Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether suggestive behavior by a private party, without any state action, should have been evaluated at a pretrial hearing to determine whether an eyewitness’ identification could have been admitted at trial. Defendant Cecelia Chen was indicted on charges of aggravated assault, armed robbery, and weapons offenses for her role in an attack on her ex-boyfriend’s wife. Nearly twenty-two months after the attack, police presented a photo array to the victim and an eyewitness for the first time. A detective testified that one of the reasons the police waited to show the photo array was out of concern that the website pictures might have prejudiced the victim. The victim and eyewitness separately selected Defendant’s picture. Defense counsel moved for a Wade hearing, arguing that the victim’s identification was based on seeing photos that her husband showed her rather than her memory of the attack. The trial court denied the motion finding the procedure followed by the police was not impermissibly suggestive. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that even without any police action, when a defendant presents evidence that an identification was made under highly suggestive circumstances that could lead to a mistaken identification, trial judges should conduct a preliminary hearing, upon request, to determine the admissibility of the identification evidence. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Chen" on Justia Law

A Union County Grand Jury indicted the two defendants for first-degree murder, third-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, and second-degree possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose. After closing his bar, Luis Lecaros proceeded to drive home several of his employees in his pickup truck, including Sandra Narvarro and his son Paul. At some point, Luis’ truck slid on the rain-slicked road and slammed into the rear of a black Honda, shattering its back window and causing its rear bumper to fall off. The State’s theory was that Defendant Timyan Cabbell was driving the Honda and that Defendant John Calhoun was a passenger. Immediately after the collision, Cabbell and Calhoun, armed with handguns, opened fire on the pickup truck, and then fled in the Honda. The central issue at trial was the identification of the shooters. Two key State witnesses gave statements to police about the shooting, but in front of the jury, neither wished to testify. Because the witnesses insisted they did not wish to testify, the trial court conducted a Rule 104 hearing outside the presence of the jury. At this point, neither Defendant was given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses before the jury. The witnesses' out-of-court statements were deemed admissible under a hearsay exception. The primary issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether Defendants were provided an opportunity to cross examine the State's key witnesses consistent with the Confrontation Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that both defendants were denied their federal and state constitutional rights to confront one of the two key witnesses before the jury. For that reason, that witness' out-of-court statement to the police incriminating Defendants should not have been read to the jury and the admission of that statement was not harmless error. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Cabbell" on Justia Law

Defendant Marie Hess shot and killed her husband Jimmy Hess, a police officer. Defendant entered into a plea agreement in which she pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter; acknowledged that she would receive a thirty-year sentence; conceded that aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors as to make the term appropriate; agreed that neither she nor her attorney would affirmatively seek a lesser term of imprisonment; and agreed not to appeal her conviction. The plea agreement did not bind the court to give any particular sentence, and nothing in the plea agreement denied defense counsel the opportunity to provide mitigating evidence. Defendant did not pursue a direct appeal. Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) claiming that she was denied her constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. At the PCR hearing, Defendant’s PCR counsel alleged that trial counsel made numerous errors, including that he failed to argue mitigating factors and to bring to light evidence suggesting defendant was a battered woman. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant was denied her constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed to present and argue mitigating evidence at her sentencing. The Court also held that Defendant's plea agreement provisions that restricted the right of counsel to argue for a lesser sentence were void. View "New Jersey v. Hess" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether Defendant George Calleia's convictions were appropriately reversed because the State used the deceased victim's "state-of-mind" hearsay statements as evidence to suggest Defendant's motive. The victim in this case was Susan Calleia, Defendant's wife. Her body was found wrapped in a yoga mat in the cargo area of the family's SUV parked at an arts center two miles from their home. Mrs. Calleia was strangled to death. Before trial, the court denied Defendant's motion to preclude statements that Mrs. Calleia made to friends that she was unhappy, wanted a divorce, and was seeking a lawyer. The court found them admissible as "state-of-mind" evidence to show the nature of her relationship with Defendant and whether it had significance in establishing his motive to kill her. The court instructed the jury that Mrs. Calleia's statements could only be considered as her state of mind and plans, and as evidence of the nature of her and Defendant's relationship, but not towards his motive to kill her. The jury found Defendant guilty of murder, and sentenced him to fifty years in prison. On appeal, Defendant challenged the admission of his wife's "state of mind" statements. Upon consideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling in admitting the statements. "If a victim's state-of-mind hearsay statements are relevant to show the victim's conduct, and if such conduct also can give rise to motive when it is known or probably known to the defendant, then the statements are admissible" to establish motive. The Court held that any error in this case that stemmed from the admission was harmless. View "New Jersey v. Calleia" on Justia Law

A mother and her adult son were found dead and bound together in the son's home. Each had been killed by a gunshot wound to the back of the head, and the son's throat had been slashed. An investigation lead police to three suspects: Keith Mercer, Defendant Dwayne Gillispie and Defendant Gregory Buttler. Before trial, the State moved to introduce evidence that Gillispie and Buttler had participated in a robbery and shooting that took place in a New York barbershop twenty days before the murders. The trial court conducted a joint hearing to determine whether "other-crimes" evidence was admissible under state law. The court found the evidence was probative to identify who committed the murders. Although the court acknowledged the evidence was prejudicial, it concluded that the probative value outweighed the prejudice and admitted it. Gillispie and Buttler were tried separately, and separate juries found Gillispie and Buttler guilty on all charges against them. In an unpublished decision, the appellate court reversed the convictions and remanded the cases for new trials. The appellate court found that the other-crimes evidence was too prejudicial, and that the probative value did not outweigh the prejudice. Upon consideration of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, and affirmed its decision. The Court held that the admission of this evidence was harmless error that ultimately would not have affected the outcome of the trials. The Court remanded the cases back to the appellate panel for disposition of other issues unanswered due to its "new trial" order. View "New Jersey v. Gillispie" on Justia Law

