Justia New Jersey Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted defendant Kelvin Williams of first-degree robbery based on evidence that he entered a bank, told a teller he possessed a bomb, and demanded money. Defendant made no gesture as he made his threat, and a bomb was not displayed. Defendant was dressed in a hooded sweatshirt and pants, and his hands were not visible. It was undisputed that defendant was not armed with a bomb. The issue in this appeal was whether defendant’s demand of money from the bank employee while telling her he was armed with a bomb, in the absence of any gesture suggesting the truth of his remark, constituted sufficient evidence of an immediate threat to use a deadly weapon. The Appellate Division concluded that the failure of defendant to make some gesture suggesting he was armed with a bomb did not allow a finding that defendant threatened the immediate use of a deadly weapon. The appellate panel therefore overturned the jury verdict. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Appellate Division: "Well-documented events since 2001 have made the public painfully aware that bombs can be secreted in cunning ways [. . .] and can be exploded by various means, including by timers and remote devices. A defendant who makes a credible threat that he is armed with a bomb may be taken at his word for purposes of first-degree robbery. So long as the victim had an actual and reasonable belief that a defendant was armed with a bomb based on the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s words, conduct, and dress, a gesture is not a prerequisite for a finding that defendant threatened the immediate use of a deadly weapon." The Court reversed the Appellate Division, reinstated defendant’s conviction of first-degree robbery, and remanded the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the remaining issue not addressed in defendant’s appeal. View "New Jersey v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Dekowski entered a bank carrying what looked like a briefcase, went to a teller’s counter, and with the use of a note demanded money and threatened that he had a bomb. The bank manager did as she was told and gave defendant cash. A jury convicted defendant of first-degree robbery. In New Jersey v. Williams, the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction of first-degree robbery for threatening a bank teller with a deadly weapon in the course of committing a theft despite having been unarmed on only having made the threat of use of a deadly weapon. The Court held that to find the defendant guilty of first-degree robbery in a simulated deadly weapon case, the victim must have an actual and reasonable belief that the defendant threatened the immediate use of such a weapon. The Appellate Division overturned the first-degree conviction in this case finding the evidence insufficient to prove that defendant simulated possession of a deadly weapon. In rendering that decision, the panel referred to the failure of the State’s witnesses to express in their testimony that “they believed defendant had a bomb in the briefcase, or that he led them to believe that it contained a bomb, or even that it was shaped in such a way that it was likely to hold a bomb.” The panel concluded that the evidence instead established second-degree robbery and remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court reversed: "A terrorized victim cannot be expected to demand proof from the robber that he is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a bomb. [. . .] It is enough if the victim has an actual and reasonable belief that the robber has a bomb based on the totality of the circumstances, including defendant’s verbal threat, dress, any hand-held objects, and overall conduct." View "New Jersey v. Dekowski" on Justia Law

At trial on attempted murder and related charges, a State's witness against defendant Vonte Skinner was permitted to read to the jury, at great length, violent and profane rap lyrics that had been written by defendant before the events at issue. There was no assertion at trial that the violence-laden verses were in any way revealing of some specific factual connection that strongly tied defendant to the underlying incident. Nevertheless, the State maintained that the lyrics helped to demonstrate defendant’s "motive and intent" in connection with the offense because the rap lyrics addressed a street culture of violence and retribution that fit with the State’s view of defendant’s role in the attempted murder. The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s conviction based on the admission of the rap lyrics into evidence in defendant’s trial. In reaching its conclusion, the panel used an N.J.R.E. 404(b) analysis and determined that the prejudicial impact of defendant’s rap lyrics vastly outweighed any potential probative value. