Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was a narrow one of appellate jurisdiction of an agency decision and the appropriate response by an appellate tribunal when it encounters on its calendar an interlocutory order from which leave to appeal was neither sought nor granted. A school principal was returned to teaching due to a reduction-in-force (RIF), which included elimination of all vice-principal positions throughout the school district. The principal filed a petition with the Commissioner of Education to establish her tenure and seniority rights as a vice-principal. Her employer, the Board of Education of the City of Elizabeth, challenged the validity of her principal certification, which challenge, if successful, affected her tenure and seniority rights. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) adopted the Elizabeth Board's position, but the Commissioner rejected the Initial Decision and remanded the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for calculation of the principal's tenure and seniority rights. The ALJ complied, the Commissioner adopted the Initial Decision, and the Elizabeth Board appealed. The Appellate Division held that the Commissioner's first decision was a final order from which the Elizabeth Board could have filed an appeal as of right. Having failed to do so, the panel concluded that the Elizabeth Board waived its right to appeal the Commissioner's first decision. The appellate panel raised the issue of the timeliness of the appeal sua sponte and determined that the Commissioner's first decision rejecting the ALJ s Initial Decision was a final order from which the employer should have taken an appeal. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the Commissioner's order became a final decision from which an appeal could be filed as of right only when the Commissioner adopted the decision of the ALJ following the remand proceedings. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "Silviera-Francisco v. Bd. of Education of the City of Elizabeth" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the standard governing revocation of direct access from a state highway to property used for commercial purposes pursuant to the State Highway Access Management Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 27:7-89 to -98, and the State Highway Access Management Code (Access Code), N.J.A.C. 16:47-3.5(e)(11) and -3.8(k)(2). Arielle Realty, L.L.C. was the owner of a three-tenant commercial property located on the northbound side of Route 166 in Toms River. The DOT informed Arielle that access to its property from Route 166 would be eliminated because the DOT intended to construct an additional northbound travel lane. The DOT also advised Arielle that it intended to construct a median to separate northbound and southbound traffic on Route 166. This design would eliminate the eight parking spaces in the front of the building. The plan would also prevent direct access to Arielle s property for motorists traveling south on Route 166 because a motorist would no longer be able to make a left-hand turn onto West Gateway. According to the DOT design plan, a southbound motorist on Route 166, who intends to access Arielle s property, would be required to drive past the property, turn right onto a local road, turn right onto another local road, turn left onto Route 166 at an intersection controlled by a traffic signal, and turn right onto West Gateway. This alternative route traversed approximately three-quarters of a mile. In affirming the DOT Commissioner's decision, the Appellate Division determined that the DOT met its burden of proof that the alternative access plan was not only reasonable but also provided a convenient, direct, and well-marked means to enter the business and to return to the state road. Accordingly, the Appellate Division determined that the property owner failed to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to the DOT design. The Supreme Court affirmed: "the Commissioner's analysis is ultimately aimed at selecting the plan that will best achieve the overarching goal of providing reasonable access to the state's system of highways rather than maximizing the business interests of a particular property owner." View "In re Revocation of the Access of Block #613" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review concerned a challenge to the validity of a municipal ordinance authorizing the issuance of $6,300,000 in bonds to finance a redevelopment project in the Township of West Orange. Plaintiffs filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs claiming that the Township failed to secure the statutorily required approval for the bond ordinance from the Local Finance Board, which is a part of the Division of Local Government Services within New Jersey's Department of Community Affairs. As a result, plaintiffs claim the bond ordinance was invalid. The trial court dismissed the action because plaintiffs filed their complaint fifty-three days after final publication of the bond ordinance (well outside the twenty-day period permitted by Rule 4:69-6(b)(11)). The Appellate Division affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court held that because plaintiffs did not present any extraordinary circumstances to allow the trial and appellate courts to consider their claims, those courts properly dismissed plaintiffs' petition. View "In re Petition for Referendum to Repeal Ordinance 2354-12 of the Twp. of W. Orange" on Justia Law

In May 2013, the Division of Child Protection and Permanency filed an Order to Show Cause for Care and Supervision of T.E. (Tommy), the six-year-old son of K.N.(mother) and K.E.(father). The Family Part investigated allegations of domestic violence and drug use in Tommy's home and awarded temporary custody of Tommy to the Division. The Division temporarily placed Tommy in the home of his maternal grandmother, where he had been residing for several months, and conducted an on-site evaluation of the home. A later evaluation revealed that Tommy's maternal step-grandfather had been the subject of a domestic-violence complaint, which was dismissed. The Division substantiated the domestic violence claim and determined that the maternal grandparents home could not be licensed under the Resource Family Parent Licensing Act. As a result, the Division removed Tommy from his maternal grandparents' home and placed him with his maternal great aunt who was eligible to be licensed as a resource family parent and receive financial assistance under the Act. At the permanency hearings that followed Tommy s placement with his maternal great aunt, the Law Guardian argued that Tommy should be returned to the home of his maternal grandparents because Tommy was developing attachment issues and experiencing personality changes. The Division maintained that Tommy could not be returned to the home because the maternal step-grandfather had been the subject of a domestic violence complaint that was substantiated by the