Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether a defendant's prior convictions for disorderly persons offenses (inadmissible because they are not crimes) could be used to find that earlier criminal convictions were not too remote and would then be admissible to impeach the defendant's credibility if he testified. Defendant Derrick Harris was indicted for second-degree robbery and second-degree burglary. He was tried for these offenses approximately thirteen years after he was sentenced to concurrent four-year custodial terms for "disorderly persons" offenses in the intervening years. At a hearing, Defendant argued that the prior convictions were too remote to be admissible; the prosecution noted that Defendant had accumulated a significant number of convictions for disorderly persons offenses. The trial court was persuaded that while the disorderly persons convictions were not themselves admissible, they could serve to "bridge the gap" between Defendant's two earlier criminal convictions and his trial in this matter. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it viewed Defendant's intervening convictions for disorderly persons offenses as having removed the bar to admission of those convictions as too remote. Thus, Defendant's prior criminal convictions would be admissible if he testified at trial. View "New Jersey v. Harris" on Justia Law

This appeal was a companion to "New Jersey v. Hudson," (___ N.J. ___ (2012), decided on the same day), because it also involved the application of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b) to an extended-term sentence. Here, the sentence was imposed on Defendant Sally McDonald for an offense committed prior to an offense for which she already was serving another extended-term sentence. As in "Hudson," the second extended term was imposed in a separate sentencing proceeding from that in which the first extended-term sentence was imposed. Consistent with the interpretation given N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5 in "Hudson," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for resentencing because it was error for the sentencing court to have imposed a second extended-term sentence on Defendant in these circumstances. View "New Jersey v. McDonald" on Justia Law

In this appeal and in "New Jersey v. McDonald," (2012), separately conducted sentencing proceedings resulted in sentences that imposed (in the aggregate) multiple extended-term sentences. In previous cases, the Supreme Court addressed N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(1)'s prohibition against sentencing a defendant to multiple extended terms in a single sentencing proceeding. In this appeal, the Court addressed for the first time the importance of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(1)'s incorporation of subsection a's prohibitions to certain offenses and sentencing proceedings, when sentencing was conducted in separate proceedings. Defendant Kevin Hudson was sentenced to a second extended-term sentence for an offense committed prior to the imposition of the extended-term sentence he was serving. The Appellate Division affirmed, recognizing that multiple extended terms may not be imposed in a single sentencing proceeding, but concluded that because Defendant sought severance and subjected himself to two separate sentencing proceedings, his sentence was not illegal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that in this case, because the indictment was severed resulting in two trials and two sentencing proceedings, and the first sentencing court imposed an extended-term prison sentence, it was error for the second court also to impose an extended-term sentence. The timing and sequence of the offenses and sentencings brought Defendant squarely under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b)(1)'s proscription against multiple extended-term sentences. View "New Jersey v. Hudson" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether it was proper for a police officer to testify at trial about how and why he assembled a photo array. In 2005, Angel Chalco left his home in Newark and headed toward the subway station to catch a train to work. As he walked down the stairs, the men grabbed Chalco, pulled him backward, and demanded money. The men took Chalco’s wallet and his cell phone. They then hit him on the head and kicked his stomach, causing him to lose consciousness. After he returned home, he called the police. Soon after, he met with a New Jersey Transit Police Detective and described one of his assailants. That description was broadcast to patrol units. At police headquarters, Chalco viewed about thirty photographs but did not identify anyone as his assailant. A police sketch artist worked with Chalco and prepared a sketch of the assailant based on Chalco’s description. The composite drawing was then disseminated. Days later, the detective came across an arrest photo of Defendant Danny Lazo taken after he had jumped a turnstile. The detective thought Defendant’s photo closely resembled the composite sketch and included a picture of Defendant in an array he compiled. To comply with guidelines from the Attorney General, the detective used a two-year-old photo of Defendant instead of the more recent arrest photo. The detective showed Chalco the photo array, and Chalco identified the picture of Defendant as his assailant. Defendant was arrested the following day. Defendant vigorously objected to both the introduction of the arrest photo and the testimony. The Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for certification. Upon review, the Court found that the officer’s testimony about the photo array had no independent relevance, merely served to bolster the victim’s account, and should not have been admitted at trial in light of the principles outlined in “New Jersey v. Branch” (182 N.J. 338 (2005)). View "New Jersey v. Lazo" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the "spouse privilege" could be pierced using the three-part test set forth in "In re Kozlov" (79 N.J. 232 (1979) to prevent that spouse from testifying in a criminal proceeding against her husband. In 2006, "Joanne" worked in Defendant Dr. James Mauti's medical office. Her sister Jeannette also worked in Defendant's office as the office manager. Jeannette was his live-in girlfriend. Joanne complained of back pain one day, and Defendant offered to treat her. He gave her a a pain pill and a small liquid described as a muscle relaxant. Joanne recalled that Defendant asked her to change into a pair of his boxer shorts "in case he needed to crack her back." After Defendant gave her a second cup of liquid, she became incapacitated. However, she remembered Mauti heating towels to apply to her back, loosening and pulling down her boxer shorts, and sexually assaulting her. She also remembered a sound that reminded her of a digital camera or cellular phone taking a picture. Joanne claimed Defendant sexually assaulted her. The State subpoenaed Jeannette to appear before a grand jury in late 2006. In the summer of 2007, Jeannette and Defendant announced their wedding engagement. Defendant was charged in August. Jeannette informed the State that she would invoke the spousal privilege with regard to her testimony. The State moved to compel Jeannette to testify. The trial court held that the privilege could be pierced under "Kozlov" because the evidence sought from Jeannette was legitimately needed and could not be secured from a less-intrusive source. The Appellate Division reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed, finding Jeannette was entitled to exercise the spousal privilege of refusing to testify in his criminal trial because there was no conflict between Jeannette's exercise of the privilege and a constitutional right, and she did not waive her right to exercise the privilege. View "New Jersey v. Mauti" on Justia Law