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that admission of the lyrics constituted highly prejudicial evidence against him that bore little or no probative value as to any motive or intent behind the attempted murder offense with which he was charged. "The admission of defendant’s inflammatory rap verses, a genre that certain members of society view as art and others view as distasteful and descriptive of a mean-spirited culture, risked poisoning the jury against defendant. Fictional forms of inflammatory self-expression, such as poems, musical compositions, and other like writings about bad acts, wrongful acts, or crimes, are not properly evidential unless the writing reveals a strong nexus between the specific details of the artistic composition and the circumstances of the underlying offense for which a person is charged, and the probative value of that evidence outweighs its apparent prejudicial impact. In the weighing process, trial courts should consider the existence of other evidence that can be used to make the same point. When admissible, such evidence should be carefully redacted to ensure that irrelevant and inflammatory content is not needlessly presented to the jury." View "New Jersey v. Skinner" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant, Bryden Williams, of murder, third-degree possession of a handgun without a carrying permit, and second-degree possession of a handgun with the purpose to use it unlawfully against another. In 2006, Joel Whitley, Omar Boyd, and Boyd's girlfriend attended a party at Dynesha Gibson's apartment. Whitley became intoxicated and involved in an altercation with another party guest, and was asked to leave. A short time later, Whitley realized he had left his cell phone at the party, and he and Boyd went back to retrieve it. Gibson refused to return the phone and Whitley started kicking the apartment's front door. Gibson told Whitley and Boyd that they should leave before defendant arrived. As Whitley and Boyd were leaving, defendant arrived. He exited his car and, armed with a handgun, aimed it at Boyd and asked, "What's the problem?" After Gibson yelled from the window that Whitley had "disrespected" either her or her sister, defendant put the gun to Whitley's head and forced him into an adjacent alley. Defendant then pointed the gun at Whitley's chest and fired once, killing him. At trial, defendant asserted that he acted in self-defense. He claimed that when he arrived at Gibson's apartment, he saw Whitley banging on the apartment's door and told him to get off the porch. As Whitley stepped off of the porch, defendant claimed that Whitley pulled out a gun and pointed it toward him. Defendant claimed that he struggled with Whitley and that as they wrestled, a single shot was fired with the gun still in Whitley's hand. Defendant stated that he never touched the gun's handle and was trying to disarm Whitley when the gun fired. Dr. Zhongxue Hua, the Chief Medical Examiner of Union County and an expert in forensic pathology, testified as to the cause and manner of Whitley's death. Dr. Hua did not perform or assist in the autopsy. The doctor that had performed the autopsy was not called as a witness, and defendant did not object to Dr. Hua's testimony or qualifications. On cross-examination, defense counsel pursued a line of questioning consistent with a theory of self-defense. Based on gunpowder residue discovered on Whitley's clothing, defense counsel elicited from Dr. Hua that the gun was fired several inches away from Whitley. Defense counsel also had Dr. Hua explain that the bullet took a downward path through Whitley's body. In response to defense questioning, Dr. Hua stated that if Whitley had been holding the gun's handle when it discharged, gunpowder residue would have been found on his hand, but that the autopsy report did not indicate whether Whitley's hand was tested for gunpowder residue. Ultimately, the jury rejected self-defense as a justification for the shooting and found defendant guilty of all charges. Defendant appealed, claiming that his right to confrontation had been violated. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division rejected defendant's claim. The Supreme Court affirmed: defendant's failure to object to the admission of the testimony on confrontation grounds and his decision to cross-examine the medical examiner constituted a waiver of his right of confrontation. View "New Jersey v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with allegedly driving off with an Audi A4 that had been left outside a restaurant in Wallington with the keys in the ignition. After the owner saw that his vehicle was missing, he called 9-1-1 and reported the vehicle stolen. Approximately one hour later, a Fair Lawn police officer saw an Audi being driven in a very aggressive manner. The officer turned on the patrol car's lights and siren, and began to chase. But the Audi accelerated to 130 to 140 miles per hour and the chase was abandoned. Subsequently, a Clifton detective took up the pursuit. While seeking to avoid the pursuit, the driver of the Audi hit a curb, turned into a shopping center, struck a car, and stopped. The occupants of the vehicle ran out of the car. The detective chased and captured the driver, defendant. Defendant was charged with third-degree theft of an automobile, and second-degree eluding by fleeing from a police officer. At the end of the trial, the judge inadvertently failed to provide the jury with the no-adverse-inference charge that was requested by defendant and his counsel. Defense counsel did not object to the failure to provide the requested charge. A jury found defendant not guilty of third-degree theft, but guilty of second-degree eluding. The Appellate Division held that the trial court erred when, after defendant requested the no-adverse-inference charge, the court failed to instruct the jury that it could not draw an adverse inference from defendant's failure to testify. The panel concluded that the trial court's failure to provide the instruction after a defendant requested the instruction was of such constitutional magnitude as to warrant automatic reversal and remand for a new trial. The New Jersey Supreme Court has mandated a trial court's use of the no-adverse-inference instruction when requested at trial. The issue this case presented was whether failure to provide the charge was a per se error requiring automatic reversal, or whether the failure to provide the charge required a harmless-error analysis. After analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that when there is a failure to provide the no-adverse-inference charge, the error constitutes trial error and does not mandate automatic reversal. In this case, the Court found the error was harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "New Jersey v. Camacho" on Justia Law