Division. At the conclusion of the hearings, the Family Part judge ordered the Division to return Tommy to the home of his maternal grandparents and to provide them with the financial assistance available to a resource family parent licensed under the Act. The Division filed an emergent appeal to stay the Family Part s order. The Appellate Division held that the Family Part had the authority to place Tommy with his maternal grandparents, but remanded the matter for further consideration of all relevant statutory and regulatory factors to determine the suitability of the placement. The Supreme Court affirmed, substantially for the reasons expressed in the Appellate Division opinion, that the Family Part judge had the authority to determine that the child s best interests were served by his continued placement with a relative not licensed as a resource family parent under the Act, and that the Family Part judge did not have the authority to compel the Division to pay financial assistance under the Act to a relative not licensed as a resource family parent. However, because the Division returned Tommy to the care and custody of his mother, the Court dismissed as moot the Appellate Division's remand to the Family Part to consider factors relevant to a placement review, including the claim of prior domestic violence involving the maternal step-grandfather. View "New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. K.N." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether an initiative petition filed under the Optional Municipal Charter Law (known as the Faulkner Act), requiring the City of Camden to create and maintain its own police force, and enjoining the municipality from replacing its police force with a countywide police force, unlawfully restricted the municipality's legislative authority or was preempted by state fiscal statutes. Defendants, a group of City voters acting as a Committee of Petitioners (Committee), attempted to block the regionalization of the City's police services. The Committee invoked the Optional Municipal Charter Law. The Committee submitted an initiative petition for the adoption of a proposed ordinance that would have required the City of Camden to create and maintain its own police force, and would have enjoined the City from disbanding its municipal police force and replacing it with a regionalized or countywide police force. The Committee obtained, on its petition, the number of voter signatures required by the Faulkner Act. It sought to have its initiated ordinance certified by the municipal clerk, considered by the City Council, and, if not enacted by the Council, placed on the ballot for voter approval in the 2012 General Election. Plaintiffs Mayor Dana L. Redd, Camden's Mayor, and Camden's Council President Francisco Moran filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the Committee's Faulkner Act initiative. The trial court found that the proposed ordinance constituted an invalid divestment of the City's legislative authority. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for a determination whether the state fiscal statutes preempt the proposed ordinance. Although the Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division that the proposed ordinance does not constitute an improper divestment of the municipal governing body's legislative power, it disagreed with the panel's remand of the case for further inquiry into the question of preemption. The Supreme Court found no evidence of a legislative intent to preempt the initiative and referendum procedure set forth in the Faulkner Act in either the municipal finance or police statutes cited in this appeal. Instead, the Court found a legislative intent in some of the statutes to retain the Faulkner Act's procedures, including its initiative and referendum provisions. Thus, the Committee's Faulkner Act initiative was not preempted. Notwithstanding the Court's holdings that the proposed ordinance neither effected an unlawful divestment of legislative power nor was preempted by state statutes, the relief sought by the Committee in its 2012 petition was not granted in a manner consistent with the Faulkner Act. Because the reorganization that the ordinance was intended to forestall was completed more than two years ago, the ordinance as drafted was inconsistent with then-current circumstances. Accordingly, the ordinance might no longer be supported by all of the citizens who backed it with their signatures, and it could not meaningfully be evaluated by the voters. The presence of an out-of-date ordinance on the ballot would contravene the Faulkner Act's objective that voters be presented with a clear, understandable proposed ordinance that they may accept or reject as they see fit. Accordingly, The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Appellate Division's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of a judgment barring the Camden Municipal Clerk from certifying the Committee's petition. View "Redd v. Bowman" on Justia Law

The unions in each of three municipalities brought scope-of-negotiations challenges to the municipal actions. The Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC), in separate decisions, held that the municipalities violated the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act (EERA), and required each municipality to negotiate the changes in terms and conditions of employment. PERC applied the three-part test set forth in "Local 195, IFPTE v. New Jersey," (88 N.J.393 (1982)), for resolving questions about the scope of public sector employment negotiations. In "Local 195," the Court established that a subject is negotiable when: (1) the item intimately and directly affects the work and welfare of public employees; (2) the subject has not been fully or partially preempted by statute or regulation; and (3) a negotiated agreement would not significantly interfere with the determination of governmental policy.The three municipalities appealed their PERC administrative determinations. The Appellate Division observed that the Commission had approved all three layoff plans during the time when the Commission's emergency regulation permitting temporary layoffs, was in effect. PERC determined that the layoffs in each municipality directly affected employee work and welfare, that the subject of negotiation was not preempted by statute or regulation, and that the municipalities did not have the managerial prerogative to unilaterally implement the layoffs because negotiations would not significantly interfere with governmental policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that at the time that they occurred, the layoff actions at issue were non-negotiable under the third prong of the Local 195 test. View "IMO Borough of Keyport v. Local 68" on Justia Law