A grand jury returned a fifty-count indictment against Defendant Roy Friedman for offenses against his wife and children. Defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to three counts of second-degree aggravated assault upon his wife that occurred during three separate periods of time in 2006. The State agreed to recommend sentences of six years, seven years, and seven years, respectively, for the three offenses, each subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA) and to run consecutively to the others. The remaining forty-seven counts would be dismissed. Defendant agreed to waive any argument against imposing consecutive sentences. At the plea hearing, the trial court carefully questioned defendant about his understanding of and agreement with the terms of the plea. Defendant admitted that during the periods of time in question, he burned his wife's arm and thigh with hot oven racks from a toaster oven; as a result, she was hospitalized for life-threatening infections and skin grafts. From his appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether Defendant must serve the periods of post-release parole supervision that are part of a NERA sentence consecutively or concurrently; and whether "State v. Hess" (207 N.J. 123 (2011)), required invalidation of a portion of the plea bargain under which Defendant agreed that his attorney would not argue for concurrent sentences, as opposed to the consecutive sentences to which he had agreed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that when a defendant has been sentenced to consecutive custodial terms under NERA, the periods of parole supervision that follow must be served consecutively. The Court did not reach whether "Hess" applied in this case because the trial court recognized its inherent sentencing authority, and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it was appropriate to impose consecutive sentences for three separate assaults Defendant admitted committing upon his wife. View "New Jersey v. Friedman" on Justia Law

Elizabeth O'Brien was found stuffed inside a closet in her home on the afternoon of January 30, 2008. It was determined that she died from blunt force trauma to her head. Defendant Demetrius Diaz-Bridges was questioned and made no direct statements to inculpate him in the crime. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant's request for permission to speak with his mother in the midst of his custodial interrogation was an assertion of his right to silence that required officers to stop their questioning. The trial court concluded that it was, and ordered suppression of all statements made by Defendant after that request. The Appellate Division disagreed, but found that Defendant invoked his right to silence during one of his several subsequent reiterations of the request to speak with his mother, and ordered the suppression of a lesser portion of Defendant's recorded confession. Upon review of the trial court record and transcripts of Defendant's interrogations, the Supreme Court concluded that neither Defendant's statements about his wish to speak with his mother nor any of his other statements were assertions of his constitutionally-protected right to silence. Therefore, the Court held that suppression of any portion of Defendant's confession was in error. View "New Jersey v. Diaz-Bridges" on Justia Law