Defendant Julie Michaels was charged with second-degree vehicular homicide, third-degree assault by auto, and four other related charges, as well as motor vehicle citations, including driving while intoxicated, reckless driving, possession of a controlled dangerous substance in a motor vehicle, and possession of an open container of alcohol. Laboratory results of gas chromatography/mass spectrometry tests performed on defendant's blood sample, which was drawn at a hospital the evening of her motor vehicle accident, revealed the presence of cocaine, alprazolam, and benzoethylene (a cocaine metabolite). At trial, the State introduced testimony from Edward Barbieri, Ph.D., an assistant supervisor and toxicology technical leader from the private laboratory that had performed the testing on defendant's blood sample and issued a report certifying the test results. Dr. Barbieri was responsible for supervising the technicians and analysts who were involved in the gas chromatography/mass spectrometry testing. Over defendant's objection, the report was admitted into evidence without the testimony of the fourteen individuals who had performed various tasks associated with the testing procedures. A jury convicted defendant on all counts, and the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction. Defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that her Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were violated because the laboratory report was admitted, although defendant had not had the opportunity to confront each laboratory employee who participated in the testing that generated the results contained in the report. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the admission of the laboratory report did not violate defendant's confrontation rights. The laboratory supervisor (who testified and was available for cross-examination) was knowledgeable about the testing process that he was responsible for supervising. "We recognize that the forensic report in issue is 'testimonial' and that it is the type of document subject to the Confrontation Clause. [. . .] However, in this matter we join the many courts that have concluded that a defendant's confrontation rights are not violated if a forensic report is admitted at trial and only the supervisor/reviewer testifies and is available for cross-examination, when the supervisor is knowledgeable about the testing process, reviews scientific testing data produced, concludes that the data indicates the presence of drugs, and prepares, certifies, and signs a report setting forth the results of the testing." View "New Jersey v. Michaels" on Justia Law

Defendant Reginald Roach was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual assault, burglary, and other offenses related to the home invasion and rape of a sixty-four-year-old woman. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether defendant's confrontation rights were violated when the DNA analyst who testified at trial, and who matched the DNA profile developed from defendant's buccal swab to DNA evidence left by the perpetrator at the scene of the offense, did not perform the testing procedures that provided the basis for the DNA profile developed from the perpetrator's evidence. At trial, the evidence from the analyst demonstrated that she had conducted her own review of the DNA testing results obtained from samples of the sperm and blood found on the victim after the sexual assault. The analyst explained that she engaged in that independent review to satisfy herself that she had a correct DNA profile to rely on in order to provide an expert comparison of DNA profiles. Upon review of the trial court record in this case, the Supreme Court held that defendant's confrontation rights were not violated by the analyst's testimony: defendant had the opportunity to confront the analyst who personally reviewed and verified the correctness of the two DNA profiles that resulted in a highly significant statistical match inculpating him as the perpetrator. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division. View "State v. Reginald Roach" on Justia Law

