing the activities sufficient for tax exemption, and ISS was merely assisting them. Focusing on the rates charged for rent to some of its for-profit affiliates, the Tax Court found also that ISS had not satisfied the third prong of the test. The Appellate Division disagreed with the Tax Court with regard to the second prong of the test, but found that ISS failed the third prong due to the subsidies it provided to its affiliates. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that West Windsor Township properly denied a property tax exemption to ISS for the tax years 2002 and 2003 because the commingling of its effort and entanglement of its activities and operations with its profit-making affiliates was significant and substantial, with the benefit in the form of direct and indirect subsidies flowing only one way-from ISS to the for-profit entities. View "International Schools Services, Inc. v. West Windsor Township" on Justia Law