Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case required the Court to address the standard to be applied by Family Part judges when they determine whether the prosecution has demonstrated probable cause under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a)(2). It arose from a 2009 shooting in which one victim was killed and one seriously injured, allegedly by a group of men led by Angel Ramos, the father of one of the two juveniles in this case -- A.D. #1. Ramos was alleged to be a leader in a street gang. The incident closely followed a fight in which A.D. #1 and A.D. #2 were beaten by an uncle of A.D. #2 and others. According to the prosecution, the two juveniles, motivated by a desire for revenge following the fight, contacted A.D. #1's father and participated in a conspiracy to murder A.D. #2's uncle and others, precipitating an assault in which the targeted uncle was unhurt, but another uncle of A.D. #2 was killed and A.D. #2's mother was severely wounded. The two juveniles, both approaching their eighteenth birthdays, were charged with murder, aggravated assault, conspiracy and attempted murder, among other offenses. The trial court denied the prosecution's application to waive the juveniles into adult criminal court, concluding that the State had not demonstrated probable cause under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a)(2). It found "no evidence" that the two juveniles had understood that their response to the fight would lead to murder. The State appealed, and an Appellate Division panel reversed the determination of the trial court, holding that the trial court had committed several legal errors in its application of the probable cause standard to the setting of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision: "the probable cause standard that governs waiver of juvenile complaints into adult criminal court under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 is similar to the standard that guides a grand jury's determination whether or not to indict. If the trial court finds that the State has presented evidence which, combined with reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, leads to a well-grounded suspicion or belief that the juvenile has committed one or more crimes enumerated in the statute, the "probable cause" standard of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 is satisfied. " View "In the Interest of A.D." on Justia Law

Defendant F.M. (Fernanda) appealed the termination of her parental rights to her now five-year-old daughter, Quinn, and four-year-old son, Troy, Jr. Both children were born of a relationship between Fernanda and T.J. (Troy). The family court found that Troy had committed an act of domestic violence against Fernanda, had an intractable drug-addiction problem, and suffered from mental illness that induced delusional thoughts that he was God. On this basis, the court considered Troy a danger to the physical well-being of the children. The termination of Fernanda's parental rights was premised on the court's findings that she was incapable and unwilling to protect her children from the dangers presented by Troy. The court barred Troy from having unsupervised contact with Quinn, the only child born of their relationship at the time. In violation of court orders and earlier consent agreements with the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), Fernanda allowed Troy to have access to Quinn in her home. Fernanda's inability to shield Quinn from her father led to the child's removal from the home and later to the removal of Troy, Jr. after his birth. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Fernanda never raised any objection to "care or custody" before the family court, she was barred from doing so on appeal based on laches. Furthermore, the Court upheld the family court's determination to terminate Fernanda's parental rights, deferring to the lower court's findings as adequately supported by the record. View "New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. F.M." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the nature and extent of fees that may be recovered from a litigant in a matrimonial dispute by an individual who has been appointed to serve as a parenting coordinator. More specifically, the Court addressed the circumstances under which and the basis upon which a litigant who raises a grievance against the parenting coordinator may be called upon to answer for fees incurred by the parenting coordinator in responding to a grievance; in resisting discovery demands relating to the grievance; in participating in discovery about the grievance; in pursuing enforcement of a fee award in the trial court; and in participating in the appellate process. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division to the extent that it affirmed the trial court's order awarding fees to the parenting coordinator for her work responding to the grievances and to the extent that it affirmed the trial court's rejection of the husband's argument that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his grievances; in all other respects the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed. View "Segal v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendant Frank A. Louis, Esq. represented Plaintiff Julia Gere in connection with Plaintiff's divorce from Peter Ricker. Pursuant to the property settlement agreement, Plaintiff had a six month window, which ended in October 2000, to decide how she wished to proceed with respect to the parties' ancillary real estate investments. Plaintiff's understanding was that she would retain a one-half interest in those assets unless she affirmatively advised Ricker within six months that she did not wish to do so. One of those assets was Navesink Partners, which owned both the real estate and business operations of a marina. Based on Louis's interpretation of Plaintiff’s wishes after a discussion with her friend, Louis sent a letter dated October 11, 2000, to Ricker's attorney stating, "this will confirm that except for the Marina, Mrs. Ricker wishes to maintain one-half interest in all other properties." Subsequently, a dispute arose in which Ricker maintained that Plaintiff had waived any interest in Navesink Partners, and Plaintiff contended that she did not waive her interest, that she wanted to continue her ownership interest in the marina's real estate, and that she was entitled to fair value for her interest in the marina's business operations. Plaintiff ultimately sued Louis for malpractice over the purported waiver of her interests in the marina property. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether "Puder v. Buechel" (183 N.J. 428 (2005)) barred Plaintiff's malpractice action against her former attorney and whether that claim was time-barred. The appellate division affirmed the trial court decision that Plaintiff indeed was time barred, and that she voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement regarding the marina property which she testified was "fair and reasonable." Upon review, the Supreme Court found Plaintiff's case was materially distinguishable from "Puder," and that her legal malpractice claim was not barred. View "Gere v. Louis" on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiff J.D. and Defendant M.D.F. terminated a long-term relationship that resulted in the birth of two children. J.D. continued to live in the house the parties had purchased, along with the children, and she became involved in a new relationship with a boyfriend, R.T. In 2009, J.D. filed a domestic violence complaint. The complaint alleged that J.D. and R.T. observed M.D.F. outside of J.D.’s residence to harass her. When asked about the incident, M.D.F. requested that R.T. be sequestered and that he be given an opportunity to question him. After the court sequestered R.T., M.D.F. did not deny that he had gone to the residence and had taken pictures, but claimed that his purpose was not harassment, but to obtain evidence to support a motion to transfer custody. The court found that line of attack irrelevant and, without allowing M.D.F. to question R.T., granted a Final Restraining Order. As explained by the court, M.D.F. conceded that he had been taking pictures and, in light of the nature of the earlier incidents, his acts constituted harassment. The Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether M.D.F.'s due process rights were violated during the proceedings that resulted in the Final Restraining Order. The Court found that the trial court failed to sufficiently articulate its findings and conclusions, and the record contained insufficient evidence to sustain the Final Restraining Order. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a re-hearing to protect M.D.F.’s due process rights and to permit the trial court to evaluate the testimony and the evidence. View "J.D. v. M.D.F." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the termination of Defendant R.D.’s parental rights to his two youngest children. In November 2004, defendant’s adult step-daughter reported to the New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services (DYFS) that defendant had been sexually molesting one of her step-sisters. A DYFS investigation resulted in the emergency removal and temporary foster care placement of the children. DYFS filed a complaint, and the Chancery Division issued an order to show cause for protective services, determining that removal was necessary to avoid an ongoing risk to the children. On the return date, the court reaffirmed its determinations and scheduled a fact-finding hearing, noting that the burden of proof "is preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing" evidence. The court eventually concluded that it was in the children's best interests to place them outside the home. After further proceedings, the Title Nine court determined that termination of parental rights followed by adoption was an appropriate plan because defendant had failed to complete services, and thus there continued to be a risk of harm to the children. Defendant never appealed the Title Nine court’s determinations. The central issue in this appeal was whether determinations made in the adjudication of an abuse or neglect proceeding under Title Nine can be given collateral estoppel effect in a later guardianship/termination of parental rights proceeding under Title Thirty. The Supreme Court held that unless the parties are on notice that Title Nine abuse or neglect proceedings are to be conducted under the "clear and convincing" evidence standard constitutionally required for guardianship/termination of parental rights proceedings under Title Thirty and appropriate accommodations are made for the fundamentally different natures of these proceedings, Title Nine determinations cannot be given preclusive effect in later Title Thirty proceedings. View "Division of Youth & Family Services v. R.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Donald Sachau and Defendant Barbara Sachau were married in 1964, and divorced in 1979. At the time of their divorce, the partiesâ two children lived with Mrs. Sachau. Pursuant to the divorce judgment, Mr. Sachau was to pay his wife child support, and Mrs. Sachau would remain in the marital home until the youngest child reached age eighteen. At that time, the house would be appraised and listed for sale within 30 days of the childâs birthday. The proceeds from the sale would then be split according to the divorce judgment. In 1984, the youngest child turned eighteen, triggering the sale provision. For the next twenty-two years, neither party took action to enforce their rights under the judgment. Mrs. Sachau remained in the home, and in 1990, began making inconsistent payments to her husband. In 2005, Mr. Sachau was unable to support himself, and as a result, sought to enforce his rights under the 1979 divorce judgment. In 2006, he sued to compel the sale of the marital home. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge ruled that the marital home should be sold and that Mrs. Sachau should receive full credit for all the payments she made. Mrs. Sachau filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied and she was ordered to sign a listing agreement. Mrs. Sachau appealed, and the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Sachau appealed the trial courtâs evidentiary findings, but the appellate court adopted the trial courtâs findings. The Supreme Court found that the divorce judgment was silent on how the parties should value the marital home. The Court reversed the appellate court decision and remanded the case to the trial court for re-evaluation of its conclusions.