One evening in August 2008, a state trooper observed Defendant Reynold Regis' vehicle repeatedly swerve over the fog line and onto the shoulder of Route 280 near Roseland, New Jersey. Upon approaching the car, the trooper detected the odor of burnt marijuana. The trooper administered two field sobriety tests to Defendant, both of which he failed. Defendant and his passenger, Camilla Reynolds, were arrested. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance, possession of CDS, and failure to maintain a lane. The municipal court found Defendant not guilty of possession of CDS (Reynolds testified that the marijuana was hers) but guilty of driving under the influence and of failure to maintain a lane. Defendant appealed his conviction to the Law Division arguing the two clauses of the applicable statute were ambiguous as applied. The Law Division concluded that the State had proven the elements of the first offense identified in the statute, namely failure to drive "as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane." The Appellate Division held that the two clauses of the statute "clearly" described only one offense: failing to maintain a lane of travel by changing lanes without first ascertaining that the lane change can be conducted safely. Although it did not find the statute was ambiguous, the panel nonetheless invoked the rule of lenity to construe the statute in Defendant's favor and reversed his conviction. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: "the Appellate Division's limitation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b) to the violation identified in the statute's second clause would render the first clause inoperative. On the other hand, the court's construction gives meaning to all of the statute's language, and thereby effects the intent of the Legislature." View "New Jersey v. Regis" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a trial court erred in denying Defendant Stanford Yough's motion for a mistrial after the victim of a robbery testified that he observed the perpetrator more times than he had indicated in his statement to police. At trial, the victim testified during his direct examination that he was certain Defendant was one of his attackers. But on cross-examination, defense counsel highlighted the inconsistency between the victim's direct testimony and the statement he gave to police. In charging the jury on identification, the judge instructed the jury that it could consider the victim's testimony that he knew the perpetrator from having seen him before the incident. The instructions did not suggest that the victim observed Defendant after the robbery. Defense counsel did not object to the jury charge or request a limiting instruction on the use of the victim's testimony. The jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree robbery and imposed a fifteen-year term of imprisonment subject to the No Early Release Act. Despite defense counsel’s failure to object to the victim's testimony as "prior bad-acts evidence" or to the jury charge, and his failure to seek a curative charge, the majority of the Appellate Court found the statement inadmissible and highly prejudicial "that undermined the fairness of the trial to the extent that cautionary or limiting instructions were not a feasible alternative." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: "[t]rials are not perfectly orchestrated productions. The testimony of witnesses may not always be predictable, particularly in criminal cases where depositions are not a typical tool of discovery. On the stand, a witness may give testimony that is different from or more expansive than an out-of-court statement recorded by the police. In many instances, discrepancies will advantage a defense attorney attempting to discredit a witness -- but not always. Every witness's digression from a prior statement cannot be grist for the granting of a new-trial motion." View "New Jersey v. Yough" on Justia Law

Rodney Harper was shot to death in a Camden apartment early in the morning on January 1, 2003. James Womble was present when two men forcefully entered the apartment, seeking to collect money from Harper. Womble knew one of the men, co-defendant, George Clark, but the other man was a stranger. According to the State's evidence, Clark shot Harper while the stranger held a gun on Womble in a small, dark hallway. Thirteen days later, police showed Womble a photo array from which he identified Defendant Larry Henderson as the stranger. At trial, additional evidence relevant to Womble's identification was adduced. Neither Clark nor Defendant testified at trial. The primary evidence against Defendant was Womble's identification and a detective’s testimony about Defendant’s post-arrest statement. The jury acquitted Defendant of murder and aggravated manslaughter charges, and convicted him of reckless manslaughter, aggravated assault, and weapons charges. He was sentenced to an aggregate eleven-year term subject to a parole ineligibility period of almost six years. The Appellate Division reversed, presuming that the identification procedure in this case was impermissibly suggestive under the first prong of the "Manson/Madison" test. The court remanded for a new 'Wade' hearing to determine whether the identification was nonetheless reliable under the test's second prong. The panel contained its finding to what it considered to be a material breach of the Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the current legal standard for assessing eyewitness identification evidence must be revised because it does not offer an adequate measure for reliability; does not sufficiently deter inappropriate police conduct; and overstates the jury's ability to evaluate identification evidence. The Court held that Defendant was entitled to a new pretrial hearing, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Henderson" on Justia Law