In 2008, the State filed a petition for the involuntary civil commitment of D.Y., who was convicted of several state and federal charges arising from sexual assaults on minors. At his initial commitment hearing, D.Y. stated that he did not want to be represented by the attorney who had been appointed for him. D.Y. did not attend his final hearing, in which his counsel moved on his behalf for an order permitting D.Y. to represent himself. The judge conducting the hearing denied the motion, stating that individuals subject to Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) commitment must be represented by counsel pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(c). D.Y. appealed, asserting a right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s denial of D.Y.’s application, concluding that neither federal constitutional principle invoked by D.Y. afforded a right to self-representation in an SVPA civil commitment proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed: "We recognize that competent litigants in New Jersey have long been permitted to represent themselves in civil proceedings, with specific exceptions identified in statutes, court rules, and case law. Accordingly, we consider the Legislature’s intent when it enacted N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(c), and N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.31(a). [. . .] We find no evidence that the Legislature, when it enacted those provisions, intended to preclude an individual facing SVPA commitment from speaking on his or her own behalf, as long as standby counsel is present and available to assist throughout the hearing if needed." View "In the Matter of Civil Commitment of D.Y." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether State intercepted phone conversations and text messages between a husband and wife, pursuant to a court-approved wiretap, were protected communications under the marital communications privilege. A second issue raised in this case was whether New Jersey should adopt a crime-fraud exception to the marital communications privilege. In the fall of 2010, the Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office was investigating Teron Savoy as the alleged leader of a drug trafficking network. As part of the investigation, the State obtained court orders under the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act authorizing wiretaps of two cell phones Savoy used. Among many hours of interceptions, the State recorded two or three phone calls and intercepted five text messages between Savoy and his wife Yolanda Terry. In those communications, Savoy asked Terry to pick up money from co-defendant Chardel Holman. The State alleged that Savoy had previously fronted heroin to Holman. In a detailed oral opinion, the trial judge denied the motion to suppress the conversations. The court found that the communications were admissible at trial because any confidential communication would be disclosed by a third party, and not a spouse. The trial court also discussed the crime-fraud exception to the marital communications privilege, which many federal and state courts have adopted, and concluded that “any communication made in this case in furtherance of drug trafficking is [not] worthy of protection.” Defendants appealed. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reversed. The panel determined that under Rule 509 and the Wiretap Act, the communications in question were protected. In addition, the panel noted that strong public policy concerns supported applying a crime-fraud exception to the marital communications privilege. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division: "A confidential marital communication protected under the marital communications privilege does not lose its privileged status by virtue of a wiretap under the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act." The Court, however, proposed a crime-fraud exception to the marital communications privilege and, pursuant to the Evidence Act of 1960, sent it for approval by a joint resolution of the Legislature and for the Governor’s signature. View "New Jersey v. Terry" on Justia Law

This was the second time defendant James Robinson appeared before the Supreme Court concerning his conviction for two drug transactions in December 2003 and January 2004. In "New Jersey v. Robinson," (200 N.J. 1, 18 (2009)), the Court held that a twenty- to thirty-second delay between the police knocking and announcing their presence to execute a search warrant and the forcible entry into defendant's apartment was not unreasonable. Defendant then filed a motion to reduce his fifteen-year term of imprisonment subject to a five-year period of parole ineligibility. The trial court had imposed two mandatory extended terms on one count of second-degree distribution of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) within 500 feet of public property and one count of third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute. Treating the motion as an application to correct an illegal sentence, the trial court held that the mandatory repeat drug offender extended term should not have been imposed on the second-degree offense. The trial court then imposed a discretionary persistent offender extended term sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment subject to a five-year period of parole ineligibility on the second-degree offense and a mandatory repeat drug offender extended term of seven years' imprisonment subject to a three-year period of parole ineligibility on the third-degree offense. Defendant argued that this sentence also was illegal. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2) barred the imposition of a discretionary extended term when the prosecutor has requested one and the trial court is obliged to impose a mandatory extended term on another offense in the same proceeding. "The statutes governing sentencing provide sufficient flexibility to fashion an appropriate sentence to address the repeat offender without resorting to multiple extended terms. To that end, when a defendant is eligible for imposition of both a discretionary extended term and a mandatory extended term, the State may elect which extended term it wishes to pursue." View "New Jersey v. Robinson" on Justia Law