Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tennessee Gas proposed constructing a new compressor station (Compressor Station 327) in West Milford Township as part of its East 300 Upgrade Project. The site is within the Highlands Preservation Area, which has stringent environmental standards. Tennessee applied to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for a Highlands Applicability Determination (HAD), claiming an exemption under N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11) (Exemption 11) of the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act. The DEP issued the HAD, determining that the project qualified for Exemption 11.Food & Water Watch appealed the DEP’s decision, arguing that Exemption 11 should be narrowly construed so that the term “routine” modifies “upgrade.” The Appellate Division agreed, vacating the HAD and remanding the matter to determine if Compressor Station 327 qualifies as a “routine upgrade.” The court emphasized that statutory exemptions should be strictly construed to protect environmental interests and found that “routine” should modify all activities listed in Exemption 11.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment. The Court held that “routine” modifies only “maintenance and operations” and does not modify the other activities listed in Exemption 11, such as “upgrade.” The Court based its decision on the plain language of the statute, its grammatical structure, and the context within the law. The case was remanded to determine if the project is consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act, considering factors such as the project's location on already disturbed lands. View "In the Matter of Proposed Construction of Compressor Station" on Justia Law

When a toxic disaster hits, claimants could seek relief in the form of assistance from the New Jersey Spill Fund by following promulgated claims procedures. In order to resolve disputes over denied Fund monies quickly and fairly, the Fund uses arbitrators and flexible procedures to allow claimants the opportunity to demonstrate that the denial constituted arbitrary and capricious action. Petitioner, US Masters Residential Property (USA) Fund, submitted a claim for Spill Fund monies for its multi-lot property located in Bayonne that was affected by storm floodwaters, which allegedly carried petroleum-based toxins. Neighboring properties also affected by the storm’s toxin-laden floodwaters were afforded Spill Fund relief. Following some back and forth with the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), petitioner’s claim was denied. After petitioner filed an appeal, two years elapsed between the request for arbitration and the commencement of the arbitration proceeding. The results of the arbitration ended in favor of the Spill Fund, and payment remained denied. The New Jersey Supreme Court expressed "concerns" about the arbitration. "Although we are mindful of the deferential standard of review, flaws in the substantive reasoning of the arbitration decision as well as procedural fairness considerations undermine confidence in the outcome of this arbitration enough to persuade us, in the interest of fairness, to require that a new arbitration be conducted. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this claim for a new proceeding." View "US Masters Residential Property (USA) Fund v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

The under review by the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed several actions by the State Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) with regard to property in the Borough of Oakland that is subject to the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act (Highlands Act), N.J.S.A. 13:20-1 to -35. N.J. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review only the determination that the property owner -- Bi-County Development Corporation (Bi-County) -- qualified for the exemption allowed under the Highlands Act for the construction of affordable housing projects, N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(17) (Exemption 17). The issue required interpretation of Exemption 17’s language concerning expiration of its safe harbor. The Court agreed with the Appellate Division, and the DEP, that this project could proceed under Exemption 17 because its qualification had not expired. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in the published decision of the panel, adding only that affirmance was based solely on a plain language reading of the Highlands Act that did not incorporate the definition of “final approval” contained in the separate but related Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163. View "N.J. Highlands Coalition v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ." on Justia Law

Quaker Valley Farms, LLC (Quaker Valley) owned approximately 120 acres of deed-restricted farmland in Hunterdon County, New Jersey. As part of New Jersey’s Farmland Preservation Program, the State purchased an easement on the property that prohibited any activity on the property that was detrimental to soil conservation, but permitted the construction of new buildings for agricultural purposes. Quaker Valley excavated and leveled twenty acres of the farm previously used for the production of crops, to erect hoop houses (temporary greenhouses) in which it would grow flowers. In the process, Quaker Valley destroyed the land’s prime quality soil. At issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether Quaker Valley’s excavation activities violated its deed of easement and the Agriculture Retention and Development Act (ARDA). The Supreme Court determined Quaker Valley had the right to erect hoop houses, but did not have the authority to permanently damage a wide swath of premier quality soil in doing so. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division, which overturned the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the State Agriculture Development Committee, was reversed. “Those who own deed-restricted farmland must have well delineated guidelines that will permit them to make informed decisions about the permissible limits of their activities.” View "New Jersey v. Quaker Valley Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Givaudan Fragrances Corporation (Fragrances) faced liability as a result of environmental contamination from a manufacturing site that a related corporate entity operated in a facility in Clifton. The issue this case presented for review involved Fragrances' effort to obtain insurance coverage for environmental claims brought by governmental entities in response to discharges of hazardous substances that occurred during the pertinent policy periods running through January 1, 1986. Fragrances claimed that the defendant insurance companies (defendants) wrote liability policies for Givaudan Corporation during those relevant years. Fragrances argued that it was entitled, either as an affiliate of Givaudan Corporation or by operation of an assignment of rights, to have the insurers provide it with coverage for that environmental liability. Defendants claimed that they insured Givaudan Corporation as their named insured, not Fragrances, and that any assignment to Fragrances was invalid because defendants did not consent to the assignment, as was required for a valid assignment according to the language of the insurance policies. Therefore, collectively, defendants refused to honor Fragrances' right to bring insurance contract claims against them. Fragrances filed its complaint in February 2009 seeking a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to coverage under the policies. In February 2010, while the declaratory judgment action was pending, Fragrances notified defendants that Givaudan Roure Flavors Corporation (corporate successor-in-interest to Givaudan Corporation) planned to assign its post-loss rights under the insurance policies to Fragrances. Defendants refused to consent to the assignment. Nevertheless, Flavors executed the assignment to Fragrances. Both sides moved for summary judgment. Because Fragrances was not acquired by Givaudan Corporation during the policy period, the trial court determined that it could not be an affiliated corporation covered under the policies. The court also determined that the assignment in this case was an assignment of policies, which could not be assigned. The court denied Fragrances' motion and granted defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, explaining that although the anti-assignment clauses in the occurrence policies at issue would prevent an insured from transferring a policy without the consent of the insurer, once a loss occurs, an insured s claim under a policy may be assigned without the insurer s consent.The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that, once an insured loss has occurred, an anti-assignment clause in an occurrence policy may not provide a basis for an insurer s declination of coverage based on the insured's assignment of the right to invoke policy coverage for that loss. The assignment at issue in this case was a post-loss claim assignment and therefore the rule voiding application of anti-assignment clauses to such assignments applied. View "Givaudan Fragrances Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co." on Justia Law