Defendant was an employee of the North Bergen Board of Education who filed an action asserting statutory and common law employment discrimination claims against the Board. In discovery, defendant's counsel produced several hundred documents that allegedly had been removed or copied from Board files. According to the Board, the documents included highly confidential student educational and medical records that were protected by federal and state privacy laws. The Board reported the alleged theft of its documents to the county prosecutor. The State presented the matter to a grand jury, which ultimately indicted defendant for official misconduct and theft by unlawful taking of public documents. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to support the indictment and withheld exculpatory evidence about her motive. She also contended that her removal of documents for use in her employment discrimination claim was sanctioned by the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in "Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.," (204 N.J. 239 (2010)). The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial and appellate court's decisions. View "New Jersey v. Saavedra" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Richard Grabowsky filed a complaint against the Township of Montclair, challenging the validity of an ordinance adopted by the Township to permit the construction of an assisted living facility on a site located next to the Unitarian Universalist Congregation Church of Montclair. Plaintiff asserted that a statement made by Township Mayor Jerry Fried, a member of the Township Council and Planning Board, demonstrated that Fried had a direct personal interest in the development and that he should have been disqualified from voting on the zoning issue. He also alleged that Fried and a second member of the Council, Nick Lewis, shared a disqualifying indirect personal interest in the development project because of their membership in the Unitarian Church. The Township, its Planning Board and the developers seeking the opportunity to build the assisted living facility denied the existence of any conflict. Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction barring the Township and Planning Board from considering or approving development applications for the assisted living facility. Although no party filed a motion for any form of dispositive relief, the trial court sua sponte granted summary disposition, and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. An appellate panel concluded that the trial court's summary judgment was procedurally improper, but concurred with the court's determination that the two Township officials had no conflict of interest, and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment, but did not concur with the panel's conclusion that, on the limited record developed in the trial court, plaintiff's claim was properly dismissed because the Unitarian Church was neither an applicant nor an objector in the redevelopment application at issue. The Court held that when a church or other organization owned property within 200 feet of a site that is the subject of a zoning application, public officials who currently serve in substantive leadership positions in the organization, or who will imminently assume such positions, are disqualified from voting on the application. View "Grabowsky v. Township of Montclair" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action because Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 and FY 2015 Appropriations Acts did not provide sufficient funding to meet the amounts called for with the Legislature's enactment of Chapter 78, L.2011, c.78 (amending N.J.S.A. 43:3C-9.5(c)). Plaintiffs argued that Chapter 78 created an enforceable contract that was entitled to constitutional protection against impairment. The Supreme Court granted the State's motion for direct certification to resolve important questions raised by this "apparent clash of constitutional provisions." After review, the Supreme Court held that the Legislature and Governor were without authority to enact an enforceable and legally binding long-term financial agreement through this statute. "Chapter 78's contractual language creates, at best, the equivalent of appropriations-backed debt that is accompanied by a strong legislative expression of intent to provide future funding. The legislative use of contractual terms in Chapter 78, when referring to the required schedule of recurring payments of the State's annual required contribution to the State public pension systems, does not create an enforceable long-term financial contract that can co-exist with the limitations of the Debt Limitation Clause and the related Appropriations Clause of the State Constitution. So long as Chapter 78 exists in its present statutory form, each year's appropriations act will reflect the present legislative and executive judgment as to the budgetary priority of this pressing need for which those branches will be answerable to the public and to the financial marketplace. It is not the place of this Court to dictate that judgment, for the Constitution has left such budgetary and political questions to the other two branches." View "Burgos v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether three teachers employed by the Board of Education of the Bridgewater-Raritan School District (Board) appropriately were denied tenure as a matter of law or equity under circumstances , implicating the interplay of N.J.S.A.18A:28-5, which establishes the general rule by which teachers obtain tenure, and N.J.S.A.18A:16-1.1, which creates an exception to that general rule. The Bridgewater-Raritan Education Association filed a petition of appeal on behalf of the teachers with the Commissioner. The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case, and the Board moved for summary judgment. The Association maintained that the teachers were entitled to tenure as a matter of law and under the equitable principles of apparent authority and equitable estoppel. An administrative law judge (ALJ) granted the Board s motion, finding that none of the teachers met the statutory requirement for tenure because they each had served as temporary replacements for other tenured teachers. The ALJ rejected the Association's equitable arguments and concluded that the Board was not required to notify teachers of their status as replacement teachers under N.J.S.A.18A:16-1.1. The Commissioner affirmed the ALJ s decision. The Association appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished decision. The Supreme Court, after review, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court found that N.J.S.A.18A:16-1.1 required a board of education to give an employee notice of his or her designation as a replacement. With respect to the claim of Tamara Manzur, a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether she was provided such notice as to her status during the 2007-08 school year. The Court agreed with the Appellate Division that equitable principles were inapplicable. View "Bridgewater-Raritan Education Association v. Board of Education of the Bridgewater-Raritan School District" on Justia Law