Defendant Andrea Hernandez was arrested in 2006 in connection with a series of armed robberies. While in custody awaiting trial on robbery charges, in 2007, she was charged in another county for burglary and theft charges. She pled guilty and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for burglary which was to run concurrently to any sentence she received on robbery charges. With the burglary conviction, Ms. Hernandez was awarded 213 days of credit for the time she spent in jail awaiting trial. Ultimately, Ms. Hernandez pled to concurrent sentences of twenty years for the robbery charges. At the robbery sentencing hearing, Ms. Hernandez objected to the amount of credit she received for the burglary charges. She believed she should have received more credit. In 2006, Defendant Derrick Rose allegedly sold cocaine and heroin to an undercover officer. He was not arrested at the time. In 2007, Mr. Rose was arrested for theft, and charged with theft and the earlier drug charges. Mr. Rose pled guilty, and received two five-year sentences on the drug charges, and a four-year sentence for theft, all to run concurrently. Mr. Rose was awarded 357 days of credit for time spent in jail awaiting trial. On appeal, Mr. Rose argued that the allocation of his jail credit should have gone towards his longer sentences so as to improve his chances of being accepted into a drug treatment program. In both the Hernandez and Rose cases, the appellate courts affirmed the calculation of credit awarded. The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases, and reversed the trial courts' calculation of credit in both cases. The Court found that the lower courts misapplied the rule for calculating credit based on a defendant's time spent awaiting sentencing. The Court remanded both cases for reconsideration of jail credit. View "New Jersey v. Rose" on Justia Law

Defendant Zarik Rose was incarcerated in 1995 on charges relating to the to the attempted murder of Charles Mosely. While awaiting trial, Defendant allegedly told one of the State's witnesses against him that he wanted to have Mosely "whacked," and that Defendant solicited the witness to kill Mosely. The State moved to admit Defendant's comments at trial. The trial court found some of the evidence admissible as "res gestae." During the trial, the court provided instructions to guide the jury's use of that evidence. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that, among other things, all evidence relating to his incarceration on attempted murder charges was improperly admitted at trial. In this appeal, the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed Defendant's conviction, finding that the trial court appropriately instructed the jury on use of the admitted statements. However, by this case, the Court ended the practice of using "res gestae" as an explanation for the admission of evidence: "[e]vidence of uncharged misconduct that is not intrinsic evidence of the crime is inadmissible unless proffered for a proper purpose. ... The Court direct[ed] trial courts to make the Rules of Evidence the touchstone for the analysis of all bad acts categories of res gestae evidence, and disapproves further use of res gestae to support evidential rulings." View "New Jersey v. Rose" on Justia Law

Defendant stated he could not perform field sobriety tests because of a handicap. After failed attempts, he was arrested. At headquarters officers read Miranda warnings and a standard statement that the law requires breath samples and that a separate summons will issue for refusal. The statement provides that any ambiguous or conditional response will be treated as a refusal; if a defendant remains silent or indicates that he has a right to remain silent, wishes to consult an attorney or other person, or if the response is ambiguous or conditional, the officer shall read an additional statement. The defendant consented and indicated that he understood instructions. He twice provided samples that were not of sufficient length or volume. An officer told defendant that if he did not give a long continuous breath, it would be considered a refusal. When defendant again failed, he was charged with violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. Law Division held that the officer was not required to read the additional statement; Appellate Division reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction. Defendant unequivocally consented to the test; his failures to provide the necessary volume and length of samples did not render his consent ambiguous or conditional. Defendant was not entitled to the additional statement.

Defendant R.T.âs nephew lived with him between 1997 and 2003. In 2004, the nephew told his mother that Defendant had sexually assaulted him multiple times. The mother reported the allegations. Defendant voluntarily presented himself to the prosecutorâs office, was advised of the allegations, received Miranda warnings, and waived his rights. During the audiotaping of his statement, Defendant denied the allegations. However, he âconfessedâ to having a drinking problem, and that if he had abused his nephew, it âprobablyâ would have been while he was intoxicated. Defendant was indicted on counts of aggravated sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant moved to suppress his statement, but the trial court denied his motion. Defendantâs confession and taped statement, and the nephewâs videotaped statement were admitted into evidence at trial. After the close of the case, the court called the parties together to discuss jury instructions. The judge asked about a âvoluntary intoxicationâ charge. Defense counsel objected, asserting that Defendant never used âvoluntary intoxicationâ as a defense, and didnât want that matter brought up for the jury to consider. The judge found that Defendant himself âopened the doorâ to the intoxication issue in his audiotaped confession. The court used the âvoluntary intoxicationâ instruction in its charge to the jury. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Defendant was sentenced to a 25-year custodial term. The appellate court was split in its decision, but reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The majority concluded that Defendantâs own statements in his audiotaped statement were too vague for a jury to conclude he intended his actions against his nephew. The court also noted that the jury instruction should be given over counselâs objection when the evidence deems it appropriate to do so. With the Supreme Court being equally divided as the appellate court, it affirmed the appellate courtâs decision to reverse the decision in the case and remand it for a new trial.