Shortly after plaintiff John Ross signed a contract to sell his home, he learned of contamination on his property as a result of a leak that previously existed in an underground oil storage tank located on a neighboring property. The prospective purchaser then cancelled the contract, and plaintiffs commenced suit against the current and former owners of the neighboring property, and their respective insurers. After the insurers remediated the contamination on the property, the lawsuit proceeded on the claims for damages against all defendants on theories of negligence, strict liability, private nuisance and trespass, as well as violations of the Spill Compensation and Control Act. In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed, and whether plaintiffs could maintain claims as third-party beneficiaries against the insurers which provided coverage to the former owner of the neighboring property where the underground storage tank was located. The Court found no basis for the claims of private nuisance or trespass against the homeowner defendants because there was no proof of negligence, recklessness, intentional conduct, or the conduct of an abnormally dangerous activity, by these parties. Additionally, the Court declined to expand these causes of action to impose strict liability upon defendants. Plaintiffs could not proceed with a direct claim against the defendant insurers for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in the insurance contracts because they did not hold an assignment of rights from the named insured, and there was no evidence that the named insured or her insurers agreed to recognize plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries of the insurance contracts. View "Ross v. Lowitz" on Justia Law

In 1979, plaintiff Morristown Associates purchased commercial property located in Morristown. The property contained a strip-mall-style shopping center known as Morristown Plaza. Among the tenants was Plaza Cleaners, a dry cleaning business owned at the time by Robert Herring. Herring and his wife had entered into a lease with the property's previous owner, Morris Center Associates, in 1976. Due to construction, Herring was unable to occupy and operate Plaza Cleaners until 1978. At some point before moving in, Herring installed a steam boiler in a room at the rear of the leased space and an underground storage tank (UST) for fuel to operate the boiler. In 1985, Herring sold Plaza Cleaners to defendants Edward and Amy Hsi. The Hsis owned the business until 1998 when it was sold to current owner and third-party defendant, Byung Lee. In August 2003, a monitoring of a well installed near Plaza Cleaner's UST revealed fuel oil contamination. A subsequent investigation revealed that although the UST was intact, the fill and vent pipes were severely deteriorated, with large holes along a significant portion of their lengths. Plaintiff's experts concluded that those holes had developed as early as 1988 and, since that time, oil had been leaking from the pipes each time the tank was filled. Each of the named oil company defendants in this case allegedly supplied fuel oil to Plaza Cleaners at various times between 1988 and 2003. The issue in this appeal was whether the general six-year statute of limitations contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 applied to private claims for contribution made pursuant to the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a). Based on the plain language of the Spill Act, reinforced by its legislative history, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 s six-year statute of limitations was not applicable to Spill Act contribution claims. The Court therefore rejected the contrary determination of the Appellate Division and reversed and remanded this case to the Appellate Division for its consideration of other issues raised on appeal that were unaddressed. View "Morristown Associates v. Grant Oil Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the nature of the nexus that must be proven by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) under the Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act or Act) against Sue’s Clothes Hanger (Sue’s), the only direct defendant that remained in the case, for costs expended in the investigation and remediation of contaminated groundwater that tainted private wells in Bound Brook. The trial court dismissed the Spill Act claim, concluding that even if the building where Sue’s was located is a contamination source, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Sue’s discharged PCE that contaminated the groundwater. The court found: the groundwater and soil contamination preceded Sue’s dry cleaning operation; there was no evidence that the drip from Sue’s continued or the pavement below showed signs of contamination; the DEP took no other action regarding the drip, suggesting it was not considered to be significant; there is no evidence that PCE in the groundwater or soil came from Sue’s rather than from others who had conducted dry cleaning operations in the building; and because there are alternative sources of contamination from the building and Zaccardi’s, the DEP had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Sue’s contributed to the groundwater contamination. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division in holding that in order to obtain damages under the Spill Act, the DEP must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, a reasonable connection between the discharge, the discharger, and the contamination at the damaged site. The proofs failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the groundwater contamination and Sue’s discharge during its operation. View "New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Dimant" on Justia Law